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ABSTRACT

This book provides a compilation of addresses and panel presentations from the 1995 International Symposium of Japan-America Societies. Twenty-nine eminent speakers and presenters, authorities on topics ranging from economics to education, shared dialogue with delegates who gathered for the first-ever meeting of members of Japan-America Societies from both sides of the Pacific. The introductory materials and overview contain the observations of the editor, compiled from notes taken during the conference and supplemented by audiotapes provided by Simul International. The second section of the Proceedings contains the documents of those presenting the keynote addresses and panel sessions, which were the substance of the Symposium. The seven panel session topics (with presenters) included: (1) "Japan and America, 1945-1995: Peace, Progress, Partnership" (Robert Scalapino; Yukio Matsuyama; Akira Iriye; Nagayo Homma); (2) "The U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia" (James Auer; Yukio Okamoto; James Kelly; Ryosei Kokubun); (3) "Education: Critical Issues and New Directions" (Yasunori Nishijima; Gene Carter; Shinkichi Eto); (4) "Public Safety: Crime and Justice" (Sabrina McKenna; Atsuyuki Sassa; Lynn Curtis; Yukiko Tsunoda); (5) "Aging: Responsibility and Cost" (Robert Friedland; Mikio Kawa; Thomas Mahoney; Kazunori Yamanoi); (6) "Seeking a Better Life: Challenges of International Migration" (Wayne Cornelius; Haruo Shimada; Glen Krebs; Yasuaki Onuma); and (7) "Easing Economic Tensions" (Glen Fukushima; Kazuo Nukazawa; Sozaburo Okamatsu; Seiji Naya). Keynote addresses included: "Japan and the U.S.: Old Friends, New Questions," (Takakazu Kuriyama) and "Japan-U.S. Cooperation: A Key to Creating Future Global Society" (Makiko Tanaka). Six student essays are also included. Concluding sections are: Speakers and Panelists, Directory of Societies, and Symposium Delegates. (EH)

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“Learning From Each Other”

Written and Edited by
E. Shan Correa
for
The Japan-America Society of Hawaii

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International Symposium Keynote Speakers

The Honorable Takakazu Kuriyama,
Ambassador to the United States

KEYNOTE SPEAKER: "Japan and the U.S.: Old Friends, New Questions"

The appointment as Ambassador to the United States adds another significant milestone to the varied and distinguished diplomatic career of Takakazu Kuriyama. His father was a diplomat, and Ambassador Kuriyama was born in France, where his father had been posted. Although a part of his childhood was spent in Sweden, he was educated primarily in Japan, and after passing the rigorously competitive entrance exam to the University of Tokyo he studied law.

A few years later, he also passed the Higher Diplomatic Service Examination, and his foreign service career began with a return to academe—this time to the United States, where he spent the next two years at Lawrence University in Wisconsin and Amherst College in Massachusetts under the sponsorship of the Ministry's diplomatic training program. Upon returning to Japan, Ambassador Kuriyama's duties and assignments in the Foreign Ministry grew in responsibility yearly, paralleling the rise that Japan was experiencing in international affairs. Among his other assignments were his appointment as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1987, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1989, and Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1991. His Ambassadorship to the United States was his second ambassadorial assignment; he served as Ambassador to Malaysia in 1985, where his wife, Masako, also did much toward fostering good relations. Ambassador and Mrs. Kuriyama have two daughters.

The Honorable Makiko Tanaka,
Minister of State for Science and Technology

KEYNOTE SPEAKER: "Japan-U.S. Cooperation - A Key to Creating A Future Global Society"

The Honorable Makiko Tanaka is Minister of State for Science & Technology, responsible for the entire administration of science and technology in Japan. She is a Member of the House of Representatives (H.R.) (Liberal Democratic Party) and has served since 1993. Minister Tanaka is a member of the Council for Science & Technology (CST), which is the advisory body to the Prime Minister to serve as supreme deliberative council on science and technology policy in Japan. She is also chairperson of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the advisory body of policy planning and decision making of research, development and utilization of nuclear energy in Japan.

As chairperson of the Space Activities Commission (SAC), Minister of State Tanaka is involved in the policy planning and decision making of space development in Japan.

Minister Tanaka graduated in 1968 from School of Commerce I, Waseda University.

The Official Proceedings of the

1995
International Symposium of Japan-America Societies

"Learning From Each Other"

June 18-21, 1995
Sheraton Waikiki Hotel
Honolulu, Hawaii U.S.A.

Written and Edited by
E. Shan Correa
for
The Japan-America Society of Hawaii

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The Japan-America Society of Hawaii
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MESSAGE OF APPRECIATION

From JASH President Dwane Brenneman

Mahalo Nui Loa!! This is Hawaii's way of saying, "Thank you very much." To all of you who participated, volunteered, and donated funds and services to make the 1995 International Symposium a great success, heartfelt appreciation from the Japan-America Society of Hawaii.

The feedback we received from the delegates, speakers, volunteers and donors has been overwhelmingly positive. The initiatives to strengthen the network of societies that we have seen since the symposium have been gratifying. The actions reflect the efforts and commitment of all involved in the societies' common mission—promoting and strengthening the United States-Japan relationship.

Let us continue to work together as we build on the foundation laid at the first symposium. And let us all strongly support the initiative and efforts of the Japan-America Society of Fukuoka as they undertake the task of hosting the 1998 International Symposium of Japan-America Societies. Mahalo Nui Loa!!

With warmest Aloha,

Dwane Brenneman
President

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Without the extremely generous support of the following donors, the International Symposium would never have become a reality. A sincere "thank you" goes out to these foundations and other contributing organizations for their invaluable assistance.

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Pre-Symposium Joint NAAJS/NAJAS Session

National Association of America-Japan Societies/National Association of Japan-America Societies

June 17: Saturday

3:30-4:00 p.m.	Registration and Opening Reception
4:00-4:10 p.m.	Welcoming Remarks
	Thomas P. Shoesmith, President, NAJAS
	Reinosuke Ohya, Board Representative, NAAJS
4:10-4:25 p.m.	Introduction of American and Japanese Participants
	Robert Marra, Executive Director, NAJAS
	Akiko Kuno, Executive Director, NAAJS

June 18: Sunday

8:30-8:50 a.m.	NAAJS and NAJAS Symposium Goals
8:50-10:15 a.m.	*Accessing Electronic Information About Japan*
	Geoffrey Froh, Electronic Information Specialist
10:30-12:00 noon	*NAJAS Joins the Information Superhighway*
	NAJAS Plan (Geoffrey Froh)
	Discussion Groups
1:10-2:30 p.m.	American Executive Directors' Presentations
	Robert Marra, NAJAS, Moderator
	Geraldine Gill, Houston Society
	Bob Payne, Florida Society
	Dixie McKeel, Oregon Society
2:30-3:45 p.m.	Japanese Society Representatives' Presentations
	Akiko Kuno, NAAJS, Moderator and Panelist
	Reinosuke Ohya, Fukuoka Society
	Muneya Nishimura, Kyoto Society
4:00-5:00 p.m.	*Shaping the Future: The Role of Japan-America Societies in U.S.-Japan Relations*
	Tadashi Yamamoto, President, Japan Center for International Exchange
	Robert Marra, Executive Director, NAJAS
5:00 p.m.	NAAJS/NAJAS Joint Session Ends

1995 Symposium of Japan-America Societies

June 18: Sunday

9:00 a.m.-6:00 p.m.	Registration
All Day	Executive Directors' Meeting
6:00-8:00 p.m.	Welcome Reception

June 19: Monday

9:00-10:00 a.m.	Opening Ceremony Welcome Addresses: The Honorable Benjamin J. Cayetano, Governor, State of Hawaii The Honorable Jeremy Harris, Mayor, City and County of Honolulu The Honorable Thomas Shoesmith, President, NAJAS and former Ambassador to Malaysia Keynote Speech: The Honorable Makiko Tanaka, Minister of State for Science and Technology
10:15 a.m.-12:15 p.m.	Panel Session *1. Japan and America, 1945-95: Peace, Progress, Partnership* A discussion of the historical significance of this relationship from wartime enemies to peacetime partners. Discussion of the benefits derived from this relationship for Japan; for America. Do the experiences from this bilateral relationship offer lessons which could be applied to other international relationships? Panelists: Akira Iriye, Professor of History, Harvard University Robert Scalapino, Robson Research Professor of Government Emeritus, University of California at Berkeley Yukio Matsuyama, Professor, Kyoritsu Women's University Nagayo Homma, Executive Director, Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership Moderator: Victor Atiyeh, Former Governor of the State of Oregon
2:30-4:30 p.m.	NAJAS Board Meeting

2:00-4:00 p.m.

Panel Session

2. *U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia*

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan has been a cornerstone of the U.S.-Japan relationship. With the ending of the Cold War, how will the U.S. and Japan cooperate on security? Will the interests of both countries continue to coincide, especially as they relate to Asia? How will the changes in the military structure of each country affect the relationship? How are the decisions being made by the political leadership affecting the relationship?

Panelists:

James Auer, Director, Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation, Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies
James Kelly, President, Pacific Forum CSIS
Ryosei Kokubun, Professor, Keio University
Yukio Okamoto, President, Okamoto Associates, Inc.

Moderator:

Hee-Suk Shin, Director General, Division of Asia-Pacific Studies, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korea

June 20: Tuesday

9:00-10:35 a.m.

Choice of Panel Sessions:

3. *Education: Critical Issues and New Directions*

Educational reforms have been on the national agenda of both Japan and the United States, but for different reasons. Critics on both sides of the Pacific look to the other side and see aspects which they like and which are lacking in their own educational systems. Panelists will discuss the issues in their own country and suggest what needs to be done. Of particular relevance will be the discussion of the content and methods of education in terms of understanding the society and culture of America (for Japanese) and Japan (for Americans).

Panelists:

Gene Carter, Executive Director, Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development
Shinkichi Eto, Former President, Asia University
Yasunori Nishijima, President Emeritus, Kyoto University

Moderator:

Caroline Matano Yang, former Executive Director, Fulbright Program in Japan

June 20: Tuesday (cont.)

4. *Public Safety: Crime and Justice*

Recent events in Japan and the United States have shown how vulnerable we are to acts of terrorism. Japan and the United States have taken different approaches, due in part to societal factors, in protecting their citizens. The United States has been in the forefront in protecting the legal rights of individuals and civil rights in general. The welfare of society and the rights of individuals are often in conflict. Panelists will address the philosophical issues along with the realistic problems.

Panelists:
- Sabrina McKenna, Judge, Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii
- Lynn Curtis, President, The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation
- Atsuyuki Sassa, Former Director General, Cabinet Security Affairs Office
- Yukiko Tsunoda, Attorney at Law, Tsunoda Law Firm

Moderator:
- Daniel Bent, Former U.S. Attorney for Hawaii

11:00 a.m.-12:15 p.m. Choice of Panel Sessions:

5. *Aging: Responsibility and Cost*

The proportion of elderly people in the populations of Japan and America steadily increases. This phenomenon occurs at the same time that the traditional family unit is weakening or disappearing. How are the elderly being cared for in our respective societies? How are the costs attendant with aging being paid? Are traditional family values concerning elderly members no longer applicable in contemporary society? What is the extent of society's responsibility?

Panelists:
- Robert Friedland, Director of Research, National Academy on Aging
- Thomas Mahoney, Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Kazunori Yamanoi, Lecturer, Nara Women's University
- Mikio Kawa, Director, Promotion Division of Welfare for the Elderly, Bureau of Health & Welfare for the Elderly

Moderator:
- Fumiko Mori Halloran, Writer

June 20: Tuesday (cont.)

6. *Seeking A Better Life: Challenges of International Migration*
Due to historic, geographic and economic differences, Japan and the United States have maintained contrasting policies regarding international in-migration. Today, however, both countries are coping with the problem of the influx of foreign laborers, both legal and illegal. Are the experiences in the two countries in this regard comparable? What can we learn from each other about treatment of the newcomers and about adjusting the policies and attitudes of the receiving society? Is this an international problem which requires coordinated international action?

Panelists:
- Glen Krebs, President, Global Business Advisors
- Wayne Cornelius, Professor of Political Science, University of California at San Diego
- Haruo Shimada, Professor of Economics, Keio University
- Yasuaki Onuma, Professor of International Law, University of Tokyo

Moderator:
- Vernon Alden, Former Chairman, The Boston Company

1:45-2:15 p.m. Featured Keynote Speaker
The Honorable Takakazu Kuriyama, Ambassador to the United States, on "Japan and the U.S.: Old Friends, New Questions"

2:15-4:15 p.m. 7. *Easing Economic Tensions*
Trade issues have placed serious strain upon the U.S.-Japan relationship. Often it appears both sides are speaking past each other. Efforts at the regional level tend to be more successful in identifying real solutions and mutual understanding.

Panelists:
- Glen Fukushima, Vice President, American Chamber of Commerce in Japan
- Seiji Naya, Director, Department of Business, Economic Development & Tourism, State of Hawaii
- Kazuo Nukazawa, Executive Counselor, Keidanren
- Sozaburo Okamatsu, Former Vice Chairman for International Affairs, MITI
- Ambassador Takakazu Kuriyama

Moderator:
- David McClain, Henry A. Walker, Jr. Chair, University of Hawaii at Manoa, College of Business Administration

June 21: Wednesday

8:30-9:45 a.m.	Presentation of Essays by Student Essay Contest Winners: Erin Bruni, Hiromasa Ebihara, Reina Nishimura, Kelly Sietz, Aindree Sircar, Masumi Takemura
10:15-11:15 a.m.	Student Roundtable Discussions
11:30a.m.-12:30 p.m.	Group Leader Presentations

Concurrent Functions:

9:30 a.m.-3:30 p.m.	Cultural Activities
11:30 a.m.-4:30 p.m.	Goodwill Golf Tournament
6:00-9:30 p.m.	Farewell Dinner

PREFACE

The 1995 International Symposium of Japan-America Societies presented a significant forum for the discussion of compelling issues affecting our lives. Twenty-nine eminent speakers and presenters, authorities on topics ranging from economics to education, shared dialogue with delegates who gathered in Honolulu for the first-ever meeting of members of Japan-America Societies from both sides of the Pacific.

This book provides readers with a compilation of these authorities' addresses and panel presentations, introduced by materials which place the Symposium in context and provide an overview of its events—a narrative summary designed to give readers a bit of the flavor of the presentations as well as enough of their substance to entice them to read the authors' papers in their entirety.

A few words about methodology might be helpful: The introductory materials and overview contain the observations of the editor, compiled from notes taken during the conference and supplemented by audiotapes provided by Simul International. Valuable proofreading help was provided by the staff and members of the Japan-America Society of Hawaii, especially by Carol Ikeda Hong and Dr. Robert Sakai. These introductory materials are necessarily subjective, reflecting the editor's views and emphases, not the opinions of the Japan-America Society of Hawaii or of its representatives.

The second section of these Proceedings contains the documents of those presenting the keynote addresses and panel sessions, the substance of the Symposium. Most papers were provided to the Society by the presenters, themselves, either in hard copy (which was scanned) or disk form. Other presenters elected to allow the Society to translate their written texts from Japanese into English, or to transcribe their presentations from the audiotapes prepared by Simul. Because these latter were prepared from oral texts, they may not read with the seamless professionalism of the written drafts. However, the compromise of providing them in this form was made at the request of the presenters to allow for a more comprehensive and useful set of papers for this publication. All translated or transcribed documents are marked as to their format.

I am honored that the Japan-America Society of Hawaii entrusted me with the task of writing and editing these Proceedings, and proud to have played a small part in this historic symposium. My sincere congratulations goes out to all who made the first International Symposium of Japan-America Societies a resounding success.

E. Shan Correa, Proceedings Editor

1995
International Symposium
of Japan-America
Societies

Symposium Proceedings

1995
International Symposium
of Japan America Societies
Honolulu, Hawaii

The Royal Guard marches out after posting flags during the Opening Ceremony.

The Symposium: In Place and Time

The Genesis of an International Symposium

Japan-America Societies are organizations formed to increase understanding and goodwill between the peoples of Japan and America. By the summer of 1995, sixty Societies in Japan, the United States and Canada were working towards that goal, some of those Societies already quite venerable. The Japan Society of Boston, for example, was already laying plans for the grand celebration of the centennial of its 1904 founding; the original America-Japan Society in Japan was established in 1917.

Although thousands of Society members were working diligently toward their mutual goals by the mid-1990s, they faced many frustrations. The Japan-America relationship was undergoing daily tests. Trade frictions often overshadowed all other aspects of the alliance. In both countries, generational differences led to questions about the efficacy of agreements forged many years earlier. Japanese leaders who personally remembered and appreciated the United States' contribution to their nation's post-war recovery were aging. Many in the younger generation viewed their country as an economic superpower whose global role was not commensurate with its stature. They questioned whether their nation's partnership with the United States was aiding or restricting Japan's continued advancement.

Many in the United States, too, were questioning the value of the alliance. Did security agreements become outdated when Cold War tensions eased? Would Japan remain an esteemed U.S. trading partner? Was there truth behind the ranting of "revisionists" who gained notoriety by bashing Japan? Monumental changes had taken place since the end of World War II. What would be in store for the next fifty years?

Economic, political, and security-related difficulties clouded the important alliance even as individual groups sought to bring light to those issues. It was in this climate that plans were laid for a first-ever meeting, not of individual Society leaders, but of all Society members from both sides of the Pacific Ocean.

This was the type of gathering envisioned by Marjorie Carter Midkiff (then President of the Japan-America Society of Hawaii) when she proposed at the June 24-26, 1993 NAJAS Annual Conference that the Hawaii Society host a symposium which would not only bind together the Societies into a more tightly knit network, but also provide a forum for discussion of even the most troubling of issues between Japan and America. Young people, whose attitudes would shape the relationship in the future, would be involved in a prominent way.

When Hawaii Society Executive Director Earl K. Okawa returned from the NAJAS conference to Honolulu, he reported that, "Mrs. Midkiff's proposal to host a gathering of all of the Societies in Japan and the United States in the summer of 1995 received overwhelming interest and support from the conferees, who also recommended that we host the NAJAS Annual Conference at the same time. . . . We want people-to-people understanding and friendship developed, and exposure to others in each of our communities to what the Societies stand for and do. We hope to see sister-society relationships formed and a closer network of Societies developed."

Word of these beginnings of the 1995 International Symposium of Japan-America Societies soon extended beyond the conference. Although the proposal was greeted with some skepticism, it also evoked enthusiasm and support. All agreed as to the pressing need for such a venture, and most felt that Hawaii's location and multicultural character could work to attract delegates from both Japan and America.

With this in mind, The Japan-America Society of Hawaii began planning and organizing the Symposium. Society leaders sought support from experts on Japan-America issues, from individuals and organizations with resources to commit, and from Societies on both sides of the Pacific. Ambitious goals were set for the Symposium which all hoped would be the first of many such gatherings in future years.

Objectives of the First Symposium

From the beginning, several major goals were established for the Symposium. These objectives guided those who planned each event, each panel discussion, each opportunity for delegates' interaction. These objectives included:

* Strengthening the network of Japan-America Societies and creating a climate for developing sister-society relationships.

* "Setting the tone" for a continued positive U.S.-Japan relationship. The theme "Learning from Each Other" was selected because it was a positive approach to looking towards the future between the two nations.

* Increasing public awareness and knowledge of issues surrounding Japan-America relations. The Symposium programs examined how both countries had benefited from their relationship over the past fifty years, but the ma-

jor focus was learning what can be done to strengthen that relationship over the next fifty years.

* Involving the next generation, young opinion leaders in particular, and helping them become interested in and knowledgeable about the importance of the Japan-America relationship.

* Providing other educational and cultural opportunities by working with community organizations to offer exhibits and demonstrations to supplement the educational and cultural content of the Symposium.

Three organizational tracks taken by Symposium planners extended well beyond the event, itself. In July of 1994, work began to develop an integrated network among Japan-America Societies in the U.S. and Japan. Realizing the very different nature of Societies in those two countries, opportunities were made for the executive directors of Japan Societies to observe U.S. executive directors' working sessions in order to gain a sense of the way they worked cohesively toward their goals. A fully functional network of Japan-America/America-Japan Societies which would extend their objectives and friendships into the future became a major goal.

Another track involved selecting and inviting recognized leaders for a series of plenary sessions which would highlight for the public the role that Societies could play in bolstering U.S.-Japan relations. Authorities in diverse fields were assembled to demonstrate the positive values of the relationship in the future as well as in the past. A forward-looking theme, "Learning From Each Other," was adopted, and support from community groups was gathered for the Symposium.

To reinforce the vital contribution that the younger generation would play in the future of the relationship, organizers identified a third track which set specific goals for involving young people in the Symposium. One means of ensuring their involvement was the establishment of an essay contest for students from both Japan and America, and one day of the Symposium was also identified for student participation.

The First International Symposium Set in Place: Hawaii

Delegates to that 1993 NAJAS Annual Conference were in general agreement that, of all of the American Societies' locations, Hawaii offered a promising site for the historic first Symposium. Hawaii is the 50th state of the United States, and it is also referred to as a "Bridge between East and West" because it links Asia-Pacific nations with the United States. The vitality of the Hawaii Society is due, in large part, to the mix of Americans and Japanese who thrive in Hawaii's multicultural environment.

In his written message to Symposium delegates, Hawaii's Consul General of Japan Kishichiro Amae noted: "The choice of Honolulu as the site for the first International Symposium of Japan-America Societies brings delegates from both sides of the Pacific to a place with a rich heritage of cross-cultural exchange."

Hawaii proved itself a fitting Symposium site. From the first meetings of the delegates, the Hawaiian atmosphere allowed Americans and Japanese to feel relaxed and comfortable together as they embarked upon long-term goals. The dedication with which Hawaii Society members undertook the planning and orchestration of the gathering showed all visitors that they were welcome. The Hawaii Society's volunteer efforts met with success because each individual felt that he was furthering the mission of each of the Societies by contributing time, talents and financial resources to the endeavor.

The Symposium: Placed in Time

While Symposium delegates were meeting, a Hawaii newspaper editorial stated that "The timing of the Symposium could not have been better." In the summer of 1995, efforts to place the Japan-America relationship into the perspective of fifty years of a mutually beneficial partnership were needed. This was especially true for the younger generations who had no first-hand memories of many of those years, and whose perceptions were being colored by the economic frictions which dominated the news during the Symposium.

The Symposium Program Committee foresaw these needs and adopted a theme, "Learning From Each Other," which would emphasize how the past fifty years of the relationship had proved beneficial to both Japanese and Americans. From the pivotal first panel session until the final session on "Easing Economic Tensions," speakers examined the need to look into the next fifty years as partners in progress.

Throughout the summer, functions commemorating the events which had brought World War II to an end in the Pacific fifty years earlier were taking place. Many of the most visible of those commemorative services were held in Hawaii. At the same time that delegates arrived in Honolulu for the Symposium, U.S. President Clinton formally announced his commitment to participate in the September 1-3 services (scheduled to be held at the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific at Punchbowl and aboard the USS Arizona Memorial in Pearl Harbor).

In 1995, events of the war were recalled daily as battles were remembered and those who sacrificed their lives were honored. In 1991, the bombing of

Pearl Harbor was commemorated in Hawaii; in August of 1995, as in other years, Hawaii residents gathered at the Izumo Taishakyo Mission in downtown Honolulu to honor those killed in Honolulu's sister city, Hiroshima. Prayers were offered not only for those remembered from the past, but also for a continuation of the peace that had marked the fifty years since the war's end.

The opening panel session of the Symposium, "Japan and America, 1945-1995: Peace, Progress, Partnership," treated the historical significance of that relationship from wartime enemies to peacetime partners. Panelists reminded delegates of the overwhelmingly positive nature of the alliance between the U.S. and Japan during those years. This significant panel focused upon the next fifty years of partnership between the two nations, and of important lessons learned from each other. The panelists did not avoid issues of contention, however, nor were problems glossed over to give delegates shallow feelings of well-being and harmony. Discussions were, as *Honolulu Advertiser*'s Focus Editor Jerry Burris phrased it, both "timely" and "riveting." Burris also noted, "They didn't ignore the storm clouds."

Several events, some more stormy than others, were affecting the Japan-America relationship in June of 1995, giving special pertinence to panel topics and presentations.

Perhaps the most volatile of the subjects treated by Symposium panelists (and referred to in other presenters' addresses) was the bitter trade friction between Japan and the United States. During the week of the Symposium, a deadline loomed for U.S. and Japanese trade representatives to reach an accord in Geneva auto trade talks. "U.S., Japan Head for Trade Wreck: Domestic Politics Keep Nations from Yielding," was the five-column headline delegates read in the June 22nd *Honolulu Advertiser* financial pages. The clock was ticking toward the U.S. deadline for imposing drastic trade sanctions (100% tariffs on Japanese luxury cars), and though a joint announcement of an agreement which averted sanctions was announced later, the Geneva talks were much in the minds of delegates as they heard the panel presentation, "Easing Economic Tensions," and listened intently to Japan's Ambassador to the United States Takakazu Kuriyama's June 20th address.

The imminent commemorations of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not the only world events which focused attention upon the military use of nuclear energy during June of 1995. Symposium Keynote Speaker Makiko Tanaka told her Opening Ceremony audience that she had heard of French President Chirac's plans to resume nuclear testing on Mururoa Atoll the day before she left for Hawaii. Minister Tanaka departed from her prepared speech in English to deliver, in Japanese, a strongly worded denunciation of her friend Chirac and the French government's plan. (Minister Tanaka's remarks may be found in the "Overview" section of this document.)

In 1995, too, a number of individuals in Japan and the United States were questioning the validity of the two nations' security relationship in light of the Cold War's end, and in the panel "U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia," experts discussed that cornerstone of the U.S.-Japan relationship, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan, as it was affected by recent global military and political changes.

"Public Safety: Crime and Justice" panelists' presentations were similarly timely, treating recent events of terrorism which had destroyed the complacency and sense of security of residents of both the U.S. and Japan. Symposium delegates watched events unfold after the bombing of the Federal Building in middle America's Oklahoma City, and, during the Symposium week, new warrants were issued for the arrest of Aum Shinrikyo leaders, implicating them in the Tokyo sarin gas attack which had occurred three months before the Symposium and had killed twelve people and injured some 5,000 others. Also in Japan on June 21, 1995, riot police in Hakodate stormed a jumbo jet, rescuing 364 people from a hijacker. Japan was still reeling from the disastrous earthquake in Kobe and its vicinity (newspapers that week reported that the death toll had climbed to 6,055) which had shattered feelings of security as it shattered lives. Symposium panelists addressed not only philosophical issues about citizens' rights, crime and public safety, but also real life events unfolding in the daily news.

Panelists examining such subjects as educational reform, immigration problems, and aging in Japan and America found those subjects topical, as well. As a June 21st *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* editorial put it, "sparks flew" at the Symposium, but the timing, as well as the conference site, ". . . could not have been better. With attitudes appearing to harden on the dispute over cars and auto parts, the symposium serves to demonstrate how the burgeoning commonalities between our two countries dwarf the few issues in dispute. We welcome all of the delegates and participants."

The Symposium: An Overview

Sunday, June 18, 1995

Welcome Reception

Although NAAJS and NAJAS leaders were hard at work in their joint meeting on Saturday, June 17th, the Symposium officially began for most delegates on Sunday evening, and they knew, from the moment they were greeted at the Welcome Reception, that they were in Hawaii.

For the evening reception, Symposium participants walked through the doors of the Sheraton Waikiki Hotel and onto the Diamond Head lawn, where abundant food and first-class Hawaiian entertainment awaited them. They were greeted with the traditional "Aloha" and welcome, and each received a fresh vanda orchid lei upon arriving at the reception. Tourists strolling along the Waikiki beach looked at the lei-bedecked delegates with envy. Old friends renewed acquaintances, and new friendships were formed between Society members from Hawaii, the Mainland United States, and Japan.

Master of Ceremonies for the evening Kimo Kahoano introduced "Halau Hula Olana," the youngsters whose dance and music blended perfectly with the view of Diamond Head, the Pacific Ocean, the sunset—and the people gathered for their first Symposium event.

In a brief address, Japan-America Society of Hawaii President **Yoshiharu Satoh** welcomed the delegates who were already, ". . . working together to develop an even stronger relationship." Mr. Satoh expressed special thanks to those whose generosity and volunteerism had made the Symposium a reality. He also said *mahalo*, the Hawaiian word for "thank you," to the many people from Japan who had traveled to Hawaii, expressing his hopes that the Symposium might be repeated, "in Japan next time."

Mr. Satoh formally introduced some of those in attendance who were to become familiar faces during the Symposium. After he stated, "It is a great honor to welcome Japan's Minister of Science and Technology Makiko Tanaka," he smiled with the other delegates at the brevity of her address: "I'm hoping that you will come back tomorrow, when I promise you a proper speech."

The Welcoming Remarks of the Consul General of Japan in Honolulu **Kishichiro Amae** were only slightly less brief. He mentioned some of the special visitors he had met since coming to Hawaii and how very comfortable Hawaii's people had made his and his family's stay in the Islands. His thoughts then turned to the events being commemorated during the summer, among them the forthcoming commemoration, at Punchbowl National Cemetery in Honolulu, of the end of World War II. With these events in mind, Consul General Amae said that, "I hope this epoch-making meeting, this Symposium, can contribute to the friendships between East and West," and he called for a "heart-moving" event during the next days.

The Symposium's Welcome Reception concluded with the hula halau's turning from contemporary Hawaiian dance to the traditional *kahiko*, the ancient hula dances. Master of Ceremonies Kahoano mentioned, in closing, the great art and history of the Japanese people. "Hawaii's history had humble beginnings," he remarked, "but we hope you will find beauty in these ancient dances and chants."

Delegates left the gathering with a "heart-moving" experience of Hawaii and much anticipation for the days ahead.

Monday, June 19, 1995

Opening Ceremony

The 1995 International Symposium of Japan-America Societies began in earnest at 9:00 a.m., and it began with a bang. Literally—with many resounding bangs, as the Hawaii Matsuri Taiko woke up delegates with their athletic and artistic drum performance. After the Hawaiian Royal Guard's ceremonial posting of flags, the Honolulu Boy Choir expressed its own unique musical welcome to Hawaii.

Welcome Addresses:

Master of Ceremonies for the Opening Ceremony **Dwane Brenneman**, Vice President of the Japan-America Society of Hawaii, expressed his Society's pride in hosting the Symposium and introduced dignitaries, including The Honorable **Benjamin J. Cayetano**, Governor of Hawaii.

Governor Cayetano wished all a good morning and "Aloha," both as Governor and as an Honorary Trustee of the Japan-America Society of Hawaii. He welcomed all of the distinguished delegates from outside of the state, informing them that in keeping with the Symposium's significance he had officially proclaimed June 18-24 to be "Japan-America Society Week" in Hawaii.

"I can think of no better time to hold this Symposium than now," Governor Cayetano continued. "We are proud to link people in the Asia-Pacific region with people in America, and many Hawaii residents proudly trace their ancestry to Japan. In fact, 70% of our people are from the Pacific Rim area; 46% are of Asian American descent. You can see the influence of Japan in our leadership at every level."

Governor Cayetano urged delegates to take a small amount of time from the serious business of the Symposium in order to see ". . . our unique state. We like to believe that we add color to the American flag." He closed his greetings by stating his conviction that: "Your work here will further strengthen the bonds of friendship between Japan and America."

The Honorable **Jeremy Harris**, Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu, also welcomed delegates by expressing his pride in being an Honorary Trustee of the Hawaii Society. He stated, "I am especially pleased by the topic addressed by the Symposium, 'Learning From Each Other,'" adding his belief that Honolulu embodies that theme. He mentioned that two days earlier, Honolulu had held a teleconference to discuss issues of mutual concern and to work together with its sister city, Hiroshima. "It is a real honor for the citizens of Honolulu to host this historic Symposium, and I look forward to our hosting another in the future."

The Honorable **Thomas Shoesmith**, President of the National Association of Japan-America Societies and Former Ambassador to Malaysia, extended on behalf of NAJAS, " . . . a warm 'aloha' to Symposium delegates on this historic occasion, this coming together to share perspectives on our future." He congratulated the host Society on its leadership and vision in planning for the Symposium, and mentioned, too, the contributions that NAAJS Executive Director Akiko Kuno had made to the success of the event.

Ambassador Shoesmith found "a very special timeliness" in the holding of the Symposium in a year marking one of the most significant events in the relationship between Japan and the United States. "Never before has the U.S. drawn such close ties to an Asian country," he remarked. "That relationship has become central to the achievement of global prosperity. It is natural that there will be strains in such a close relationship . . . It is vitally important, however, that contentious issues not overshadow the positive aspects of this relationship." He also urged that businesses engender a sympathetic understanding on matters of common concern, and he charged those at the International Symposium of Japan-America Societies with a similar goal.

Keynote Address:

Master of Ceremonies Brenneman next introduced The Honorable **Makiko Tanaka**, Japan's Minister of State for Science & Technology, who delivered the morning's keynote address on the topic: "Japan-U.S. Cooperation—A Key to Creating A Future Global Society."

After expressing her appreciation to the Japan-America Society of Hawaii for its invitation to speak, Minister Tanaka recalled her first visit to Hawaii en route to Philadelphia, where she was a foreign exchange student in the 1960s. She contrasted her memories of the "less hectic days" of the 60s with her impressions of Japan and America today, and she expressed some surprise at finding herself in Hawaii, this time as a cabinet member of the Japanese government.

The issues which Minister Tanaka must deal with in her cabinet post were the issues she treated in her Symposium address—namely science, technology and energy issues. "We have entered an era when all of the 5.6 billion people on the earth must help each other and cooperate. Among the serious issues that we must deal with are food supply, energy, and the environment on a worldwide basis." In speaking of nations' resources, she examined human resource development ("the software that will become the foundation of our society"), not simply the "hardware" of technology.

After a comprehensive update on Japan's energy policies and plans, including nuclear waste disposal, Minister Tanaka spoke of other environmental issues which pose serious problems for mankind. "We know this beautiful, blue earth is the only place that can support human life," she remarked, praising cooperative ventures between nations such as the new Global Observation Information Network (GOIN) which will facilitate the solving of environmental problems.

Minister Tanaka turned next to some of the difficulties Japan faces today, but not before delivering an impassioned plea for the wise and ethical use of technological research: "In research areas such as nuclear power, ecological protection, genetic manipulation and information networks, we must never lose track of a strict ethical framework to guard against recklessness and misuse of these technologies."

Societal problems worrying Japan—a rapidly aging population, low birth rate and the care of the elderly—were examined by Minister Tanaka, who showed how her roles as a private citizen as well as an elected official make her doubly aware of the challenges we all face. She concluded her formal address by charging delegates to redouble their efforts, "not on the activities of one race or one nation, but instead on enhancing the welfare of all races and countries on the face of the globe." She also called for those in Japan and the United States to "redouble our efforts to cooperate on joint projects, together with other nations, that will lead to the realization of the aspirations of all peoples in the world. This should be our common pledge."

Although Makiko Tanaka's prepared remarks in English ended at that point, she appended certain observations in Japanese which provided some of the "sparks" the journalists mentioned when covering the Symposium. These were prefaced by a bit of the history of her relationship with France's President Chirac, who was an old and dear friend of her father, Kakuei Tanaka, the former Prime Minister of Japan. "I met Monsieur Chirac in Paris when I was seventeen," she recalled. "Later, I cheered him on and was glad when he became President. I sent him flowers and a congratulatory telegram. He visited us six months ago at the Science and Technology Agency."

With disappointment and anger coloring her voice, Minister Tanaka then recalled her shock at hearing that President Chirac and the French government had reached a decision to resume the testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. "I was shocked by what I heard! As I said in my speech in English, we can no longer live by ourselves. No one is alone—we are one nation and one race. We have been allowed to live because of the contributions of our forefathers, and we are responsible for the future. We work hard, study hard, and attempt to live in harmony. Why must anyone experiment with nuclear energy at this point?"

Makiko Tanaka mentioned problems that France shares with other nations, and the automobile trade issues which haunt the Japan-America relationship, but she stated her belief that cooperation will lead to their solutions if we are "positive and productive" in our mutual dealings. But, "Nuclear testing today is pure nonsense. The South Pacific people should not be subjected to that kind of action. So before leaving Japan for Hawaii, I told the press in Japan that if Monsieur Chirac wants to experiment with the bomb, why doesn't he do it in the suburbs of Paris? I mean this sincerely!"

Before closing, Minister Tanaka pledged, "I am going to contact many political leaders and good friends all over the world to stop this. I am going to do everything in my power to stop this nuclear testing."

Her powerful and heartfelt remarks drew delegates to their feet for a standing ovation and show of support.

Panel Session One:
Japan and America, 1945-1995: Peace, Progress, Partnership

Panel Moderator **Victor Atiyeh**, former Governor of the State of Oregon, noted as he introduced the session's panelists that "Each speaker is truly distinguished and respected far and wide . . . . They represent an incredible reservoir of accumulated knowledge and experience."

Delegates found that Governor Atiyeh's observations applied to each of the Symposium's presenters, and they were especially attentive to the sweeping, comprehensive picture painted by the first panelists. The "Peace, Progress, Partnership" panel set the tone for all later discussions.

Robert Scalapino, Robson Research Professor of Government Emeritus at the University of California at Berkeley, began his discussion of the topic by observing that, "In the long span of history, fifty years is a relatively brief time. Yet the amazing changes that have taken place in U.S.-Japan relations during that period testify to the dazzling pace of events in a period of global revolution."

Dr. Scalapino traced those changes back to their "seeds," analyzing the opinions that Japanese and American citizens have held of each other since the war and tracing the movement of Japan from "enemy" to "protege" status in the minds of the Americans. "Under American tutelage, a new Japan emerged. Yet it would be very inaccurate to assume that all that was old disappeared. In its earlier modernization drive, Japan had demonstrated its genius in using its cultural traditions selectively to underwrite change. That trait remained very much alive."

The system worked, and with the U.S. taking on the burden of security in the area, Japan became "a model for developing societies." Dr. Scalapino reminded his listeners, however, that new problems forced the U.S. to reconsider the costs of winning the Cold War and to ask its allies to share the costs that it, the remaining superpower, felt had become burdensome and unfair. Implicit in that sharing, Dr. Scalapino noted, was a willingness to share responsibility.

As the economic nature of the Japan-America alliance changed, the need for dialogue increased. Although Dr. Scalapino candidly discussed the thorny nature of that dialogue as it cut into the domestic affairs of the two nations, he maintained "cautious optimism" about the future, especially in light of the many issues upon which the two nations agree. He stated his belief that for both nations, the key challenges are now domestic problems, many of them economic problems which require domestic solutions.

Dr. Scalapino observed that there are "different overarching challenges" on foreign policy, and he discussed some of the major ones. "The United States must be *a* leader in global affairs, but it cannot be *the* leader." And how, he asked rhetorically, can Japan reconcile its homogeneity and introversion in order to become truly internationalist?

"The continuance of a strong and increasingly intimate American-Japanese relationship," Dr. Scalapino concluded, "is crucial to meeting both of these challenges . . . In sum, our bilateral relation remains the most important single bilateral relationship in the current world, not merely for our two countries but for others as well."

Yukio Matsuyama, journalist and professor at Kyoritsu Women's University, continued the panel's tracing of the Japan-America relationship over the past fifty years, sharing his own personal observations of the Japanese and Americans' changing attitudes towards one another. Through a journalist's eyes (he worked for the *Asahi Shimbun* for over forty years), he pictured early visits to the United States and the "drastic changes and historic transformations" he saw in American society in recent years, the most conspicuous being "the enhancement of the Japanese presence in American consciousness."

In early visits to the U.S., Professor Matsuyama reported, the Japanese were noticed in the press "only if they shouted," and Japanese goods, including automobiles, were considered cheap and inferior. Gratifying changes have taken place making Americans more accepting of the Japanese and bringing Tokyo closer to the U.S. in its trends and tastes. "As the medical profession will tell you, such mutual transfusions of cultures can occur only where a basic compatibility exists between donor and recipient," he commented.

Apart from the acceptance of foods, goods, music and other innovations, however, lies acceptance of each others' political systems. Professor Matsuyama analyzed the differences in the meaning of "democracy" by tracing the history of its development in both countries and contrasting their views of "leadership." After having compared the "lawyer-minded" American politicians with their bureaucratic Japanese counterparts, he stated: "Having covered Japanese and American politics for more than forty years, I have come to realize that it is rather miraculous that our two countries, with such entirely different constitutions as well as national traits, are allies."

Professor Matsuyama urged that the Japan-America relationship be improved by person-to-person interaction, especially in this post-Cold War period. "In order to elevate the level of our relationship," he concluded, "we must redouble our efforts to make ourselves as understandable, reliable and attractive to others as possible. Money and technology can reach the moon. But they will never reach the inward heart of any peoples."

To "enable us to understand how wartime enmity translated into postwar amity and partnership," Harvard University's Charles Warren Professor of American History **Akira Iriye** focused upon cultural aspects of the Japan-America relationship. He suggested reading books containing eyewitness accounts of World War II as a starting point in that understanding, noting that both animosity and forgiveness, on the part of those who suffered, are genuine reactions, but that neither explains the phenomenon. As had Dr. Scalapino, Dr. Iriye found the transformation of wartime enemies into peacetime partners to be "amazing."

Dr. Iriye argued that, "The partnership has been as solid and durable as it has been because it has been built not just on the mutually felt security needs of the two nations but also, and fundamentally, on the sharing of cultural experiences by Americans and Japanese." Without these shared experiences (examples of which were supplied in Iriye's talk), the relationship would have remained far more superficial and tension-filled after the war.

Pessimists in both America and Japan believe that cultural exchanges of this kind are mere "window-dressing" in the relationship, superficial similarities which cannot aid in coping with the serious issues of trade and politics. Dr. Iriye pointed out, however, that "without close cultural contact and communication, relations among nations would remain unstable and opportunistic, subject to shifting global power and trade balances." These nations, too, "will be in no position to contribute to the well-being of the world community."

Dr. Iriye next placed the cultural contact he advocated into the larger context of "cultural internationalism" which is increasing in this century. He defined the movement as "crosscultural communication and cooperation as a way to contribute to a more stable, peaceful world order" and he showed its resurgence after World War II and its transference into specific programs and exchanges. Students, scholars, artists, literary figures, athletes and others are engaging in an increasing number of exchange opportunities, Dr. Iriye stated.

"The question today is not whether a global village is coming into existence, but what shape it will take . . . Peace, progress, and partnership, the subtitle of this presentation, are themes that need to be defined in the framework of a world environment of increasing cultural diversity and intercultural contact." Dr. Iriye believes that Japan and America have demonstrated that it is possible to cooperate across cultural boundaries and, he observed, "if they continue to do so, in the process inviting other countries to join together in expanding the networks of communication and understanding, they will be making a signal contribution to a more peaceful, humane world."

Nagayo Homma, Executive Director of The Japan Foundation Center for

Global Partnership, began his discussion by quoting a haunting sentence in an essay of American literary critic Randolph Bourne: "War is the health of the State." As a young man from defeated Japan who carried with him vivid wartime memories, Dr. Homma had pondered Bourne's statement and wondered what kinds of lessons could be learned from wartime experiences. "One lesson was obvious; never again should we, Japanese and Americans, engage in war with each other."

Dr. Homma encapsulated the two nations' mutual history since the war's end, bringing the history to the point where, "We have been forced to reaffirm or redefine the significance of partnership between Japan and the United States." In doing so, he asked whether the Japanese, for example, are now happier or more interesting people for having made tremendous progress during these past fifty years. Although the answer to that is in dispute, Dr. Homma did assert that "America has always held the interest of the Japanese people ever since the time of Commodore Perry's visit to open the gates of feudal Japan." As Dr. Iriye had done earlier, Dr. Homma used examples from music and literature to substantiate his statement.

Rapid changes took place in postwar America as well as in postwar Japan, and Dr. Homma swept his listeners along in an enlightening four-phase history of American culture. The nation emerged, not simply as "a country formed and led by Anglo-Saxons" or as one dominated by its many immigrants, but as one shaped by each group. Stating that the 1920s were crucial years in the history of the reception of American culture by the Japanese people, he mentioned that Tin Pan Alley pop culture was considered "vulgar Americanism" by Japanese intellectuals, who were joined in their attack by their counterparts in America. But American culture, with all of its vulgarism and materialism, had become "truly fascinating" to watch.

In examining this phenomenon and its effects upon those in Japan, Dr. Homma concluded that "Using today's terminology, we might say that post-World War II Japan embraced both WASP culture and ethnic culture without being fully aware of the character of the American themes." Later, during the days which he termed as the "Cold War Culture" period, American culture was seen as "the culture of the whole," that is, the wholeness of the American way of life then emphasized over America's cultural diversity. "But beginning with the 1980s, and certainly as we entered the post-Cold War period, America as a land of multicultural diversity came to be emphasized. On the other hand, so-called revisionists on Japan have been asserting that Japan is fundamentally different, a complete 'other' to Americans." Naturally, this view poses new problems for both Japanese and Americans in this post-Cold War period.

Dr. Homma contends that, in spite of the Americans' cultural diversity, the motto *e pluribus unum* remains essentially valid today, and that Japan's assimilation of so much of American culture "gives us a hope that perhaps we might work toward creating a common culture shared and enjoyed by diverse nations of the world."

Unable to conclude his remarks on a "serenely optimistic note," Dr. Homma warned that debates about the meaning of our countries' alliance in this new era, already bringing both thoughtful and flippant opinions from both sides, "may lead to a dangerously volatile situation not only in East Asia but also in the entire world. At this crucial moment, moreover, we are suffering from weak political leadership and short-sighted bureaucracy. So there is all the more reason for more active roles for Japan-America Societies in both countries aiming at better and deeper understanding of each other as well as sharing and creating common culture."

During the question and answer session which followed the panel session, Yukio Matsuyama was queried about his assertion that Japan is still a "feudalistic nation," politically. Prof. Matsuyama stood by his statement, adding that "The Japanese are used to being ruled. Many bureaucrats in Japan have forgotten that they are supposed to be public servants." He pointed to the nearly forty years during which the LDP was in power, a time in which a "sheep bureaucracy" carried out the party's wishes. In response to requests for his opinion on the possibilities for changes after the next elections, now that the LDP is no longer the majority party, Prof. Matsuyama stated, "I hope there will be changes, constitutionally or otherwise, but I see few being made at this time. The Socialists are declining, but many old bureaucrats are still around. But we *must* shake off the shackles and become less feudalistic so that the voices of the Japanese citizens can be reflected and honored in the next elections."

A question directed to Akira Iriye sought his opinion about a presumed shift of interest on the part of young Japanese toward China and Southeast Asia and away from the United States now that Japan is no longer so economically dependent upon America. Dr. Iriye confirmed that there is no longer the overwhelming dependence on the part of the Japanese upon the U.S. that there was in the past, and that Asia is being targeted for trade. However, he has observed that "This interest has not yet translated into the formation of rich cultural connections as it did with the United States—connections formed with Americans in sports, education, and entertainment, for example. Trade figures come and go, investments and those matters fluctuate from year to year, from decade to decade, but cultural contacts have been increasing, particularly among young people." He felt "somewhat optimistic" in seeing that these first generations of Japanese young people who do not remember the war seem to be more open minded on issues such as war crimes and responsibility.

Robert Scalapino had the dubious honor of fielding this question: "Sketch alternative futures of the Japan-U.S. relationship. Just how bad and how good can the relationship get in the next ten to twenty years?"

Dr. Scalapino created possible scenarios. The negative ones would be created if the U.S. were to withdraw prematurely from its commitments to Pacific Asia, if our respective nationalisms were to rise and to be used as weapons by political leaders, or if the increased breakdown in order in the Southeast Asia region were to reach the point where no nations could cooperate ". . . like the tragedy we see now in Bosnia." He expanded upon the phenomena, seen in both the East and West, of people seeking an identity, searching for a closer community than that which the secular state can offer. These people tend to find what they need in cultism or fundamentalist religions or ethnicism. At the same time, they are bombarded from above because there must be regional and international institutions that make decisions, so the state must share its sovereignty. "Under these pressures, and with declining ideologies, nationalism is a kind of weapon of political leadership, and in some settings, an appeal to people."

More positive scenarios would involve an increasing willingness on the part of Japan and the U.S. to share in ventures in *all* areas of common interest, with a broader range of community being forged between our younger generations. "We must bring our future leaders into closer contact with each other," Dr. Scalapino stated. "Culture is no longer monolithic. If we are to work out our respective domestic problems, we *must* do this." He expressed optimism ("I am an optimist. At my age you have to be.") that a broader and stronger relationship between the two countries will be a part of our future.

Governor Atiyeh posed this question for each of the panelists: "What are the specific mechanisms, in government or in the private sector, which can or should be created in order to institutionalize the security, economic, cultural and political relationship between the United States and Japan now that the end of the Cold War has led to the breakdown of the major framework that has guided the relationship over the past fifty years?"

Nagayo Homma responded with his contention that "We must utilize the existing mechanisms more effectively." As examples, he cited programs of the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, and the Japanese government's efforts to increase the number of American and other foreign students studying in Japan by establishing "numerical targets." While graduate students are coming to Japan on fellowship grants, more encouragement is needed to attract undergraduates. "The new generations share much more than rock music," he noted.

After describing new programs which will soon go into effect to solve some of these problems, Dr. Homma said that at the government level, mechanisms must be put in place to encourage the training of capable staff members for congressmen so that questions can be asked and answered directly and meaningful dialogue established.

Prof. Matsuyama had even more specific communication mechanisms he would like to see in place. "We shouldn't be exchanging platitudes at this point. We should be able to say, 'I don't like how so-and-so acts' and to encourage more open dialogue. I would like to see top Japanese Diet members come to the United States to talk about essential things such as what the war in the Pacific meant. I would even welcome Congressman Gingrich's [U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich's] traveling to Japan to see exactly how he is affecting the American image in the eyes of the Japanese."

Dr. Scalapino asserted that "personnel changes" will be more important than "mechanisms" for shaping post-Cold War history. "We must have true specialists on both sides, with more staff members trained in policy making. I would like to see a 'Wise Persons' panel reestablished whose interests extend beyond business and trade." He advocated wider contacts between NGO's, those working on solving mutual problems, including environmental and health problems (such as conquering AIDS), with networks of organizations to buttress these individuals.

Dr. Iriye, too, stressed personal over official connections ("War is created in the hearts and minds of men and women."). He stated his hope that Japan, in particular, will form more of these networking mechanisms at the grass roots level, not just with specialists in government and from universities. Organizations such as the Japan-America Societies can make a positive difference in the future.

Panel Moderator Governor Atiyeh echoed the panelists' hopes that the next fifty years of the Japan-America relationship will bring about, ". . . a shift to a never predicted bilateral partnership." He predicted that, "Pivotal to that partnership relationship will be the Japan-America Societies in both nations."

Panel Session Two:
The U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia

Moderator **Hee-Suk Shin** of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that he was the only Korean to participate in one of the Symposium's panels on Japan and the United States before reminding all that not only were Japan and the U.S. significant in commerce, "Their relationship is important in defining the situation in Southeast Asia, so it is of utmost importance that they pursue cooperation, not confrontation."

Dr. Shin introduced the first panelist, **James Auer**, Director, Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation, Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies, who shared several observations regarding U.S.-Japan security relations.

Dr. Auer commented upon the many differences in the Cold War and the post-Cold War world, citing both the decreased threat of nuclear exchanges (and huge costs of maintaining defense forces) and the new instability which now affects important areas of the world. He pointed out that, "Despite all the differences between Japan and the U.S. in language, culture, history and tradition . . . Japan and the U.S. have close national interests" because rich trading countries rely upon global stability for continued growth and prosperity.

In elaborating on that point, Dr. Auer asked, "Who is most threatened by the increased instability of the Cold War world? Are the unfortunate nations such as Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti, which are suffering greatly, the newly threatened? Yes, they suffer, but instability is not a new phenomenon for these countries. It is the rich trading countries who rely on global stability in which to continue the prosperity and growth of their economies which have much to lose in an unstable world."

According to Dr. Auer, although the U.S. and Japan differed upon matters of trade during the Cold War, U.S.-Japan defense relations were a great "success story," particularly during the decade of the 1980s when the nations cooperated in countering the Soviet threat. "America's role was primary," he stated, "but Japan's efforts are not appreciated as much as they deserve in either the U.S. or in Japan." Dr. Auer did point out that the security relationship nearly collapsed during the Persian Gulf War. He summarized the events of those days and analyzed some of the forces which led to that near breakdown.

Dr. Auer believes that Japan's 'PKO' Bill is deeply flawed and is seriously inadequate to deal with many, if not most, potential future crises including those similar to the Gulf War crisis, and he offered suggestions for remedying such problems and for bringing the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty into the post-Cold War era. One of those steps involved seeking consultations between the U.S. and Japan immediately following the outbreak of a crisis such as the Gulf War. "This has been done, and particularly of late is being done at the sub-ministerial level, but unfortunately it is not being done well at the critically important political level. Both the U.S. and Japanese governments have been disappointingly focused in an overly domestic manner which has exacerbated bilateral economic frictions even more. And, as a result, security ties have been endangered."

Another of Dr. Auer's suggestions for accommodating the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to the post-Cold War world would involve expanding the operating areas rather than the defensive character of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Although some Japanese leaders object to that direction, Auer believes, " . . . the Constitution does not limit Japan's defense prerogatives if the requisite political will and leadership are present," and he believes that the alternatives (severing U.S.-Japan ties and Japan's seeking some autonomous defense role) are far more dangerous.

Dr. Auer urged increased responsibility on the part of both nations so that not only will they prosper, the entire world will benefit as well. "The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has served well since 1951. Its value in the next half century could be even greater," he concluded.

Yukio Okamoto, President of Okamoto Associates, began his panel presentation by saying that, "When I speak in Japanese, I suddenly become more polite and decent, so I will speak in English in order to be more provocative." He then stated that he, too, shared apprehension over the U.S.-Japan security relationship which has become "very vulnerable."

Although the U.S. should feel obligated to come to Japan's aid in a crisis, since it had stripped Japan of its right to a full military power, Mr. Okamoto wondered, "Would the U.S. risk tens of thousands of lives, or even nuclear war, to defend Japan today? It is naive to believe this would happen just because we have a piece of paper which states our agreement."

What is more important than the existing treaty, Mr. Okamoto believes, is the substantive relationship which makes the U.S. believe that Japan does need to be protected. Although the U.S.-Japan economic relationship is acting in a counterproductive way, the security relationship is as valid as ever after the Cold War. He termed it "wide-ranging" and "indispensable" for Japan, for without the U.S., Japan would be at the mercy of several large armies in its region.

Mr. Okamoto also found the security relationship indispensable for the United States; without Japan, it could have no consistent Pacific policy. "Naturally, there was a political weakening after the Cold War ended," he pointed out. "There was no longer a common 'bogeyman' enemy to fight, and the two countries have been unsuccessful in finding a substitute." But not only is Japan making a huge contribution to the costs of American troops in the area, together they deter threats in Southeast Asia. Japan now wants transnational cooperation in areas such as AIDS research, but the U.S. is hesitant, hoping to settle economic matters first.

Although Japan and America were exposed to much economic vitriol even twenty years ago, Mr. Okamoto worries that continuous economic squabbling is beginning to take its toll. He viewed the current auto talks as part of that pattern, not substantively different from past trade talks on rice, for example. "Both sides must make complementary moves," he insisted, "moves toward deregulation and against excessive savings on Japan's part, and towards reduced consumption on the part of the United States."

Mr. Okamoto worries, too, about what he sees as a trend towards regionalism, and about a rising nationalistic trend on the part the young. His hope is that these movements might be channeled: "Assertiveness among the young *can* be positive. After a period of introversion, some freshness is definitely desirable."

The panel on security concerns continued with **James Kelly**, President of Pacific Forum CSIS, adding his wealth of experience to the discussion. He launched his remarks by quoting voices which are saying that the 35-year-old Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States has become "ossified," and that the United States should drop Japan from its "protectorate" status. Yet even during the Cold War there was more to the treaty than just an alliance to meet the threat of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kelly maintained.

Has the security treaty become outdated and U.S.-Japan policies in the Pacific obsolete? To answer that question and the Symposium planners' question about how the U.S. and Japan will operate in security arrangements in the future, Mr. Kelly stated his belief that the world situation is still dangerous. There are no simple answers, especially as to the *why* of our security relationship. Political and economic simplifications, which say that military power has somehow been superseded by economic power, are also naive. Yet the economic changes in the region are mind-boggling: "As a result of this economic leap, as Samuel Huntington put it, 'Peoples and governments of non-western civilization—Asia—are no longer objects of history but have joined the West as fellow shapers of history.'"

Mr. Kelly asked, "If economics is superseding military power, why are all those Asian countries modernizing, and in some cases, enlarging their military forces?" Although he stopped short of describing the region as a "powder keg," he asserted that the interplay of economic, political and military power is still very complex. He hopes that the balanced views of some of these countries' "capable and intelligent officials" will prevail.

The "why" of the Japan-America security relationship, from both Japan's and America's point of view, was treated in a list of specific observations. Mr. Kelly pointed out how compelling these reasons are for continuing that valuable alliance—but in an adjusted and redefined form. Although he emphasized that the U.S.-Japan security relationship is separate from the economic relationship, "One inevitably affects the other. If Japan's over-regulated, too often restricted, markets continue to be so; if large trade surpluses persist, it will inevitably erode American support, not just for an alliance, but for being a trading nation." He concluded that we must acknowledge both economic and political relationships and build on their symmetry, promoting not an outdated relationship but a sophisticated new one.

Keio University Professor **Ryosei Kokubun** added a fourth voice to the security relationship discussion as he picked up on James Kelly's remarks about the recent Asia boom and placed them into a different perspective for his listeners. He first examined Japan's part in the economic upturn, showing how its prolonged recession and high yen had forced it to turn to other Asian nations for manufacturing, how it is seeking to raise its status in the world with those nations' help (with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council a possibility), and the underlying and "convoluted" emotions about trading with the U.S. which have led it to turn to Asian nations as counter moves.

However, "The Asia boom is fragile because there is little introspection and subjectivity on the part of Japan toward Asia," Dr. Kokubun commented, illustrating the point by recalling recent statements by Japanese leaders about their nation's role during World War II. Failing to unequivocally apologize for its war atrocities in the region has hurt Japan: "What should the Japanese, as samurai, do? Take responsibility. Giving way to narrow-minded nationalism is anachronistic. And dangerous. Japan cannot choose between Asia and the United States, and choosing isolationism is not a possibility. In light of the ever increasing mutual dependency between Japan and the United States, the nations must seek an equilibrium where attaching importance to Asia also means attaching importance to the U.S., and vice versa."

Turning from his discussion of the "Asia boom" in Japan to the question, "Will the 21st century truly be the age of Asia?" Dr. Kokubun stated that, if we focus *only* upon economics, that outcome is not farfetched. But he outlined three "shadows" lurking behind the bright lights of the economic boom.

"Mutual suspicion begets mutual fear," he pointed out, commenting on the trend of building up economic power being closely followed by building up military power. New energy sources are needed for development, but technology must also follow to make nuclear energy, in particular, safe and secure.

A second "shadow" was that the Asian nations' ill-balanced growth is causing disturbing "disparities." Some nations are prospering, while "vast lands have missed the train." There is also a widening disparity in the distribution of wealth between the coastal and inland areas of the richer nations. With this uneven growth, ethnic and religious differences are magnified and hostilities may erupt. Dr. Kokubun also pointed out that in the rapidly developing nations, "The study of environmentalism is prospering while the destruction of the environment is taking place. There are slogans, but little action." This "shadow" cannot help but have a tremendous effect upon Japan and other nations.

Each of these problems is closely interrelated, and by nature, each could become an international issue. The challenges they present are compounded, and they cannot be treated separately from one another.

In commenting upon the security roles of the U.S. and Japan in the Asian region, Dr. Kokubun observed that, "There is still a strong expectation among Asian nations that the U.S. will continue to play an important role in the future. There could have been little economic development in Japan and other Asian nations without the U.S. presence in the area [and U.S. buying power] during the Cold War." Is it possible for this presence to continue in light of America's declining economic strength? Dr. Kokubun believes that it is, but that Japan must offer more support to accomplish any stepping up of the U.S. military presence in the area. "What is needed is not the issue of who protects whom, but of mutual supervision as dependency is enhanced."

In order to meet these goals, Dr. Kokubun advocated a frank exchange of opinions between nations at the people-to-people level, discussions such as those taking place at the Japan-America Symposium. He applauded the volunteers he had observed helping with the Symposium. "These dialogues will provide a sound basis for learning to build a fruitful Japan-America relationship, and they are personally meaningful to me."

Before his panel members answered questions from their listeners, Moderator Hee-Suk Shin provided an interlude during which he told a story and sang a song, apparently in an effort to lighten up the proceedings. One panelist referred to him, with a smile, as "Mr. Entertainer, or, rather, Mr. Chairman" after his performance. The business at hand, however, was the very serious issue of security in Asia, and the first question, addressed to Dr. Auer, was a request for his feelings about American decision makers' extending "peace-loving democracies" into the world because they believe that someplace deep within the democratic system is a natural anti-war framework.

Dr. Auer replied that although the U.S. has had as a goal a desire to promote and extend democracy to other nations, it is not because it believes that democratic nations cannot fight each other. Rather, "We prefer our form of government and feel that democratic principles might inhibit the desire for war." He could not see American decision makers' attempting to impose democracy upon nations which did not want to become democratic.

The second question addressed to Dr. Auer asked for a show of "support and understanding" for Article 9 of Japan's constitution, the article which states that Japan renounces war. Auer not only showed support for the article, he traced for the Symposium attendees the development of the clause from its first drafting in response to General MacArthur's 1946 directive (prohibiting Japan's maintaining even defensive forces), through the 1970s when Japan could have gone back to that original prohibitive interpretation but did not. "No Japan-America security agreement could have been possible had Japan taken that step," he stated.

Dr. Auer added that "I have always thought that it is completely unnecessary for Japan to change its constitution, since much can be done within its present boundaries . . . neither Japan nor America could have anticipated the success of that security alliance, and the U.S. has strong reasons to support it."

The first of two questions posed to Yukio Okamoto was, "Under the present security situation in Asia, is it not time for Article 9 to be abrogated?" Mr. Okamoto agreed that the "old-style thinking" which prompted the provision ("The Japanese are bad; take away their guns") can be done without, but he found the fundamental ideals sound, especially given the rightist movement and rising nationalism in Japan. He believes that these troubling attitudes are due, in part, to Japanese arms manufacturers' desire to export arms. "The weapons industries think they could wipe out the U.S. arms industries in a matter of a few years if they were given more freedom."

Mr. Okamoto asked, almost rhetorically, "What *are* defensive weapons?" and stated that he is in basic agreement with Dr. Auer that Article 9 should not be abrogated, only altered slightly to meet changing conditions in the world.

Other questions to Mr. Okamoto involved trade issues: "What is the U.S.-Japan trade relationship? What is the bottom line on automobile trade talks? Must we live with these problems and the animosity we see growing toward Japan?"

Because the questions did not directly concern the subject of the panel, the U.S.-Japanese security relationship, Mr. Okamoto kept his reply brief. He did, however, comment upon the toll that trade and economic aggravations have taken upon the overall relationship over the years. "Our frustrations are not merely with a party or with two negotiators," he noted. From Japan's viewpoint, he stated, "In the past, Japan has always compromised, but it is not always bad to say no." On the other hand, little progress has been made on deregulation in Japan because of the nation's unwieldy bureaucratic system and its "lack of political leadership."

This question was posed to James Kelly: "It is one thing to discuss Japan-America security ties in Asia, but what about threatening moves by China and Russia?" Mr. Kelly replied succinctly that he did not see those two nations as a threat at this time. He cited internal problems which both huge nations face as they develop viable economies, and he expressed hopes that neither connects growing economic and political power with military power: "China has not yet asserted itself as a hegemonic power . . . we have to try to work with China to the extent that any outside power might have an influence."

The question to Mr. Kelly, "Which of the possible candidates for President of the United States best understands the complex relationship between the U.S. and Japan?" drew groans from the Symposium delegates, and some disclaimers from Mr. Kelly, who stated that, "All have a certain amount of knowledge." That was evidenced, he observed, by the discussions generated by recent trade issues which were not divided along party lines. "But I don't believe that any of the announced candidates are experts on the Japan-America relationship."

In answer to the question, "What relationship will be formed among China, Japan and the U.S. ten years from now?" Ryosei Kokubun mentioned that in each of the conferences he had attended recently (on the Japan-America relationship, China-Japan relationship, etc.), the nation not specifically included was the one of most concern to the conferees. "We obviously need more than bilateral approaches to improving these relationships," he stated, adding that "Japan and the U.S. have a strong background of cooperation vis-a-vis China. They can do much together to help China become a stable nation." However, the U.S. obviously doesn't want to miss the train in trading with China, or for Japan and China to form an exclusive alliance, and Dr. Kokubun again emphasized that serious confrontations between Japan and the U.S. over trade influence all other aspects of that relationship.

Dr. Kokubun was next asked for his opinion about the Japanese Diet's recent resolution commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific: "What could have been a better way of expressing such a message? How and by whom?"

"Some in Japan feel that the Diet should not have adopted that resolution," Dr. Kokubun responded, "and to some extent, I agree with them. But it was done. Although it was apparently necessary, we need dialogue on other levels, not just at the governmental level."

The security panel members, having answered questions from Symposium delegates, were then allowed a brief time for wrapping up their discussion. Some highlights of their remarks included:

James Auer: "A question I was shown but did not have an opportunity to respond to was 'Would expanding the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to other nations such as China ever pass the U.S. Congress?' Possibly *some* day other nations might be included, but I would reply that the treaty was never *imposed*, and that it has evolved throughout its history. It is a living document, one that is continually updated. Panelists Okamoto and Kelly, incidentally, influenced the treaty over the years. I believe it is in the best interest of all that it be allowed to continually evolve."

Yukio Okamoto: "I like to believe that Japan, too, is evolving and progressing, though it sometimes seems that changes come one step too late. We should build on the basis set for allowing peacekeeping forces to be sent into Cambodia, and expand our role and responsibilities in the world. We should also face the wrong we have done in the past, and not keep sweeping World War II dirt under the rug. Similarly, European and even Russian leaders have traveled to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not to make formal statements but to lay a wreath at the memorials for those who died there. Is it too much to expect that U.S. leaders might make that same symbolic gesture?"

James Kelly: "I must add my support to Professor Kokubun's contention that trilateral dialogue between Japan, China and America, is preferable to bilateral discussions. This is exactly what will occur soon when CSIS and Dr. Kokubun will conduct such a discussion. And while we're passing out chrysanthemums to fellow panelists, I need to mention that James Auer got two successive American Secretaries of Defense to stop asking Japan to spend more money on defense, and to put that in a more constructive way—which goes to show how a bureaucrat can influence governmental policy in a positive way."

Ryosei Kokubun: "The United States needs to learn that in Southeast Asian nations there are wide diversities in values and cultures. Just being assertive, or bashing Japan, will only encourage those within Japan to become more nationalistic."

At the end of the security panel's presentations, Japan-America Society of Hawaii Executive Director Earl Okawa thanked those who had participated in both of the day's panels and invited those who still had questions for panelists to attend the reception which would follow.

During that reception, no formal discussions took place, but The Japan Society of Northern California took the occasion to present honored scholar Robert Scalapino with an award, and those Symposium speakers who were in attendance received remembrances of Hawaii from the host society. Recognition was also given to the Board of Trustees of the Japan-America Society of Hawaii during the evening. The rest of the reception provided another opportunity for delegates to meet with each other on an informal basis.

Tuesday, June 20, 1995

Panel Session Three:
Education: Critical Issues and New Directions

Tuesday morning's first panel session opened with Moderator **Caroline Matano Yang**'s calling attention to the great aptness of the panel on educational issues to the Symposium's theme, "Learning From Each Other." Moderator Yang, who had served as the Executive Director of the Japan Fulbright Program, also noted the efficacy of that program: "We have many representatives of the Fulbright Program here today, both as delegates and as presenters—including the two Japanese members of this panel."

Ms. Yang observed that until twenty years ago, much of the "learning from each other" done between our two countries had involved Japan's post-war learning from the Americans. Even in the Fulbright exchanges, more Japanese scholars studied in the United States than Americans in Japan. "However, seeing the economic miracle that was Japan during the post-war days led to many Americans' desire to learn from Japan's accomplishments. Americans began to study the Japanese educational system to determine why Japanese students always seemed to outperform their American counterparts, at least at the elementary and secondary levels."

There are, of course, problems with schooling in both nations, Ms. Yang remarked, using the relative weakness of Japanese higher education as one example ("In fact, the Japanese have always considered America's graduate programs one of the best exports which the U.S. has to offer."). By the 1980s, both nations were feeling great dissatisfaction with their educational systems. The pivotal "A Nation at Risk" report summed up weaknesses in the United States' schools; a National Educational Council, established by the Prime Minister, reported on problems in Japan.

"Both nations are being forced to undertake major restructuring," Ms. Yang observed, "not only in business, but in government and in education as well. The challenge for the U.S. is how to educate an increasingly multicultural society while budgets and assistance from the government will be shrinking. In Japan, the challenge is that, though the educational system has served them well in the past, how today may the system instill more creativity, flexibility and an international perspective in a country which has changed incrementally, yet is expected to play an increasingly proactive role in the world?"

After her brief overview of Japan's and America's changes and challenges in education in the past fifty years, Moderator Yang called on her panelists to examine what they believe to be the most critical issues in education faced by our nations today.

Yasunori Nishijima, President Emeritus of Kyoto University, prefaced his remarks with an early example of Japan's learning from the United States. In 1872, Arinori Mori, the first Japanese Legate to the U.S., solicited "views in reference to the elevation of the condition of Japan, intellectually, morally, and physically" from key American leaders with the intention to design a new educational system for Japan's modernization. "Much goodwill was extended by the Americans," Dr. Nishijima related, and in 1873, Mori published those letters.

Dr. Nishijima continued with a survey of Japan's educational system from the first stage (1870-1945), to the second (1945-1985), and to the third stage (1985 to the present). In 1872, the national principle of "Education for ALL" was announced by the new Meiji government, and learning for practical utility was stressed. "Mr. Mori was appointed as the first Minister of Education in 1885, and he established the basis for the entire educational system." That system was not radically modified until 1994, although a movement toward humanities studies and increased respect for individual thinking gained credence during the 1910s and 20s.

Naturally, war years were not ideal times for conducting educational reform. After World War II, however (in 1946), the U.S. Mission for Japanese Education proposed urgent educational reform to, as Dr. Nishijima explained it, "eradicate nationalism and to sow deep roots of democracy. The recommendation [to General Douglas MacArthur] covered the entire change of the educational system and curricula . . . social equality of individuals was emphasized."

Dr. Nishijima also observed that "In the course of the astonishing economic reconstruction since the 1960s, social demand on education was enhanced and academic careers became a progressively dominant factor in the hierarchy structure of society."

Because of the keen competition for entrance into universities, preparation for examinations reached such great heights that pressures were felt even at the primary school level. Dr. Nishijima regretted what he termed "the fragmented knowledge rather than the individual intention and depth of knowledge" that this phenomenon has produced: "Although the postwar educational reforms have efficiently contributed to the economic reconstruction of the nation, the contents of the educational system have been increasingly geared to the mechanism of the socio-economic structure."

However, towards the end of the 1970s, the public mood in Japan began shifting from seeking material affluence to cherishing the satisfaction of the mind. In 1985, the study Ms.Yang had referred to, the National Educational Council's report, targeted three reforms: emphasis upon individuality rather than uniformity; establishment of a life-long learning educational system, with closer connections between schools and communities; and a more versatile educational system which is more adaptable to the changes in society.

Dr. Nishijima stated his belief that the curricula reform now going on in Japan, with each educational institution attempting to establish its own identity, "implies a kind of cultural revolution that is the new phase of Japan." He predicted that a further sympathetic international awareness was in view for Japan's future, and with it the mastering of the "ability to cope with the flood of information and to judge its social implications," and what he termed the "ethics of universality . . . for humane commitment to global issues." He also lauded recent higher education reforms which stress the formation of trans-disciplinary integration.

"We do not know the ultimate effect of this cultural revolution in the form of educational reform," Dr. Nishijima summarized, "but we do realize the need for such movement in the present society and for the centuries to come."

Moderator Yang thanked Dr. Nishijima for his "useful historical perspective" and for pointing out that Japan and the United States were learning from each other even during the Meiji era and earlier, not just in post-war days. She then introduced panelist **Gene Carter**, the current Executive Director of one of the nation's largest and most influential educational organizations, the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD).

Dr. Carter immediately reminded Symposium delegates that ignorance and freedom are incompatible. "The American democratic system depends upon an educated citizenry's personal and civic morality, knowledge and common agreement," he stated, noting that America's commitment to universal public education sets it apart from developing nations.

However, those "great equalizers," the public schools, must now meet unprecedented challenges to retain students and to enable them to "demonstrate new, higher, and universal standards of performance . . . While teachers and students reach for the bright stars of knowledge, they are often bombarded by meteor showers of conflicting community opinions, declining funds, and families in crisis." The mission of education is becoming much less clear.

Dr. Carter maintains that although other countries have faced similar challenges (teaching more students, and more students who have traditionally been the least successful in school), the situation in the U.S. is made more difficult because of the heterogeneous and pluralistic nature of our society. While diversity is a great asset, it also makes concerted action for education more difficult.

After discussing such issues as "content-driven systemic reform" and its accompanying development of voluntary national academic standards in diverse subject areas, Dr. Carter mentioned possible drawbacks of such measures. "Presently," he noted, "there are no mechanisms in place at the national level to build connections among the disciplines to forge the development of integrated curricula. The development of high standards alone does not guarantee an improved quality of education." Neither do high standards constitute a "vision" for improving education.

According to Dr. Carter, education is a continuing process, a long term effort, and great vision is required if it is to focus on common challenges and to retain that focus over time. "Reform does not happen in a vacuum. United States schools are steeped in a culture, an almost impermeable bureaucracy. If we really wish to change what occurs in the classrooms and schools, we must change the culture." Without a sound understanding of that culture, all changes are cosmetic and transient.

School renewal, rather than school restructuring, is what Dr. Carter called for. Better curricula and exams are being developed, but these, too, are not sufficient. Teacher training and working conditions must also be addressed. Sufficient *time* outside of the classroom must be allowed for teachers' planning and for their own professional development.

If we are also to change the culture of our schools, future educational aims must include connecting all classrooms to each other, allowing each access to the "information superhighway" that technology can provide. Future educational aims should include "learning to learn effectively, socialization on a broader scale involving more alternatives, values formation, education beyond college preparation and job training . . ." so that everyone might become a lifelong learner.

"In short," concluded Dr. Carter, "we must install learning as a central value of the American society . . . We must see life as a journey because even the things that change must subsequently change again. Our survival is directly, almost symbiotically, correlated with our flexibility and willingness to adapt."

Shinkichi Eto, former President of Asia University, carried the theme of educational reform efforts back to Japan and referred to the historic 1945 educational reform policy which Dr. Nishijima had described earlier for the Symposium attendees. He indicated that he would take up major issues in Japanese education and discuss new directions for the educational reforms taking place today. His listeners found that in accomplishing this, he also provided a close look at Japan's higher education system and made a scathing denunciation of those who shaped policy and taught at many universities in Japan.

"During the past fifty years," Mr. Eto recounted, "college professors as well as other school teachers have seen a tremendous decline in their social status. Before the defeat in World War II, they were very highly respected . . . However, with the democratization of school education and as teachers' positions came to be guaranteed, ironically their social status declined."

Today, a poll on respected jobs in Japan ranked "teacher" as number twelve (with "businessman" the number one priority). Mr. Eto noted that a similar poll of Americans still listed "teacher" as the most respected profession. He confessed to being impressed that the teachers' status was so high in the eyes of the Americans, but added that he was "rather skeptical about that result."

In any event, Mr. Eto believes that the democratization introduced during the Occupation, and the accompanying activities of teachers' unions which standardized teachers' treatment, led educators to take their duties less seriously. Security led to mediocrity, and nowhere has this been more apparent than at the university level. "Within faculties," Mr. Eto revealed, "mutual shortcomings are covered up. Serious alcohol dependency and plagiarism are often concealed by other faculty members . . . Also, with high economic growth and the enthusiasm for education, the number of schools increased. It is a 'buyer's market' for colleges, and the positions of professors have remained secure."

Mr. Eto quoted a colleague, Isamu Miyazaki, who had even harsher words for the stagnation of certain college professors and the lack of substance in what they teach: "Students only consider schools as a ticket to the real world. The relationship between professors and students is mechanical only; there is no feeling of closeness or of intellectual tension."

Adding to what Dr. Eto feels is a crisis in higher education is the factor of the shrinking pool of students entering universities. "The population of 18-year-olds will decrease from two million to 1.5 million within several years. So a sense of crisis has come over the colleges, as well." He then described mechanisms that various colleges have adopted to cope with this problem. Fortunately, some of the changes (especially changes which have implemented the National Educational Council's recommendations) have been positive. Self-evaluation and self-inspection have been incorporated into these reforms.

Dr. Eto pointed out that, in contrast to the United States, 70% of college education in Japan is provided by private universities, only 30% by public and national schools. Consequently, these private schools depend upon tuition for over half of their income, and they must be run like businesses. Attracting students is a necessity for their survival.

At progressive universities with powerful chairmen of the board (Mr. Eto named Tokai University and Keio University as examples), implementing reforms has gone smoothly. In schools still directed by "mini-popes," to use Eto's term, innovations are discussed but seldom implemented. "So the fewer college applicants will most likely concentrate in the first rate universities," he predicted, and the future of these universities should be secure. The same should occur for the so-called "college entrance exam industries," the cram schools, which might experience confusion, but not decline. He estimated, however, that over fifty junior college-level schools will close in Japan in the near future.

This competition is healthy in Mr. Eto's judgement. "Japanese education will improve only when the mini-popes can no longer sit there comfortably in their fortresses. With international market mechanisms in place, and while enduring some sacrifices, reform in higher education can be accomplished. When this reform is completed, the human resources produced at these schools will be sent to elementary and secondary schools. That will complete the educational reform."

Because he had been so critical during the body of his address, Mr. Eto closed with some compliments for Japanese education. He mentioned increased efforts to internationalize ("Japanese campuses of American colleges have had a great impact on this trend.") and to "correct the political pendulum," to balance the swing he had described towards too much authority and too little accountability on the part of faculty members. In spite of much criticism, Japan's Ministry of Education is taking the initiative in this pendulum swing, as it is in promoting management streamlining to counter the over-liberalization of the faculties in some institutions.

Mr. Eto also sees "values education" as a growing trend. "The mere provision of technology and knowledge will not be enough to foster capable people," he observed, adding that "Some of the excellent graduates of colleges so far have opted to join Japan's notorious cult groups, groups such as the Aum Shinrikyo. That is because, so far, our educators did not make the effort to teach them right from wrong."

Panel Moderator Yang culled through the many questions submitted to the panel on education to draw some common themes which might be addressed by her panelists. They were urged to select from the list which she had provided or to substitute any other questions which might interest them. The audience appeared to care most about responses to such issues as decentralization and the role of individual creativity in schools; the role of teachers; the institution of job-oriented educational programs and of values education; the impact of technology; and the place of foreign languages in the curricula.

Yasunori Nishijima briefly commented upon what he believed to be a misconception about Japan—that the Japanese lack creativity. He stated that the trend in Japanese education to encourage individuals to be creative and innovative is not running counter to that trend in the United States.

In response to the "information superhighway" and new technology question, Dr. Nishijima cautioned against holding access to modern technology out as a panacea for educational problems. He cited a Kyoto experiment which compared learning in a class which was divided into one group which viewed a videotape of the subject matter, one group in which teachers taught that same subject matter, and one which utilized both the video and a tutor who was available for students who wished to "ask deeper questions" about the material. The results showed that the last group learned more effectively. "Access to technology is important," he concluded, "but for superlative education we must also have effective tutors and teachers."

Shinkichi Eto briefly fielded a question about rules and regulations in Japanese education, saying that most restrictions are found in individual schools, not at the governmental level. He also mentioned that in 1991, a recommendation had been made at the Ministry of Education level to remove liberal arts instruction from the curricula. Interestingly, another part of the proposal recommended an emphasis upon that same instruction. He ventured that: "Perhaps it will be emphasized, but in a way different from the traditional style of instruction."

On the question of foreign language instruction, Mr. Eto responded that language, too, needs to be taught in less traditional ways. "The teaching of Japanese and English must shift from earlier uses of language to more modern usage, from the language of Shakespeare, for example, to the language needed today to communicate with one another." He also voiced an opinion that the Americans are the worst speakers of foreign languages, but that "The Japanese are, perhaps, the second worst!"

On the topic of the globalization of education, Mr. Eto cited the "tremendous efforts" being made in that direction at his own Asia University, touching upon reciprocal programs now going on with the U.S. Pacific Northwest states of Washington, Idaho and Oregon.

Gene Carter responded to several of the audience's questions, including one which focused upon what he had called the creation of a "seamless web of schools" from pre-K to 16. The question asked if he believed that efforts such as Sizer's Coalition of Essential Schools might provide one mechanism to propel education in the right direction. Dr. Carter responded "yes" to the question, but pointed out that it was restricted in that it applied to only a limited core of schools.

Dr. Carter's direct experience with observing schools in Japan (six times since 1983) led him to comment on the "paradox" of the relative sparsity of high-tech teaching aids in those schools. He stressed that the challenge is not only for the increased presence of technology in schools, but also for devising ways in which they best supplement (not replace) teachers' efforts. "Students *and* teachers must continue to learn," he concluded, "and technology can provide an important vehicle for this learning."

On the foreign language question, Dr. Carter reported having been a strong advocate for language instruction at early levels when he was a Superintendent of Education. Several languages should be learned in elementary schools, he believes, and he mentioned that he has seen a growing realization at the national level that a second language is necessary. The problem seems to be, however, which language to select.

Dr. Carter commented upon the "teacher training" question by saying that he has found that elementary teachers in America are not as steeped in the content areas that they teach as they should be. These teachers also need to learn more about learning styles, about multiple intelligences and the workings of the human brain.

A final, related, question treated by Dr. Carter asked about the teachers' role in U.S. schools. He answered that it is difficult to generalize about their role, their status, or their effectiveness. However, it is obvious that teaching must be treated as a *profession*, and if teachers wish to gain respect as professionals they must meet standards similar to those established for other professions—medicine, law, etc. "There is much work to be done if we are to draw the 'best and the brightest' into this essential profession."

With time growing short, Moderator Yang gave each panelist one minute to respond to one or more of these questions: "Have you new ideas on avenues in which the U.S. and Japan can collaborate to reform our schools?" and "Since all students are not created equal—since they come to us with different interests and capacities—why is our educational emphasis so strongly upon college education instead of training for service industries, etc.?"

The first response, from Dr. Nishijima, contained a parable of "eye and foot" in which both eye and foot worked hard to go beyond their capacities, but both vision and action were involved in their success. "How much can the public work actively for education, while at the same time looking far ahead?" was Nishijima's question on collaborative efforts at educational reform. "Education is not something just for today," he reminded his Symposium audience.

Mr. Eto commented upon cooperative efforts in education between Japan and America, citing successful examples of students' "going both ways" in learning from each other. On the question about vocational training for some students who might not benefit greatly from a traditional college education, he observed that "In the Japanese society, we still feel that a student must have a college diploma in order to succeed. We have technical schools for training those in some vocations (acting schools, flight attendants' schools, etc.), but they have great difficulty competing with colleges."

The subject of college entrance examinations in Japan drew Mr. Eto's final response: "They will not disappear," he predicted, resignation in his voice. He drew applause when he added that he has strongly encouraged the inclusion of *modern* history in those examinations, the history which would acquaint students with their own nation's strengths and weaknesses.

Dr. Carter tied together some of the threads of the discussion of education by saying that he hoped that all Symposium delegates might leave this forum with an appreciation that each of our nations is involved in ambitious efforts to reform education. We should also "embrace the power and the passion that knowledge represents, and more importantly, not engage in rhetoric which reflects an either/or stand. Instead, we must seek a balance based upon the needs and values of our respective societies."

Three terms which Dr. Carter said might best describe what we should do as we try to prepare our young people for the new century are "collaboration," "partnership" and "coalition building." He closed with this charge: "If we take nothing else home from this forum, this symposium, we need to go forth together in the spirit of sharing, one with another."

In conclusion, Ms. Yang stressed that more than technology is needed if we are to share in this way. She mentioned that next year the world will be observing the Fulbright Program's fiftieth anniversary and that the program can serve as an example of the type of understanding we seek.

"We begin to believe that we are all instant experts because of our computers and televisions, our access to sound bites. We can instantly get all the information we need from overseas, so there is no need to actually travel overseas. But these are the very reasons why we need to have more long-term exchange programs. Only by long-term experiences in other countries may we move beyond 'sound-bite' superficiality to gain true understanding."

Panel Session Four: Public Safety: Crime and Justice

Former U.S. Attorney for Hawaii **Daniel Bent**, the moderator of the panel on public safety, immediately put his panelists' topic into the perspective of recent world events. "We have the opportunity to look at this subject from the sad circumstances of recent months," he said. "Unique elements in our society have wreaked havoc upon the United States and Japan, with repercussions throughout the world." He then introduced four authorities who shared different perspectives on those elements and who, together, painted a vivid picture of crime and its ramifications in Japan and America today.

Judge **Sabrina McKenna**'s viewpoint on the topic was shaped not only by her professional training and experience, but also by her growing up the daughter of an American father and a Japanese mother. Judge McKenna (Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii) attended American schools in Japan. She stated that, with this background, she became ". . . especially concerned that we be able to understand, appreciate and learn from each other' cultural and institutional differences."

The first major difference between the U.S. and the Japanese criminal systems, Judge McKenna explained, had evolved from the centralized nature of the Japanese government compared to the federal nature of the American government. "American states have much more autonomy and independence" than their Japanese counterparts. She next led her audience on an organized tour of the U.S. court system, showing it in operation in Hawaii in the workings of the U.S. District Court, and also in the Hawaii State Court System, an entirely separate criminal justice system under the Hawaii state government.

Judge McKenna discussed matters of appeals of court judgements, court jurisdictions, magistrate selection and other criminal justice system operations in federal and state courts. She then treated some issues raised by the American federal system, notably "double jeopardy" and differences in the defending of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. "In general," she stated, "America provides more protection than Japan for the civil rights of criminal defendants," and criminals may have even greater protection under a state constitution than under the federal constitution.

Using the sensitive gun control and illegal drug enforcement issues as examples, Judge McKenna observed, "The trend in what the American media often calls 'the war against crime' seems to be the increased involvement of the federal government of the United States through the passage of new federal laws and increased federal spending." Stepped up imposition of mandatory sentences for certain crimes has resulted in longer prison sentences and increased spending for prisons. She mentioned, however, that Hawaii seems to be running counter to those trends.

Judge McKenna observed that "Some of the newer federal laws, such as those criminalizing environmental pollution, display a change in society's perceptions toward what constitutes criminal activity," as do the trends toward the increased criminalization of "drunk driving" and the increased recognition of crimes against women.

"When I received my invitation to speak at this event last year," Judge McKenna noted, "the written introduction to this panel session included the statement: 'Japan is highly regarded for its public order and safety, while the United States has developed a bad reputation in this respect.'" She then cited examples of violations of public safety which had occurred in Japan since then, and pointed out that feelings of alienation from the mainstream society may, in any country, lead to similar actions.

Judge McKenna concluded: "It appears that the real problem facing both countries is not what criminal laws to pass or what types of prisons to build, but rather, how to create societies with increased economic, educational, racial, sexual and social equality . . . Our two nations may have much to learn from each other as we pursue this mutual goal."

Atsuyuki Sassa, Former Director General of the Cabinet Security Affairs Office, began his discussion by observing that in the war against crime, the law often comes after the crime and is less effective because of that progression: "The crime comes first, then justice attempts to chase it, to follow it, *post facto*."

There was no law criminalizing hijacking in Japan, for example, until after Japan experienced its first hijacking in 1970; similarly, the use of sarin nerve gas in the recent Tokyo subway attack was not a criminal offense, and although there is now an anti-sarin law, it is not retroactive. "We should be afraid of biological poisons," Mr. Sassa warned, mentioning that the use of botulin poison is still not criminalized in Japan, and that the Aum sect had been researching the ebola virus in Zaire.

In any event, crimes must be measured and tried by laws, and there must always be evidence that crimes have occurred: "Mere confessions are not sufficient," Mr. Sassa reminded his audience.

Mr. Sassa cited as one major difference between the criminal justice systems of Japan and America the fact that Japan has professional judges, but no juries. "We in Japan give high priority to human rights, but our judicial system is not always swift," he observed. As an example, he cited incidents in Nagano in which fourteen members of the Red Army were sentenced twenty-one years after they committed their crimes. "Victims and taxpayers object to such slow justice. For some reason, they seemed to want to see justice served during their lifetimes!"

In earlier days, Mr. Sassa indicated, motivations for crimes seemed relatively simple. Families had domestic problems, neighbors had disagreements. Today, there seem to be more crimes committed purely for pleasure, more happenstance murders with undecipherable motivations, more political crimes in which nightmarish threats and demands are made. During Mr. Sassa's term in office, for example, no CBR (Chemical, Biological, Radiological) incidents took place; then, on March 20th, Japan was jolted by the sarin gas attack.

"In Japan, religious rights and extraterritorial rights of religious corporations are respected and all religions have a tax exempt status. Now, by inaction or omission, we have allowed this to come. Leader Asahara took advantage of the Russia-U.S. conflicts and convinced his followers that by 1999 there would be an Armageddon. Many believed in his hoax and joined the cult . . . With the end of the Cold War, no Armageddon appeared likely, so he had to stage his own, convincing his followers that the U.S. army would use poison gas against them."

After tracing the causes and effects of this one tragic violation of public safety, Sassa stated his strong belief that, "There is much to be done in the education of our young people. People without a vision, dream, or hope for the future try to find their security and identities in cults. Perhaps this phenomenon is global. I can only hope that Japan can share the knowledge we have gleaned from our CBR threats with other countries to prevent further nightmares."

Panelist **Lynn Curtis**, President of The Milton Eisenhower Foundation, also speculated about the causes of crimes and possible ways to prevent them during his presentation. "To a considerable extent," he stated, "we already know a great deal about what works [for reducing crime] for children, youth, families, and the inner city. And we know a great deal about what doesn't work . . . We need to stop doing what doesn't work and use the money saved to replicate what does work—but funded at a scale that is equal to the dimensions of the problem."

Although this seems axiomatic, Dr. Curtis showed how poverty, crime, and racial tensions have increased in the U.S. because we repeated old mistakes instead of learning from them. The number of prison cells tripled between 1981 and 1991, for example, even though there was no proof that additional prisons resulted in less crime. Dr. Curtis stated some shocking figures on incarceration, one of which was: "One of four young African American males in America was in prison, on probation, or on parole by the late 1980s."

Clearly, crime reduction policies such as this don't work. And what does work? Dr. Curtis listed such measures as gun control ("It has worked in Japan."); preschools in which the young are stimulated early; "safe haven" sanctuaries for students after school; educational innovations; job training (carefully linked to job creation); feasible options for continuing on to college; employment linked to economic development; and "problem-oriented, community-based policing, which helps secure a neighborhood for the types of economic development that create jobs."

This latter measure was illustrated in a video which Dr. Curtis showed to those attending the presentation. It showed *koban* ministations working in Japan with what Americans would call "community based policing." Police officers live and work in the kobans, which are small police stations situated in the communities being policed. The officers who live there make concerted efforts to get to know the residents in their area and become true neighbors, "fellow citizens."

The Eisenhower Foundation, which Dr. Curtis represents, has taken American police chiefs and community leaders to observe kobans in Japan, and over the last ten years it has facilitated American variations on this Japanese theme, with heartening results. Kobans work, ". . . not just to reduce crime, but to stabilize neighborhoods for youth, community and economic development."

Unfortunately, Congress is currently proposing to continue to do more of what does not work (building more prisons, allowing more assault weapons, etc.) and less of what does work (reducing funds for successful programs such as the koban models). Dr. Curtis lamented this trend and called for the backing of private sector, nonprofit community-based organizations to solve problems. These, he reasoned, have had the most success because they are the closest to the people.

"Decentralization and 'devolution,' to use the ungainly word now fashionable inside the Washington, D.C. beltway, are to *this* community and neighborhood, level in our plan. As Walt Whitman wrote in *Leaves of Grass*, 'The genius of the United States is not best or most in its executives or legislatures, nor in its ambassadors or authors or colleges or churches . . . nor even in its newspapers or inventors . . . but always most in the common people.'"

The focus of **Yukiko Tsunoda**'s panel presentation was upon issues of women's rights and domestic abuse in Japan, issues which are also of great concern throughout the world. Attorney Tsunoda (Tsunoda Law Firm) began her discussion by noting that infringements of women's rights in Japan tend to be different from those in the United States.

In Japan, for example, fewer instances of husbands' raping their wives are reported. Although in her work in a Tokyo rape crisis center Ms. Tsunoda helps numerous complainants to determine their legal rights, she knows that in Japan few crimes against women are included in the statistics. Crimes are reported only if there is an intent to prosecute; they have a limited period during which they must be reported; and "Rape offenders are seldom pursued, caught or indicted."

"Why are these victims quiet?" Ms. Tsunoda asked. "Because our society and the criminal justice system are forcing them into silence. There is a dichotomy of reason involved—rape is said to be unreported in order to 'protect the chastity of women.' And what is chastity? In Japan, once a woman is no longer a virgin, there can be no rape between a husband and his wife. This logic, of course, is badly flawed. It is espoused for the protection of men, not for protection of the human rights of women."

Society, as well as the criminal justice system, are colluding to help rapists avoid punishment, Ms. Tsunoda averred. "A woman's privacy is not protected, so she hesitates to report rapes, especially spousal rapes and abuse. We need to begin listening much more closely to victims. These crimes are usually investigated by police who are not properly trained in this area."

Ms. Tsunoda reported that in Japan, "little common sense is used in handling sexual crimes." Victims have no anonymity in the court system (unless they are small children), and damage must be established. "Violence is there in Japan. It is very common. It is just not reported, not sufficiently publicized." She backed up her observations with findings from survey results which demonstrated that not only are physical injuries and violence prevalent, they are very serious, although few victims seek police help.

"In this Symposium," Ms. Tsunoda concluded, "we believe it is important to learn from one another. When I first came to the United States, I was impressed by the efforts being made to protect women's and children's human rights. Entire communities joined in these efforts, and the judiciary played a vital role in furthering this protection. In the 1970s, the United States was a great deal like Japan is today in dealing with violations of women's human rights. It is high time we in Japan realize that crimes against women and children are crimes against us all in a very real sense."

Moderator Daniel Bent selected two questions from the many which had been posed to panelist Sabrina McKenna, asking her to speak briefly to, "What pro-active steps might be taken in Japan and in the United States to put us *ahead* of crime instead of always behind it?" and "Why does it cost so much to keep a criminal in prison in the United States?"

Judge McKenna responded that panelist Lynn Curtis might best respond to the first question. On the problems of the high cost of maintaining a prisoner in the U.S., she stated her belief that because the area of human rights is taken very seriously, the rights of criminals are also protected very vigorously. She used as an example a State of Hawaii civil-rights lawsuit which protested prison overcrowding. "I know that in many countries the United States is viewed as perhaps too lenient, too humane, and this might account for the high costs of maintaining a prisoner in our system."

With regard to pro-active steps which might be taken to put us ahead of crime, Judge McKenna referred to some of the measures outlined in Mr. Sassa's and in her own presentations. "This is an area which always perplexes those of us in crime enforcement," she stated. "I wish I had an easy solution. But any pro-active solutions must come through positive approaches toward crime taken by community leaders." As an example of this, she noted the community based efforts of Hawaii's people to revise the state's penal codes. She again referred to Mr. Sassa's comment that a crime must be in the statutes in order for there to be a crime, so laws must be kept up-to-date. Today, this would even involve passing statutes to counter such crimes as computer-based fraud and pornography, and similar matters.

A question for Atsuyuki Sassa involved panelist Robert Scalapino's statement of the previous day that the U.S. and Japan are facing challenges from below. After the Cold War, people started to ask, "Who am I?" and to seize upon fundamentalism and cultism to fill their empty lives. "Does Mr. Sassa believe that the Aum attack resulted from these feelings of disenfranchisement?"

Mr. Sassa's response was positive: Low level racial and ethnic conflicts have now spread all over the world, and the Aum Supreme Truth cult is symbolic and symptomatic of that phenomenon. "It is our experience that you might raise the walls of your prisons, but you will still not prevent crimes. We must instead motivate young people to live together, and to live right. They must develop a sense of self-identity and self-improvement, a sense of *belonging*. The greatest lesson we have learned from the Aum incident is that we must control science and technology, not the other way around. Technology should not dictate human behavior. As Professor Scalapino said, we must give young people a sense of purpose; they must feel they are living worthwhile lives. One way of doing this is to encourage joint actions for good causes such as overseas volunteerism. These types of activities, not raising the height of prison walls, are what we can do."

Another questioner sought additional, more specific, information from Lynn Curtis on the adaptation of the Japanese system of kobans within the United States. "Given the different police systems and communities in the U.S., how did the Eisenhower Foundation implement the idea?"

Dr. Curtis outlined the implementation process, tracing its development from the early stages in the 1980s during which police officers from Japan and the U.S. were first brought into contact with one another. He stressed that American police officers with open minds, those who were receptive to new ideas, were selected to begin the work, and that the koban model was never imposed, only offered as an alternative to other policing systems. "Because of that, we saw many variations of the model," Dr. Curtis observed. "There is still some resistance on the part of some police officers to the idea of community-based, non-governmental organizations training them and, yes, training is an area we will focus on in the future."

As time for answering further questions had run out, the panel moderator Daniel Bent read some of the more interesting ones submitted to the panelists. He suggested that panelists might have other opportunities to speak with those who had submitted questions after the presentation, and thanked the audience for its very active participation in the discussion.

Panel Session Five:
Aging: Responsibility and Cost

The word is "Aging," not the "Aged": The distinction between these two terms in her panel's discussion was immediately pointed out by Moderator **Fumiko Mori Halloran**. "Each of us is aging," she stressed, noting that Makiko Tanaka had made this observation in her earlier Symposium address. Minister Tanaka had, in highlighting the problems accompanying an aging population in Japan, stressed her own personal involvement as both a public figure and the daughter of an aging mother. Moderator Halloran told the audience to expect discussions by the panelists ranging from national to very personal thoughts on aging in today's society.

"Who we are as a society is very much tied to how we treat the most vulnerable among us," reasoned **Robert Friedland**, Director of Research, National Academy on Aging. Not only are the elderly vulnerable to many problems, they are also bound to another vulnerable group in our society—our children, who will be, "tomorrow's workers, tomorrow's leaders, and tomorrow's elderly. It is the future productivity of our children that affords us the ability to ensure that today's elderly have access to health care and a base retirement income. But at the same time, it is the elderly who contribute to the raising of our children and make available through their savings the financial capital to make labor productive. And so, public policy about aging is policy about all of us."

Dr. Friedland introduced statistics which showed that the population of older citizens in the United States, in proportion to the younger population groups, is growing dramatically. "We are living longer with fewer children," he explained. "For a family this means fewer children from which to share in providing care; for our society it means a relatively smaller base from which to tax for public programs directed at the elderly." There is naturally some alarm because, in the future, programs such as social security will have fewer workers to contribute to more beneficiaries. However, Dr. Friedland maintained that worries over this predicted shortfall of funds might be mitigated by the fact that there will potentially be fewer dependent children to support, as well.

After outlining important trends which have changed the composition of family life in America in recent years, Dr. Friedland pointed out that disability rates have changed little as life expectancies have increased. He called long-term care for the elderly "the great unmet concern." The demand for home care and nursing home services is not met by Medicare, which is intended to cover acute care. "A diminution of family effort in providing caregiving assistance to family members who need long-term care" has come with the changing composition of our families. Fortunately, Dr. Friedland reported, these more complicated family relations, ". . . have not led to abandonment of the elderly by their children."

The changes have, however, presented the federal government with a true dilemma. As the U.S. Congress debates how to reduce the budget deficit without increasing taxes or touching Social Security or defense spending, it is also reevaluating the Medicare and Medicaid spending on behalf of the elderly. Friedland provided examples of the interconnected programs, and stressed that "How we use our financial resources is critical." He found it difficult to imagine how families might cope if they also had to pick up greater portions of the direct costs of healthcare, clothing and shelter for their aging relatives.

Although insurers are attempting to sell long-term health care policies, few are buying these. Medicare only covers about one-half of the elderly's acute care costs, and "Virtually no one has adequately prepared for the provision of long-term care." Another problem, Dr. Friedland said, is that too many have nothing to live on but Social Security income: "Social Security was intended to provide a base, a floor of protection, upon which one would layer personal savings and employer-provided pensions." At present, however, less than half of our work force participates in employer-provided pension plans.

The children of the elderly realize that Social Security and Medicare are critical programs, but difficulties are presented by this very support: "Our challenge is to find a way to support today's most vulnerable elderly and their families while at the same time to revamp our spending priorities towards tomorrow's children, while reducing our federal deficit," Dr. Friedland summarized. "Our challenge is to recognize that today's elderly are connected to tomorrow's elderly."

Mikio Kawa placed the problems of Japan's aging society in perspective for his Symposium audience, as Dr. Friedland had done with U.S. problems. As Director of the Promotion Division of Welfare for the Elderly, Bureau of Health & Welfare for the Elderly, Mr. Kawa also came with distinguished credentials for addressing his topic.

"From a nation which was practically destitute after the end of the war fifty years ago," Mr. Kawa observed, "Japan has grown tremendously in wealth and in its quality of living." He provided statistics which showed that his nation's commitment to meeting the needs of its elderly has also grown proportionately, and, "In Japan, both pension and health care are 100% covered, and all national citizens are in the national program."

Concentrating upon the period between 1950 and 1990, Mr. Kawa reported that not only has Japan become richer, many new services and products are now available to Japanese citizens. Today, too, many services which were once done within the household (laundry, meal preparation, etc.) have been externalized. Even being born and dying are now much more likely to take place in a hospital than at home.

As is the population in the United States, Japan's population is aging rapidly. Mr. Kawa reported that in 1947, the average life span of a Japanese male was 51 years, and of a female, 55 years; today those life expectancies are 76 and 82 years, respectively. "In light of these changes in Japanese life and society," Mr. Kawa stated, "our policies and measures for the aged, including pensions and medical care, have, in fact, been fully coordinated. There are still other systematic and structural changes that need to be incorporated, however."

Long-term care for those who are bedridden, in particular for those receiving care at home, is one such area which needs attention. Mr. Kawa proposed that general health, medical, and nursing care all be coordinated to provide comprehensive care for those living at home. He also believes it essential that the Japanese people have a "long-term perspective with a clear vision toward the future. We need to design a system and make plans so that they completely understand these factors which will so heavily influence their lives."

Turning to the theme of social security and the family, Mr. Kawa dispelled the prevailing notion that all Japanese willingly, and without complications, care for their aged parents in their homes. From the 80% of the elderly who were living with their children in 1950, the number had fallen to only 60% in 1990. There has been an increase in the *number* of these senior citizens during that time period, of course, but the percentage cared for by their children continues to decline.

Even more telling, perhaps, is the fact that "There are circumstances that make it difficult for them to live with their children." Mr. Kawa pointed out, for example, that Japan once had few women who worked outside of the home, and these unpaid workers were expected to care for both children and elderly parents. Today, the government needs to not only provide nursery and daycare facilities for working mothers' children, but also services for the elderly who were once cared for by Japanese housewives.

Mr. Kawa stated, in conclusion, that a final challenge to his government comes because, "Independent individuals and families which are self sufficient and self reliant are supporting the entire society. How can we do something for these individuals and families? We need to seek a good balance, a good combination of these efforts for the future."

Shifting back to the ways in which the United States is dealing with the problems of an aging society, **Thomas Mahoney**, Professor Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, brought his audience timely information on the 1995 White House Conference on Aging (WHCOA). Dr. Mahoney had only recently served as one of twenty-five members of that commission's Policy Committee (PC) which had planned and overseen the conference. The 1995 WHCOA, which was the first in fourteen years and will be the last in this century, was called by President Clinton and charged with making recommendations for a national aging policy for the next decade.

Once again, the distinction of the term "aging," as opposed to "the aged," was stressed by a panelist. Dr. Mahoney stated that "The PC chose as the Conference theme, 'America Now and Into the 21st Century: Generations Aging Together with Independence, Opportunity, and Dignity.' The key phrase here is 'Generations Aging Together,' which clearly identifies the Conference with aging as opposed to the aged and says that this is a process all humans share, regardless of age."

Four major issues, each with seven sub-issues, were discussed by conference delegates: health, economic security, housing, and quality of life. Experts on gerontology and geriatrics (two were from Japan) attended the American conference " . . . because of its global significance, especially its democratic procedures." President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore addressed the conference, both emphasizing the need to contain Medicare and Medicaid costs, and "President Clinton received sustained applause for his call to make long-term care available in the home."

Dr. Mahoney reported that the conference concluded on May 5th in a plenary session in which the delegates adopted fifty resolutions. "The top vote getter was the resolution, 'Keeping Social Security Sound for Now and for the Future.' Two of its most significant parts, Medicare and Medicaid, were also in the top five of the resolutions adopted. By their vote, the delegates gave the lie to the tired slur that older persons were 'greedy geezers' when they called for a sound Social Security not only for themselves but for all generations to come. Social Security, in my opinion, is itself a truly intergenerational program and one which I consider a sacred compact between the American people and the government."

Also recognized at the WHCOA were intergenerational coalition building; the importance of grandparents in the changed U.S. family structure (many grandparents are now serving as children's primary caregivers); the neglected "sandwich generation" of men and women caring for both children and parents; and, for the first time at such a conference, women's health issues. Hillary Rodham Clinton presided over a plenary session on the latter issue.

Dr. Mahoney observed that "The two resolutions on Medicare and Medicaid . . . have become the key issues before the country as far as the budget is concerned." He hoped that tangible ways might be found to implement the conference's recommendations, and suggested several possible ways of proceeding beyond the conference, itself. Among those were discussing values and not just dollars; aggressive intergenerational support; learning from other cultures and nations (and from advances in technology, ideas and resources); and massive commitment to control the cost of health care by focusing on fraud, waste, managed care, health promotion, and disease prevention.

"If we do not make conscious decisions about establishing our social values and goals," Dr. Mahoney concluded, "the invisible hand of time and events will force its own values and priorities upon us. If that time comes, it may be too late to change course."

Kazunori Yamanoi, Lecturer at Nara Women's College, gave his panel presentation a title: "Gray Outlook: Japan's Silver Lining Has Some Clouds." The man who had seen his grandmother bedridden at home for twenty years knew many of those clouds first-hand. "People in Europe and America tend to believe that Japan is a nation that respects and takes good care of its elderly," he stated. "The actuality, however, is that it is not so pleasant for senior citizens."

Mr. Yamanoi's research on aging led to numerous publications which resulted from his personal observations of the elderly in Japan, especially of the *netakiri rojin*, the bedridden or bedbound elderly. "In 1989," he reported, "Japan's Management and Coordination Agency conducted a poll on what people feared most in old age . . . the greatest number of respondents replied, 'Becoming a *netakiri rojin* or senile.'"

Mr. Yamanoi reasoned that this fear is so great because of the failure of family members to provide proper care for their elderly relatives. The suicide rate among the *netakiri rojin* is high, and 60% of those who took their lives were living with family members. "In modern Japan," he revealed, "living together with a child's family is not necessarily pleasant. The all-too-common struggle between the bride and the mother-in-law has become a social problem that is a popular theme of TV dramas today. Women's groups are pointing out that the so-called "free" labor of housewives comes, in fact, at very great costs to the nation."

Mr. Yamanoi listed some of the difficulties family members (especially the sons' wives) have in performing this arduous task, and he called for improved public welfare services to better the lot of the bedridden elderly and of their care providers.

For the growing number of affluent elderly, Mr. Yamanoi reported, various businesses have evolved to fill this need. The "silver businesses," which often include "silver mansions," or apartments for independent living, require huge initial investments, however, and monthly fees that are prohibitive for all but the very rich. Yamanoi believes that people are attracted to "silver mansions" because of what he called, "the great backwardness of public welfare for the aged in Japan." There are long waiting lists for homes for the elderly, and even those who are fortunate enough to secure a place in these facilities sacrifice their privacy, typically living four people to a room.

An estimated 1.5 million *netakiri rojin* will need assistance by the year 2020, Mr. Yamanoi revealed, and the Japanese Diet is planning ways to boost taxes to pay for their welfare. Objections to tax increases for this purpose are few because most people realize that changes must be made. "Deep-seated in the minds of the leaders of industry, however, is the thinking that if Japan expands public welfare for the elderly, as in European countries, taxes will become so high that Japan's economic power will dwindle."

Mr. Yamanoi concluded that: "Japan is the first country in Asia ever to face the problems of an aging society. To what extent can Japan depend on the family to cope with the problems this creates? Japan's experiment will be watched with great interest by other Asian countries."

Following Mr. Yamanoi's presentation, a questioner asked Dr. Friedland if he had any cautions for Japan if it planned to import some of the Americans' ideas for caring of the elderly (insurance products, home care and nursing home care, etc.). In answer, Dr. Friedland pointed out the inadequacies of some of these possible "imports," primarily the fragmented ways in which they are utilized in the United States. "We have a tremendous *non*-system of long-term care," he observed. Planning is limited, new insurance products are created out of fear, costs are measured only in dollars. At present, home-care is financed primarily by Medicare, a program designed for those recuperating from acute illnesses, and "different skills, different institutions are needed for good quality home-care for the elderly."

What we must begin doing, Dr. Friedland stated, is to begin to think of the needs of the *patients*, who require quality care both in nursing homes and in the community. "We have a long way to go," he told the questioner. "We are still learning. Please look at what we hope to do, not at what we are doing today."

Panel Session Six:
Seeking a Better Life: Challenges of International Migration

As had other panel moderators, **Vernon Alden**, former Chairman of the Boston Company, commented on the extreme timeliness of the topic of his panel's discussion, both in Japan and in the United States. In Japan, he noted, there is much concern over the importation of foreign labor, and in states like California and New Mexico pressure is growing to convince legislatures to limit both illegal and legal immigration because of the extremely high costs of services to immigrants.

Mr. Alden introduced his first panelist, **Wayne Cornelius**, a Professor of Political Science at the University of California at San Diego, who shared his current research on the problems created when foreign labor is imported into a country.

Dr. Cornelius stated that "Public tolerance for immigration is once again on the decline in the United States." Waves of anti-immigration sentiment are a cyclical phenomenon in U.S. history, dating back to the late 18th century. Dr. Cornelius proceeded to list the most prominent reasons for increased demands for reducing immigration, most based more upon myths than upon "clear-headed, data-based evaluation." Citizens' concerns about the economy and rising crime, the increasing visibility of ethnically and culturally distinct foreigners in their areas, and their declining confidence in the country's ability to absorb more of these foreigners are further inflamed by the "posturing of opportunistic politicians."

Cries for increased enforcement of restrictive immigration laws are almost always directed at the more visible and "unacceptable" immigrant groups; calls for the enforcement of laws against the more acceptable immigrants, who would need to be rooted out of established businesses, are quieter. "By most estimates," Dr. Cornelius stated, "visa overstayers constitute about one-half of the total stock of unauthorized immigrants in the United States today, but their presence is almost totally ignored by the general public as well as by most elected officials."

Dr. Cornelius then offered explanations for this inequity, showing that the costs of purging the country of this latter, entrenched immigrant group would be great. Even more significant was the composition of the group, generally deemed "model nationalities," not the so-called "problem nationalities."

"It is, therefore, the *sources* of today's immigrant influx—not just absolute numbers of foreigners, nor even whether they are legal or illegal entrants—that arouse most of the anxiety about immigration in the U.S. today," Dr. Cornelius observed, adding that "The U.S. has never really come to terms with the fact that it *is* a multicultural 'nation of immigrants,'" despite mythology to the contrary.

Dr. Cornelius believes that Japan's intolerance of immigration (because of its traditional adherence to the principle of ethnic homogeneity) is not necessarily greater than intolerance in the more multicultural United States, partly because Japan's stance on employment is more pragmatic. The Japanese more readily admit that foreign labor is necessary for some jobs, and recognize that there are classes of jobs (known as the "3-K" jobs) which are shunned by others. They see that these jobs are not decreasing even in more advanced, high-tech societies. Dr. Cornelius observed that "As in Japan, illegal foreign workers are showing up everywhere [in the United States], and they are still getting jobs, even in a slow-growth or recessionary economy."

After analyzing the inefficacy of border controls and employment eligibility verification in stemming illegal immigration, Dr. Cornelius suggested that the prescription of his fellow panelist Haruo Shimada for closing the gap between politics and reality in Japan was valid—namely, that we must recognize the *inevitability* of a significant and growing presence of foreign labor in our countries no matter what alternatives are pursued. With that as a starting place, and a realistic recognition of our countries' "guestworker" programs and how they work, officials can develop policies and programs for recruiting sufficient foreign workers "through the front door," and integrating those who opt to become permanent residents into the host society.

In conclusion, Dr. Cornelius stated that doing so would take both political courage and societal self-confidence. "We must somehow get beyond the short-term politics of fear, resentment, and cultural threat, and move to a clear-headed, data-based evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternative policy options for regulating immigration—not making it disappear."

Panelist **Haruo Shimada**, Keio University Professor of Economics, furthered his audience's understanding of the immigration situation in Japan and proposed ways in which to solve some of the problems presented by the influx of foreign labor into that country. He remarked that the Symposium presented an excellent opportunity to discuss that issue because "we are in Hawaii, which is a melting pot of races, and because of the timing of the Symposium, during which we look forward to the 21st Century."

Dr. Shimada's more formal observations began with this statement: "Japan's foreign worker problem is a serious one that will influence the future of the nation to a greater extent than people generally realize." He cited statistics showing the huge number of undocumented workers presently in Japan, and he noted that although the problems they present are not new to Japan, today's combination of Japan's nominally high income and the aging of its population are enhancing its attractiveness to foreign workers, presenting even greater problems for the Japanese.

Expanding upon Dr. Cornelius' reference to Japan's shunned "3-K" workers, Dr. Shimada explained that an English equivalent for that term might be "dirty, demanding and demeaning" occupations, and he stated that more and more young Japanese workers are refusing to perform them. However, "The current Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law takes a strict line, permitting residence to foreign workers with special skills or knowledge, but prohibiting those without such skills or know-how from residing in the country for purposes of employment."

Consequently, a paradoxical situation arises: Unauthorized foreign workers are allowed into Japan, but their alien status insures that their human rights are not protected. Although foreign workers may enter Japan under the sponsorship of "brokers," most are "forced to work illegally and are treated, in effect, as criminals." They are not seen as "real workers," so employers feel little obligation to pay them "real wages." Abuses are rampant, and the workers' countries of origin observe Japan's deceptive labor policies with a consequent decline in respect for the Japanese. Dr. Shimada predicted dire results for the future unless this is changed, including growing tensions in Japanese society and distortions in the economy.

As had Dr. Cornelius for the United States, Dr. Shimada called for bringing foreign labor into Japan "through the front door." His personal proposal involved Japan's creating a new resident legal status for immigrants and creating for them a training center where they could "work-and-learn" their crafts inside Japan's borders. Employers *and* workers would have clearly defined rights, and the skills attained would be measurable and understandable. A placement agency for work-and-learn employment would also be established, and ordinary Japanese citizens (such as housewives) would be shown the desirability of becoming teachers of Japanese language to the trainees.

Dr. Shimada pointed out that even in nations which are made up of immigrants (such as the United States and Australia), considerable discrimination against undesirable immigrants still exists. "It is easy to hold up the principle of equality, but anyone who claims that such equality can be fully implemented can hardly be living in the real world." He believes, however, that by breaking the psychological barriers which lead to discrimination, Japan has an opportunity to be a true world leader in the future.

"By doing its best to reform the employment structure, Japan will be in a better position to welcome foreign workers, accord them civil rights, and treat them the same way as Japanese citizens. This will minimize the various social problems that could arise from opening the doors to foreign workers, and it is the best way to ensure that the situation develops to our mutual advantage and not to our mutual detriment."

Glen Krebs, President of Global Business Advisors, began his panel presentation with these words: "It is difficult to separate fact from fiction in the current immigration debate in the United States." He then presented several verifiable facts about U.S. immigration—its nature, its sources, the areas to which immigrants migrate, and the numbers of legal immigrants and others who enter the country on a temporary non-immigrant basis. He then noted that "Beyond the permanent immigrants and temporary non-immigrants who are granted visas each year, there are those who come to the United States through illegal channels, and it is at this point that fact and fiction blur."

The number of illegal immigrants is difficult to document, with estimates of between 3,000 illegals joining the current illegal immigrant population each year (INS estimates) to between one and three million people (immigration interest groups' estimates, which may be more accurate). Although some regions of the country are fairly tolerant of this group, most antagonism does focus upon illegal immigrants. A major backlash against them, for example, is now taking place in California, which absorbs perhaps half of the nation's illegal immigrants.

"The current immigration debate in the U.S. focuses on the legitimacy and worth of both legal and illegal immigration," Mr. Krebs stated. "In this debate there are many arguments in favor of continuing or even increasing immigration. One of the most persuasive of these is that most U.S. citizens come from immigrant ancestors . . . Their diversity has created and contributed to the value of life in the U.S. Another argument is the economic benefits of immigration. These include the human capital which immigrants comprise, the taxes paid by immigrants and the gutsy, entrepreneurial spirit of immigrants." As had earlier panelists, Mr. Krebs pointed out that immigrants often accept jobs which Americans are unable or unwilling to perform: "Because of this, they seldom displace American workers."

Within the United States, Mr. Krebs is seeing a strong, bipartisan constituency arguing vocally for the curbing of immigration. Although some of the reasons behind these appeals are xenophobic, and many are based more upon emotion than facts, he has found one credible, and one somewhat credible argument: that immigrants contribute to poverty, and that they swell the welfare rolls of the U.S. However, he countered two other popular arguments: that immigrants take jobs from Americans, and that aliens are more prone to crime than citizens. He then went on to acquaint his listeners with factual data on the costs of supporting immigrants in California, versus the economic gains which such immigrants bring to the state.

Mr. Krebs said that, "No one knows for sure what will be the final outcome of the debate about immigration in the U.S., but it is certain to be a colorful and persistent question in foreign and domestic policy." As examples of proposals now being advanced, he cited the executive summary issued by the "Jordan Commission," a government appointed council for studying the problems of immigration and advancing possible solutions.

"It is safe to say," he concluded, "that the immigration debate is likely to be an important element in the upcoming presidential election. With the current political tide in Washington and in high immigration states such as California, Texas and Florida, I think it is safe to predict that there will be a reduction in the number of aliens who are allowed to enter the United States both legally and illegally."

Yasuaki Onuma, Professor of International Law at the University of Tokyo, presented Symposium attendees with a comprehensive and perceptive analysis of the problems of international migration.

Noting the gigantic gap in economic power between nations today, he stated that "The advanced nations are proud of their unprecedented productivity and economic prosperity." In order to develop an even more powerful economy, they accept the cheap labor offered by less developed nations. The result is greatly increased immigration, and though the U.S. and European nations are also "accepting nations," Japan is different.

What sets Japan apart, Dr. Onuma revealed, is that nation's past and present. In early years Japan sent its own citizenry as laborers in other countries such as the U.S., but when Korea was under Japan's colonial rule, many Korean workers immigrated from the Korean Peninsula as cheap labor. "Post-war Japan, focused on rebuilding its devastated land and increasingly worried about gaining economic prosperity, did not think about accepting immigrants. The myth of the homogeneous nation has been fixed in Japanese society since the Meiji Period and Japan has maintained a very closed policy toward immigration."

When Japan's economy expanded, however, corporations looked toward other countries where labor was less costly, and all of Asia wanted to take advantage of the many jobs available in Japan. "Government policies were not altered to reflect the acceptance of foreign laborers. In the short term view, the conventional measures seemed adequate, but with the economic recession, there has been a backlash against the foreign workers."

Dr. Onuma agreed wholeheartedly with Dr. Shimada's call for clear and realistic immigration policies for Japan. "The United States has accepted many immigrants, who have helped to build a vital economy," he observed. "It afforded them civil liberties and a generous amount of freedom." Dr. Onuma wondered, however, if America's excessive growth might also have led to its discrimination against minorities. Discrimination does exist in Japan, and though it is less specific and overt, the types of discrimination that do exist ". . . do not prepare us sufficiently to live in the 21st century."

Returning to Japan's history, Dr. Onuma stated that "'Learning From Each Other' is not very difficult for the Japanese." He cited Chinese and Korean contributions accepted into Japan's culture, and the more recent gains made by incorporating Western knowledge into its development. "What is needed for the Japanese is thinking independently rather than learning from others." Conversely, he found that "The Americans are far behind in learning from Japan. They have begun learning, but the effort must be greatly increased." He spoke of "hidden assumptions" made about Japan which are not valid because most Americans' knowledge of Japan's culture and its language is very limited. For example, "American secretaries, even American ambassadors, do not understand Japanese. I believe it is essential for Americans to greatly increase their knowledge about Japan, especially in the twenty-first century when the U.S. will probably remain as *a* superpower, but not necessarily as *the* superpower in a world of many superpowers."

Dr. Onuma concluded his presentation on a somewhat more positive note, stating his belief that those who had gathered for the International Symposium have been making, "a great effort in bringing the United States in this direction, in 'learning from each other,' and I appreciate this. However, I *do* insist that greater efforts are needed."

The question and answer period following the formal discussions of immigration was necessarily very brief. Panelist Glen Krebs had time to comment upon one question about the problems of human smuggling and migrant trafficking: "Is illegal immigration connected to organized crime? How will this affect future patterns of immigration in Japan and the United States?"

Although Mr. Krebs stated that he did not know the extent of the problem, he assumed that it involved only a small part of the immigrants entering a country. However, there is also human smuggling being conducted by others, and it adds an "unsightly and tragic" face to the other problems of immigration. Mr. Krebs did not feel that it would have a major effect upon the future of immigration, but that it would continue to play a small, albeit an ugly and uncomfortable, part in the total immigration picture.

Haruo Shimada commented upon questions he had received about the perceived structural gap in the salaries of American workers and Japanese workers. He explained it to be the result of the "current distorted exchange rates" which he predicted would not continue for a long period. He suggested: "If you have a lot of money to invest, don't buy yen at this point, because this yen/dollar situation will not last."

Mentioning Wayne Cornelius' statement that there appeared to be a growing acceptance of foreigners on the part of the Japanese, Dr. Shimada concurred, but added that there was a dual structure involved. "On the surface, yes, Japanese tend to be friendly. But the real question is whether the Japanese have a framework under which individual human rights are protected, and this is a question which we must examine very carefully."

Dr. Onuma and Dr. Cornelius gave up their summation time in deference to " a greater cause," namely, the luncheon which followed their panel.

Featured Keynote Address

"Japan and the U.S.: Old Friends, New Questions"

The Honorable Takakazu Kuriyama

The Ambassador to the United States, The Honorable **Takakazu Kuriyama**, was introduced to his Symposium audience by Ambassador Thomas Shoesmith as having, " . . . a sympathetic understanding of the United States." Shoesmith also called his friend "an exemplar of a true diplomat," and he noted how gracefully Kuriyama and his wife Mimi had represented their country in America.

Ambassador Kuriyama elected to use the Americans' preferred method of beginning his address—providing his audience with a bit of humor. He quoted the British writer, G.K. Chesterton, who once told an American audience, "My last American tour consisted of inflicting no less than ninety lectures on people who never did me any harm." Kuriyama stated that, "In that spirit, I've been going all over America, and I'm always grateful for the kind reception I receive . . . in spite of my speeches. As I told one audience, 'I do not like to listen to long speeches any more than you do. Unfortunately, I do enjoy giving them.'"

In actuality, Ambassador Kuriyama's address was not a long one. It was, however, substantive and, after his opening remarks, extremely serious. His message reflected both his nation's friendship and gratitude to the United States, and also the perilous point at which the two countries now find themselves in their economic dealings.

Ambassador Kuriyama first read from the memoirs of a young American Marine who had witnessed the bombing of Nagasaki, then continued with his own personal recollections of his family's wartime nightmares. He called attention to the fact that, after the war's tremendous pain and anguish, " . . . the healing began with surprising speed."

Why, Ambassador Kuriyama wondered, have our countries come so far in such a remarkably short time? "I believe it's because our two countries share common values and outlooks. Some things are not West; they are not East; they are good and right and democratic."

Yet Ambassador Kuriyama expressed serious concern that the trust which this shared outlook has engendered is being eroded, and that our two peoples ". . . increasingly view our relationship not on the basis of our compatibilities but our frictions . . . On the surface, the reason is economics—or, more accurately, misperceptions about economics. But more deeply, there are misperceptions about change and culture and the differences between us. I'm often told that there are two schools of thought about Japan in the U.S.: that Japan and America are different, but Japan can be changed to become like America, or that Japan and America are different, but Japan cannot be changed so, therefore, it should be treated as different." Ambassador Kuriyama explained why he found both of those perceptions to be erroneous.

Just has America has changed from its rural, Norman Rockwell days, Japan has changed remarkably during the past years. It is much more pluralistic, Ambassador Kuriyama maintains, and the Americans' "Japan, Inc." stereotype is definitely outdated. He recounted his experiences during recent auto trade negotiations, saying that at times he and the U.S. trade representative seemed to have been talking in different languages. "We *were*, in fact, talking about two different worlds," Ambassador Kuriyama observed. "Mr. Kantor was talking about the Japan of yesterday. I was talking about the Japan of today."

Ambassador Kuriyama expressed his frustration over the interpretation of statistics and other information which seems to lend credence to the Americans' notion of Japan's intractability in its trade dealings. He maintained that Japan has progressed greatly from its once-closed ways, but, "Sometimes Japan's changes just aren't seen by American eyes."

In regards to Japan's large trade surplus with the U.S., Ambassador Kuriyama stated that "The truth is that *Japan's* changing will never solve *America's* problems." The United States will continue to run trade deficits as long as it sustains federal budget deficits and Americans' savings rates remain as low as they are today.

Next, Ambassador Kuriyama presented additional information on the bilateral trade imbalance, noting that although Japan still has a ways to go to open its market and to integrate its economy with the outside world, the imbalance in itself is not a relevant measure of how open or closed Japanese markets are.

Instead of fixating upon the imbalance, Ambassador Kuriyama offered an alternative: "The level playing field we need is understanding," he stated. Not only has Japan changed at the governmental level, Japanese consumers' attitudes towards imports have changed significantly. "I am concerned," Ambassador Kuriyama confessed, "that neither the scope nor the depth of the changes occurring in Japan is understood in the United States." He then advanced several possible reasons for that lack of understanding, and cited examples (such as the Japan Exchange and Teaching Program, in which Americans live and teach English in little-known places in Japan or work in prefectural governments) which demonstrated how interchanges can help to promote the true understanding we need.

"We must encourage our two peoples to be exposed to the other's culture in order to understand our differences," Ambassador Kuriyama concluded, charging representatives of the Japan-America Societies to "See the opening door that is Japan and . . . help the perceptions of Japan catch up with the reality of the changes in Japan. That is my request of you today."

Panel Session Seven:
Easing Economic Tensions

The adjective that panel Moderator **David McClain** (Professor, University of Hawaii College of Business Administration) used for describing Japan's and America's current economic problems was "exasperating." The litany of blame reported each day in the world media was nothing new, he pointed out. Today, the frictions focus on the ongoing automotive talks, but similar complaints were voiced during talks on rice, on semiconductors, on other trade areas throughout the years. Dr. McClain, in characterizing the exasperation felt by all during the negotiations, referred to the negotiators using a current movie title, *Dumb and Dumber*.

After his opening statements, Moderator McClain introduced **Glen Fukushima**, Vice-president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan and noted expert upon U.S.-Japan trade negotiations. Mr. Fukushima acknowledged that although the "Easing Economic Tensions" panel was the last formal discussion of the Symposium, its subject was perhaps first in the minds of the Symposium attendees, and the impact of the auto trade talks could be monumental, ". . .if action comes about because of failure to reach agreement in these next few days."

Mr. Fukushima painted a picture of the Japan-America relationship as a "stool with three legs." The legs which held the precarious alliance in balance were the security, political and economic aspects of the relationship. The major imbalance, at this point, is in the economic leg. "These asymmetries and inequities need to be repaired," Mr. Fukushima stated. "The fact that there are tensions and differences in the economic relationship is not something to be alarmed about, given the fact that these two large economies interact with each other in such an extensive and complicated way. But the real question is how to manage these conflicts and differences and how to ease the tensions."

Some of the observations which Mr. Fukushima presented might well lead to positive steps for lessening those tensions. He found what Ambassador Kuriyama had just said (about government level barriers in Japan being greatly reduced in recent years) to be true. On the other hand, private sector barriers have grown in importance, and the Japanese government has been "unwilling or unable" to resolve these. He concluded that because of this, the role of the private sector in resolving disputes should increase.

There is a gap formed in accountability, Mr. Fukushima mentioned, which leads people to wonder who's in charge. He elaborated upon the lowering of trade barriers at the governmental level, but also stated that, from the standpoint of foreign companies attempting to do business in Japan, a second level of structural, organizational, and especially attitudinal barriers is still in effect. "The often-heard word in Japan, *jimai shugi*, or self-sufficiency being a virtue, is something that is very real in Japanese organizations."

Mr. Fukushima also offered support, from his experience in doing business in Japan, for his contention that the definition of competitiveness can be quite different in Japan from its definition in other world markets. Whereas in most countries a product's attributes define its competitiveness in the market, in Japan, support and relationship factors are often more important.

Of his observation that the Japanese government has been unwilling or unable to remedy this situation, Mr. Fukushima mentioned not only current "passing the buck" reasoning, but also positive examples of what can be accomplished when the Japanese government actively encourages Japanese companies to solve trade problems (the 1986 semiconductor agreement, for example).

Because many of these problems are intangible, rules-based international organizations have only a limited ability to solve them. This fact led to Mr. Fukushima's challenge to both Japanese and American companies to promote cooperation wherever possible, and to rely less upon governmental remedies. "In the best of all possible worlds, I suppose we could rely on political leadership to bring this about. Unfortunately, right now there doesn't seem to be a lot of political leadership in either country with regard to the U.S.-Japan economic relationship."

Mr. Fukushima warned that, "If Japanese and American companies do *not* take a bigger role in trying to resolve these problems, the U.S.-Japan relationship, itself, including its security and political dimensions, may be jeopardized."

Kazuo Nukazawa, Executive Counselor of Keidanren, pointed out that his wearing of a "Hawaii costume," an aloha shirt, might put him at odds with panelists who were dressed more formally. "Ambassador Kuriyama said that the society of Japan is changing and becoming more pluralistic," he said with a smile, "but I am probably one who does not concur with the consensus of society." He also claimed that he had not prepared a detailed speech, knowing that the other panelists would by now "fully satisfy, intellectually" the audience's needs with their impeccable speeches.

Nukazawa then went on to add his own unique contribution to the topic of "Easing Economic Tensions" by bringing Symposium attendees up-to-date on the current situation in Tokyo, since he ventured that most delegates had come either from the United States or from areas of Japan outside of Tokyo. He discussed two aspects of Japan's economic impasse—the domestic economy and the impasse with the U.S.—which he felt were interrelated.

One breakthrough he mentioned was macroeconomic management. "If we increase domestic demand we will be able to absorb more imports from foreign countries, including the United States." He also outlined how the deflation gap in Japan has become so high and the government so heavily in debt. "The long term bond of the Japanese government has come up to the level of 200 trillion yen, which is about 40% of Japanese GNP. So the government does not have money. The private sector has over-invested in the past years."

A commonsense approach to the country's domestic economic impasse would involve increasing demand. "After the law of Keynes, we have learned how to print money and inflate demand," Mr. Nukazawa said. "But there is opposition to that, mainly from the people who are responsible for fiscal discipline."

The government's debt to the nation, both short and long term debt, is very high: "The central government has borrowed nearly 80% of the Japanese GNP, which is probably similar to the American federal government's situation. So there is legitimacy in what the fiscal authorities are saying. But there is a small difference. The Japanese are borrowing from the Japanese. The American government is borrowing not only from Americans but also from foreign countries."

Although Mr. Nukazawa urged more economic discipline on the part of Japan's government, he also advocated an increase in expenditures for infrastructure, for example, and especially for funding scientific projects which might lead to technological breakthroughs in needed areas such as nuclear fusion. "Except for Indonesia, almost all Asian countries are importing enormous amounts of oil," so technological breakthroughs in the field of energy would be more than welcome. He mentioned that nuclear fusion is an area in which the U.S., Russia, Japan and European nations are cooperating.

Turning to the area of deregulation, Mr. Nukazawa stated his belief that "We want to go into a period of small government." However, efforts at deregulation are not going smoothly, and economic power is still concentrated in the central government. Opponents to the efforts "sit on regulations" and oppose further privatization by instilling fears that Japan will become more like America. If society is completely dominated by competition, there are few winners, many losers."

Despite this, Mr. Nukazawa voiced strong personal support for deregulation. "I don't propose for Tokyo to become New York," he explained, "maybe just more like Hawaii, or possibly San Francisco!" He mentioned that the deregulation conflict is made even greater by American negotiators who demand that the Japanese government be strong and order businesses to do this and that. "Would you want that? No. Corporations should be free to buy goods which are better and cheaper, and from whomever they like. This is at the heart and core of corporate freedom."

Mr. Nukazawa stated that Japan and America are not the only nations involved in the equation, and that Asian nations, in particular, have a stake in negotiations such as the current auto trade talks. These nations fear that if Japan gives in to pressures from the United States, a precedent might be set for the Americans to "come after" those who are not as strong as Japan. They wonder if this is the meaning of democracy. Mr. Nukazawa reaffirmed his belief that threats of invoking Super 301 against Japan are unfair and an infringement of GATT, and he expressed indignation over the threatened U.S. tariff on Japanese luxury cars, the very threat of which, he declared, has already severely hampered that industry.

"Certainly, we would like to see business-to-business negotiations with the United States," Mr. Nukazawa concluded, "but we do not want to negotiate with anyone who has a gun. The result would be obvious. We want to talk with people with fewer guns and more common sense."

When **Sozaburo Okamatsu** had been invited to participate in the Symposium panel on economic tensions, his first feelings had been negative. "However, the title of the session was so fascinating, I decided almost immediately to join." In his panel presentation, Mr. Okamatsu, the former Vice-Chairman for International Affairs of MITI, placed many of the panel's issues into both personal and historical perspective.

Mr. Okamatsu recalled his youth, growing up in postwar days in a Japan which " . . . could only have survived with generous American aid." He recounted his country's economic struggle to reduce its deficit and recover economically. "Finally, during the second half of the 1960s, we were able to put our country on a stable surplus basis. The irony today is that the pressing task for Japan is how to reduce its surplus in the current account. Also, we are deeply concerned about the ruinous appreciation of the yen."

Noting that his own career with the MITI had paralleled Japan's economic development, Mr. Okamatsu analyzed strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese economy and of the "growing economic interdependence" of Japan's relationship with the United States. Many products cannot be made without imported parts, for example, and direct investment between the two countries has increased, and along with that, an increased number of Japanese and Americans are visiting and living in each other's countries.

"While economic interdependence has increased between us, frictions, unfortunately, have also increased," Mr. Okamatsu continued, tracing trade frictions which dated from the early 1960s. Americans at first called for increases in restrictions of Japanese imports; then, after the semiconductor dispute in 1986, they shifted their focus to access to lucrative Japanese markets. "Foreign exporters began to question Japan's domestic regulations, business practices, and government policies. In other words, trade frictions began to center on Japan's economic and social structure."

Mr. Okamatsu lamented the growth of mutual distrust between Japan and America, and he stated his belief that if we had observed most situations objectively, "Most disputes should have been solved, but in most cases, disputes were politicized and emotionalized." He called for that much-needed objectivity, and for the creation of a framework for resolving economic disputes from "a purely economic viewpoint, with expert but neutral mediation."

To fellow panelist Glen Fukushima, Mr. Okamatsu commented that "The Japanese government will not do anything that a government should not do. The private sectors' earlier bargaining cannot be repeated because of economic conditions today." And as had panelist Nukazawa, Okamatsu stated his belief that the United States' "unilateral" decision to implement Section 301 and propose 100% tariffs on Japanese luxury cars was "a clear violation of WTO rules."

From specific trade frictions, Mr. Okamatsu turned to more sweeping observations on the Japan-America economic relationship. He listed extensive changes which are now affecting Japan (the growing consumer movement, cries for deregulation and for changes in Japan's industrial structure, for example).

"Japan is anxious to strengthen its economic foundations," he concluded. "As for the United States, I wish to say that through my dealings with American people while I was stationed in New York and through my work with MITI, I have come to appreciate that the American people are, above all, reasonable and fair . . . My hope is that from now on the United States will help to create a global society that transcends historical, cultural, and social differences for further development of the world economy."

Seiji Naya, Director of the State of Hawaii's Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism, opted to focus his panel presentation upon "...broad regional aspects of bilateral relations and approaches to easing tensions."

Although Dr. Naya had observed many changes since having first come to Hawaii forty years earlier, he mentioned just one: "The Japanese were poor then. And now look. There is much Japanese investment in Hawaii, and though there has been a temporary slowdown, I hope that it will continue to play a large role in our future."

In summarizing his views of the current trade talks, Dr. Naya noted that June 28th is the deadline for an agreement on the auto trade talks, that tensions are high, and, "For some time, Japan and the U.S. have been debating the root causes of the present trade imbalances." He generalized that for the U.S., the problems are largely due to a macroeconomic imbalance (the huge government budget deficit and low U.S. savings rate); for Japan, they are primarily structural (a highly regulated economy with close ties between firms, and a high national savings rate).

Although both nations are attempting to remedy these problems, progress has been slow and frustration is growing. In its frustration, the U.S. has listened to revisionists' views of trade relations which recommend "managed" trade with numerical targets, something which economists warn against. "My personal view is that it would be a major mistake to impose sanctions at this time," Dr. Naya stated, adding several reasons for anticipating extremely negative impacts for both nations should those sanctions go into effect.

Dr. Naya also stated that referring the dispute to the WTO would be ill-advised, and he reminded his audience that private barriers to trade in Japan, which are ". . . very difficult to break down because they are closely tied to social traditions," require greater understanding on the part of Americans if they are not to become discouraged, once again, by any agreements reached. He predicted that a compromise would be forged by the deadline. "Anything less courts disaster for the U.S., Japan, and the broader context of global economic cooperation . . . As panelist Nukazawa said, the impact of this will affect more than Japan and the United States."

Continuing along this line of thought, Dr. Naya noted that "Clearly, a trade war between Japan and the United States is not in anyone's best interest. The U.S. and Japan are actually highly interdependent," and he supported that contention with facts and figures. He advocated approaching cooperation with Japan in a regional context, with a greater understanding of "the perception of this process of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific." Needed, too, is a "building block" approach to economic cooperation for laying the foundations of trade policy cooperation.

Another more productive governmental role would involve, as is currently being done in Hawaii, getting smaller firms more active in international trade, something which the U.S. can learn from Japan and other East Asian countries. "Instead of attempting to manage trade," Dr. Naya suggested, "we can stimulate trade by providing information to our disadvantaged small and medium-sized enterprises."

Dr. Naya believes that Hawaii must play a major role in increasing economic and cultural opportunities in the future, looking toward the economically dynamic Asia-Pacific region for more than just tourism. "We still have a long way to go to fulfill the vision of Hawaii as the American 'gateway to Asia,'" he admitted, but he hoped that by looking both outward (especially toward Asia-Pacific) and inward (to see weaknesses within ourselves), Hawaii will contribute toward greater American productive engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. "We hope these efforts will also help to ease economic tensions with Japan and other Asian trading partners and secure a brighter future for our children."

The first question addressed to the panelists was posed to Ambassador Kuriyama, who had joined the panel following his formal address. "Several of the questions I have received go like this," Ambassador Kuriyama summarized: "'Do you feel that the problems in economic areas will affect our political and security relationships?'"

Ambassador Kuriyama revealed that while he was with President Clinton and Prime Minister Murayama, they both agreed that it must not be allowed to happen. "But it is one thing for them to say that. How, exactly, do they prevent it? This mutual distrust can erode our overall relationship. We *must* manage our trade disputes in a more productive way."

Another question involved the panelists' contention that the private sector must take more responsibility for resolving problems. The questioner wondered, "Is there anything which the government should do?"

Glen Fukushima allowed that in the best of all possible worlds, no government actions would be necessary, but in our present world, we are not managing well. He advocated granting incentives to motivate the private sector to maintain our positive relationship because, "We must have a constructive and meaningful relationship with each other."

Sozaburo Okamatsu also spoke to that question, rephrasing it as, "What can a bureaucracy do to ease economic tensions that it is not already doing?" He suggested that whatever governmental and private sectors can do should be separated, but often this is not done. He pointed out that bureaucracies have different systems for approaching problems from private sectors, mentioning Japan's *keiretsu* system and the different European countries' systems as examples.

Kazuo Nukazawa shared his belief that "Corporations should be allowed to operate as true free agents in a free society" and wondered how Japan's lack of an antitrust system can be supported. The United States' criticism of Japan for this weakness, however, is "the pot calling the kettle black," he felt, giving the regulation of newspapers as an example of the Americans' acting in restraint of trade.

Mr. Fukushima agreed that the primary responsibility for resolving trade disputes should not rest with government, but he did provide an example of where government intervention might be necessary. He spoke of the Americans' perception that Japan refuses to accept U.S. goods, especially industrial products, even if their cost is competitive and their quality high. If this is what is actually occurring, and if there are not other valid reasons for refusing to import foreign products (customers actually wouldn't accept them, for example), then intervention might be necessary to "level the playing field." He did not feel that a mere potential loss of jobs would constitute a valid reason for refusing imports, however. "If there are differences, and those differences result in harm to the U.S. and other nations, they need to be addressed. Japan cannot have it both ways—it is either different or it is not."

A question with several parts was addressed to the Ambassador and to Dr. Naya: "The next APEC meeting is sure to be difficult for Japan. The general outline of the Bogor Declaration needs to be more clearly defined. Will Japan, as host and leader, be able to do this? Are APEC ministers prepared to define the liberalized process and the status of which countries will qualify as developing and developed nations, and will the ASEAN bloc of nations be difficult to persuade as to the strategy of the Bogor declaration?"

Ambassador Kuriyama conceded that the next APEC conference will undoubtedly present difficulties for Japan. He said that the question of how to respond to it had also been discussed in Halifax by President Clinton and Prime Minister Murayama. "There is an enormous diversity among the eighteen members of the APEC," he stated. "You have on the one hand mature market economies, and on the other, developing countries with very different economies. Formulating an agenda which will bring them under one program of action will demand skill and imagination."

The Ambassador added that he had used the word "imagination" instead of "leadership" very deliberately. Unlike most American officials, he believes that the key to such agreements is found in cooperation and hard work on the part of all members. A consensus needs to be reached on the commitment formulated in Bogor toward investment and trade liberalization in the next century, and, "The President and the Prime Minister pledged to work on this very closely in the coming next months, towards November."

Dr. Naya commented that in the last two APEC meetings, the EPG (Eminent Persons Group, formed by one representative from each of the member nations) worked together and came up with a proposal. "What worries me," Dr. Naya continued, "was that, while the EPG still exists, there seems to be an understanding that its purpose has been served and that some new scheme must be developed to replace it." As Ambassador Kuriyama had pointed out, the concepts and problems handled are very complex, and Dr. Naya feared that the understanding and skills might be lacking to tackle these. He suggested that panel moderator David McClain's group might provide the expertise needed to steer the discussions in the right direction.

Dr. McClain explained that "Dr. Naya is referring to the APEC study centers which are an initiative taken by the leaders in Seattle and currently exist in about eleven or twelve of the countries. We'll certainly give it our best try." He then went on to "a question which has been lying here, very pregnant, on my desk during the discussion," one addressed to the Ambassador and to panelists Fukushima and Okamatsu, in particular. "What will happen if the trade sanctions on the thirteen luxury cars are implemented when we reach the deadline in the current auto trade talks?"

Ambassador Kuriyama replied that he certainly hoped that it would not occur, and that from the Japanese point of view, the sanctions are illegal and would violate WTO rules. He also believes that the issue has to be resolved as quickly as possible for the reasons that he had mentioned in his address. He reasserted his hopes that the negotiators in Geneva will reach an accord, in accordance with mutually agreed upon rules, so that the sanctions will become moot.

Mr. Fukushima mentioned that, as he had been leaving Tokyo the past Sunday, a high-level MITI official was reported to have ventured that there was only a 1% chance that the sanctions would not go into effect by June 28th. Fukushima gave better odds ("perhaps 9-to-1"), but he voiced concern and stated his sincere hopes that an agreement would be reached.

Mr. Okamatsu expressed his hopes, too, that "the stop watch will not go off before a bilateral agreement can be reached," but he added that trade sanctions are already in effect because, "From the minute Mr. Kantor announced that the procedural sanctions would be retroactive to May 20th, the industry had already been affected."

A question addressed to Mr. Fukushima asked: "If you were to be made FTR in the next administration, Clinton's or otherwise, what would be the key elements in your trade policy towards Japan? In particular, would you support targets?" Moderator McClain posed the question, adding that he would like Mr. Nukazawa to offer his own advice to Mr. Fukushima, should that scenario come to pass and Mr. Fukushima become the next United States FTR.

To some laughter from the audience, Mr. Fukushima answered that, "First of all, I probably would not accept the job." After some consideration, he added that if he were forced to take it, he would support results-oriented agreements in *industrial* sectors, not consumer-oriented ones, because results-oriented agreements go beyond establishing "targets" by being process-oriented. He would also assemble a negotiating team with members who were better informed on Japan and who understood that all trade negotiations must be handled in the context of other fields of the bilateral relationship (i.e., political and cultural fields).

Mr. Nukazawa would advise the new FTR to recall that any agreement must conform with Japan's efforts to deregulate, and must not distort the market or become a price directorate. Otherwise, Japan's central government will become even stronger—if the government is forced to dictate to industry. "Also, don't come to the bargaining table with a shopping list of demands which increases at each session, especially in the area of automobile trade. Tell us clearly what you want."

The final question, addressed to Ambassador Kuriyama, expressed, as Dr. McClain interpreted it, ". . . the sincere desire of each of the delegates that we have a better economic relationship between Japan and the United States." The question was, "Mr. Ambassador, you have described, and even decried, how badly discussions and communications have taken place at the ministerial level. What can be done so that both parties will be talking on the same plane with understanding and appreciation of the other's frustrations?"

Ambassador Kuriyama lamented that he had no "quick fix," no magical answer to the question. It seemed to him that the more interaction there is between the two nations, the more friction is formed. "The only way to ease those frictions is to somehow bring about an increasing level of mutual understanding, bringing it to a level comparable with the actual political and economic interactions which are taking place in our two countries."

He also added that a major constraint in that process is the disproportionate number of American students who live and study in Japan and in the rest of Asia. He believed that the Japan-America Societies might act as one of the grass-roots forces to encourage foreign study and exchanges by the Americans.

Wednesday, June 21, 1995

Some of Wednesday's activities took delegates away from the Symposium's meetings to social and cultural activities, including a "Goodwill Golf Tournament," but many adults remained to support and listen to the group which had the floor on the final Symposium day—young people from Japan and America.

Early in the planning stages of the Symposium, planners adopted as a key goal, "Involving the next generation, young opinion leaders in particular, and helping them become interested in and knowledgeable about the importance of the Japan-America relationship." Many young people attended the entire Symposium, but Wednesday was their own special day for meeting each other, working and having fun together, and voicing their opinions about issues which they believed will be of concern when they are the "opinion leaders" of tomorrow.

One instrument for eliciting student opinion on the relationship between the two countries was an international essay contest which had been conducted in advance of the Symposium. For student essayists in both Japan and America, the theme of their papers was, "What might I learn from the Japanese [or from the Americans] which could help me improve myself and my society?" From the many entrants, three awards went to high school students from Japan and three to American winners. Each student received a trip to Hawaii to attend the Symposium and to present his essay.

Over two hundred students assembled on Wednesday morning. They were welcomed by Hideto Kono, Chair of the Symposium's student Essay Contest Committee. Mr. Kono summarized some of the Symposium's presentations, mentioning that adults often carried with them "memories, habits and institutional baggage" which made it difficult for them to solve problems. The younger generation, however, comes with no such baggage, and Mr. Kono mentioned the freshness which made the essay contest entrants' works so valuable. He then introduced Dori Lyn Hirata and Raegen Jones, from the Japan-America Institute of Management Science, who coordinated the day's activities and insured that the students enjoyed the day and each other.

In the initial large group session, students listened to the essay contest winners, the first two being representatives from the Symposium's host society, the Japan-America Society of Hawaii.

Moanalua High School student **Chris Kuramoto** opened with his thoughts on how we can learn from each other. He believed that Japan has been a very successful nation, one which has much to offer to the world. The primary gift which it has to offer, he summarized, is its ability to keep modern and traditional culture in harmony: "We all can benefit from the blending of modern with traditional ways of life." A second gift, in his eyes, involved the family bonds which remain so important in Japan.

Although Kuramoto noted that respect for elders and pride in family represented conformity, he found that this type of conformity is necessary and important in society. He also praised the goal oriented Japanese, and their resilience. Of the latter, he gave examples of the Japanese people's rebuilding their cities after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and after the more recent destruction of Kobe by a devastating earthquake.

Dina Hashimoto, from Kalani High School, also stressed that Americans could learn much from the Japanese qualities of patience and resilience. "After Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed, it would have been natural to wallow in the self-pity which could have led to Japan's being a third world nation today." Instead, Hashimoto pointed out, the Japanese found the "hope and courage" required to rebuild their nation. A second quality of the Japanese which she felt was praiseworthy was the initiative shown by Japanese people, young and old.

After the essayists from Hawaii finished their presentations, students began the small group work (which included opportunities for socializing, as well) which constituted most of their activities during the day.

Students from both Japan and the United States sat together at round tables and participated in their activities as part of a team. Instead of having table numbers, each team had as a sort of mascot, a famous person whom they would all recognize. Large pictures on their tables included notables from Bill Clinton to Mickey Mouse, from Madonna to the sumo star from Hawaii, Takamiyama. Team spirit immediately erased shyness as each group created a "cooperative masterpiece," drawing lines to produce a picture based on a word they had been given.

After the first ice-breaking activity, students listened to their fellow essay winners from the international contest read their papers.

Hiromasa Ebihara, from Rokko High School in Kobe (sponsored by the Osaka Society), told of his experience as a Rotary Club-sponsored exchange student in the state of Michigan. He had noted many differences which had impressed him about the Americans, ones which he felt the Japanese might emulate. Among those were the learning of practical skills, as opposed to "rote learning" in classes. Practical skills, too, were picked up outside of school classrooms in the Americans' spare time activities.

Ebihara praised the spirit of volunteerism which he had observed while in the U.S., reporting that there had been volunteers who helped in the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake but their tasks were limited because, ". . . most of them, including myself, were participating in volunteer activities for the first time." He concluded that "true knowledge always accompanies actions. What we need are people who are capable of feeling with their hearts and thinking with their minds and making decisions to put into action." For this reason, "Japan should reconsider its education based only upon cramming" and memorization, and try to incorporate more practical training and activities to foster wise decisions in the international community.

Aindree Sircar, from High Point High School in Beltsville, Maryland (sponsored by the Washington, D.C. Society), lauded Japan's "rich cultural heritage" which had led to the traits of discipline and pride in their ability to work cooperatively with others. As had essayist Chris Kuramoto, Sircar saw that these qualities might be criticized as types of conformity, but she, too, believed that this type of conformity was good for the community. Individuals exist only as part of a group, she noted, adding that in Japan, "They emphasize that individual development is not tied to individual rights or to individualism. Rather, individual development comes when people can take responsibility for their actions and learn how to discriminate between right and wrong." Sircar also applauded the eclecticism of the Japanese and their ability to incorporate elements from other cultures, enhancing them as they adapted them.

Reina Nishimura, from the Tokyo Joshi High School and representing the Tokyo Society, urged not just learning from each other, but also truly listening to each other's viewpoints. While in America, she had seen first hand that parents tried to listen impartially to their children's accounts of their arguments. "In Japan, we would just have gotten a 'parents' lecture' designed to keep order and discipline." Now that Japan has become a viable economic power, it must seek out people with flexibility and sophistication who can help the Japanese to cope with change. Nishimura said that the Japanese can no longer keep their stereotypical views of Americans as "overly aggressive and stubbornly persistent in their views." She called these traits 'flexibility," something to be learned from Americans if the Japanese are to develop the assurance they will need as the next step toward internationalization.

From Brush High School and representing the Cleveland, Ohio, Society, **Kelly Sietz** reminded her fellow students that, "From across the street to across the world, humans are humans, and they all behave as such." She praised the Japanese people's respect for the ancient traditions which were symbols of morality, and for their "courtesy first" priorities. She believes that in the United States, where "youth is king and old age is treated like a disease," we can learn much from the experiences of our elders. Respect can also go far in combating public crime and safety problems, she stated, and, "The idea isn't to assimilate, but to adapt, to sample, until finally, ideally, paradise is found."

Masumi Takemura, a contest winner from Tokyo Joshi High School, recalled her stay in the United States, during which she had carried her Japanese training, especially her politeness, along with her. "Japanese people place a great emphasis on politeness," she noted, "but Americans place more emphasis upon character." She believes that the United States taught the Japanese much after World War II, including the guidance under which the democratic Japanese constitution was formed. "The Japanese Constitution contains ideas not from Japan but from America, a country which created its Constitution after going through a painful war for independence." She urged establishing not only individuality, but also one's own humanity. "I'm going to make my utmost efforts to establish my own humanity, and if I can achieve a real sense of politeness by respecting others without hiding my individuality, then finally I will learn what a true international person should be."

From Plymouth High School and representing the Wisconsin Society, **Erin Bruni** said she had once, before visiting Japan, pictured the Japanese as "grim workaholics," and she was pleasantly surprised to find them inquisitive, humorous and personable. Other adjectives she used were "genuine and welcoming." Lessons she had learned from the Japanese included their laudable ingenuity in compensating for space problems (including the realization that mass transportation is necessary, so should be treated with respect), their respect for the elderly, and their rationality. Of the latter, she believes: "In America, political strife is caused by fervent emotions that tell us something is either right or wrong. . . . If the Japanese and the Americans could somehow combine their strengths, their lives of their citizens sould be more fulfilling, more wonderful."

Returning from the large assembly to their small groups, students took advantage of other activities which helped them to know one another and which elicited team spirit. Large white placecards at their tables gave them opportunities to fill in the blanks to tell others a bit about themselves. One card, for example, was filled in like this: My name is: Miwa Yoshihara. People think I am: optimistic, but I am really: really really optimistic!

Roundtable discussions were the next agenda item for the student delegates. Leaders had each group look at a large "gift" on their tables. The present, they were told, was gift-wrapped in a colorful page from the newspapers comic strips to remind them that even important and serious issues can best be addressed with a dose of humor. "The opportunity to discuss issues with those from other countries is a gift given to you by the organizers of the Symposium," they heard. They then opened their group's "gift" to find some candy they could share and the topic they would address during their discussion. Some of those "Learning From Each Other" topics had been discussed earlier by adult panelists, but the students added their own unique ideas to these.

After the host Society's Dr. Robert Sakai inspired them with a brief account of two Japanese youngsters, Joseph Heco and Manjiro Nakahama, who had made a profound difference in our world, the student teams examined their discussion topics. No awkward silence pervaded the large room as the teams discussed their respective issues. Team members agreed later, without exception, that their initial strangeness and language differences did not block their joint efforts, and the noise level of the discussions evidenced that. Exchanges were sometimes very serious, often lively and punctuated with laughter. Each team selected a leader or leaders to represent it during the next and final session of the student day, reporting back to the entire group.

Recording the observations of each of the student teams in these proceedings is, of course, not possible, but some of their shared wisdom and insights are summarized here:

On "Public Safety and Values," most Japanese and American students said that their parents had taught them right from wrong, but Americans observed that "As you get older, you tend to drift away from some of those ethical beliefs." Those from Hawaii had seen that many visitors from Japan felt like they were targets for criminals, and, "We tried to convince them that Hawaii is basically a friendly and safe place to visit and live in." Others observed that Hawaii is safe in some areas, but not in others, and they blamed the problems on "the failure of many American parents to discipline their children, something we could learn more about from Japanese parents." They did not, however, attribute the major causes of crime to lack of wealth. Instead, they noted a sense of "community," and of helping one another, which pervades many rural areas of Hawaii.

Gangs, drugs and crime dominate some areas, students reported, and they surmised that "We cannot tell the world we have achieved the desired level of safety until we have enacted better educational programs, trained more effective police, passed stricter laws against crime, and organized community walks to help with these problems."

Some team representatives reported that Japan, too, is not immune to problems of crime and public safety. "In Tokyo," they gave as an example, "subways need to be made more safe." Memories of the recent gas attack in the city's subway system were still very much on their minds.

The groups discussing "Family and Culture in Everyday Life" found that being from the United States or from Japan made little difference in the way they viewed these issues. "We found many more similarities than differences," a team leader reported. Families rarely are able to spend a great deal of time together, but family ties still run deep. Students seemed to agree that, in general, Japanese parents exerted more discipline than their American counterparts, and demanded more respect for the elderly members of the family. "Americans are more kind to their children," some Japanese team members believed, and they said that there is not, in America, as much favoritism shown to children who excel. "They treat those who can't do as well more fairly."

"We see generations making mistakes" in both countries, group leaders agreed. They discussed issues such as role models in family members, conformity, and individuality. Of the generalization that the Japanese look to their children to provide care for elderly relatives, one Japanese student responded: "Yes, most expect to care for their aging parents, but most don't want to!"

Issues of "Education," too, elicited some provocative thoughts from the student groups. Widespread criticism of the pressures exerted upon students to enter the university systems came from both Japanese and American students who also wondered, "Are we really being prepared for the *world* by our schools?" Americans felt that their schools did not do enough to ease the transition from high school to college; Japanese students soundly castigated the pressures created by the entrance examinations they faced for college admission. They believed that if admissions were made less restrictive, more intense learning would go on in university classrooms. Of Japanese "cram schools," they said, "Most students who are highly motivated should not have to go, and the unmotivated students should be forced to go."

Japanese students, in general, believed that Americans were given more choices on how they would meet their goals, and that activities in early years better prepared them for success. "We all want to be more successful," they maintained. Americans, however, believed that more choices should be available for them, and that a better educational system would allow them to take more elective courses in areas of interest. All agreed that each country should emphasize the importance of being open-minded, that stronger exchange programs between countries are needed, and that skills in foreign languages were extremely important. One American group leader reported, with some surprise, that his fellow team members from Japan had felt, "In Japan, there is not enough emphasis on learning English."

Some teams discussed issues of "Internationalization," examining them from the bases of their own experiences. The major issue each group seized upon for giving young people the skills necessary for understanding other cultures was a better understanding of other people's *languages*. The second was living in each other's countries. One group leader summarized those feelings in these words: "We Japanese have difficulty speaking English. We must study languages as a means to understand culture, not just to read books. Even more important is going to other countries."

More Americans than Japanese seemed to feel that their parents were good role models in preparing them for learning about other cultures. Military dependents, in particular, felt prepared for internationalization, and some students from Hawaii thought they had a certain advantage in living in a multicultural environment: "We take our shoes off at the door, and things like that." Others, however, pointed out that there is racial prejudice in Hawaii ("It is easier for the Japanese, who can be united as one people."), and some commented upon the Hawaiians' divisive struggle for sovereignty.

After the discussions had ended, the students, who had worked, played and eaten a hearty luncheon together, were sincerely pleased with the day's program. "We expected we'd be comparing and contrasting feelings and ideas with each other," one commented, "but we also became friends." Many students, too, openly expressed appreciation for the adults in their lives who had prepared them for these opportunities.

Farewell Banquet

All that remained of the First International Symposium of Societies was Wednesday's opportunity for Symposium delegates and presenters, young and old, to gather and share food and conversation at the evening's Farewell Dinner.

As it had been at earlier events, the Hawaiian "sense of place" was renewed, with entertainment for the evening provided by Hawaii musicians Cathy Foy and Randy Hongo, and the Hawaii Youth Opera Chorus. Dr. Ruth Ono, Mistress of Ceremonies for the banquet, officially recognized many of the individuals and groups who had spearheaded the Symposium and made it a success, including Symposium Steering Committee Co-chairs Jean Rolles and Michael Leineweber, and Marjorie Midkiff, who saw her idea for a gathering of Societies from Japan and America come to fruition in the 1995 forum.

There were no formal addresses during the evening, but in a brief ceremony, Hawaii State Senator Matt Matsunaga announced the recipient of the prized award founded in the name of his late father, the Spark M. Matsunaga Peace Award. The 1995 award was presented to a surprised and grateful Yoshiharu Satoh, the President of the Japan-America Society of Hawaii. In accepting the honor, Satoh thanked the many people in Japan and in the United States who had so graciously helped him and the Hawaii Society to meet their goals.

Dr. Ono closed the Symposium by saying that "We leave, this evening, with an international sense of goodwill." The first-ever gathering of members of Japan-America Societies from East and West ended with delegates standing, joining hands and, led by the Hawaii musicians, singing together the familiar song, "Let There Be Peace on Earth."

1995
International Symposium
of Japan-America
Societies

Symposium Papers

Symposium delegates hear speakers' addresses in Japanese and English.

James E. Auer

U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia

I would like to make six points regarding U.S.-Japan security relations. The first point is that *The post Cold War world is different from the Cold War world.*

The Cold War had many bad points; one of the worst, of course, was the real danger of a nuclear exchange between the two military superpowers getting out of hand. The civilian and military leadership of both the United States and the Soviet Union understood the dangers of nuclear war and constructed expensive and sophisticated command and control systems to minimize the danger of such an exchange starting accidentally, but still there was a risk. There were, of course, other bad points, including huge defense expenditures on the part of superpowers and other countries as well.

But, particularly in retrospect, a good point of the Cold War was the relative stability which existed in such a bipolar world, owing to the alliances between the U.S. and its NATO allies and the U.S. and Japan, on the one hand, and between the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact "allies" and relationships among the USSR, China and North Korea, on the other. In the post-Cold War world, the threat of nuclear holocaust has hopefully declined and will continue to do so owing to reductions of nuclear weapons by the military superpowers. The military budgets of many nations have also been reduced considerably.

A bad point of the end of the Cold War, however, is the increase in instability which now exists in many important regions of the world. We simply don't know what is going to happen in North Korea under Kim Jong Il, and in China, especially after the death of Deng Xiaoping. Progress is hopefully being made in the Middle East, but the region still seems far from stable, and, of course, the situation in Russia and other places in Eastern Europe is of great concern.

My second point is that *Despite all the differences between Japan and the U.S. in language, culture, history and tradition, particularly in the latter half of the Cold War and even more so in the post Cold War period, Japan and the U.S. have extremely close national interests.*

James Fallows and some so-called "Revisionists" argue that Americans and Japanese have very different value systems and that Japan's trading practices constitute a threat to America's future. I believe that Japanese values are more relative than is ideally the case, but I believe the values of virtually every nation in past and present history, and most likely in the future as well, have been, are, and are likely to be, similarly relative.

Who is threatened by the increased instability of the post Cold War world? Are unfortunate nations such as Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti, which are suffering greatly, the newly threatened? Yes, they suffer, but instability is not a new phenomenon for these countries. It is the rich trading countries who rely on global stability in which to continue the prosperity and growth of their economies which have much to lose in an unstable world.

Regardless of whether Fallows or Auer is correct about the similarities or differences in Japanese and American values, I strongly believe that Japan and the U.S. have very similar interests in preserving stability, which may in some ways be more at risk in the post-Cold War world than they were during the Cold War. For the United States and Japan together constitute only 7% of global population, but together they control about 40% of the world's wealth.

Particularly if instability becomes widespread, the economic levels of the U.S. and Japan could suffer. If only the status quo continues, the U.S. and Japan will remain among the richest, if not the two wealthiest, nations in the world. Even as recently as the late 1980s, neither the U.S. nor Japan could have imagined the opportunity they now have to see a market type economic system established in countries such as China, Russia and Vietnam. Should such a growth in global capitalism occur, many nations will profit, and the super rich —the U.S. and Japan—will likely become even richer.

The third point I would like to make is that *Unlike the situation in the trade area, U.S.-Japan defense relations were a success story throughout the Cold War.*

Particularly in the decade of the 1980s, the commitment of the world's largest economy (the United States) and the second largest (Japan) to cooperate militarily against the third largest economy (the Soviet Union) in 1981, I believe, had much more impact in Moscow than is realized by many Japanese and Americans. The likes of Messrs. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze realized that the USSR could not successfully compete and survive against such odds, and that drastic restructuring was necessary.

Together Japanese and American deterrence persevered until the Soviet Union collapsed, and huge Soviet military efforts in Asia turned out to be for naught. America's role was primary, but Japan's efforts are not appreciated as much as they deserve to be in either the U.S. or in Japan.

Particularly Japan's air defense and anti-submarine capability complicated Soviet military planning in the Pacific, the essence of deterrence. This real Japanese capability was neither offensive nor autonomous, even for the defense of Japan itself, but it served as a mighty and effective complement to U.S. power which documented testimony of Soviet military leaders shows to have been greatly effective.

The fourth point I would like to make is that *The U.S.-Japan defense cooperation, as good as it was, especially in the final decade of the Cold War, came close to collapsing during the Persian Gulf War.*

Japan was not one of the thirty-seven nations which joined the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf. Japanese political leadership was split. Some LDP leaders such as Michio Watanabe and Ichiro Ozawa, as well as some in the Democratic Socialist Party, argued for participation by elements of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, while Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, his successor Kiichi Miyazawa, as well as the largest opposition party, the Socialists, opposed dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces outside of Japan.

Japan gave money—lots of money—and took the courageous action, for a democracy, of raising taxes in peacetime in order to do so, but in the end Japan's efforts were not appreciated by the United States, by the Gulf countries, or by many Japanese as well. Japan was labeled "an unreliable ally" by some Americans who argued that Japan was unwilling to share human risk despite having national interests equal to or greater than those of other countries and U.S. allies which did participate.

In response to international and domestic criticism, even Prime Minister Kaifu was finally persuaded to take the significant step, for Japan, of the first ever operational overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces to the Persian Gulf in April, 1991, after Desert Storm was over. This deployment of four Japanese minesweepers and two support ships turned out to be strongly supported by Japanese public opinion and resulted in the passage of the Peacekeeping Operations or "PKO" Bill in 1992. Under this bill six hundred Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force engineers were sent to Cambodia to build and repair roads in support of U.N.-sponsored elections in Cambodia later that same year. Smaller detachments have subsequently been sent to Mozambique and Zaire, and the Government of Japan is presently considering a deployment to the Middle East later this year.

My fifth point is that *Japan's 'PKO' Bill is deeply flawed and is seriously inadequate to deal with many, if not most, potential future crises including those similar to the Gulf War.*

Under the provisions of the "PKO" Bill, Japanese Self-Defense Forces cannot participate in military activities, but only in logistics support type activities, and cannot participate in any environment in which a cease-fire has not been declared, and must withdraw if the cease-fire conditions break down. Not only would Japan not be allowed to operate in many potential crises from the outset, a terrorist or aggressor would be given almost certain control over Japanese participation in that, if that terrorist or aggressor could interrupt the cease-fire, he could end Japanese participation.

It would have been very much in the interest of the United States to have sought consultations between the U.S. and Japan immediately following the Gulf War. This has been done, and, particularly of late, is being done at the sub-ministerial level, but unfortunately it is not being done well at the critically important political level. Both the U.S. and Japanese governments have been disappointingly focused in an overly domestic manner which has exacerbated bilateral economic frictions even more. And, as a result, security ties have been endangered, despite the already noted increases in instability which make the U.S.-Japan treaty more important than before for Washington, Tokyo, and for much of the rest of the world, particularly Pacific Asia.

Sixth, and finally, *What should the U.S. and Japan do in the security area in the post Cold War world?* I will offer two suggestions.

First, for all the reasons mentioned already, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty should be continued. But, given the great changes since the Cold War, both treaty partners should reach out to engage others, particularly South Korea, China and the Russian Far East, in discussions, joint exercises, and ultimately, to join the treaty relationship itself. Joint naval exercises, for example, among the Japan Self-Defense Fleet, the Republic of Korea Navy, the Russian Pacific Fleet and the U.S. Seventh Fleet, should be considered as a gesture to emphasize the importance of stability of the seas of the Western Pacific.

North Korea and China might object, but both of these countries' leadership understand that neither the U.S. nor Japan constitutes a military threat to North Korean or Chinese territory. Such cooperation also would provide some degree of dignity to the Russian military in a manner which doesn't constitute a threat to Russia's neighbors, an important ingredient in a successful Russian transition.

Neither the U.S. nor Japan wants to designate China as a potential enemy, but clearly worrisome is China's seemingly hegemonic conduct, e.g., increasing the size of its military budget, its unilateral declarations of sovereignty as well as its bilateral actions in seizing disputed territory in the Southwest Pacific despite its conciliatory rhetoric in multilateral fora. But, as much as the Chinese might complain about a firm U.S. and Japanese posture which welcomes and rewards moderate Chinese behavior, which is not threatening to its neighbors and which deters aggressive actions, such action is in the interest of Pacific stability from which all nations are most likely to profit. If and when China clearly demonstrates it has become a non-authoritarian country with economic stability and doesn't threaten its neighbors, it would be eligible for treaty inclusion; indeed, in that day, the U.S.-Japan security pact might no longer be necessary.

My second suggestion for accommodating the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to the post-Cold War world is to expand the operating areas rather than the defensive character of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Only the unexpected short duration and minimal U.S.-led coalition casualties kept criticism of Japan's Persian Gulf conduct from becoming much more severe than it was. Today's turbulent world makes future crises almost certain, and Japan needs to be able to participate flexibly not only in those which happen to occur in the immediate vicinity of Japan.

While a number of Japanese leaders of the ruling Social Democratic Party of Japan and the Liberal Democratic Party hold to the opinion of New Frontier Party President Kaifu that Japan cannot send the Self-Defense Forces outside Japan within the Constitution, another view—that the Constitution does not limit Japan's defense prerogatives if the requisite political will and leadership are present—exists among other conservative Japanese leaders such as the New Frontier's Ozawa and Japan's foremost strategic thinker, Hisahiko Okazaki.

Resolution of this question is extraordinarily important. Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama and LDP Foreign Minister Yohei Kono favor a permanent seat for Japan on the United Nations' Security Council without any obligation for Japan to participate in military peacekeeping activities. Such an occurrence would only institutionalize the results of the Gulf War; i.e., Japan's non-military actions would be viewed as mercenary and as unworthy of a great power with vested national interests.

Rather than being a slippery slope to Japan's militarization, Japan's participation in defensive military activities under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty throughout the Pacific area and in U.N. military peacekeeping activities throughout the world are far less dangerous than severing U.S.-Japan ties and Japan's seeking some autonomous defense role.

In conclusion, in the post-Cold War world, as was increasingly the case during the latter twenty years of the Cold War, the U.S. and Japan share common, vested interests—they are two rich countries of the world which, therefore, have both responsibility and capability to act in a responsible manner.

Happily, if the U.S. and Japan do so, the whole world in general, and the U.S. and Japan in particular, will benefit. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has served well since 1951. Its value in the next half century could be even greater.

Gene R. Carter

Education: Critical Issues and New Directions

John Adams, an American statesman, said, "Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people." While Thomas Jefferson stated, "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free it expects what never was and never will."

The American democratic system depends on an educated citizenry's personal and civic morality, knowledge and common agreement. Education is essential for an enlightened and free society. The capacity to think independently and creatively is essential to avoid intellectual enslavement and forced subservience to the will of others. America's historic commitment to universal public education sets us apart from other developed nations.

The common school has long been America's ideal. It embraces the characterization of education as the "great equalizer." Many have used education to realize the American dream despite other adversities. Since its inception, the United States public education system has served the nation well. Now, however, it must meet unprecedented challenges.

The Kindergarten-12 system of education was designed to serve all pupils for twelve years and not to weed out any pupils at an earlier age. This policy resulted in more students completing secondary school than in most other nations. That is no longer the case. Several other advanced countries, including Japan, now have a higher proportion of secondary school graduates than does the United States. The reason is undoubtedly that the social and economic context has changed dramatically, but educational institutions have not responded accordingly. Demographic and work force trends make it clear that, if schools are to deliver on the democratic ideal, they must demonstrate new, higher, and universal standards of performance.

Every day we face the challenge of new realities in our classrooms in an environment no longer protected from the impact of the outside world. Our vision of the kinds of schools we want collides with the daily tasks of surviving in the schools we have. While teachers and students reach for the bright stars of knowledge, they are often bombarded by meteor showers of conflicting community opinions, declining funds, and families in crisis. The mission of education is much less clear now, with many conflicting expectations.

We have led the world in the quest for equity and excellence. We paid attention to multiculturalism and meeting the unique needs of children with disabilities much earlier than did other nations. However, today's schools are expected to teach more to more children, and many of these children are those who traditionally have been least successful in school. Other nations may face similar challenges, but the situation is especially acute in the United States. Our challenge is made more difficult because ours is a heterogeneous and pluralistic society. The United States is comprised of different races and cultures, and language groups with different values and perspectives on life. We continue to see this diversity as America's greatest asset, but it makes concerted action more difficult.

Because of our social and cultural diversity, new controversies continually confront us, hampering our ability to mount a strong, united reform effort. Current disputes include the debate over prayer in the public schools, the call to eliminate the federal Department of Education, and concerns regarding the direction of America's first national comprehensive education reform initiative. Until recently, there appeared to be a broad consensus in support of what has been described as "content-driven systemic reform."

The basis for this approach has been the development of voluntary national academic standards in numerous subject areas, including—history, mathematics, geography, the arts, civics and science. Each set of standards has its own distinctive character. There has been considerable debate about what standards should be, and how they should be determined, used, and evaluated. Because standards for each field were developed in isolation, there may be other valid ways of conceptualizing what students learn, and there is the danger that the standards, if treated as mandates, could lock future curricula into the mind-set of 1995. Presently, there are no mechanisms in place at the national level to build connections among the disciplines to forge the development of integrated curricula.

The adoption of high standards alone does not guarantee an improved quality of education. Instead, these new standards should be seen as the basis for improvement of instruction, assessments, classroom materials, teacher education, and the redirection of resources. They should be meaningful and relevant for all schools, families, and communities.

Even if there is no national press for systemic reform based on the new content standards, America's locally-controlled school districts are free to innovate. There are about 110,000 public elementary and secondary schools in the United States distributed among approximately 16,000 school districts. In some parts of the country, the states are exerting increased control, but local districts are still relatively autonomous. While local control permits grassroots initiative and responsiveness, it also inhibits coherent, long-term reform. Our democratic traditions lead to frequent changes in leadership; politicians and educators often do not want to continue or to emphasize reforms they did not originate.

Education is a continuing process. Reform cannot be partisan or tied to an election. It is a long term effort. The vision of change must be powerful enough to focus the public and all levels of the governance system on common challenging purposes and to sustain that focus over an extended period of time.

Even if we had a strong set of national standards, standards alone do not make a vision. The vision must go beyond the development of common standards to an articulated and agreed upon concept of the type of system and schools that will help all children attain high outcomes. These visions must reflect the values, understandings and conditions of each locality and state, and serve as the basis for policy design and school improvement strategies. A fragmented delivery system cannot sufficiently improve results. All aspects of schooling must be in alignment for reform to take hold.

Reform does not happen in a vacuum. United States schools are steeped in a culture, and almost impermeable bureaucracy. If we really wish to change what occurs in the classrooms and schools, we must change the culture. Otherwise the old system will reinvent itself. Such cultures must value individual development through lifelong learning and training.

American schools have a distinctive culture that must be understood and involved if changes are to be more than cosmetic. Schools are places where both teachers and students are learners and where learning is an active process that takes place in many different ways. Time, space, instruction and people are organized to achieve that goal. Concomitantly, we must focus on the school as a total entity.

We can see, in other words, that a major obstacle to reform in the United States is that many leaders lack the knowledge and skills needed to change the culture of schools. Observers are beginning to recognize the idea is not to restructure schools but to renew them.

While the United States is developing challenging and better conceived curricula and exams, there is no commensurate effort under way to improve the training or the working conditions of teachers. Teachers still work in a structure that inhibits collaboration and professional renewal. There is no national strategy that provides professional growth and renewal opportunities for the 2.2 million teachers in America.

Accordingly, major school improvement initiatives at the federal and state levels have brought a sense of urgency to concerns about finding time for teacher and administrator professional development. American teachers have little time for preparation, planning, cooperation or professional growth. The issue of how teachers spend their time needs to be rethought in a systematic way. The ultimate question may be whether parents and policymakers can be persuaded that more teacher professional development time and less teacher classroom time will yield higher quality teaching and learning. School reform shifts the focus from what teachers do to the results that their actions produce.

We are facing a watershed moment in history that will effect how we function as a society, how we live, how we exchange ideas, and how we learn. Today, we must create a nation of learners, a seamless system from kindergarten through college/university.

A new development that can contribute immensely to this seamless web is the emerging "Information Superhighway" that will put vast amounts of information at our fingertips. It must be focused educationally, all classrooms must be connected, all schools must have access, and the cost must be reasonable. We must work towards full educational access and equity for all children preparing students for the information age.

Future educational aims should include learning to learn effectively, socialization on a broader scale involving more alternatives, values formation, education beyond college preparation and job training (including continuing education and leisure time pursuits, development of skills in evaluating ideas, and education for coping with probabilities and the unknown).

In short, we must install learning as a central value of the American society. In the new millennium everyone will be a lifelong learner.

We must see life as a journey because even the things that change must subsequently change again. Our survival is directly, almost symbiotically, correlated with our flexibility and willingness to adapt.

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Wayne A. Cornelius

Seeking a Better Life: Challenges of International Migration

Public tolerance for immigration is once again on the decline in the United States. Waves of anti-immigrant sentiment are a cyclical phenomenon in U.S. history, dating back to the late 18th Century. The current movement to reduce immigration—in all its forms—is being fueled by a combination of factors, of which five are of particular importance:

1. *Economic frustrations and uncertainties about the future,* which are the result of various factors totally unrelated to immigration: stagnant or declining real wages for the average middle- or working-class citizen; fears of job loss due to corporate downsizing and the collapse of the defense industry following the end of the Cold War; and the perceived loss of national economic power, in the face of increasingly stiff foreign competition. All this makes Americans less optimistic about their own futures, and the future of the country as a whole. Economic restructuring, recessions, and slow growth create a sense of general insecurity and a search for scapegoats. Under these conditions, foreign workers are more likely to be seen as competitors for jobs or for social services, rather than as contributors to economic growth and complements to the native-born work force. A zero-sum mentality has taken hold: Any economic gain by immigrants must mean a commensurate loss, of some sort, for native-born Americans.

2. *Increased concern about crime,* even when official police statistics show that crime rates are actually declining, which has been the case in the United States for the past three years. But the public perception is otherwise. Immigrants—especially poor, dark skinned ones—are assumed to be a major source of crime, even though there is no reliable evidence indicating that immigrants contribute disproportionately to crime in the communities where they reside.

3. *The increasing visibility of ethnically and culturally distinct foreigners in large cities,* where most of them now work and live, often in very close proximity to upper and middle-class neighborhoods.

4. *Declining confidence in the country's ability to absorb immigrants and refugees,* regardless of their legal status, especially if they are poorly educated and occupationally unskilled upon arrival. The popular assumption is that, if the U.S. is failing to educate and find productive employment for *native-born* minorities, immigrants arriving with even less education will fall, inevitably and permanently, into the country's "underclass."

5. *Inflammatory posturing by opportunistic politicians,* who correctly see immigration as an emotional, "hot-button" issue that can be used to mobilize

large numbers of voters. In the United States and the industrialized democracies of Western Europe, there is no question that public perceptions of immigrants are strongly influenced by political leaders who exhort citizens to either welcome or spurn the new arrivals. Governor Pete Wilson of California clearly demonstrated the electoral potency of the issue in the 1990s, winning reelection decisively in November 1994 by attaching his campaign to Proposition 187, a blatantly anti-immigrant voter initiative. Politicians in Washington, both Republicans and Democrats, took note of Wilson's success and almost immediately began toughening their positions on immigration issues.

Most—but certainly not all—of the public hostility and the political fire of the 1990s are being directed at illegal immigrants, particularly Mexicans who enter clandestinely via the southern border, rather than at legal immigrants nor the numerous, predominantly non-Mexican visa overstayers who enter mostly as tourists. By most estimates, visa overstayers constitute about one-half of the total stock of unauthorized immigrants in the United States today, but their presence is almost totally ignored by the general public as well as by most elected officials.

How do we explain this willingness to overlook the large population of visa overstayers, even as the reaction to clandestine border crossers grows increasingly hysterical? Part of the explanation lies in the political sensitivities that would be aroused among the Latino population and the economic disruptions that would be caused by more vigorous enforcement of immigration laws within the U. S interior, as contrasted with stronger enforcement efforts at the border. To reduce the population of visa overstayers, immigration authorities would have to root them out of workplaces and residential neighborhoods and deport them in very large numbers—a far more intrusive, heavy-handed type of immigration law enforcement than Americans are accustomed to.

A more compelling explanation, however, lies in the difference in the *composition* of the visa overstayer population, as compared with the flow of clandestine border crossers. The illegal entrants are overwhelmingly from Mexico and other Latin American and Caribbean countries. The visa overstayers come from all over the world, but proportionately more of them are so-called Caucasians as well as Asians. They are members of those nationalities that are currently deemed to be more readily assimilable into U.S. society; those who bring valuable human capital. By contrast, the Mexican and other Latin American migrants tend to be viewed as people who will assimilate culturally at a slower rate than Europeans and Asians, who are more likely to become public charges, and who are more likely to commit crimes.

All industrialized countries today have a hierarchy of more acceptable and less acceptable source countries for immigration. There are so-called "*prob-*

lem nationalities" and "*model* nationalities"—those who often outperform even the native-born population. This hierarchy is not necessarily fixed. For example, in the United States in the late 19th Century, it was Chinese immigrants who provoked the most intense hostility among native-born Americans; today, except for the occasional load of illegally entering Chinese "boat people," Chinese immigrants are prized for their entrepreneurial zeal, their strong work ethic, and their children's high educational performance. Today, it is the Mexicans—and those of even darker hue, like Haitians—who are perceived as the most undesirable immigrants, those whose arrival on our shores or whose penetration of our southern border is viewed as a national disaster.

It is no coincidence that, in 1995, the most widely discussed, best-selling book on immigration in the United States is a pot-boiler written by a journalist who is himself an immigrant from England (Peter Brimelow, *Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration Disaster,* New York: Random House, 1995). The author's appeal to racist sentiments to justify a much more restrictive U.S. policy toward immigrants from Third World countries is quite explicit: "The American nation has always had a specific ethnic core," he writes. "And that core has been white." Current immigration from the Third World, he goes on, "is turning the U.S. into a multiracial society." To enter an Immigration and Naturalization Service waiting room, he writes, is like descending into the New York City subway, where "you find yourself in an underworld that is not just teeming but is almost entirely colored." The book makes frequent reference to the need to shift the country's racial balance back to what it was before 1965, when immigration laws were changed in a way that permitted the entry of many more Latin Americans and Asians.

It is, therefore, the *sources* of the today's immigrant influx—not just absolute numbers of foreigners, nor even whether they are legal or illegal entrants—that arouse most of the anxiety about immigration in the U.S. today. Some politicians openly pander to this type of concern by talking about the so-called "core culture" of the United States (whatever that is), and insisting that "the core" is being diluted unacceptably by the kind as well as the volume of immigration that we are experiencing today.

In fact, the United States has always been a diverse, multicultural society. In its official discourse and rhetoric, the U.S. has always prided itself on being more tolerant of ethnic and cultural diversity than other nations. This is a key element of our national mythology. But the reality is that the United States has never really come to terms with the fact that it *is* a multicultural "nation of immigrants." We have never wanted to admit that the functioning of our economy and our economic growth are dependent, to some degree, upon a continuing influx of immigrants. We have resented the "cultural baggage" that immigrants bring with them. Historically, we have always doubted our capacity to absorb large numbers of culturally, religiously, ethnically, or racially distinct immigrants.

Today in the United States, multiculturalism is viewed as a threat to social cohesion and economic well-being—not as a source of national strength. We seem to have forgotten about the "immigrant work ethic," and we tend to ignore evidence that cultural assimilation is proceeding just as rapidly, if not *more* rapidly, among the offspring of the most recent wave of immigrants to the U.S. than it did in previous eras. For example, the shift into predominant or exclusive use of English seems to be speeding up; it now occurs within two generations, as compared with three generations in the past. This should accelerate the income and occupational mobility of the second generation. Nevertheless, the general perception is that today's Third World immigrants are much more likely to fail economically than their predecessors, and that they will actively resist cultural assimilation rather than jump into the melting pot.

To be sure, there are important variations in U.S. attitudes toward immigration—by region, by age, income, education, ethnicity, and other variables. For example, one does not sense the kind of anti-immigrant hysteria in New York City that we have in Los Angeles or San Diego. Variations in local political culture are significant in explaining such differences. Southern California is a region whose population grew through waves of internal migrants, many of them culturally and politically conservative, white Protestants from the Mid-West. These are people who never wanted to be living in a place where people are "different" from themselves. This contrasts sharply with New York City, where nearly everyone is either an immigrant or the child of an immigrant. Also, the state of Texas, on the whole, tends to be more tolerant of Mexican immigrants than is California, even though Texas has a much longer border with Mexico, and its border counties are even more heavily impacted by Mexican immigrants than are San Diego and Imperial Counties in California.

Thus, subnational variations are important, and generalization is difficult. But in key states like California, which absorbs about half of all legal and illegal immigrants entering the U.S., there is, unquestionably, a very strong anti-immigrant backlash. That backlash is inspiring all manner of state and federal legislative proposals aimed at deterring illegal immigration and denying access to basic social services—not just to illegal immigrants, but to legal permanent-resident aliens and the U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants. Under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, those children are automatically citizens of the United States; but there is a bill pending in the U.S. Congress to rescind their citizenship.

Looking ahead, I do not think that we should automatically assume that, in the longer term, tolerance for immigration will be significantly lower in Japan than in the United States, supposedly because of the traditional Japanese adherence to the principle of ethnic homogeneity. Public opinion surveys done in Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s show just the opposite: Many Japanese appear more tolerant of the ethnic and cultural diversity being introduced into their society by contemporary immigration than are their U. S. counterparts.

While this apparent cross-national difference may be an artifact of the survey method, it may also reflect a more pragmatic stance on the part of the Japanese. At minimum, the Japanese public exhibits a greater willingness to admit that there are certain types of jobs, even in a highly advanced, industrial or post-industrial society, that persons born and raised in such a society will shun, regardless of the wages paid. In Japan, these are known as "3-K" jobs; interestingly, we lack an equivalent term in the United States, partly because we refuse to admit that such jobs exist, or if they do, we argue that they shouldn't be permitted to exist. We just call them "bad jobs," and wish that they would go away. Instead, they just keep increasing, even in a "high-tech," post-industrial economy.

On the other hand, there is no reason to expect that the Japanese people would easily tolerate a very rapid, large-scale, uncontrolled expansion of the foreign-born population, especially if it became clear that a significant percentage of foreign workers and their dependents were settling permanently in Japan. Perhaps the estimated 600,000 foreign-born workers already in Japan represent a threshold of tolerance, beyond which a U.S.-style backlash would become inevitable. However, especially at the local level in Japan, there seems to be a higher degree of pragmatism and acceptance—including a willingness on the part of local authorities to do everything possible to facilitate the social integration of immigrants—than is typically found in California cities that are being heavily impacted by immigration. In Japan, if the health of the local economy clearly depends upon continued access to foreign labor, the community tends to be more tolerant of their presence, not just as workers but as residents.

In the United States, the structure of the economy is changing in ways that would undercut even the most aggressive, brilliantly designed, well-funded efforts by the government to purge labor markets of "unwanted" foreign workers. Immigrant labor is increasingly dispersed through the economy, geographically and sectorally. This pool of relatively cheap, flexible, highly motivated, readily available labor is now drawn upon by a broad swath of industries, from "traditional" ones like agriculture and horticulture, textiles and apparel, shoes, and construction to "non-traditional" employers like high-tech electronics manufacturing, food processing, hotels, restaurants, fast-food outlets, retail commerce, janitorial services, landscape maintenance, medical and convalescent care, car washes, dry cleaning, housekeeping, child care, messenger and package delivery services, and a wide range of other services provided to individuals and businesses in large metropolitan areas. Indeed, in the five U.S. states where an estimated 80 percent of all illegal immigrants now work (California, New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois), it is difficult to find a single industry of any economic consequence in which illegal immigrant labor is not amply represented at some level.

Within many of these industries, a process of "layering" has been underway for some time in which the most labor-intensive tasks are subcontracted to non-unionized, smaller firms, which are significantly more immigrant-dependent than those above them in the industry hierarchy. These small and medium-sized subcontractors, which also employ the bulk of unauthorized foreign workers in Japan, typically face intense competition from domestic and even foreign firms, and operate on very narrow profit margins. Thus, they have powerful incentives to hire the lowest-cost immigrant workers. The increasing use of immigrant labor contractors (in Japan, called "dispatching firms") to supply temporary workers to firms in many different industries is also promoting the employment of foreign workers, irrespective of their immigration status.

These long-term trends in the U.S. economy greatly complicate the task of enforcing immigration laws and labor standards so as to discourage the utilization of unauthorized foreign workers. For example, the fines and criminal penalties against employers who "knowingly" hire illegal aliens that were enacted by the Congress in 1986 have gone largely unenforced.

How can we explain the weakness of enforcement efforts, despite the existence of an apparently broad public constituency supportive of tighter immigration controls? The political impulse remains strong to respond to special interest pressures and foreign policy concerns by weakening what might have been more effective immigration control measures through legislative compromises and administrative actions, even before the measures can be implemented. Most importantly, there are still too many U.S. employers—businesses as well as individual citizens requiring household services—in the U.S. today for whom immigrants are a preferred labor source, regardless of their legal status. As in Japan, illegal foreign workers are showing up everywhere, and they are still getting jobs, even in a slow-growth or recessionary economy.

In both the United States and Japan, the link between business cycles and the demand for foreign labor has been severely weakened, if not broken. Recessions no longer cause large-scale voluntary repatriations of foreign workers.

In 1993, at the height of Japan's current recession, the estimated number of visa overstayers dropped by only about 2,000 persons (a decline of 0.6 percent), according to government statistics.

The explanation lies in the fundamental market forces, demographic pressures, and transborder family and employer networks that drive most unauthorized immigration to the United States and Japan today. The most important international migratory movements to these countries have become self-sustaining. They are increasingly insensitive both to macroeconomic fluctuations and to changes in laws and public policies.

Notwithstanding the declining efficacy of border controls, around the world, U.S. policymakers in all likelihood will invest billions of dollars in stepped-up border enforcement: more manpower and hardware, more sophisticated detection and apprehension technology. The goal of having 10,000 Border Patrol agents (a nearly 300 percent increase over current levels) stationed on our southern border with Mexico by the year 2000 is gaining wide acceptance among members of Congress. Computerized systems for verifying employment eligibility almost certainly will be developed and at least partially deployed before the end of this decade. Such measures will be pursued because of the political necessity to create at least the image—if not the reality—of government control over immigration flows. But the growing gap between unrealistic immigration policies and the actual outcomes of those policies—namely, the persistence of largely *uncontrolled* immigration flows—will only fuel the public demand for more Draconian controls.

One way of closing the gap between politics and reality is the prescription offered by Haruo Shimada for Japan, namely, to recognize the *inevitability* of a significant and growing presence of foreign labor in our labor markets, even if all theoretically available alternatives to the use of foreign labor (further automation, boosting labor force participation by women and the elderly, "rationalizing" labor utilization in the service and retail sectors, greater investment in overseas production facilities) are vigorously pursued.

This recognition must be accompanied by a rejection of the various "back door" and "side door" mechanisms that officials have developed for importing unskilled foreign workers, and by the development of a public policy framework for recruiting sufficient numbers of foreign workers, at all skill levels, legally (bringing them in through the "front door"). And if some portion of these workers and their dependents eventually opt to become permanent residents, policies and programs should be in place for integrating them as quickly and completely as possible into the host society.

In the United States as well as in Japan, the time has come to recognize that both countries already have "guestworker" programs involving hundreds of thousands of foreign workers and their employers. The problem is that these are largely *defacto* programs, operating outside of government control, and resented by growing numbers of citizens who perceive no direct personal benefit from them.

There must be a better way; but finding it will require the kind of long-term vision, political courage, and societal self-confidence that seem to be in such short supply in both the United States and Japan today. We must somehow get beyond the short-term politics of fear, resentment, and cultural threat, and move to a clear-headed, data-based evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternative policy options for regulating immigration—not making it disappear.

Lynn A. Curtis

Public Safety: Crime and Justice

After the Los Angeles riots in 1992, a New York Times/CBS News poll asked a national sample of Americans whether they were prepared to have more tax dollars spent on effective programs that reduced crime, child poverty and related American dilemmas. A majority said they were willing to pay more for effective programs that work. The poll then asked what was the greatest obstacle to achieving effective programs. Fifty-one percent of the respondents said that the greatest obstacle was "lack of knowledge."

My message is that we do have the knowledge to reduce crime and poverty. But presently America lacks the political will.

No one should overstate. Yet, to a considerable extent, we already know a great deal about what works for children, youth, families, and the inner city. And we know a great deal about what doesn't work.

In many ways, then, our national policy ought to be as American as apple pie. We need to stop doing what doesn't work and use the money saved to replicate what does work—but funded at a scale that is equal to the dimensions of the problem.

Scale is important. Solutions are at hand. But Americans are told by their politicians that there is not enough money to expand them nationally to all children, youth, and families who qualify for them. That is not so.

What Doesn't Work

In the 1980s, trickle-down, supply-side economics reduced taxes on the rich so they would, Americans were told, invest more. This, the country was assured, would reduce the debt and help the middle class and the poor. Benefits would trickle down to them.

Instead, in the words of conservative analyst Kevin Phillips, "The rich got richer and the poor got poorer." From 1977 to 1988, the income of the richest 1% of the United States increased by 122%. The income of the poorest fifth declined by 10%. Child poverty increased significantly.

Over the same period, the real incomes (adjusted for inflation) of the working class and the middle class also declined. The national debt that the children of these families would have to pay back rose from $800 billion in 1981 to $3 trillion in 1991.

Did trickle-down economics bring the nation closer to class war? Some thought so. The rich were pleased that, in the 1980s, their tax rate was reduced well below their counterparts' in Japan and Germany. According to some, the middle class became the "anxious class"—worried that the new, high-tech global economy was benefitting only the fortunate few at the top, who could, for example, disinvest from American workers and get workers in China to do their jobs for much less. The anxiety might have been alleviated if middle-class workers had the opportunity to upgrade their skills through new technologies, so they could work in sectors where Americans had a comparative advantage. But no such plan was legislated to invest in the human capital of the middle class. This was even more true for the poor, who expressed their views, for example, in the 1992 Los Angeles riot and in a dramatic rise in violent crime among youth in the 1980s.

Woven into the increased class tension of the 1980s was increased racial tension. The prophecy of the 1968 Kerner Riot Commission—of "two societies, Black and White, increasingly separate and less equal"—came to pass. The English spoken by African Americans became more and more different from the English spoken by white Americans. "Hypersegragation" became a term to describe housing patterns in cities like Newark and Milwaukee. Prison building became part of American civil-rights policy.

Even though there was no proof that more and more prisons resulted in less and less crime, the number of prison cells tripled from 1981 to 1991. The cost was up to $100,000 per cell built and up to $30,000 to keep someone in that cell for a year. *One of four young African American males in America was in prison, on probation, or on parole by the late 1980s.* That is an astounding proportion. The proportion was one in three in California, which usually leads the rest of the nation (for better or worse), and almost one in two in some major cities, like Washington, D.C. The new prisons tended to be in rural areas. Some saw parallels to the rural "homelands" policy of South Africa during apartheid. The new rural prisons disproportionately incarcerated minorities, but heavily employed whites as prison personnel. Small rural cities began lobbying for prisons as an economic stimulus package to employ family breadwinners. The prison-building surge coincided with a decrease by 80% in federal appropriations for housing the poor. So in some ways, prison building became America's national low-income housing policy.

What Works?

Based on existing scientific evaluation (with comparison or control groups) over the past quarter century, the principles that appear to underlie what works to reduce crime and poverty, especially at the grass-roots level, include safe haven sanctuaries off the street after school where kids get mentoring, social support, and discipline from big brothers and big sisters; educational innovations (like computer-based remedial education) that motivate youth to obtain a high school degree; job training (which continues social support and discipline) carefully linked to job creation; feasible options for continuing on to college; employment linked to economic development (like housing rehabilitation); and problem-oriented, community-based policing, which helps secure a neighborhood for the economic development that creates the jobs.

This kind of successful problem oriented policing owes much to the experience of Japan—through its *koban* system. Koban ministations are within a ten minute walk of most urban residents. From these ministations, Japanese police undertake what Americans would call community based policing—on foot or on bicycles. In the suburbs and in rural areas, kobans are residential. On the first day of an assignment, a residential koban officer will walk door-to-door. He will introduce himself and his wife. They will invite each resident home for tea. They will become true neighbors. A typical koban officer knows by name every family in the neighborhood.

The Eisenhower Foundation has taken American police chiefs and community leaders to observe kobans in Japan. Over the last ten years, we have facilitated American variations on Japanese themes. These include residential kobans (in Puerto Rico and South Carolina), home visits (as in Newark, New Jersey), and police living in their neighborhoods (through special offers by public housing agencies for young officers to live rent free in low income communities). Traditional-looking kobans have been tried in cities like Baltimore—where they have the potential for stabilizing neighborhoods to generate economic development and housing rehabilitation that, in turn, can create jobs for high risk young people. In other locations like Washington, D.C., kobans have been combined with youth safe havens where young people go for help with their homework after school. Police mentor the young people and serve as big brothers and big sisters. Studies sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York have shown that such mentoring is a powerful vehicle for keeping kids out of trouble, keeping them in school and increasing the likelihood that they will become employed, tax paying citizens. The Eisenhower Foundation presently is pursuing such American variations — not just to reduce crime, but to stabilize neighborhoods for youth, community and economic development.

Not all successful ventures illustrate all of these principles, but multiple solutions usually are evident in the most enduring models. And to be able to identify the underlying principles means we can begin to replicate them, with variations based an local needs.

Similarly, the successes tend to have multiple good outcomes. Not uncommonly, in American programs evaluated as successful, these outcomes include some combination of less crime, less gang-related behavior, less drug abuse, less welfare dependency, fewer adolescent pregnancies, fewer school dropouts, more school grades completed, more successful school-to-work transitions, more employability, better parenting among targeted high-risk youth, and more stable families. The communities where young people live can experience less fear, fewer drug dealers, and more business, job, and economic development. Not all model programs achieve all of these good outcomes. But the point is that multiple outcomes are the rule, not the exception,

"Enough is known about the lives of disadvantaged high-risk youth to mount an intensive campaign to alter the trajectories of these children," says Joy Dryfoos in *Adolescents at Risk*. "Enough has been documented about the inability of fragmented programs to produce the necessary changes to proceed toward more comprehensive and holistic approaches."

"We know how to intervene to reduce the rotten outcomes of adolescence and to help break the cycle that reaches into succeeding generations," says Lisbeth Schorr in *Within our Reach*. "Unshackled from the myth that nothing works, we can assure that the children without hope today will have a real chance to become the contributing citizens of tomorrow."

What Should America Do?

With a knowledge of what works, I propose a crime and poverty reduction plan for truly disadvantaged urban families—which constitute about 10% of all families in the United States. The policy centers on educational opportunity, job opportunity, and job creation.

The plan can be attained if American citizens realize that the problem is not so much the Boyz N the Hood as the boys on the Hill. It calls for a citizen revolt to reverse what some view as the betrayal by Congress of American democracy. In the words of William Greider in *Who Will Tell the People*, "Rehabilitating democracy will require citizens to devote themselves first to challenging the status quo, disrupting the contours of power and opening the way to renewal." Common people must "engage their surrounding realities" and "question the conflict between what they are told and what they see and experience."

Reversing the betrayal must begin with campaign finance reform and control of special-interest lobbyists, based on the plan set forth by Common Cause. Then we will have the money to implement what works for inner-city families and children on a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem. The new citizen movement that is needed should be financed by American foundations.

My plan is for the federal government to raise money, create guidelines based on what works, and enforce standards. At the same time, to a considerable extent, we favor decentralized day-to-day implementation of the investments in children, youth, families, and inner cities that form our plan to reduce child poverty. If something federal works—like Head Start—don't fix it. But localities, and especially private-sector, nonprofit community based organizations, are closest to the people and have had the most success. Decentralization and "devolution," to use the ungainly word now fashionable inside the Washington D.C. beltway, are to this, community and neighborhood, level in our plan. As Walt Whitman wrote in *Leaves of Grass*, "The genius of the United States is not best or most in its executives or legislatures, nor in its ambassadors or authors or colleges or churches . . . nor even in its newspapers or inventors . . . but always most in the common people."

Shinkichi Eto

Education: Critical Issues and New Directions

(Format note: This paper was transcribed from Simul International's English translation recorded on audiotape.)

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great honor for me to be one of two speakers to discuss recent problems in Japanese school education. I believe that everyone here in this room has a copy of my Japanese written paper. Those who read Japanese are advised to use it as a text. Those who do not read Japanese, just take a look at the three charts at the end of my paper and afterwards, throw it away.

As Professor Nishijima has mentioned, in 1985, an educational reform policy was implemented in Japan. In accordance with this policy, a new recommendation to the Ministry of Education was submitted. This would prove to be an epoch-making turning point in the history of Japanese education. The purpose of this paper is to take up the major issues in Japanese education and to discuss new directions for the educational reform taking place today.

During the past fifty years, college professors as well as school teachers saw a tremendous decline in their perceived social status. Before the defeat in war, school teachers, especially college professors, were very highly respected. When I finished college, I wanted to become a college professor because that profession's social status was extremely high. However, with the democratization of school education, and as the teachers' positions came to be guaranteed, ironically, their social status declined.

According to a recent poll on respected careers in Japan, teaching ranks only number twelve. Ever since the Meiji era, since the 1870s, school teachers have always been number one in terms of social status. But today the number one profession is considered to be the businessman working for a leading company. Number two: researchers and engineers. Japanese people make a distinction between college professors and researchers because college professors do not necessarily do any research. Number three are business owners. Incidentally, when the same poll was conducted in the United States, the number one position was still that of teacher. Number two was college professor. And number three was business owner. So I was impressed by the fact that the teachers' social status is so high, although I'm somewhat skeptical about that result.

As for teachers, the democratization introduced during the Occupation secured the position of school teachers, and the activities of teachers' unions standardized the treatment of all teachers. Consequently, market mechanisms no longer functioned among teachers and they developed a strong tendency to be vocal about their own rights, and to neglect their duties and responsibilities. This was seen not only among students, but also among teachers.

For teachers, lifetime employment is guaranteed. In the case of college teachers, that guarantee is even more secure. The Ministry of Education, however, grew tired of political authorities' interference in personnel and academic affairs at colleges. Therefore, the Ministry left all personnel appointments at schools up to the faculty. And within faculties, members tried to make up for each other's shortcomings. Problems such as serious alcohol dependency, or plagiarism, were often concealed by other faculty members. Instead of hiring competent personnel, faculty members preferred to hire incompetent but friendly people. Just as within the medieval guilds, the members were very strongly united and supportive of each other. Also, with high economic growth and renewed enthusiasm for education, the number of schools increased. It became a "buyer's market" for colleges, and the positions of professors remained secure.

My friend, Mr. Isamu Miyazaki, formerly a vice minister of the Economic Planning Agency, deplores this situation. Allow me to quote his words:

> *We hear that Japan has a very high educational standard and Japanese are intelligent, but I don't think so. When they talk about that, they cite the rate of people who are enrolled in colleges, or the number of colleges. But that is no indication of substance. College today is not a place for distinguished teachers teaching fine subjects. Rather, professors are no different from office workers. Students only consider schools as a ticket to the real world. It is just a mechanical relationship. There is no feeling of closeness or tension [between professors and students].*

While it may not be this bad, and my friend, Mr. Miyazaki, may be too harsh, that is what he said. And clearly, the stagnation of the educational system prevails. That is why we have begun hearing growing criticism against college education.

Also, the eighteen-year old population began decreasing in 1993, and it is known that their population will decrease from two million to 1.5 million within the next few years. So a sense of crisis has come to be felt within colleges, as well. Tama University and Asia University tried to make themselves "open door" colleges and attempted to introduce market mechanisms. Keio University's Fujisawa Shonan campus has actively adopted the good parts of fine American private colleges.

The National Education Council, for the first time, simplified the college set of standards drastically, retaining only the basic rules from the formerly extremely detailed regulations. It was done for the first time in the postwar period to allow colleges and universities to provide unique education in line with the policies of the respective schools. The Ministry of Education fully adopted this recommendation and institutionalized the Council's recommendations. The Council also encouraged self-inspection and self-evaluation at these colleges. These things were almost nonexistent before the National Education Council made these recommendations.

College professors, until then, were like "mini-popes," or small popes, so with this reform, they started feeling a sense of crisis once again. Up until then, they were complacent within the fortress of the faculty.

Even today, college professors still have a monopoly. I am a graduate of Tokyo University, so that is why I was able to teach at the University of Tokyo; 95.3% of the faculty members are from the University of Tokyo. Dr. Nishijima is a graduate of Kyoto University, and so he taught there. But in the case of Dr. Nishijima, he was competent. That's why he was able to teach at Kyoto University. In my case, I was able to do so only because I graduated from the school.

One of the characteristics of Japanese college education is that 70% of college education is provided by private universities; only 30% is provided by national and public schools. That is the opposite of the case in the United States. Thus, private universities are like business organizations, and many of them depend upon tuition for over 50% of their income. This is quite a difference from most American private schools. Given this, for the Japanese universities, the attraction of students is an absolute mandate.

Tokai University and Keio University, where they have powerful chairmen of the board, were able to implement reforms one after the other. However, at schools where the mini-popes still prevail, they hold meetings and discuss reform, but never implement it. In the case of Keio University, the Fujisawa campus is very innovative. But their older campuses, like Mita or Hiyoshi, are not so active in pursuing reform. In a few years, we will see a drastic decrease in college applicants. Given this, and the abrogation of the so-called temporary increase of students set up for baby boomers, what will become of Japanese colleges and universities?

Because these fewer college applicants will most likely concentrate in the first rate universities, the top-most private schools and national schools will not have immediate management difficulties. The same is true about so-called "college entrance exam industries" such as cram schools and pertinent magazines. They will experience confusion, but will not decline.

The problem will be in the junior colleges below the third tier. My estimate is that the over fifty junior colleges which are not highly respected will close down. Incidentally, there are 1,100 colleges and universities in Japan.

It is important to have such competition among colleges and universities in Japan. Japanese school education will start improving only when mini-popes can no longer sit there comfortably in their fortresses. With international market mechanisms, and by enduring some sacrifice, reform in higher education can be accomplished. When this reform is successfully completed, the human resources produced at these schools will be sent to elementary and secondary schools as educators. That will complete the educational reform. And Japan, in this way, will be able to maintain first class education in Asia.

I have been very critical in the first half of my remarks, so I would like to close with some compliments.

Currently education is going in the following directions. The first direction is internationalization. Japanese campuses of American colleges have had a great impact on this trend. But each one is struggling. Some of them have already withdrawn from Japan. Global internationalization efforts are seen by the Japanese colleges setting up facilities outside of Japan, as well.

Now, the second direction is the correction of the political pendulum. Before the war, the intervention of political authority existed at extreme levels. After the war, liberalization was reintroduced in an excessive manner, and faculties were given too much authority. So college education in Japan is trying to strike a proper balance between the two, and we are in the midst of such efforts. Through such work, the Ministry of Education will not collapse, despite the fact that it is controversial. In fact, surprisingly, the Ministry of Education is taking the initiative in correcting the political pendulum.

The schools, also, will pursue a more unique culture. For example, Reitaku University and Tamagawa University are pursuing so-called "well-balanced education," which is influenced by American universities. The mere provision of technology and knowledge will never be enough to foster capable people. Some of the excellent graduates of colleges so far have opted to join Japan's notorious cult groups like Aum Shinrikyo. That is partially because education, so far, has lacked efforts to teach what is right and what is wrong.

The fourth point involves the streamlining of management. All campuses are improving facilities. Waseda University has built a hotel to help improve its management style because it can't do anything that is under the jurisdiction of the faculty. So, unlike this country, again, underlying these trends is the very strong influence of the Ministry of Education in Japan.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Robert B. Friedland

Aging: Responsibility and Cost

I want to thank the conference organizers for the opportunity to participate in this historic gathering. It is a privilege to represent the issue of "aging" in American society. In my allotted time, I will address how the growth in the elderly has affected and is likely to continue to affect our society; and how our society has chosen to address the costs of health care, long-term care, and the means by which people strive to remain financially independent. I will talk about the financial and political challenge that the aging of society offers all of us as members of society and as individuals in families.

Who we are as a society is very much tied to how we treat the most vulnerable among us. But who among us is vulnerable depends very much on how we nurture, care for, and educate our children. They will be tomorrow's workers, tomorrow's leaders, and tomorrow's elderly. It is the future productivity of our children that affords us the ability to ensure that today's elderly have access to health care and a base retirement income. But at the same time, it is the elderly who contribute to the raising of our children and make available through their savings the financial capital to make labor productive.

And so, public policy about aging is policy about all of us. It is not just what we do for our grandparents, but what we do for their grandchildren. For some day, they, too, will be grandparents.

The societies of industrialized nations throughout the world are aging. Its evidence and impact are everywhere—politics, social policies, and the economy. In the costs of public and private pensions, the financing and delivery of health care, and in the issues that confront families. All of these facets of our lives and more are affected by the growing proportion of our society that is older relative to the proportion of the population that is younger. In the United States, the fastest growing population are those over the age of 85—those most likely to be frail and in need of physical or medical assistance. In about 15 years, the fastest growing age group will be all those age 65 and older. Within 35 years (2030), we expect that the number of Americans age 65 or older to double in size from what it is today. At that time, the elderly will represent over 20 percent of our total population. A dramatic change from 1945, when 7.5 percent of our population was over the age of 65, or even today when nearly 13 percent of our population is elderly.

It is important to understand that our societies are aging for two very different and unrelated reasons. Yes, life expectancies have increased; but most of the aging is due to the fact that fertility rates, or the number of children born to women over their lifetimes, have declined.

Thus we are living longer with fewer children. For a family this means fewer children from which to share in providing care; for our society it means a relatively smaller base from which to tax for public programs directed at the elderly. This is most clear in the financing of Social Security, or specifically, Old-Age and Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI). This is our largest, oldest, and most successful social insurance program. Society collectively pays the premiums with a tax on earnings while working, and this enables workers to earn the right to collect benefits for themselves or their surviving dependents when not working due to death, disability, or retirement.

Because of our aging society, the number of workers for every Social Security beneficiary has fallen and will continue to fall. Today there are 3.2 workers for every beneficiary. In fifteen years (2010) this is expected to drop to 2.9 workers for every beneficiary and in 30 years (2025) it is expected that there will be 2.2 workers for every beneficiary. Right now, the actuaries expect the trust fund to have sufficient resources to pay beneficiaries for the next 35 years. And although modest changes today could improve the projection for 75 years, it is the sense of all these people retiring, relative to the number of workers, that leaves many people in the United States with little confidence in the future of the Social Security program. The numbers just do not add up. How can so few workers support so many beneficiaries?

In 1945, people should have been even more alarmed than they are today. At that time, there were nearly 42 workers for every beneficiary. Yet, Social Security has survived the 92 percent decline in worker-to-beneficiary ratios over the past fifty years. We cannot grow our way out of this future shortfall, but clearly economic growth is a key reason the Social Security program has been able to sustain the dramatic decline in workers relative to beneficiaries. Therefore, how we use our resources to enhance productivity is critical.

But looking at the number of elderly relative to workers is not the whole story. There is also an important story related to the number of children supported by working parents. Prior to today there were more total potential dependents—children and elderly relatives—to the number of people of working age. In fact, between now and 2050, the number of children and elderly relatives to the number of people age 18 to 64 is not projected to be as great as it was in the year 1900.

Over the past thirty years, we have seen a number of important trends that have changed the composition of family life. For example, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of women in the labor force, including many women with children, raising the need for child-care. Currently, three out of five women with children under the age of six are working. At the same time, we have seen a persistent decline in the labor-force participation of older workers, suggesting a propensity for more Americans to retire earlier and earlier, therefore increasing the time period which they spend out of the labor market. We have also experienced a substantial increase in divorce rates which affects the building of financial resources and complicates the sharing of non-financial resources within families.

Compounding these trends has been the post-World War II baby-boom. Beginning in 1945 and ending in 1964, there was a remarkable surge in fertility rates. From 1945 to 1964, seventeen million *more* children were born than would have been born had fertility rates remained at 1940s levels. Most of the increase centered around the period 1952 to 1958. The children born during the peak of the baby-boom are about forty years of age today. As a group, "baby-boomers"—as they are often called—represent 79 million Americans, or nearly a third of the population.

As this group of children reached school age, working age, and began to form into families, they had a dramatic impact on the financing and delivery of education, the labor market, the housing market, and the consumer goods markets. As this group approaches old age, all of our public and private institutions associated with the elderly will be tested.

While life expectancy has increased, disability rates have not changed very much. As a result, as more people live longer, more people can be expected to need hands-on assistance from others in order to function. The type, degree, and duration of assistance needed will vary from needing help grocery shopping to spoon-feeding food.

Currently about 23 percent of the elderly need some form of long-term care assistance. Most people needing long-term care live in their own homes or their children's homes. At any point in time, about 5.3 percent of the elderly live in an institution like a nursing facility. For those who live in the community, at least three quarters of the care provided is done by family and friends or volunteer community organizations. Less than 11 percent of all care provided in the community is purchased.

Given just the change in the number of elderly, it is projected that over the course of the next two decades, the demand for home care services will increase 44 percent, and the demand for nursing home care will increase 64 percent over what is currently purchased.

Medicare, our health care program for the elderly, disabled, and those with endstage renal disease, does not cover long-term care. It was intended to cover acute care. People who purchase long-term care usually purchase it on their own. If in the course of their medical and long-term care needs they become impoverished, then they can apply for assistance from the State's Medicaid program. About half of all nursing home expenditures are financed through the Medicaid program—a third is financed out-of-pocket. Medicare financed nine percent and private insurance covered two percent, but most of this coverage was for post-acute or rehabilitate care—not long-term care.

Labor market mobility, the changing composition of family as parents divorce and remarry, and the pressures of two-worker families have not led to a diminution of family effort in providing caregiving assistance to family members who need long-term care. These changing family relationships may complicate emotions and interactions, but they have not lead to abandonment of the elderly by their children. In fact, one of the chief concerns has been the willingness of caregivers to forsake their own health, careers, and marriage to care for a frail mother, father, or in-law.

The role of government in our aging society is the underlying question now faced by the U.S. Congress. It manifests itself in the debate over the size and distribution of the Federal budget and the means by which to reduce the budget deficit. This year a budget deficit of $176 billion is expected.

There is no talk of tax increases; in fact, the U.S. House of Representatives just passed a tax cut. Congressional leaders have promised not to touch Social Security or defense spending. Together with the interest on the debt, this constitutes 55 percent of the budget. Of the remaining portion, Medicare is the largest program, representing 11.5 percent of the total budget. Medicaid is the next largest program, representing 5.9 percent of the budget. All other assistance directed at the poor, other than Medicaid, totaled 5 percent of the budget.

About 88 percent of Medicare spending and 28 percent of Medicaid spending is on behalf of the elderly.

None of our public programs are so comprehensive that they completely substitute for the direct out-of-pocket expenditures of those in need. A critical question is how families will respond to reductions in Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, food or cash assistance.

Perhaps some of the services foregone are not needed; perhaps some of the services foregone will result in new public expenditures. For example, *Medicaid* often covers the outpatient prescription drugs of very poor elderly. If Medicaid eliminates this coverage and people cut back on their medications, will this result in increased *Medicare* hospital expenditures? Does the poor mother who forgoes adequate prenatal care deliver a premature baby that requires very intensive hospital care?

Public costs seem high because we have a lot of people covered by these programs. Medicare provided coverage to 35.6 million people at an average cost of $4,017 per beneficiary. Medicaid covered 31.6 million relatively ill people, at $3,570 per person. Social Security pays benefits to more than 42.2

million people at $7,166 per beneficiary.

At any point in time, relatively few families face the issues that arise from the poor health of an elderly parent. While the odds of facing these questions increase over one's lifetime, they are not absolutely certain. Many people live long and healthy lives with only a very short time period in which they need any long-term care. But given the cost and burden of care for those who need it, it is difficult to imagine how families would cope if they also had to pick-up greater portions of the direct costs of health care, food, clothing, and shelter.

In 1960, more than 35 percent of the elderly had incomes below the poverty threshold. Fifty percent of the elderly had no health insurance coverage. Today, all but about 1 percent of the elderly have health care coverage and less than 15 percent live with incomes below poverty. This change is due primarily to the passage of Medicare in 1965 and the cost of living adjustments in Social Security in 1972. But while the economic well-being of the elderly has improved generally, and is expected to continue to improve, it is important to understand just how financially vulnerable many of the elderly remain.

First, too many elderly have too few sources of income other than Social Security. Social Security was intended to provide a base—or floor—of protection upon which one would layer personal savings and employer-provided pensions. For 78 percent of the elderly, Social Security represents 50 percent of their income or more. For 20 percent, Social Security is all the income they have. Second, Medicare only covers about one-half of the elderly's acute care costs. Third, virtually no one has adequately prepared for the provision of long-term care.

These facts are not likely to change very much in the future. Yes, each successive cohort of elderly does retire with more education and often better health, and slightly better accumulated savings. But too few people save enough to cover their longer life expectancy and, certainly, their potential health or long-term care needs. Less than half the workforce participates in an employer-provided pension plan. The Congress is not talking about expanding Medicare, nor are they talking about a serious effort to pool the financial costs of long-term care.

Social Security and Medicare are critical for maintaining the independence of the elderly. The children of the elderly know this. They know full well that without these programs, the adult children of some of these people could find themselves forced into a position of having to find a way to support their parents or in-laws. For this reason, people of all ages—and especially those under the age of 65—support these programs.

This fact makes the challenge we face today a political challenge. While most Americans are uncertain about the future of these programs, they do support them. The irony is that in a democracy, support for the program is virtually tantamount to its continued existence.

Our challenge is to find a way to support today's most vulnerable elderly and their families, while at the same time revamping our spending priorities towards tomorrow's children, while reducing our federal deficit. Our challenge is to recognize that today's elderly are connected to tomorrow's elderly.

Glen S. Fukushima

Easing Economic Tensions

(Format note: This paper was transcribed from an audiotape prepared by Simul International.)

I am very pleased to be with you here in Hawaii today at the 1995 International Symposium of Japan-America Societies. I want to thank the organizers for putting this conference together and for inviting me from Tokyo to participate.

This panel, "Easing Economic Tensions," is the last formal panel of the Symposium, but in many ways the subject is the most immediate. This is because, as was mentioned by David, a week from tomorrow, Wednesday, June 28th, the United States may impose $5.9 billion worth of tariffs on thirteen models of Japanese luxury cars being imported to the United States, making it the largest unilateral tariff action of that kind in post-war history. This action, if it does come about, will be because of the failure to reach an agreement between the United States and Japan on the issue of automobiles and auto parts which has been an issue between the United States and Japan for roughly twenty years, and most recently, over the last two years, a subject of intensive negotiations between the U.S. and Japan. So the subject of easing economic tensions is timely and immediate, and I'm looking forward to a productive discussion on this today.

It has often been pointed out that the United States-Japan relationship rests on a stool with three legs (this is something that I think has been consistent from the Bush administration to the Clinton administration), those three legs being the security dimension, the political dimension, and the economic dimension of the relationship.

As you might have gathered from yesterday afternoon's discussion, the security dimension of the relationship is quite healthy, constructive and cooperative, as is the political dimension. It's really the third area, the economic dimension, where we have some major asymmetries, imbalances and inequities that need to be repaired. The fact that there are tensions and differences in the economic relationship between the U.S. and Japan is not something to be alarmed about, given the fact that these two large economies interact with each other in such an extensive and complicated way. But the real question is how to manage these conflicts and differences, and how to ease the tensions.

With regard to easing these tensions, I would like to make three propositions, and then draw a conclusion from them. Proposition number one is that many of the government level barriers in Japan have been reduced in recent years. This is consistent with what Ambassador Kuriyama has said. Number two, however: Private sector barriers in Japan have grown in importance. Number three: The Japanese government has been unable or unwilling to resolve many of these private sector problems. The conclusion that I draw from this is that the role of government in easing tensions between the U.S. and Japan has declined, and the role of the private sector in resolving disputes between the U.S. and Japan should be increasing. However, it has not yet reached the point that it should.

Therefore, we see a gap between the Japanese government, which on the one hand says that it cannot intervene in the free market and therefore it is beyond government reach to do anything about these problems, or others in the Japanese government who claim that Japan has a different form of capitalism and therefore nothing can be done about it; and on the other hand, the private sector in Japan which says this is a subject that the government should resolve. So the question is: Who's in charge? Who is to be given accountability, and who has the responsibility for resolving these problems? As I mentioned, on the one hand the government of Japan says, "These are matters for the private sector." In such forums as the U.S.-Japan Business Council, on the other hand, the Japanese business sector says, "The business sector can identify problems, but it's not in a position to solve problems between the U.S. and Japan. That's up to the government." So we have a gap here. And that, I think, is what has to be dealt with.

I would like, now, to go into these propositions that I made in a bit more detail. Number one, the first proposition: Many government barriers in Japan have been reduced in recent years. It's very true that as a result of multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations, and also because of changes that are being induced within Japan, itself, that the number of formal trade barriers in Japan has declined over time. So now Japan has the lowest average level of tariffs in the world. It has very few quotas. And in terms of import procedures, standards, certification, administrative guidance and other issues that are under the direct control of the Japanese government, it is very true that the barriers have declined.

However, from the standpoint of foreign companies trying to do business in Japan, there is a second level of barriers which one might call "structural," "organizational" or "institutional." And then, third: There is an attitudinal or psychological barrier in Japan which is not so much found in individual consumers, but rather in organizations in Japan that make purchasing decisions—that is, corporations and government entities. The often-heard word in Japan, *jimai shugi*, or self-sufficiency being a virtue, is something that is very real in Japanese organizations.

Number two, the second proposition: private sector barriers in Japan have grown in importance. This may seem a bit paradoxical, but I can assure you, having worked in Japan these past five years and also having daily contact with American business people in my capacity as Vice President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, and if you read our annual "Trade White Paper"—of which I have a copy and you are free to read it—there are, in fact, many barriers on the level of the private sector in Japan that make it very difficult for newcomers, especially foreign newcomers, to enter. This is not to deny that changes are taking place, but many of the changes taking place are taking place because they benefit Japan, and whether or not they benefit foreign players in Japan is a rather peripheral issue.

Now there are, as I mentioned, private sector barriers that are very overt, as well as government inspired barriers which the government of Japan currently may not be promoting, but, because of past government action, still persist. For instance, Japanese scholars have pointed out that in the 1960s and 70s, the Japanese government actively encouraged Japanese companies to engage in more cross-shareholding specifically for the purpose of preventing takeovers and acquisitions by foreign newcomers into the market. Also, there is a very nebulous or gray area which involves Japanese government toleration or lack of action, for instance with regard to the enforcement of the anti-trust laws. And so in areas like glass, paper, construction and many other areas, one finds it's not Japanese government actions, but rather, the toleration by the Japanese government of business practices, that makes it difficult for foreign players to enter the market. And so, as I mentioned, the private sector barriers can be very real in semiconductors, in glass, in paper, in construction, in autos and auto parts.

In addition, the definition of competitiveness can be quite different in Japan versus other markets. In most markets around the world, it's the product's attributes—that is, having good quality at a low price—that determine how competitive a product is. In Japan, however, there are many support factors and relationship factors which I could discuss at length, but, given the limited amount of time, I will just mention. But as Ambassador Kuriyama said, such terms as *anshin kan*, the sense of feeling assurance about a seller, a vendor, can be extremely important in Japan, making it very difficult for newcomers, especially foreign newcomers.

The third proposition: The Japanese government has been unable or unwilling to resolve some of these problems. Some in Japan make the argument that the Japanese government is not able to solve these problems because they are matters for the private sector to solve. The Japanese government cannot reach into the private sector to solve these problems. Others attribute this, rather, to the unwillingness of the Japanese government to solve these problems. One can look, for instance, at the 1986 semiconductor agreement and the 1991 renewal, as well as the 1992 auto companies' import promotion plans. These are all successful attempts by the Japanese companies, with the encouragement of the Japanese government, to solve some of these problems. But what we find now, between 1993 and 1995, is the Japanese government's saying it is not capable of doing what it did a couple of years ago. And, therefore, the U.S. government is in the position of asking the Japanese government to intervene in order to resolve these problems, many of them private sector problems, and the Japanese government is saying that, no, that would be contrary to free trade principles.

So this creates a real problem for the United States because these are, as I say, by and large private sector problems, and the government of Japan is either unable or unwilling to deal with them. Because these problems are intangible, international organizations like the OECD or the World Trade Organization have only a limited ability to deal with many of them, because these organizations are, by and large, rules-based organizations.

The problems that American and other foreign companies face in Japan are not, by and large, a result of government rules and restrictions. Therefore, we're seeing a gradual privatization of trade disputes and their resolution in Japan. For instance, last spring, when the cellular telephone, the so-called "Motorola issue," was being contested between the U.S. and Japan, it was actually Motorola and IDO, Japanese and American companies, that were doing the negotiating, with the governments of the United States and Japan overlooking, or refereeing, the negotiations and then blessing their outcome. Or, in the case of the auto and auto parts issue, because the Japanese government has said it's beyond its power or its reach, what has happened is that the U.S. government has had to talk with the auto companies. Also, this recent listing of so-called "trade sanctions" is an attempt by the U.S. government to persuade the Japanese auto companies to announce some voluntary import promotion plans.

So when one looks at the six elements of problems between the U.S. and Japan in the economic arena, the first two—that is, the global current account surplus of Japan as well as the bilateral trade surplus of Japan—are by and large, I think, government related issues of macroeconomic policy in both the U.S. and Japan. But when one looks at the other four, that is, the low level of manufactured imports in Japan, the sectoral barriers in Japan and the companies' specific barriers in Japan, as well as the low level of foreign direct investment in Japan, these are all in one way or another a result of private sector conduct. I'm running out of time, so let me turn to my conclusion.

The U.S.-Japan relationship is obviously a very complex and multi-faceted one. Simultaneously, I think we are going to see cooperation, competition and conflict. The challenge on both sides is to find areas to promote cooperation between the United States and Japan to derive mutual benefit from competition and to try to minimize the areas of conflict. In the best of all possible worlds, I suppose we could rely on political leadership in both the United States and Japan to bring this about. Unfortunately, right now there doesn't seem to be a lot of political leadership in either country with regard to the U.S.-Japan relationship. And therefore, with regard to easing economic tensions, I think right now that it's up to the private sector to take more initiative and not to rely so much on the governments to try to resolve these problems.

This could involve private sector cooperation between American and Japanese companies, as in the case of joint ventures, joint projects, design-ins—long term relationships that, in fact, have been encouraged as a result of the 1986 semiconductor agreement. Second, private sector attempts for harmonization and standardization, and, third, private sector dispute resolution, as in the case of the Motorola IDO case that I mentioned before. In fact, on the current issue of autos and auto parts, although the U.S. government claims that the Japanese government's *shaken* system provides a barrier, in fact, most of the problems that the U.S. government has identified with regard to autos and auto parts have to do less with Japanese government conduct and more with private sector conduct in Japan.

Therefore when, four or five years ago, Mr. Morita, then Chairman of Sony Corporation, came out with his famous article about the need for Japanese companies to take the initiative to resolve problems and to engage in *kyosei* (economic symbiosis), I think that was a rather prescient statement about the responsibility of the private sector in trying to resolve these problems. I'm personally concerned that if the Japanese companies don't play a bigger role in trying to resolve these problems, the U.S.-Japan relationship itself, including its security and political dimensions, may be jeopardized.

And so, in conclusion, I would say that my prescription for easing economic tensions between the U.S. and Japan is for the Japanese government and the U.S. government to provide leadership to the extent that they can. But to the extent that they are not able to, the private sector in both Japan and the United States must take more positive and responsible steps to resolve disputes. Thank you very much.

Nagayo Homma

Japan and America, 1945-1995: Peace, Progress, Partnership

Randolph Bourne, an American literary critic who died immediately after the end of World War I, left a haunting sentence in his unfinished essay on the State.[1] The self-appointed malcontent stated repeatedly in the essay, "War is the health of the State." I came upon his writings—"a pile of fragments in search of that imagined audience of perfect comprehenders,"[2] according to Daniel Aaron—when I was studying at Amherst College in 1954-56. As a young man from the defeated Japan still carrying vivid wartime memories, I pondered Bourne's message. Was World War II the health of the United States? What about Japan? What kind of lessons should we learn from our war experiences? One lesson was obvious; never again should we, Japanese and Americans, engage in war with each other.

For the past fifty years since 1945, the Japanese people have enjoyed the fruits of peace. Thanks to fate and the irony of history, Japan became a beneficiary of the Cold War in a way. The United States fought twice in Asia during this period, while the Japanese people were exempt from being directly involved in military combat. Japanese efforts to reconstruct and redevelop their country concentrated largely on economic activities, and by the mid-eighties Japan had come to be regarded as an economic giant. The fact that a Harvard professor would publish a book titled *Japan as No. 1* was unthinkable for most Japanese. However, in the 1980s, we realized that Japan was beginning to be perceived by some Americans as a threat—largely in economic terms—to the United States. Then the Cold War ended, and for the last several years we have been forced to reaffirm or redefine the significance of the partnership between Japan and the United States.

How much progress has Japan made as a nation during this period? We can certainly point to various statistical figures, beginning with the growth of GNP, which indicate that Japan has developed into one of the most advanced countries in the world. Compared to the prewar period, Japanese society has become highly egalitarian. The right to the pursuit of happiness is much more fully assured than fifty years ago.

But to ask whether individuals in Japan are happier now is a moot question. My memory is not clear, but I believe I read an essay by an American critic a long time ago entitled, "Of Happiness and Despair There Is No Measure." Today's Japan is a democracy, sharing the values of liberty and equality, so I do not believe that Japan is a system which necessarily makes those who live within it unhappy. Prewar Japan produced many literary works—novels, plays, tanka, haiku, modern poems, etc.—that were full of misery and despair. But postwar literature has described happiness as well as sorrow.

Is Japan today an interesting civilization? I raise this question thinking of Matthew Arnold's famous essay, "The Civilization of the United States," which was a trenchant assessment by the celebrated British poet of the quality of American civilization as of the 1880s. His verdict was that America was not interesting because it lacked distinction and beauty. If Arnold should come to life again and visit Japan today, I wonder whether he would similarly find that Japan lacks distinction and beauty and is therefore uninteresting. On the other hand, Marius Jansen, a leading scholar in the field of Japanese history, concluded his supplementary chapter of the enlarged edition of Edwin O. Reischauer's *The Japanese Today* by assuring the readers that Japan will become still more interesting.

America has always held the interest of the Japanese people ever since the time of Commodore Perry's visit to open the gates of feudal Japan. John Manjiro was probably the first Japanese who sang Stephen Foster's "Oh, Susanna!" when he returned to Japan toward the end of the Edo government after many years' stay in America. Foster's nonsense song was enormously popular among those people who trekked to California following the news of discovery of gold. After the Meiji Restoration, America was a source of many cultural products for the Japanese people as they strove toward modernization. High school students studied Washington Irving's *Sketch Book*, making "The Legend of Sleepy Hollow" a familiar story for my father's generation. Indeed, I first heard this story from my father when I was a small boy. I just wonder if there will be a "politically correct" version of "Rip Van Winkle" coming out soon.

A study of Japanese textbooks for grade school pupils show that George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and Columbus were the most conspicuous heroes in the Meiji period. There was even a Japanese song "Song of Washington," applauding the feats of the great general of the American Revolution (although the song also made anachronistic references to the Rockies and Michigan). I believe this is the only song about Washington. Once, I explained the significance of this song in the history of Japanese-American relations in my seminar class and even sang the song—which is full of Meiji flavor—to my bewildered students. Similarly, Franklin's *Autobiography* served as a powerful didactic story for ambitious young boys of Meiji Japan.

But we cannot talk about America as an unchanging entity. A somewhat arbitrary periodization of American cultural history offers at least four phases. First, in what may be called "post-Revolutionary War period," American republicanism, as epitomized by the federal Constitution and the founding fathers and based upon a belief in civil virtue, was challenged by the new forces of individualism and acquisitive spirit. Although Thomas Jefferson best symbolized the spirit of Enlightenment of the 18th century, he witnessed with his own eyes the rapid change in cultural climate as America turned to romanticism and evangelicalism. It was also in this period that the budding of American commercial culture was seen.

In the second phase, the "post-Civil War period," American culture developed in two counterpointing ways. On the one hand there was so-called "Victorian culture" or "the genteel tradition," an example of which was Alcott's *Little Women*. The ideal type of individual in this Victorian culture was reliable, sincere, neat, industrious, conscientious, never addicted to liquor, respecting property rights, refraining from pursuing immediate pleasure for the sake of long-term worthy goals, pious and believing in the Bible, family-oriented, conscious of guarding honor in human relations, devoted to cultivating virtues, and, of course, patriotic. This was the character of the largely Anglo-Saxon American Victorianism.

On the other hand, an increasing number of "new immigrants" from Eastern and Southern Europe, as well as from Asian countries like China and Japan, played a double role of transforming themselves into "Americans" while changing the character of American culture itself. The beginning of the 20th century was both the heyday of "WASP" influence in American society and the emergence of ethnic culture.

Post-World War I America offered this double image to the outside world. It is interesting to note here that Takagi Yasaka, the most highly respected Americanist in Japan for many years, studied at Harvard in the early 1920s, and published his major work in the early 1930s in which he propounded the thesis that the United States was basically a country formed and led by Anglo-Saxons. On the other hand, Tani Joji, who also spent several years in the United States in the early 1920s, asserted in his articles published in 1927 that the United States of Anglo-Saxon domination was fading and that the influence and power of new immigrants were growing. Takagi taught American political history at Tokyo Imperial University, while Tani became a bestselling writer. Tani worked so hard that he died young in his mid-thirties, while Takagi lived long enough to enhance the respectability of American studies in postwar Japan.

In the history of the reception of American culture by the Japanese people, or, for that matter, by the whole world, the 1920s were crucial years. The image of American culture as the culture of modernism was built upon new cultural products that were non-Victorian or anti-Victorian, and also largely non-WASP. I am thinking, for example, of Tin Pan Alley songwriters such as Irving Berlin and the Gershwin brothers, of jazz, motion pictures, and so on. There emerged a dichotomy of America as a nation of Washington's integrity, Franklin's Protestant ethic, and Lincoln's dedication on the one hand, and the world of exciting but blatantly commercial popular culture. American culture was now truly fascinating, but Japanese intellectuals took a disdainful attitude toward "vulgar" Americanism.

In fact, American intellectuals themselves vehemently attacked the cultural vulgarism and materialism of their own country. Some of them gave up on the future potential of American culture and fled to Europe in the early 1920s. Among those who remained in America, Henry C. Mencken was most ferocious in attacking practically every aspect of American culture. In this connection, I think it is noteworthy that William Hyland, former editor of *Foreign Affairs*, has just published a book on the history of popular songs in America. His conclusion is an effort to bridge the chasm between "highbrow" and "lowbrow" America in his own way. He states that the Golden Age of popular songs became the common language of the era between 1920-1950. More importantly, Hyland contends that "the great songwriters defined the Roaring Twenties just as much as Hemingway and Fitzgerald" and that "during the isolationist 1920s and 1930s American themes emerged strongly and continued to do so during World War II."[3]

This is a very important point and very much relevant to our concern of progress in Japanese-American relations. Using today's terminology, we might say that post-World War II Japan embraced both WASP culture and ethnic culture without being fully aware of the character of the American themes. Hemingway is now the subject of serious academic study, while Tin Pan Alley songs still belong to the realm of entertainment programs of NHK.

Going back to my periodization of American cultural history, I would submit that the post-World War II period could be counted as the fourth phase. At the beginning there was a euphoria of victory, which was immediately clouded by new strains in confronting the threat of communism coupled with the fear of nuclear war. The Truman Doctrine could be read as a political expression of such an unstable psychological predicament. But the United States could afford to present its self-portrait as an affluent republic. It was a combination of the ideal or ideology of the founding of the American republic and the development, as well as achievement, of American capitalism. In retrospect this was a period of "Cold War culture" which emphasized American culture as "the culture of the whole." The key phrase here was "the American way of life."

The Japanese people during the Cold War period were conditioned to accept American culture as "the culture of the whole." It was a natural attitude for foreigners to receive each segment of American culture as part of the whole. But, beginning with the 1980s, and certainly as we entered the post-Cold War period, America as a land of multicultural diversity came to be emphasized.

On the other hand, so-called revisionists on Japan have been asserting that Japan is fundamentally different, a complete "other," to Americans.

This picture of diversity that is America and otherness that is Japan poses a new problem both for Americans and for Japanese people in the present post-Cold War period. American culture is certainly a culture of rich diversity, but for all the good points made by multiculturalists, foreigners can perceive that there is something that is characteristically American. The metaphor of America as a melting pot of peoples of the world may be discarded as a myth, but the American motto of "e pluribus unum" remains essentially valid today. And the fact that the Japanese people, in spite of their completely different cultural tradition, have assimilated so much of American culture gives us a hope that perhaps we might work toward creating common culture shared and enjoyed by diverse nations of the world. I hope that the lessons of Japanese-American cultural relations will be applicable to other cases.

I am afraid I cannot conclude my remarks with a serenely optimistic note. The foundation of the bilateral partnership between Japan and the United States is of course our alliance relationship, but the debates about its meaning in this new era may lead to a dangerously volatile situation not only in East Asia but also in the entire world. Already both thoughtful and flippant opinions are being offered from both sides. At this crucial moment, moreover, we are suffering from weak political leadership and short-sighted bureaucracy. So there is all the more reason for more active roles for Japan-America Societies in both countries aiming at better and deeper understanding of each other as well as sharing and creating common culture.

Notes

1. See Randolph S. Bourne, *War and the Intellectuals: Collected Essays, 1915-1919* (Harper Torchbooks, 1964), pp. 65-104
2. See Daniel Aaron, *American Notes* (Northeastem University Press, 1994), p. 209
3. See William G. Hyland, *The Song Is Ended* (Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 204.

Akira Iriye

Japan and America, 1945-1995: Peace, Progress, Partnership

Among the large number of books published to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the hostilities, particularly important have been those that contain eyewitness accounts of the war and the peace. They necessarily contain conflicting messages, but they all deserve to be read to enable us to understand how the wartime enmity translated into postwar amity and partnership.

I would like to cite two recent books. One, called *With Only the Will to Live* (1994), contains recollections of experiences by American soldiers in Japanese prisoners of war camps. The stories they tell are of necessity gruesome. Some of them say they have never forgiven the Japanese ("I just distrust them, and I hate them"), while others indicate they have overcome the memories of their unpleasant wartime experiences and do not hold Japan forever responsible for what they suffered ("they were just like I was; they were victims of circumstances . . . I don't blame the Japanese government").[1] Both these reactions are genuine and should be equally respected. It would be naive to think that the former view has disappeared altogether or that the latter sentiment itself is conducive to a solid friendship.

Then how should one understand the history of U.S.-Japanese relations in the last fifty years, when there has indeed been formed a partnership across the Pacific? The partnership has not been without difficulties and tensions, but the most amazing thing, given the wartime animosity, is the transformation itself. There are those who argue that this partnership has been merely a marriage of convenience necessitated by the Cold War so that, now that the Cold War is over, the marriage is destined to be dissolved. I shall leave it to other sessions in this conference to address the security implications of the end of the Cold War. Here I would like to argue that the partnership has been as solid and durable as it has been because it has been built not just on the mutually felt security needs of the two nations but also, and fundamentally, on the sharing of cultural experiences by Americans and Japanese. They have developed a community of individuals and groups who have communicated and influenced one another, who have explored common interests, and who have created and recreated visions of a more harmonious international order.

How have they been able to do so? Here another book published recently offers a clue: Jacob van Staaveren's *An American in Japan* (1995). The author was a young lawyer from Chicago who worked for the occupation's educational reform programs in Yamanashi prefecture during 1946-1948. The book is based on his letters and notes written at that time and provides a fascinating first-person account of what it was like to be involved in the remaking of Japan. But I mention the book as it exemplifies another aspect of U.S.-Japanese relations since the war. For instance, one day in October 1946, van Staaveren wrote to his parents, "I have already attended an opera and two concerts by the Nippon Philharmonic Orchestra in Hibiya Hall . . . For most occupationnaires, Tokyo appears enveloped in a perpetual Roman Holiday."[2] What this and other passages in the book indicate is the absence of any deep-seated animosity between occupier and occupied.

This, of course, is a well known story, but a personal account like van Staaveren's helps us to understand some of the factors behind this rather remarkable phenomenon. The fact that the Nippon Philharmonic Orchestra was already performing classical music in downtown Tokyo—Hibiya Hall was one of the few buildings that had survived the air raids—and that Americans were flocking to these performances suggests the sharing of a common cultural experience. This experience, and examples can be easily multiplied, provided a basis for the development of postwar U.S.-Japanese relations which would otherwise have remained far more superficial and filled with more tensions.

The sharing of cultural experiences, however, did not start with the end of the war. Classical music had been performed in Japan for several decades before the war, and European and American artists had long familiarized Japanese with Western music. Japanese artists had studied in Europe and North America, and works by hundreds of Western novelists and poets had been translated into Japanese. In the field of popular entertainment, American movies and sports, especially baseball, had been popular up to the very eve of the Pacific war. The cultural contact was severed during the war, but even so a noted Japanese sociologist, Shimizu Ikutaro, could write in 1943 that Japanese society was still saturated by what he called "Americanism," or the American way of life.[3] It is no wonder, then, that once the war was over cultural communication was resumed and quickly expanded under the aegis of the U.S. occupation.

There are those, in Japan as well as in the United States, who insist that any such cultural contact is mere window-dressing for a more critical strategic relationship. Others assert that shared cultural experiences have been of little help in coping with trade, currency exchange, and other issues that have been increasingly vexing U.S.-Japanese relations. Then there are the pessimists who argue that Americans and Japanese are so different, being products of contrasting civilizations, that there can be no meaningful sharing of common cultural experiences between them. These pessimists deny the possibility of mutual understanding across cultural boundaries as well as the possibility that a given culture can change as a result of contact with other cultures. Of course, if we follow their logic, these pessimists are themselves products of their respective cultures, and the fact that they exist in both the United States and Japan is evidence that there is, after all, something in common between the two. Moreover, the two countries have produced not just cultural fatalists but also cultural communicators, and who is to say that these latter are not as authentic representatives of their cultures as the pessimists?

But I do not mean to spend much time quibbling over abstract, semantic questions. Rather, I would merely like to point out that without close cultural contact and communication, relations among nations would remain unstable and opportunistic, subject to shifting global power and trade balances. Geopolitical and economic "realities" keep changing all the time, and a relationship built on a temporarily shared set of interests will be a poor framework for a solid partnership. Moreover, in today's world cultural issues are growing in importance, ranging from the preservation of the natural environment to the protection of human rights, and a nation that devotes itself solely to security and economic interests will be in no position to contribute to the well being of the world community.

In such a context, the history of U.S.-Japanese relations provides a good example of cultural association which has steadily expanded and which, if further confirmed and strengthened, can play an important role in shaping the post-Cold War world order. But it is important to note that such cultural contact has been part of a larger phenomenon, the development of what I have called "cultural internationalism" in the twentieth century. The significance of U.S.-Japanese cultural relations lies in the fact that the story is an integral part of one of the most impressive developments in recent and contemporary history.

Cultural internationalism is a movement for promoting crossnational and crosscultural communication and cooperation as a way to contribute to a more stable, peaceful world order. The movement arose just before the First World War and steadily gained momentum after the war. The League of Nations established an international committee on intellectual cooperation to promote scholarly and artistic exchanges among nations. It is interesting to note that although the United States did not join the League, individual Americans were very active in the intellectual cooperation committee, as were Japanese. As late as 1937, the year war broke out between Japan and China, intellectuals from various countries, including the United States, Japan, and (it should be noted) China, met in Geneva to rededicate themselves to the proposition that the nations of the world shared a "common interest in preserving mankind's heritage of culture and in promoting the future development of the sciences, arts and letters," and that "the cause of peace would be served by the promotion of cultural relations between peoples."[4] Unfortunately, such a noble vision was soon to fall victim to the vandalizing impact of war in Asia and Europe, a war in which monuments of civilization were destroyed and worldwide networks of cultural communication severely disrupted.

One of the most moving phenomena of the war was that from the very beginning there was strong determination in the allied capitals to restore cultural internationalism as soon as peace returned. Thus one finds, for instance, cabinet ministers and political leaders from Europe, the United States, and China holding a series of meetings in wartime London to resume intercultural activities after the war. "Cooperative activity in education and in the furtherance of cultural interchange among the peoples of the world," they asserted at one point, I will promote the freedom, the dignity, and the well-being of all, and therefore assist in the attainment of security and peace."[5] Such ideas were soon translated into specific programs for cultural exchange among nations, such as the Fulbright program and the various activities undertaken under the auspices of UNESCO, established in December 1945.

Postwar U.S.-Japanese cultural relations, therefore, should be seen as part of this movement for cultural internationalism, indeed as among the most successful exemplifications of it. It is an impressive story. Even while Japan was under U.S. occupation, some eight hundred young Japanese were brought over to study at American colleges and universities through GARIOA funding. This was followed by the Fulbright exchange program, under which the first group of over three hundred Japanese students came to the United States in 1952. From that time on the flow of Japanese students across the Pacific has increased steadily, and today there are said to be nearly forty thousand Japanese students in various educational institutions. Nor has the flow been unidirectional. American scholars and students have been going to Japan for research and study. Although the number, which today totals about twelve hundred, is only about three percent of the Japanese students in America, we should compare the figure to the prewar situation when there were hardly a dozen American students in Japan. Moreover, under the JET program, over a thousand young Americans annually join those from other English speaking countries to teach English at Japanese high schools.

But student and scholarly exchanges are only one example of cultural internationalism. There have been exchanges of artists, literary figures, musicians, athletes, and many others. Tourism has grown to such an extent that in 1990 over two million Japanese visited the United States, and some six hundred thousand Americans visited Japan. Apart from students and tourists, there were nearly three hundred thousand Japanese living in the United States in 1991, and over forty thousand Americans in Japan. These were still tiny fractions of the total populations of the two countries, but even at the grass-roots level, an increasing number of exchange activities have taken place. Thanks to the Japan-America Societies all over the United States and their counterparts in Japan, and through the financial support of organizations such as the Center for Global Partnership of the Japan Foundation and the U.S.-Japan Friendship Commission, the network of individual Americans and Japanese who share a commitment to promoting communication and understanding has been rapidly expanding.

Cultural contact and exchange between the two countries have been of decisive importance in transforming the bilateral relationship, and indeed in transforming the two countries. The United States and Japan today are what they are in part because of the mutual cultural interactions. Some may not approve of the changes and yearn for a simpler age when continuity and order could be taken for granted, when sovereign nations assumed that their autonomy could be maintained with little impact from abroad. But changes cannot be wished away in a world of multinational corporations, constant innovations in telecommunications and information technology, and crossnational concerns with global issues such as the environment, drug control, and human rights. The question today is not whether a global village is coming into existence, but what shape it will take. It is here that the example provided by the transformation of wartime enmity between the United States and Japan into postwar amity through increased cultural contact holds important messages. Crossnational and crosscultural contact is bound to increase in the decades to come. To control the tide through artificial restrictions will not prevent the coming into existence of "cultural borderlands" all over the globe. Nor will an emphasis on security and trade issues alone offer a solution to what is far more than a military or economic phenomenon.

Peace, progress, and partnership, the subtitle of this presentation, are themes that need to be defined in the framework of a world environment of increasing cultural diversity and intercultural contact. The United States has been a major promoter of cultural internationalism since the war, and Japan has been a principal beneficiary. Together they have demonstrated that it is possible to cooperate across cultural boundaries. If they can continue to do so, in the process inviting other countries to join together in expanding the networks of communication and understanding, they will be making a signal contribution to a more peaceful, humane world.

Notes

1. Robert S. LaForte, et al., eds., *With Only the Will to Live* (Wilmington, DE, 1994), pp. 234, 235.

2. Jacob van Staaveren, *An American in Japan* (Seattle, 1995), p. 20.
3. Reprinted in *Chûôkôron,* April 1989.
4. International committee on intellectual exchange, report, August 1937, F0371/2125/W16679, Public Record Office.
5. F0924/20/LC768.

Mikio Kawa

Aging: Responsibility and Cost

(Format note: This paper was transcribed from Simul International's English translation recorded on audiotape.)

I would like to extend my gratitude to the Japan-America Society for inviting me to be one of the speakers at this Symposium. I was happy to be able to fly to Hawaii, and because I enjoy warm weather, I was even happier to have been invited to a conference here in this very warm climate.

I do, however, need to preface my remarks with three confessions. First, I seem to have come down with a cold while flying here. Ordinarily, my voice is wonderful, but today, I'm afraid it may crack. Second, my English is not perfect, so I will ask you to use the services of the interpreters. And third, because the time limit on our panel presentations is only fifteen minutes, I will be deleting some of my remarks and not elaborating upon details. I plan to just give you a general overview of my subject.

As you know, this year happens to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II. Japanese society has undergone many changes over the past fifty years. There are several numbers which I can cite which are indicative of these changes. Because from 1945 up until the 1990s several of these numbers are not necessarily accurate, I would therefore like to rely upon numbers that were collected in 1950, and for examining recent situations, I would like to cite statistics from the year 1990. During this time, there is a span of forty years. By utilizing or comparing these two numbers, I will attempt to explain what kinds of changes Japanese society has been going through.

The first number I would like to refer to concerns quality of living. From a very devastated, destitute level, we were able to become a very wealthy nation. The national income was 4.4 trillion yen as of 1950; however, in 1990, it was approximately 340 trillion yen. The amount of money that was spent during this time is also reflected in the numbers. In 1950, social security benefits totaled .2 trillion yen. As of 1990, the payout was 50 trillion, which was 300 times the 1950 level.

A social scientist once likened social security benefits to an airplane. It needs a powerful engine and large wings so that it can fly. The very powerful engine is the economy, and large wings are the will of the people to support each other. Over fifty years, the Japanese engine has grown very large. Accordingly, the wings have also expanded. Just for reference sake, half of 50 trillion yen is, in fact, used for pensions for aged people. Forty percent, which is 20 trillion yen, is used for medical care. In Japan, both pension and health care are 100% covered, and all national citizens are in the national program. Social security benefits and pensions account for 40-50% of the overall 50 trillion, and 1% is welfare for the nation's aged citizens.

Second, in the different changes we have seen over the past fifty years—setting aside that Japan has become a very rich country—many new services have begun to become available in society. In other words, the production mode of mass production, from trying to produce cheap products, has shifted to emphasis upon demand. A small number of diverse products demonstrates this change in the types of services that are available in society. Right after the war, and from 1970 and 1975, perhaps, are the demarcation lines for these two different systems.

Third, another change in Japanese life occurred within Japanese households. Household functions that were once performed within the family have become externalized. In other words, people began to go to restaurants to eat. Bento boxes became available for purchase, as well, and more and more people began to eat outside of their homes. A whole new industry developed that offered fast foods and also foods that people could purchase and bring home. Similarly, the number of dry cleaning services has increased. More and more specialized services became available for things that were once done completely within the household.

One of the major differences we notice is the change in where people are born and die, compared to forty years ago. As of 1950, 95% of babies born in Japan were born at home. In 1990, only 1% of newborns were born at home. In other words, 99%, the vast majority of the children, are now born in hospitals. Furthermore, there have been changes in where people die. In 1950, 89% of the overall population died at home, whereas in 1990, only 25% died at home. In other words, the majority now die in hospitals. That's where they spend their last moments.

To summarize, on one hand we have the fact that Japan became an affluent society. Second, services that can be obtained externally, or outside of the household, have increased. Third, many of the functions once done in the household have now been externalized. There is also a fourth major change, which perhaps applies in the United States, as well, and that is the aging of the population.

In 1947, the average life span of a Japanese male was 51; of a female, 55. Currently, as you may well know, life expectancy is 82 for women and 76 for men. In other words, people now live 1.5 times longer. This is, in fact, a reflection of the affluence of society as well as, perhaps, evidence of the contributions of social services and welfare. Accordingly, the percentage of senior citizens above 65 has shifted from 5 to 12%. Currently, I believe the aging ratio is approximately the same as in the United States. In 2025, it is believed that the aging rate will be even higher in Japan; it is anticipated that we will reach a level of 25-26%.

In light of these changes in Japanese life and society, policies and measures for the aged, including pension and medical care, have in fact been fully coordinated. There are still other systematic and structural changes that need to be incorporated, but as for the system itself, we feel that we have done our work.

However, when it comes to welfare services, in particular long term care for people who are bedridden, a considerable amount of work remains. In particular, this applies to people who are receiving care at home. In that respect, we have made three proposals. One is for the elderly who are being taken care of at home. Second, when such services are provided in the home, medical care, health care, and also nursing care are all necessary. We feel the need to integrate these services in order to provide comprehensive services for the elderly. Third, since this is very deeply related to the lives of the Japanese citizens, we must have a long term perspective with a clear vision toward the future. We need to design our system and make our plans clear so that the Japanese people will have a good understanding of the factors that will have a heavy influence upon their lives.

In 1990, the Japanese government presented a policy called the "Golden Plan." In 1994, 3,300 cities, towns and villages had designed their own versions of the Golden Plan that had been presented by the government. Currently work is underway based upon these plans.

Now, let us look at social security and the family, which is one of the themes of this current symposium. It is an issue that has been very hotly debated recently. As stated earlier, the issue of the percentage of Japanese senior citizens living with children is indeed very high. In 1950, 82% of all senior citizens were living with their families. 80% of those people were living together with their children. Subsequent to that, because of the development of industry and so on, in 1990, this ratio had fallen to 60%. However, I must note that the number of senior citizens during this period increased from five to fifteen million. Therefore, the actual number of senior citizens living with their children has, in fact, increased. However, there are circumstances that make it difficult for them to live with their children. It is more difficult to provide proper care for these senior citizens even when they are living with their children.

When we look at the future of social security policies and the family, how we can bring harmony between these two is one very important challenge. First, there is the relationship of the individual, the family, and social security measures. Second, more and more married women are going into the work force, so we need to establish a social security system which is based upon the premise that women will be going to work. Based on that, we need to provide day care and nursery care with that in mind. And third, be it pension or medical care, everything is done based upon how money can be provided for those purposes. However, be it day care or nursery care, the services, themselves, are lacking in Japanese society. For that reason, more and more effort needs to be focused in order to provide specific care in these areas. That will be our challenge.

Finally, but not the least important, independent individuals and families that are self sufficient and self-reliant are supporting the entire society. How can we do something for these individuals and families? This is indeed a major challenge for the national government. We need to seek a good balance, and a successful combination of these efforts—this is what is most required for the future future. Thank you very much.

James Andrew Kelly

U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia

We could scarcely be meeting at a more appropriate time. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan is thirty-five years old now, and the Cold War in which it was formed has been over for more than half a decade. More immediately, large trade sanctions are likely to be applied by the U.S. against Japan next week, and Canada has just hosted a meeting of the weakest looking group of seven (eight, counting Yeltsin) heads of government that have yet come together under the pretense of world leadership.

It is a time to reflect on what has happened, where we are, and on basic directions. Some voices object; for example: *Foreign Affairs*, the respected journal from New York, will publish an article this week that will call American military strategy in East Asia "ossified." It will claim that too many in Washington do not recognize that economic power has superseded military power; it will blow the whistle about the trillions of yen that Japan avoids spending by virtue of its treaty with the U.S. at the cost of a few billions to support those forces in the Far East; and it will call for Japan to drop from its "protectorate" status (or be dropped) so it can reach its destiny, presumably as a "ordinary" or "normal" country.

These are not isolated voices. Others vow that the U.S. role in Asia is as "unpaid security guards," and that it is time for America to stop giving and giving while Cold War allies such as Japan play us for fools.

What is a person to think? There have long been weaknesses in the explanations for why this arrangement should continue; if it should continue; or even if adjustments are necessary. The case has to be made, and it is complicated enough to require more than a slogan. Even during the Cold War there was much more to the alliance than the threat from the then Soviet Union. This panel is not a debate, and I suppose that our audience may be predisposed to a cooperative attitude. I believe strongly that the reasons for preserving and strengthening the alliance that we have are compelling. But I am also aware that these reasons have not been aired thoroughly—on either side of the Pacific.

The symposium organizers asked us: "With the end of the Cold War, how will Japan and the U.S. cooperate on security?" I prefer to rephrase the question a little and to respond in a way that puts the problem a little better. Rather than *how*—*why*, from either Japan's or America's viewpoint, should close cooperation on security continue?

The Cold War has been over long enough for us to realize that, for all the wonderful news that was, the world is more complicated than we may have supposed, and still dangerous in new and old ways. And there is a serious shortage of simple answers. The hopeful invocation by President Bush of a "new world order" is now all but paired with an ironic chuckle, or a snort of contempt. Though professors can search, looking for overarching visions is futile; it will be a long time before very many, even in one country, will be able to agree on some "world order." Other simplifications—political or economic—need the same skepticism.

For example, the proposition that economic power has superseded military power is, at best, untested. Yes, as *The Economist* put it, "The modernization of Asia is the most momentous public event in our lifetimes." The reference was to remarkable economic growth and the impact on the lives of hundreds of millions of people, if not billions. I was in Malaysia ten days ago, and the changes in even three years are stunning—and the implications of those changes are very poorly grasped by most Americans.

As a result of this economic leap, as Samuel Huntington put it: "Peoples and governments of non-western civilization—Asia—are no longer "objects of history" but have joined the West as fellow shapers and movers of history. . . . Asian countries are now places with weight, wealth, talent, and point of view that affect the West, whether or not the West chooses to respond. Japan chose to assert its voice among the West 130 years ago, but even its views have often been muted.

So we can accept that economics are important in Asia and that Asia is much more important because of economics. But if economics is superseding military power, why are all those Asian countries modernizing, and in some cases, enlarging their military forces?—except for Japan and the U.S.—and why did North Korea, begging for rice from LDP politicians, feel it had to start building nuclear weapons to go with its ballistic missiles that can reach targets more than a thousand miles away? Why is China accelerating its increases in military spending, even as its border agreements with Russia are mostly resolved? Why did China celebrate Prime Minister Murayama's departure and the extension of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty by exploding nuclear fireworks and testing a new mobile missile?

It seems to me that the interplay of economic, political, and military power is considerably more complex than wishful thinkers claim. It seems to me that Trotsky's old quote still speaks: "You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you!"

This is not to say that East Asia is some powder keg. In many ways, it is very stable indeed, and there is every reason to believe that the threats to that stability can be managed in some way. Every country or territory—including

North Korea—has some, perhaps many, capable and intelligent officials. But it is certainly premature to conclude that these wise men and women will always prevail, or that balance of power politics, not to mention evil and greed, have been eliminated.

Why is it in Japan's Interest to Continue Military Cooperation with the United States?

My list has six points:

1. To maintain the nuclear umbrella; more specifically, to avoid the need for Japan to face choices of either dealing with nuclear neighbors from weakness, or changing its consensus from opposing to favoring nuclear armaments. Minister Tanaka's remarks this morning indicate that no such shift is likely. This logic operates at other levels, as well, with respect to Japan's foregoing capabilities to project military or naval power. Costs are a factor, too. These military capabilities are expensive.
2. By staying within the U.S.-Japan Security Framework, Japan is better able to develop useful political and security relationships in East Asia without frightening the smaller powers of Southeast Asia; in Northeast Asia, perhaps the last pit of the Cold War, and a subregion with difficult political issues marking every line, the alliance provides better prospects for peace and development than would be afforded to Japan by itself.
3. To keep the United States—at minimum, Japan's largest customer—engaged in the region in the full range of political, trade, financial, and military activities. An end to the security relationship with the U.S. would also mean, as a practical matter, the end of a U.S. role of consequence in the region, setting in motion a potentially unstable process among Asians of forming a new set of power relationships.
4. To have a better assurance of reliable energy supplies, which may, as Asian consumption grows with no matching increase in regional reserves, come under increased strain. The sea lanes from the Middle East are long.
5. To be able to move into the more distant future of East Asia in an atmosphere of stability. This means some kind of Korean Unification; China's re-emergence as a great power; possible strains in Eastern Russia. Put bluntly, this means Japan can avoid either dominance by, or alliance with, Russia or China.
6. For Japan's people, as reflected in their elected leaders: to be able

to manage deregulating, changing, perhaps an aging Japan, without the pressure of powerful external political forces.

Why is it in the United States' Interest to Continue Military Cooperation with Japan?

1. If the United States is to be a trading nation, it has to be *present* in Asia. Corporate marketing offices, or even banks—whether in Singapore, Shanghai, Seoul, or Tokyo—are not a sufficient presence. Forty stealth bombers in Arkansas are an important capability, but they are not enough, either. There is no substitute for bases in Japan as the foundation ("linchpin" is the favored term) of American military/political presence in Asia. This applies to South Asia as well.
2. For the period of divided Korea, because Japan is essential to managing and financing a difficult and dangerous diplomatic and military problem.
3. To respond better to China's emergence. Its success as an economy, and as a country, is in its own hands. But it will be influenced from outside. Both Japanese and American hopes for China (and the avoidance of less attractive outcomes) can be better worked together than separately.
4. At a time of diminishing military resources in the United States, the alliance provides advantages of location and support that are not replaceable at any cost, and which, even in a much more limited way, would be much more expensive.
5. Multinational institutions have some importance, but they are not developing either steadily or speedily in Asia. There is no interest in any kind of NATO equivalent; the United Nations has far to travel to meet the hopes of fifty years ago, and the ASEAN Regional Forum is but a modest beginning. Beyond that, what strength that multinational endeavors have shown has been based on the vitality of bilateral relations. These new institutions have promise, but they are no substitute for working together for either Japan or the United States.
6. To preserve a unique partnership with the nation in Asia that, for all our differences, is closer to America in the size and mass of its economy, and in its democratic values, than any other Asian place.

Redefining the Practical Aspects of the Relationship.

Although the security relationship, I argue, remains valuable for both Japan and the U.S., there are many elements that need adjustment or redefinition. The Mutual Security Treaty itself need not be amended, but emphasis could usefully be shifted from Article 5, Defense of the Territory of Japan, to Article 6, Maintenance of International Peace and Security.

Japan's forces need structured adjustment to apply the revolution in military technology. The Prime Minister's Commission, led by Mr. Higuchi, last summer issued an important report. It suggests that Japan needs several modern military capabilities, including improvements in command control—obtaining benefits from computer and telecommunications technology. Defense against ballistic missiles—Japan is threatened by so called "theatre" rather than intercontinental missiles and reconnaissance capabilities—to know about military threats in Northeast Asia. These are both areas in which improvements are essential.

Within the alliance, early progress on ways to support each other's forces with supplies and technical services is being worked on and is needed. For example, there has been a lack of clarity over what Japan could do to help American forces going to Korea's aid if North Korea chose to invade again.

Finally, both sides can cooperate better to support peacekeeping missions. Both Japan and the United States are approaching this subject carefully. There are new concerns for the differences of peace keeping or peace enforcement. But the tasks that are undertaken can be helped by cooperation.

For the Future: Working Together as the Political Landscape in East Asia is Redefined

The separate and mutual relationships with China will continually undergird the U.S.-Japan relationship. It does not matter whether the scenarios for China are optimistic or pessimistic. At best, China will be a growing power in many ways. Under less favorable outcomes, China's problems will somehow spill over. China, for better or worse, will be no one's long term ally in any equal sense. Our interests—and our influence on the giant—will be more successful if we work together.

In a smaller way, the Taiwan-China problem does not seem to be getting easier. Japanese and American cooperation may prove essential in this dangerous matter.

The U.S.-Japan security relationship may be separate from the economic relationship, but one inevitably affects the other. If Japan's overregulated, too often restricted, markets continue to be so; if large trade surpluses persist, it will inevitably erode American support, not just for an alliance, but for being a trading nation.

The goal: recognize and build on mutually useful asymmetry. It is not an outdated legacy, but a new kind of sophisticated security relationship to meet the emerging political structure of Asia, and the economic framework that exists. We need it to respond to a vigorous unified Korea, to bring the resources of Russia's Far East to use without political or environmental upheaval, and to help China prosper and develop.

Ryosei Kokubun

U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia

(Format note: This paper was transcribed from Simul International's English translation recorded on audiotape.)

When I was in the United States eleven or twelve years ago, people looked at me as if I were a junior high school student. At that time, I was already an assistant professor, but my youthful looks are deceptive. Recently, I visited the United States again and people viewed me as a high school student. I had grown up from the level of a junior high school to a high school student in those ten years. Probably ten years from now, if I visit the United States, people will think I look like a college student. Being viewed as an adult takes a long time for someone like me. And that's very much like the U.S.-Japan relationship, isn't it?

Because of my language difficulties, I would like to speak in Japanese. Okamoto-san said that if you speak in English, your talk can be more provocative and progressive and meaningful. I think that's true. But the problem is that when I speak in English, it's also hard for you to understand what I'm saying, so I'll switch my language into Japanese.

Thank you very much. I would like to be given the opportunity to deliver my address in Japanese. My speech consists of three main parts. One is the recent "Asia boom" and how we should view it. Second, there is a strong indication that we are now approaching the "Age of Asia." Is that really true, and if so, what are the challenges? The third theme is the role of Japan and the United States in terms of Asian security. Those are the three major points I would like to touch upon.

First of all, I would like to go into the Asia boom in Japan. The 21st century is anticipated to become the era of Asia. Perhaps, as a reflection of this, Japan is recently experiencing a boom on all things Asian. The rise of our interest in Asia is not limited to business, but is also seen in political and cultural contexts. There has been a considerable increase in the proportion of Asia-related reports in the media, as well. But why an Asia boom now?

I believe there are three reasons. First, because of the prolonged recession and the appreciated yen, many Japanese businesses have been compelled to shift their operations abroad. There is this underlying reason that dictates the interest of Japanese businesses toward China, which is showing tremendous growth, as well as toward other Asian nations as candidates for investment.

Second, Japan is seeking to increase its international contribution politically by, for instance, securing a seat as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Support from neighboring Asian nations is indispensable to that end.

Third, and I feel this is very important, is that while these factors are significant, we must not forget the fact that there are underlying convoluted emotions against the United States. Some within the political, business and bureaucratic circles feel that they have already had enough pressure exerted by the United States to open up the Japanese market. As a reaction, they are turning to the concept of Asianism, such as EAEC (East Asia Economic Caucus), propounded by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia. In other words, there is now a tendency to return to Asia as a ground for claiming autonomy *vis-a-vis* the United States.

With that in mind, I feel that this Asia Boom is merely a boom, and nothing more. It is in essence very fragile. I say this because there are extremely circumstantial and utilitarian elements that come into play, and there is little introspection or subjectivity on the part of Japan towards Asia.

This is symbolized by the recent Japanese Diet resolution commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. It was envisioned to become a starting point for Japan as an international state. But it became, instead, the subject of battles and semantics due to constraints and the legacy of domestic politics. It ultimately ended up as an empty resolution, a product of compromise. After all, it served no purpose other than a domestic one, and the reactions of the majority of Asian countries were chilly toward the resolution, as you might expect.

We have been called "samurai" by our Chair, and a samurai originally was one who could admit his mistakes. For instance, we can't take the position that just because something was done first by a Western state, we can also do the same. There are many people who blame others for what they do. However, what is in question here is Japan— what *we* should do. And as samurai, we must clearly understand what our responsibilities should be.

The above mentioned situation in Japan is starting to give rise to some narrow-minded nationalism. However, in light of the ever increasing mutual dependency between Japan and the United States, this is clearly an anachronism. Its danger is evidenced by Japanese history prior to World War II. Moreover, reinforcement of the Japanese autonomous defense capability, including possession of nuclear weapons, would only invite military nuclearization and an arms buildup among neighboring countries. It is extremely dangerous because it is highly likely that it would result in an Asian arms race.

The path to be pursued by Japan is not to choose between Asia or the United States, nor is it isolationism. We must search out an equilibrium whereby attaching importance to Asia will also mean attaching importance to the United

States, and vice versa. This is a step toward Asia-Pacificism, as opposed to Asianism. I feel that an attempt to position EAEC within the framework of APEC by the ASEAN countries is a sound concept.

Now, putting aside the Asia Boom: When we look at Asia objectively, will the 21st century truly be the Era of Asia? When we simply focus on the aspect of economy, it doesn't seem that this is farfetched. Yet behind the bright light of economic growth, we need to remember that there are shadows.

First, to the extent of economic growth seen in many Asian countries, there is also a trend of even greater military build-up. This might be an influence of the collapse of the Cold War, when the absence of a clear threat (i.e., the former Soviet Union) created a situation where mutual suspicion begot mutual fear, thus leading to a tendency toward self reliance and regeneration throughout the region. In countries such as China and North Korea, the military buildup is also serving the purpose of maintaining public peace and order. Moreover, because of the Asian countries' increasing need to secure energy for economic growth, there is a heightened level of interest in nuclear energy development and the technology to assure its safety, something which will be of paramount importance.

The second problem is that while it is fine that economic growth is taking place, this ill-balanced economic growth is causing disparities. NIEs (newly industrialized economies) have already achieved economic development. Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, are prospering. China, Indonesia and Vietnam have very vast lands. But the Philippines, Cambodia and North Korea have somewhat missed the train. In countries like China and Indonesia, due to their vastness and diversity, there is a considerable difference in the level of economic development. In particular, the disparity is widening between the coastline and inland regions.

Third, in Asia there are many nations which are composed of diverse racial and ethnic groups. When specific racial or ethnic groups suffer from ill-balanced or distorted economic growth, it is likely that seeds of conflict will be sown. Whether or not the wealth produced by economic growth can be evenly distributed is very relevant to the race issue. Moreover, when democratization is promoted by economic growth, it is easily conceivable that we will see greater degrees of assertion by different racial or ethnic groups. How we can maintain unified nations while understanding this challenge is important.

Fourth, economic growth is leading to serious destruction of the environment. In the trade-off between development and environment, Asian countries are focusing upon development. Lessons learned from the advanced nations are resulting in a high degree of interest in environmental issues. But the reality is that in many cases, those issues remain nothing more than slogans. The study of environmentalism is prospering while the environment is being destroyed. That is what is taking place.

Environmental destruction is particularly serious in China, and we believe that it has grave ramifications for Japan. I feel that in that respect, Japan has a very important role to play.

As can be seen, economic growth in Asia has produced shadows, not just light. These problems are all closely interrelated, and at the same time, by nature, they could possibly become international issues. This suggests to us that we cannot arrive at a valid resolution by debating each issue separately. For this reason, these compound challenges require discussion from a comprehensive perspective on security as we move ahead. I believe that we are already prepared in that area.

The final point I would like to make involves this question: "What roles can Japan and the United States play in terms of security in the Asian region?" There are still strong expectations among Asian nations for the United States to continue to play its role in the field of military security. This is true even in China. China, even today, does not deny the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty head on. This has evolved from China's concern about the moves that Japan might take in the event of the absence of the United States.

We cannot deny the meaning or significance of the American presence in Asia during the Cold War. I say this because without the U.S. presence there would never have been economic development for either Japan or Asian economies. In particular, Japan, by totally depending on the United States to bear the costly burden of security, has been able to devote itself to economic development. Japan's economic development has been supported by the enormous buying power of the United States, as well. In short, for Japan to deny the presence of the United States up to this day is to deny itself.

Now, is it possible for the U.S. presence to continue as it has in the past? In reality, due to the relative decline of the economic strength in the United States, it is becoming more and more difficult for it to step up its military presence. As a reflection of this, perhaps, the United States is seeking greater burden-sharing with Japan in the area of security. However, because of its constitutional restraints and the sentiments of the Japanese people, and possibly out of consideration for the concerns of the Asian countries, Japan has not presented any affirmative policy for increasing its international contributions in the area of security. And, to be practical, it is extremely difficult to do so, at least in the short term future. We are yet to complete the coordination of domestic policy, including the issue of the constitution. We also need to be prudent and to listen to the opinions of our Asian neighbors.

But we need to bear in mind that in Asia, the 21st century will not be an era in which the United States and Japan will be the sole leaders. There will most certainly be problems, as well. There is a strong probability that China will emerge as a great power in the 21st century and that the Asian nations, including Vietnam, will see significant development. On top of that, although it is not yet known how it will manifest itself, it is known that a united Korean peninsula might become a reality.

With these possible developments in mind, what is needed is not the notion of who protects whom, but rather the notion of mutual supervision. It means that we need to build a framework for multinational talks based on bilateralism, i.e. to create an Asian version of CSCE. Through this, the mutual dependency of Asia-Pacific nations would be further enhanced, and it is hoped that this might lead to a framework for mutual supervision.

When it comes to multinational consultation in Asia, we have opportunities for informal summits through APEC, or regional ASEAN forums. However, at this time it is still unclear as to whether they might develop into the Asian version of CSCE. There are still more problems that need to be overcome. Having said that, it is necessary to continue to strive to form mutual networks by expanding developing windows of dialogue. Japan should actively serve the role of a facilitator, or a bridge in an effort for such a formulation.

Last but not least, let me discuss the future of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Needless-to-say, this security treaty was based upon the anticipated threat of the Soviet Union. As stated earlier, we cannot deny the fact that the economic prosperity that is enjoyed in Japan today was brought about largely due to the U.S.-Japan security treaty. In other words, it was based upon the premise that economic development in Japan was in the interest of the United States. Yet the situation has changed dramatically. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and the economic competition between the United States and Japan is intensifying.

In Japan, at this time, those who advocate the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty are in the minority. And it is well known that even the Socialist Party in Japan has altered its position on this issue. However, over the years, the quality of the relationship between the United States and Japan has changed, and it is no longer reasonable to merely emphasize the sole aspect of security. There is also a growing need to improve this relationship.

In this respect, in the interest of long-term U.S.-Japan relations, it is felt meaningful to explore ways to transform the treaty to one of a more bilateral nature, both in terms of substance and quality, over the next decade or so, to include the above-mentioned comprehensive security arrangement. Concurrently, with our relationship as a basis, I feel that we also need to work to incorporate the U.S.-Japan relationship within a multilateral Asian context.

Just one final word I would like to add. I majored in Asian studies, and very recently the U.S.-Japan economic relationship has been under a lot of stress. It is also very much debated. As an Asian scholar, I very frequently envy this open debate, as Chairperson Shin mentioned earlier. This kind of frank exchange of opinion is, in fact, not yet possible in the dialogue between Japan and other Asian nations. I think we don't really have that framework wherein we can be totally frank with each other, and I feel that to be very unfortunate.

But in light of this very severe economic situation, while we can strongly debate with each other, why does it make it possible for the U.S.-Japan relationship to stay as it stands? I feel that certainly there is great meaning at the governmental level in the relationship between our two governments, but even more so, I feel that what is paramount is the relationship between our peoples.

This kind of networking is very interesting and very important. Since yesterday, I have watched the volunteers working very hard in order to facilitate and promote this bilateral relationship at the grass roots and private level. I feel that this type of interaction is what is promoting the fine relationship between the two countries. In that respect, I believe that the relationship between Japan and the United States could provide the basis for learning how to build the relationships between Japan and Asian nations. In that respect, I have learned a great deal, and I believe it has been very meaningful to me personally. Thank you very much.

Glen M. Krebs

Seeking a Better Life: Challenges of International Migration

It is difficult to separate fact from fiction in the current immigration debate in the United States. Therefore, I would like to begin with some verifiable facts.

First, we know how many people legally immigrate to the United States every year. Current U.S. immigration laws allow for approximately 800,000 foreigners to immigrate—that is, to become permanent residents of the U.S.—each year. In 1993, over 900,000 people actually immigrated to the U.S. through legal channels. These immigrants consisted mainly of three categories of people: family members, workers and refugees. In 1993, 255,059 were immediate relatives (that is, spouses, minor children and parents) of citizens or permanent residents. Another 226,776 were extended family of citizens. 147,012 aliens entered the U.S. in work-related categories. Refugees or other persons seeking asylum in the U.S. accounted for 127,343. 114,624 were admitted as a result of a special legalization program instituted in 1986, and the remaining 33,463 entered as winners of the diversity lottery, another special program designed to allow immigrants to enter from under-represented countries.

Second, we know where people emigrate from. In 1992, immigrants to the U.S. came primarily from Mexico (91,000), Vietnam (78,000), the Philippines (59,000) and the former Soviet Union (44,000). In 1993, most immigrants came from Mexico (126,561), China (65,578), the Philippines (63,457), Vietnam (58,614) and the former Soviet Union (58,571).

Finally, we know where people immigrate to. Most immigrants to the U.S. settle in six states: California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois.

In addition to the 900,000 legal immigrants each year, hundreds of thousands more foreigners take up temporary residence in the U.S. each year. These people—referred to as non-immigrants—enter as business visitors, tourists, students, exchange visitors, or workers. Non-immigrants receive limited visas valid for a short period of time, usually between three months and seven years.

Beyond the permanent immigrants and temporary nonimmigrants who are granted visas each year, there are those who come to the United States through illegal channels, and it is at this point that fact and fiction blur. Unfortunately, the number of illegal immigrants entering the U.S. is more difficult to document, which means that there is no reliable data on which to analyze illegal immigration. Various groups gather statistics on illegal immigration, and each group has a different version of the facts. For one, the Immigration and

Naturalization Service (INS) estimates 300,000 illegals join the current illegal immigrant population each year. It contends that about one-half of these enters in a legitimate category and then overstay, while the other half illegally crosses a border.

Some immigration interest groups estimate that the number is higher—between one and three million people. These figures are probably more accurate than the government's estimate; the best documented statistics in California show that over 600,000 illegals enter California alone each year. That translates into nearly 2,000 illegal crossings every day! Based upon estimates such as this, most academic studies assume that there are currently 3.4 to 3.8 million illegal aliens residing in the U.S., about one-half of them in California.

Regardless of how many illegal aliens enter each year, or how many currently reside in the United States, the undoubtedly large number of illegals in this country is a problem to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Therefore, INS has attempted several approaches to reducing the number of illegal aliens. One approach has been a special legalization program instituted in 1986. Legalization was designed to reduce the number of illegal aliens by offering those currently in the country amnesty. It was also designed to reduce the number entering by imposing fines on employers who hired illegal aliens. Initially, the legalization program reduced the number of illegals dramatically. However, the number has again climbed over 3 million, and it seems that the program has had little lasting effect.

Policy makers may be tempted to look abroad for examples of effective immigration policy. A recent study of immigration practices in France, Germany, Canada and Australia indicates that their laws are basically similar to those of the U.S. These countries use the general categories of family, worker and refugee. They also permit close family members to immigrate to join citizens or permanent residents. Canada and Australia also use a point system to allow other family members and workers into the country. When compared on a per capita basis, both Australia and Canada admit more aliens than the U.S. By this standard, we may be allowing too few foreigners to enter the U.S. each year.

The current immigration debate in the U.S. focuses on the legitimacy and worth of both legal and illegal immigration. Of course, most of the antagonism centers on those entering illegally. This was recently the case when California voters approved Proposition 187 and thereby denied certain welfare and educational benefits to illegal aliens. However, other major points of debate concern closing our borders to refugees such as those from Haiti and Cuba, as well as tightening legal immigration channels.

In this debate there are many arguments in favor of continuing or even increasing immigration. One of the most persuasive of these is that most U.S. citizens come from immigrant ancestors. Our heritage and history is full of immigrants who have risen to great heights and contributed immensely to the economics, education and culture of America. These immigrants have strengthened America through their courage, determination, democratic values and energy. Their diversity has created and contributed to the value of life in the U.S.

Another argument is the economic benefits of immigration. These include the human capital which immigrants comprise, the taxes paid by immigrants, and the gutsy, entrepreneurial spirit of immigrants. Immigrants comprise valuable human capital because they accept many jobs which Americans are unable or unwilling to perform, in both white collar and blue collar positions. Because of this, they seldom displace American workers. For one, immigrant professionals proportionately outrank citizen professionals: 17% of immigrants of working age are professionals, while only 15% of citizens of working age are professionals. Additionally, immigrants provide a working class to fill needed jobs involving manual labor which are unattractive to citizens. We should note, however, that the number of jobs in this category is diminishing as we move to an information and service-based economy. Therefore, in the future, this argument may not be as compelling.

A second economic benefit of immigration is that immigrants contribute to the U.S. tax base. This argument applies to both legal and illegal immigrants. The vast number of legal immigrants pay income taxes through their employers just like U.S. citizens. In addition, they and their illegal counterparts pay sales taxes with the large number of consumer products they purchase in American stores. Additionally, it has been argued that legal immigrants provide a net gain to the government's coffers because they tend to consume fewer government services than they contribute in taxes.

Third, immigrants benefit the U.S. economically because they tend to be more entrepreneurial than citizens. In fact, statistics show that immigrants start proportionately more new businesses each year than do U.S. citizens. One example of this is the Southeast Asian doughnut empire in Southern California, where the Vietnamese and Laotian communities dominate the doughnut franchise chains. Businesses such as these started by immigrants strengthen the U.S. economy by providing jobs for citizens as well as by contributing to the tax base.

Finally, immigrants' diversity contributes to the quality of life in America. For example, consider the entertainment industry. Many of Hollywood's studios were started by immigrants or their children, and an unusually high number of our entertainers are immigrants themselves. This industry creates many jobs for citizens and engenders a substantial and growing export industry. Diversity has also spawned many ethnic restaurants and the rich variety of ethnic and regional cuisines found in our country. Furthermore, diversity is a key ingredient in invention, an area in which America leads the world. In business innovation, America's diversity contributes twice: by providing dynamic producers and innovators, and by fostering a diverse and dynamic consumer base which forces business to be innovative.

Despite the compelling arguments for continuing and expanding immigration, there are powerful and vocal arguments for limiting and curbing immigration. Such arguments come in a variety of forms and with a varying degree of intensity. For instance, most arguments concern illegal aliens, but some also apply to legal immigrants. Some arguments are xenophobic and threaten the white majority with projections that they will soon be outnumbered by a colored majority. Those opposed to immigration also point to the difficulty created by the proliferation of foreign languages. Some feel that aliens and immigrants are causing overcrowding in the schools. Many others argue that racial tensions are being exacerbated by the influx of aliens and immigrants. Furthermore, there are those who say that diseases previously eradicated in the U.S. are being reintroduced by third world immigrants.

Despite the variety of these arguments, there is one popular and somewhat credible argument: that immigrants contribute to poverty and swell the welfare rolls of the U.S. Additionally, there are two popular arguments for which there are strong counter-arguments: 1) Immigrants take jobs from Americans; and 2) Aliens are more prone to crime than citizens or immigrants.

First, the argument that immigrants (both legal and illegal) contribute to poverty and welfare rolls is bolstered by recent statistics indicating that income levels of recently arriving aliens are 32% less than citizen men. In 1970, income levels of recently arriving aliens were only 17% less than citizen men. Census records also show that the percentage of citizens receiving a high school diploma went up from 77% in 1980 to 85% in 1990. The percentage of immigrants with a high school education remained steady at 63% during the same period of time. Therefore, immigrants are less well paid and less well educated.

Next, consider the popular argument that immigrants take jobs away from Americans. Upon careful examination, this does not appear to be a legitimate argument. As stated earlier, immigrants create new businesses which employ citizens. Immigrants also consume products in the U.S., thus increasing demand for such products. Finally, most legal immigrants who come in employment-based categories must prove that they will not displace an American worker.

Another often cited reason to limit immigration is that immigrants increase crime. While this may be true, statistics show that immigrants are not more prone to crime than citizens. Illegal aliens make up 25% of the federal penitentiary inmates. 80% of those are for drug related offenses. The largest groups in prison are Mexican, Colombian, Cuban, Dominican and Jamaican. Of those groups, only Mexicans are also on the list of countries from which most illegals arrive. This indicates that most of the 25% in federal prisons are not immigrants, rather they are aliens temporarily in the U.S. to feed on the current drug epidemic. In state penitentiaries, only New York had a higher percentage of aliens in prison than in its total population (12.4% in prison; 9% in total population). Thus, upon further consideration, the argument that immigrants contribute to crime in America may also be difficult to prove.

Finally, consider the case of California's Proposition 187, the event which has prompted much of the current debate and which has brought to the fore many of the popular arguments for limiting immigration. Because Prop 187 focused on the cost of illegal immigration to states and local governments, we should examine these costs in our evaluation of arguments to limit immigration. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) has performed a study of various cost estimates used by California and by various other institutions in drafting the law. The GAO admitted to a paucity of reliable data, but nonetheless provided estimates which are generally felt to be reasonable.

Providing an education for the children of illegal aliens costs the State of California about $1.6 billion. This is for pre-school through 12th grade. Even though Prop. 187 would eliminate the need for California to pay for the education of illegal immigrants, there is a U.S. Supreme Court case which requires states to provide education to all persons, legally admitted to the U.S. or not. Therefore, the enforceability of this segment of Prop. 187 is highly suspect.

Aliens are not eligible for most types of state and federal welfare. However, there are some exceptions. Most notably, Medicaid at the State level. Medicaid provided to illegal aliens costs California approximately $400 million a year. $100 million of that goes for care associated with the birth of babies to illegal alien mothers. These babies become citizens upon birth in the United States. It is estimated that 70% of the babies born in Los Angeles hospitals last year were to alien mothers. Aliens are also entitled to Head Start and Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children. Citizen children are also eligible for Aid for Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamps.

Incarcerating aliens is the final large expense to California. It is estimated that incarcerating illegal aliens in California prisons costs approximately $360 million each year.

Income provided by illegal immigrants is almost impossible to determine. However, the GAO study estimated that illegal aliens in California contributed between $528 million and $1.4 billion to the coffers of the state. California also collected from the federal government between $542 million and $2 billion in aid to support programs assisting illegals.

When all the tallies have been made, illegal aliens either cost California taxpayers over $1 billion, or illegals provide a net gain to California of slightly less than $1 billion, depending upon which assumptions you make and which calculations you use.

So, where does all this debate lead? There is currently a government appointed commission studying the effects of immigration on the U.S. and recommending solutions to the problems it identifies. It is commonly referred to as the "Jordan Commission" because it is chaired by Barbara Jordan, a former congresswoman from Texas. Last Fall, the Jordan Commission provided an executive summary of some of its findings to date. This report identified illegal immigration as one of the greatest problems facing the U.S. today, and suggested several measures to combat the problem. The most notable is an expansion of work site enforcement over legal immigration. The commission proposes to do this by instituting a national computer registry whereby employers could immediately find out if prospective employees are authorized to work. Although this proposal has yet to be introduced in Congress, opponents are already organizing against it. Civil liberties groups have already voiced their opposition toward an employment registry because they feel it is a step toward a national identification card, which would violate privacy rights.

The Jordan Commission also recommended several other measures, such as increased border management, a review of benefits eligibility and its fiscal impact, and the immediate and permanent removal of all criminal aliens.

In addition to the reports of the Jordan Commission, many pieces of national legislation concerning immigration are getting significant coverage by the media. Almost all of these propose laws would restrict immigration into the U.S. One of the bills most likely to pass is one introduced by Sen. Alan Simpson which would reduce legal immigration to about 550,000 a year from the current level of 800,000.

In conclusion, no one knows for sure what will be the final outcome of the debate about immigration in the U.S., but it is certain to be a colorful and persistent question in foreign and domestic policy. Furthermore, it is safe to say that the immigration debate is likely to be an important element in the upcoming presidential election. With the current political tide in Washington and in high immigration states such as California, Texas and Florida, I think it is also safe to predict that there will be a reduction in the number of aliens who are allowed to enter the U.S. both legally and illegally.

Thomas Mahoney

Aging: Responsibility and Cost

Let me state at the outset that my perspective is that of one who has served on a School Board, City Council, State Legislature, and in the Cabinet of a major state, written widely on historical works and societal trends, and taught at one of the nation's premier institutions of higher learning.

The 1995 White House Conference on Aging (WHCOA), the first in fourteen years and the last this century, was called by President Clinton and charged with making recommendations for a national aging policy for the next decade. A twenty-five member Policy Committee (P.C.), including nine women, was named by the President and the majority and minority leaders of Congress to plan and oversee the Conference. I received the Democratic Congressional Leadership appointment. The Committee included four U.S. Senators, four members of the House, three Presidential Cabinet Secretaries, and the head of the Administration on Aging.

This Conference was characterized by greater grass roots participation and a larger focus on intergenerational issues than its three predecessors. It was also committed to working to ensure that its resolutions would be implemented.

The P.C. chose as the Conference theme, "America Now and Into the 21st Century: Generations Aging Together with Independence, Opportunity, and Dignity." The key phrase here is "Generations Aging Together," which clearly identifies the Conference with aging as opposed to the aged and says that this is a process all humans share regardless of age.

It was further agreed by the Committee that four major issues, viz., health, economic security, housing, and quality of life would be discussed, debated, and modified by the delegates. Under each, four to seven sub-issues were listed. Provision was also made that other significant issues and various special constituencies would be addressed in each of the resolutions which the delegates ultimately adopted. These were identified as cross-cutting issues and included: interdependence among generations and members of extended families; the responsibility of individuals to plan for changes that will come throughout the lifespan; and the unique contributions and needs of special populations, e.g., women. Also established were procedures for appointing 2259 voting delegates, 300 official observers, and 30 international observers. The latter were chosen by a sub-committee which I chaired and were drawn from the ranks of expert gerontologists and geriatricians from all over the world, two of them from Japan. These men and women from other countries attended this American conference because of its global significance, especially its democratic procedures.

President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore addressed the Conference and emphasized the need to contain Medicare and Medicaid costs. The President received sustained applause for his call to make long-term care available in the home. These speeches were highlights of the Conference, along with the forum on mammography presided over by Mrs. Hilary Rodham Clinton at a plenary session which constituted a distinction for women never previously accorded by any previous WHCOA. In anticipation of Mother's Day, badges were distributed to the delegates containing the legend, "Mama gram. That's a mammogram for Someone Special. Let a woman whom you love know you care. Medicare covers mammograms."

The Conference concluded on 5 May in a plenary session at which the delegates voted by secret ballot to adopt fifty resolutions of those they had discussed, debated, and modified in the workshops they had attended. The top vote getter was the resolution, "Keeping Social Security Sound for Now and for the Future." Two of its most significant component parts, Medicare and Medicaid, were also in the top five resolutions adopted.

By their vote, the delegates gave the lie to the tired slur that Older Persons were "greedy geezers" when they called for a sound Social Security, not only for themselves but for all generations to came. Social Security, in my opinion, is itself a truly intergenerational program and one which I consider a sacred compact between the American people and the government. I called it such in my 1981 resolution which the WHCOA of that year adopted. As President Clinton has said, older persons "are concerned with issues that at first glance affect only younger people—issues like public education, student loans, job training, and health care and nutrition for pregnant women and children . . . they want a future filled with opportunities for their children, for their grandchildren and for the young people in their communities."

Another successful resolution supported "intergenerational coalition building" and would establish "a National Intergenerational Resource Center that supports training, technical assistance and demonstration models."

The importance of grandparents in the changed family structure was recognized in a resolution backing financial assistance in a greater degree for grandparents serving as primary caregivers for their grandchildren and was a "first" in WHCOA annals. But another neglected group did not receive the recognition it deserves. These men and women constitute what my late friend, Professor Louis Lowy, called the "sandwich generation," a phrase he coined to describe those who care for aged parents, on the one hand, and children, on the other. Some of this group have economically disadvantaged children and, in some instances, even unemployed grandchildren. They make up what I will call the "club sandwich generation" and desperately need help.

A few observations are in order concerning the two resolutions on Medicare and Medicaid which, as I write on the day following the President's announcement of his new plan to balance the budget, have become key issues before the country as far as the budget is concerned. The fact that the President now concedes that Medicare and Medicaid must be scaled down by a total of $181 billion over the next decade will disappoint the majority of the WHCOA delegates who, it must be said, were somewhat out of touch with financial reality as far as the present and immediate future are concerned.

Congress is clearly tilting toward raising out of pocket costs to Medicare recipients who are already paying a higher percentage of their health costs than they did before the 1965 enactment of Medicare and Medicaid. It is also likely that Medicaid may be block granted ("shifted and shafted"), a practice which would allow Congress to keep the annual appropriations flat or below the cost of living, thus leaving the states to pick up the difference. Let there be no mistake about it. What block grants mean is that the impact will be to shift political strife from Washington to the state capitols and city and town halls.

If this happens, the threat of intergenerational war that some of us predicted some fifteen years ago will become a frightening reality. We are seeing some skirmishes now when shortsighted seniors oppose the funding of local school budgets, baby boomers form coalitions and other anti-senior groups spring up, and various office holders perceive political safety in cutting Medicare and Medicaid.

It should also be noted that the delegates to the Conference failed to offer any suggestions on how to finance the benefits they advocated. As American Association of Retired Persons legislative director, and himself a delegate, John Rother put it in the June *AARP Bulletin*, the delegates "felt their job was long-term needs and how to meet them. They didn't have the tools to recommend financing."

The next step is for the resolutions of the Conference to go to Congress, where the betting is that they will not be well received by the current majority. Most analysts predict that few of the resolutions will be adopted. On the other hand, there are some optimists who believe that, in time, many of the resolutions will come to fruition.

Ceteris paribus (all things considered equal), most delegates remain sanguine. The Conference will reach out to the grass roots and encourage implementation of the resolutions. The public will be asked to express its views and to suggest ways and means by which both the public and private sectors can help to put the resolutions forward. Only fifty resolutions were adopted, in contrast to the over 1400 passed by the three earlier conferences. This is a tribute to those who learned from history that a small, manageable number of resolutions is a better way to proceed and might well produce worthwhile results.

In conclusion, I wish to recommend several possible ways of proceeding if the hopes of the Conference are to be realized in time:

(1) Achieve aggressive intergenerational support.
(2) Advocate and pursue full public discussion about values as opposed to talking about dollars exclusively.
(3) Learn about best practices from other cultures and nations.
(4) Accomplish more international dialogue to promote the sharing of technology, ideas, and resources.
(5) Make a massive commitment to control the costs of health care by focusing on fraud, waste, managed care, health promotion, and disease prevention.

If we do not make conscious decisions about establishing our social values and goals, the invisible hand of time and events will force its own values and priorities upon us. If that *time* comes, it may be too late to change course.

Yukio Matsuyama

Japan and America, 1945-1995: Peace, Progress, Partnership

1. *The Enhancement of the Japanese Presence in the United States.*

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I feel very happy to be here with you today. Whenever I visit Honolulu, I realize that the worst day on this island is better than the best day in Tokyo. So I really appreciate you for giving me this opportunity to be relaxed and refreshed in the Paradise of the Pacific, far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife, the air pollution, the sarin gas and earthquakes of Japan.

But frankly, when I received this invitation, I wondered why I was chosen as a speaker. It is, I presume, because all the other Japanese participants are so serious, academic, sophisticated, bureaucratic, economy-minded or business-oriented. In order to correct any misunderstandings you might have, and to give you a better-balanced view of the Japanese, I seem to have been asked by Mr. Satoh or Mr. Okawa to come here. That is, to show you there is a wide variety of Japanese. There are the outstanding, and there are the others. So, here I am, one of the others.

Although I now teach at universities, I, myself, feel I am still a journalist since I have spent more time writing journalistic columns than academic dissertations, even after returning from the *Asahi Shimbun*, where I worked for more than forty years. So today, I'll venture to be a bit provocative, not as a scholar but as a journalist, by pointing out what other participants might not refer to.

My first visit to this country came many years ago. Since then, I've been observing a number of drastic changes and historic transformations in the American society, but for me the enhancement of the Japanese presence in American consciousness has been one of the most conspicuous.

2. *From One-dollar Blouse to Mr. Nomo.*

In the J.F. Kennedy era, the Japanese ambassador to Washington D.C., Koichiro Asakai, who was able and aggressive but had scarcely any chance to meet with President Kennedy because of the low status of Japan, used to complain to us, "If we stopped shouting loudly here on every occasion, the U.S. government might forget even the very existence of Japan."

In those days we had a dream—would you believe?—that photos and cartoons of our prime minister would be printed on the front pages of American newspapers and magazines some day.

In 1963, when I went down to Tuscaloosa to cover the first entry of black students into the University of Alabama, I talked with Governor Wallace and his staff, who surprised me by asking if there were any subways in Tokyo, and if Japan produced any automobiles for herself.

Speaking of automobiles, when visiting Detroit in 1961 to see the Ford plant's automated assembly line, I was told that Japan might as well give up trying to export automobiles to the U.S. Not only automobiles, but almost all Japanese products used to be regarded as cheap—symbolized by the "one-dollar blouse."

Very gratifying changes have since taken place. Japan has remarkably invaded this country, occupying space in your minds as well as in your living rooms and garages. And yes, photos and cartoons of Japanese prime ministers now appear on the pages of newspapers in this country—although not necessarily as favorably as in our dream.

There are more than two hundred Japanese restaurants in New York which are occupied by Americans who used to regard eating raw fish as barbarous. We can run into Seiji Ozawa at the Boston Symphony Orchestra and Hideo Nomo at Dodgers' Stadium in Los Angeles.

Similarly, if you visit Tokyo today, you can eat Kentucky Fried Chicken, a McDonald's burger, drink all kinds of colas, and shop for bluejeans. Almost everything that is popular or rampant in the U.S. sooner or later becomes so in Japan.

As the medical profession will tell you, such mutual transfusions of cultures can occur only where a basic compatibility exists between donor and recipient. Oh, yes. We share much in common, ranging from freedom of speech, market principles, to jazz and Hollywood movies. Both Japanese and American societies are enthusiastically receptive to new ideas and innovations, and both like to keep improving and advancing themselves. This leads to the common worship of work, progress and success.

3. *Accidental Liberalists*

However, as a longtime watcher of the U.S.-Japan relations, I often think that our values are poles apart in terms of politics. Of course, both our countries are democracies, but there are conspicuous differences in the actual ways they function. Today, putting aside the similarities, let me dare to shed some light on the contrasts.

First, Japan is a bit odd in that it obtained freedom not by aspiring to it but by being completely defeated by opposing democracies, while Americans are "children of revolution," having revolted against the British monarchy. In other words, the Japanese, at least in the immediate post-war period, were sort of "accidental liberalists" resulting from an "it-can't-be-helped-democracy" forced on them by the American Occupation.

In this connection, it was quite unfortunate that, at the outbreak of the

Korean War, the American government changed its policy vis-a-vis Japan 180-degrees and allowed Japanese leaders in many fields to resurrect because they were considered useful bulwarks against the expansion of communism. Such a thing never happened in West Germany. As a result, the old-line Japanese did not distance themselves from the ideologies and organizations which pushed Japan into World War II. They could easily pass as pro-American so long as they were anti-Red.

Now look at those conservative, nationalistic, right wing congressmen who insist that the Pacific War was "the war of legitimate defense" to emancipate Asians from the Caucasian hegemony in Asia. Ironically, it was the U.S. that spoiled and encouraged them during the Cold War era.

4. *Feudalistic Democracy*

Next, in connection with revolution, let me emphasize that Japan is still in a feudalistic age in terms of relations between the rulers and the ruled. Having lived in both countries, my feeling is that the Japanese are as docile as sheep and would seldom dream of taking a defiant attitude toward the shepherd, while Americans are very proud of the Boston Tea Party.

In the Japanese House of Representatives, 45% of the LDP members are Nisei-Dietmen, meaning second-generation Dietmen having a father, father-in-law, uncle or grandfather as a former Dietman who more or less passed the office on. Many governors and mayors have perpetuated their terms of office for twenty years or more—just like the feudal *daimyo*.

In the American constitution, peace usually results in the taking up of arms, whereas in our constitution, peace brings a prohibition against the resorting to arms. I won't say who imposed the Peace Constitution upon Japan, but anyway Americans have always been worried about the pacifism and the lack of dynamic initiative on the part of the Japanese. As the late Prime Minister Ohira once said, Japan is surely like a raft without an engine or a rudder which can only commit itself to the current.

5. *Japanese Leadership*

Japan is such a consensus society, the leadership in Japan is quite different from that in the U.S. I know in this country the decision-thrust tends to start from the top and thrusts downward. Perhaps this is in keeping with the Old Testament tradition, when Moses came down from Mt. Sinai with a new set of laws for his people. And the Americans seem to keep yearning for their president to behave somewhat like Moses—to exercise "strong and decisive leadership." If Mt. Sinai is not available, Camp David seems to be acceptable, at least.

Japan's Prime Minister, in contrast, is more to be compared to a rather young chairman of a corporation's Board of Directors, or not so much to a father as to an elder brother, not so much to a conductor of an orchestra as to a first fiddler of a string quartet. He is sometimes only *primus inter rexes*, a first among peers; mostly, he waits for a consensus to develop. So, who the Japanese Prime Minister happens to be is not so important as who the American President is.

While living in this country for a long time, I got the impression that Japan could well be compared to a hare. A hare has long ears, symbolizing his avid capacity to catch information quickly, while he cannot express himself clearly with his very small mouth. His behavior is far from being majestic. He moves and jumps so unsystematically that no one can tell where he is heading for. And mild and gentle as he may look, he is often disliked by others because of his habit of sneaking into other's fields to eat carrots.

Generally speaking, Japanese universities, including even Tokyo University to which Honma-sensei used to belong, are producers of hares. I wouldn't blame you if you felt bored sick and tired unto death while talking with Japanese political leaders or high-ranking bureaucrats, although I do believe that you will find, after long association with them, the same attraction that you would find in the Stone Garden of Ryoanji Temple in Kyoto.

6. *Lawyers vs. Bureaucrats*

While American politics tends to be too greatly influenced by lawyer-minded people who are self-centered and short-sighted, Japanese politics is dominated by bureaucratic-minded people reluctant to take initiative, who lack the frankness and sense of humor Americans value so highly.

Thus, having covered Japanese and American politics for more than forty years, I have come to realize that it is rather miraculous that our two countries, with such entirely different constitutions as well as national traits, remain allies. It was, I believe, mainly the "Soviet threat" that made us close partners without minding the substance of our respective democracies.

Now that the "Soviet threat" has disappeared, the U.S.-Japan relationship has been entering into a new phase. Perhaps, from now on, Americans will begin to be more sensitive to the political culture of Japan. There are three basic kinds of relationships: "GG," that is, government-to-government; "BB," that is, business-to-business, and "PP," that is, people-to-people. It is my conviction that what matters most in international relations is not the "GG" or the "BB," but rather the "PP" relationship, especially in the post-Cold War period.

The Pacific Ocean has become very narrow. But I am afraid that Americans apparently cannot escape from the prejudice that Japan must be just as they imagine it to be. This stereotyped image is so deeply rooted in Americans that they seem to believe that all Japanese women of today are still as chaste and virtuous as Madame Butterfly, who committed suicide deploring having been abandoned by her lover. I wish they were! They suppose that Geisha girls and rickshaws, which young Japanese men and women have scarcely any chance to see, are still popular in Tokyo.

7. *Baseball and Ping Pong*

It is true that as far as GNP is concerned, Japan is a rich country, but when we think of our natural resources and the poor housing conditions of individuals, we cannot help but paraphrase Hamlet, "Frailty, thy name is Japan."

Consider this: while I was stationed in Washington, D.C., as a bureau chief of the *Asahi*, I lived in a five-bedroom house with a huge backyard where we could play baseball. After being assigned back to Tokyo, I am obliged to live in a tiny house with a tiny garden where we cannot play even ping pong. My youngest daughter believed for a long time that I was demoted for making some serious blunder.

I still remember being impressed with President Kennedy's remarks concerning the U.S.-France relations when he said something like, "The French government is not always friendly to our policies, but France is always our reliable country." In order to elevate the level of U.S.-Japan relations to that of U.S.-France relations, we have to double our efforts to make ourselves as understandable, reliable and attractive to others as possible.

Money and technology can reach the moon. But they will never reach the inward heart of any peoples. May I conclude by saying that what is badly needed now is not more material or technological relations, but more kind-hearted activities such as what you are now engaged in.

Mahalo (thank you) and *aloha*.

Sabrina Shizue McKenna

Public Safety: Crime and Justice

At the beginning, I wish to express how honored I am to be invited to join such distinguished and insightful panelists as former Chief of Police Mr. Atsuyuki Sassa, attorney and professor Yukiko Tsunoda, and Dr. Lynn Curtis of the respected Eisenhower Foundation.

I am also truly honored to have been invited to speak as a panelist at this first International Symposium of Japan-America Societies. In this era of anticipated trade friction, I believe it is especially important for there to be increased dialogue and communication between representatives of our two nations. As the daughter of an American father and Japanese mother, who grew up in Japan attending American schools, I am especially concerned that we be able to understand, appreciate and learn from each other's cultural and institutional differences.

I have been invited today to speak on the topic of "Public Safety: Crime and Justice." Specifically, I have been asked to provide a perspective on how the United States is coming to grips with this growing problem. Accordingly, I will explain to you what I perceive to be the United States government's recent approach to this problem. Before doing so, I will present some background information regarding the United States and Hawaii criminal justice systems. I will then present some my views.

Federal and State Criminal Justice Systems:

It is important to note a major difference between the U.S. and Japanese criminal justice systems. This is the difference between the centralized nature of Japanese government compared to the federal nature of the American government. American states have much more autonomy and independence than the Japanese *todofuken*.

I understand that Japan's criminal laws, judiciary and law enforcement are centralized under Japan's national government. In contrast, the United States has separate criminal laws, judiciary and law enforcement personnel at the federal and state levels.

In the State of Hawaii, we have a federal court called the "United States District Court of the District of Hawaii." The main courthouse is located in downtown Honolulu. Court proceedings also take place in temporary courtrooms in other locations. The United States District Court of the District of Hawaii has four full-time judges and two retired judges with senior status. Federal judges are appointed for life terms. There are also two full-time and several part-time magistrates who are appointed for limited terms. The part-time magistrates hear proceedings outside Honolulu that are within the federal District of Hawaii, including locations such as Midway island.

Judgments of the United States District Court of the District of Hawaii can be appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on the west coast, then ultimately to the United States Supreme Court in Washington, D.C.

Federal crimes are defined by laws passed by the United States Congress. Possible violations of federal crimes are investigated by agents from federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

Federal crimes are prosecuted by federal prosecutors, called U.S. attorneys. Poor defendants are represented by federal public defenders. Convictions can result in imprisonment in U.S. prisons. There is no U.S. prison in Hawaii; therefore, a person convicted of a federal crime in Hawaii must currently serve his sentence in the continental United States.

In addition to the federal system, there is an entirely separate state criminal justice system under the Hawaii state government,

Trials for Hawaii crimes take place in either the District, Family, or Circuit courts of the First (Honolulu County), Second (Maui County), Third (Hawaii County) or Fifth (Kauai County) Circuits. District courts handle smaller offenses, from violations to misdemeanors, and do not handle jury trials. Family courts generally handle juvenile offenses. All jury trials and felonies are handled by circuit courts. In the Hawaii judiciary, there are approximately twenty-two district court judges, fourteen family court judges, and twenty-eight circuit court judges. These full-time judges are appointed for renewable six or ten-year terms, but must retire at age seventy. There are also many part-time district and family court judges.

Judgments of these courts can be appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals or the Hawaii Supreme Court.

Hawaii crimes are defined under the Hawaii Penal Code, which consists of laws passed by the Hawaii State Legislature. Possible violations of Hawaii crimes are investigated by officers from county police departments, and sometimes by agents of state agencies.

Hawaii crimes are prosecuted by prosecutors from county prosecuting attorney departments. Poor defendants are represented by state public defenders. Convictions can result in imprisonment in prisons located in each county.

The existence of this double-tiered federal and state system raises some issues that are not seen in the centralized Japanese system:

1. Double Jeopardy: An act committed by a person in the United States could be a crime under both U.S. and state laws. Courts have ruled that the constitutional protection against "double jeopardy" does not prohibit federal and state prosecutions for the same conduct. This is based on a concept called the "dual sovereign exception."

The "dual sovereign exception" allowed two prosecutions of the Los Angeles police officers who allegedly assaulted motorist Rodney King. The officers were found not guilty in a state criminal trial. They were then prosecuted by the federal government for violating federal criminal laws against violating a citizen' s civil rights. Two officers were found guilty in the federal trial.

The "dual sovereign exception" to the double jeopardy rule would also allow a second trial by another sovereign nation, such as Japan.

2. Differences in Constitutional Rights of Criminal Defendants: In general, America provides more protection than Japan for the civil rights of criminal defendants. For example, American courts will not allow evidence to be admitted at trial if the evidence was obtained by police in violation of a defendant's constitutional right against "unreasonable searches and seizures." Therefore, illegal drugs found in a defendant's house can be rejected as evidence.

This concept may sound strange in Japan. What may be more strange is the possibility of individual states giving criminal defendants *greater* protection under a state constitution than the defendant would have had under the federal constitution. For example, federal courts have held that it is permissible to search a person's home garbage without a search warrant. The Hawaii Supreme Court has held, however, that a person has a reasonableexpectation of privacy in his house's garbage. Therefore, Hawaii police officers generally cannot search a person's garbage without a search warrant.

The United States Government's Recent Approach to "Public Safety: Crime and Justice."

As you can see, there can be differences in approaches to crime between the United States federal government and the governments of individual states.

I will now turn to what I perceive to be the trend in the United States government's approach to public safety problems, which I believe can be summarized as "increased federal government involvement."

The trend in what the American media often calls "the war against crime" seems to be the increased involvement of the federal government of the United States through the passage of new federal laws and increased federal spending. The federal government seems to feel that individual states are losing the war against crime, and that, therefore, the federal government must get involved.

For example, when President Kennedy was assassinated, Harvey Oswald could not have been prosecuted for a federal offense, but only for the Texas state crime of "murder." Since then, the federal government has passed laws prohibiting political assassinations.

In addition, the federal government is getting increasingly involved in the fight for "gun control." The federal government recently succeeded in passing a limited gun control law regulating assault weapons. As you know, gun control is an extremely sensitive issue in the United States, partly because of language in the United States Constitution that seems to protect some individual gun ownership. Some states, including Hawaii, already have gun registration laws in effect.

The federal government has also gotten increasingly involved in the area of illegal drug enforcement. Many federal laws now exist regulating interstate transportation of drugs. Federal funding is also now being offered to states for the creation of "drug courts." Hawaii is in the process of organizing its drug court with the assistance of federal funds.

The federal government has also passed laws that also make the following activities criminal under certain conditions: (1) violation of a criminal defendant's civil rights; (2) environmental pollution; and (3) "white collar" fraud.

Again, most of these activities would constitute crimes under the laws of most individual states, including Hawaii. The clear trend, however, is for the federal government to pass more crime laws.

It is important to note that in its war against crime, the federal government has also instituted a system of mandatory sentencing. Mandatory sentencing takes discretion away from judges to decide appropriate sentences for criminal convictions. In effect, it gives much more power to federal prosecutors, who decide what charges will be brought against a defendant.

Hawaii law does not require mandatory sentences except in a few, but increasing number of, areas.

One clear outcome of mandatory sentencing is the increased imposition of longer prison sentences. This, of course, results in the need for more prisons. The federal government's approach toward mandatory sentencing, therefore, requires more spending to be allocated to the construction of prisons.

As stated, Hawaii law generally does not require mandatory sentencing, which would require the building of more prisons. Rather, the approach of Hawaii's community leaders appears to be geared towards alternative sentences to imprisonment. For pretrial detainees, Hawaii has begun experimenting with techniques such as supervised release with electronic monitoring devices.

Other Trends and Concluding Thoughts

Some of the newer federal laws, such as those criminalizing environmental pollution, display a change in society's perceptions toward what constitutes criminal activity. I would like to point out two additional areas that display the changing views of society.

The first is the trend toward increased criminalization of "drunk driving." When I first moved to Hawaii in 1974, drunk driving was not perceived as a serious criminal problem. Much more attention is now placed upon this activity by Hawaii's criminal justice system.

The second trend will probably be of special interest to attorney Tsunoda. That is the trend toward increased recognition of crimes against women. Even in Hawaii, until recent years, it would have been nearly impossible for forced sexual intercourse by a husband against a wife to be considered "rape." Under current Hawaii law, however, such conduct is clearly criminal.

In addition, "domestic violence" has also become an important topic. In the past, police officers would calm down the people involved in a domestic dispute, then leave the house. Now, Hawaii police will automatically arrest the assaulter and issue an order requiring him to stay away from the home for a period of one or two days. In addition, the Honolulu prosecutor's office has a "no drop" policy in domestic violence cases. Under this policy, the prosecutor's office will not dismiss a domestic violence prosecution even if the alleged victim later recants and says the violence never happened.

As I approach the conclusion of my presentation, I would like to focus on the following. When I received my invitation to speak at this event last year, the written introduction to this panel session included the statement: "Japan is highly regarded for its public order and safety while the United States has gotten a bad reputation in this respect."

This introduction was written before the Tokyo Subway Sarin case referred to by Mr. Sassa, before the attempted assassination of the current Chief of Police, and before the receipt of a mail bomb by the Tokyo Mayor's office.

Whether or not the Aum Shinrikyo group was involved, Japanese media reports indicate that Japanese society is seriously attempting to understand the alienation from society felt by this group's followers. "Alienation from society" is the concept I wish to stress.

In fact, as illustrated by some of the examples raised by Dr. Curtis, the American experience also seems to show that those people most often imprisoned are those who feel alienated from mainstream society whether for financial, racial or other reasons. In addition, in recent years, I have heard several Japanese say that Japanese crime has increased due to the influx of immigrant workers.

In conclusion, it appears that the real problem facing both countries is not what criminal laws to pass or what types of prisons to build, but rather, how to create societies with increased economic, educational, racial, sexual and social equality. This, in my humble view, is what is necessary to decrease the sense of alienation from society that contributes to crimes against society.

It appears that our two nations may have much to learn from each other as we pursue this mutual goal.

Thank you very much for your attention. It is truly an honor to be here today.

Seiji Naya

Easing Economic Tensions

It is indeed an honor for me to be here with you today to discuss an extremely timely subject. I would like to extend a warm welcome to the Societies from across the United States and Japan. It is indeed a pleasure for us to see so many prominent business and government leaders here. My congratulations to Mr. Yoshiharu Satoh, President of the Japan-America Society of Hawaii, for organizing this important Symposium.

In my remarks today, I will make only brief comments about the present sources of friction, since other panel members are experts in this area and I am sure that they will focus on this particular topic. I would like to concentrate my remarks upon broader regional aspects of bilateral relations and approaches to easing tensions. Finally, I will touch upon the role of small and medium-sized enterprises and the importance of the Asia-Pacific connection for Hawaii.

Current Economic Tension

The deadline for an agreement is just around the corner—June 28. Tensions are very high. The situation is grave. Both sides seem to be taking a much harder stand than in previous negotiations. Both the President and the Prime Minister are standing tough in a high stakes game with global consequences.

For some time, Japan and the U.S. have been debating the root causes of the present trade imbalances. We have made considerable progress and have, in fact, gone much beyond merely assessing these root causes.

For the United States, the problem is mostly one of macroeconomic imbalance. The large U.S. government budget deficit and the low U.S. savings rate are major factors behind our large trade deficit.

For Japan, in contrast, the issue is more structural. The highly regulated Japanese economy, with close traditional ties between firms and the high national savings rate, largely explain the big Japanese surplus.

Both sides have been trying to correct their problems. Both have put into motion processes to address these root causes of the trade imbalance. But progress has been slow. The issues are more complicated and intractable than at first assumed.

The present atmosphere reflects U.S. frustration about the large and seemingly permanent trade deficit with Japan. The real danger is that in this frustration, Americans have increasingly turned an ear to revisionist views of trade relations. This present trade conflict reflects experimentation with controversial revisionist views that have been gaining ground in the U.S. These views say that the U.S. cannot count on market forces to correct Japan's trade surplus, and therefore, what is needed is "managed" trade, forcing Japan to set numerical targets. As most economists would argue against managed trade, this state of affairs shows that we economists are losing out—which is not unusual.

My personal view is that it would be a major mistake to impose sanctions at this time. The negative effects would be overwhelming. The tensions over automobiles are just the tip of the iceberg. Already, the automobile tariff threat has been followed by Eastman Kodak's charge that Fuji Photo Film is blocking Kodak's access to the Japanese photographic film and paper market. Kodak is putting pressure on U.S. officials to force Japan to open its photographic market. In a related development, the U.S. stepped up pressure on Japan to resume talks on U.S. airlines' rights to serve Japan and other Asian markets.

It is not at all certain that sanctions would solve these problems. They may, in fact, make them worse. The negative impact on the Japanese economy of a full impasse in the current dispute is estimated to be around $16 billion, including not only direct effects on the auto sector, but also indirect and ripple effects on other sectors such as steel. In fact, the total negative impact will be very large, slowing down Japanese imports.

Thus, sanctions will not really work. And certainly asking bureaucrats to handle these issues is not the answer. Although the professed goal is more open and free or "fair" trade, sanctions undermine that very goal. Government should be taken gradually out of the picture, not put back *in*.

Moreover, I feel that referring this dispute to the World Trade Organization (WTO), a strategy advocated by some Japanese, is not a well-advised course of action. First, this referral of the dispute would mean that it would take a year or longer before a final decision is reached. Direct negotiations, despite their many faults, have the virtue of compelling both sides to reach a solution much quicker. Second, it would be wrong to test the efficiency of the new WTO dispute settlement process with such a critical and controversial dispute.

At the center of the current trade tensions are the issues of private barriers to trade, and bilateral misperceptions regarding these barriers. The Japanese tend to view deregulation in terms of merely lowering official barriers to trade; what is often overlooked are institutional barriers that are true stumbling blocks in trade relations. Americans, for their part, do not fully understand the social and cultural roots of the business practices that limit outside access to the Japanese market. Failing to see significant progress after official barriers are lowered, Americans become very frustrated. Friction escalates.

Private barriers to trade are very difficult to break down because they are closely tied to social traditions. Increasing American understanding of these issues is crucial to resolving the current crisis and averting future ones. That is why I feel that the bilateral negotiations by private sector auto makers, which have already begun, are very important. Direct private sector negotiations can increase understanding of private barriers and how to overcome them, bringing each side closer to a mutually acceptable compromise.

In view of these issues, my own belief is that either the deadline will be postponed or a compromise will be reached. A compromise *is* most likely. Anything less courts disaster for the U.S., Japan, and the broader context of global economic cooperation.

U.S.-Japan Interdependence

Clearly, a trade war between Japan and the United States is not in anyone's best interest. The U.S. and Japan are actually highly interdependent. The United States has been, and continues to be, the largest single market for Japanese products, accounting for about 29 percent of Japan's total exports. The U.S. is also an important source of vital research and technology, access to which will be crucial for Japan's economic future.

The United States' economic future, in turn, is closely linked with Japan and other Asia-Pacific nations. U.S. exports to the region are nearly 30% of our total exports. This percentage is larger than that of U.S. exports to Europe, and has been for some time.

Moreover, the impact of U.S.-Japan relations extends far beyond these two economies. As the two major powers in the vast Asia-Pacific region, their economic tensions, especially, will have enormous impact on other Asian countries.

In the last ten to fifteen years, the countries in the Asia-Pacific have become much more interdependent. Market forces are pulling these countries together. Of course the U.S. and Japan continue to be the major economic players in the region, but the other East Asian economies are playing an ever more important role.

In fact, U.S. exports to Japan constitute only about 10% of our total exports. Exports to the rest of East Asia are 70% percent larger than exports to Japan. American exports to the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) of South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, the ASEAN nations (including the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia), and China account for 17% of US exports.

There is a perception that these economies are less dependent on the U.S. It is true that both Japanese and other East Asian exports to the U.S., as a percent of total exports, have been declining. But this decline is only relative to the mid-1980s, when the U.S. had severe macroeconomic imbalances and the exchange rate was highly overvalued. In fact, if you compare, instead, current levels with those of 1980, the export shares are about the same.

What is most interesting is that the other East Asian countries have become the driving force behind trade and investment expansion for both Japan and the United States. U.S. exports to East Asia are already larger than our exports to Japan. And Japanese exports to developing East Asia are substantially larger than Japanese exports to the U.S.

Both powers rely heavily upon the East Asian market. So we need to look at bilateral trade relations in the broader context of overall Asia-Pacific regional trends.

The Regional Context and Approaches to Cooperation

Only recently, we were concerned that the world was dividing into three hostile trading blocs: the European Union, the North American Free Trade Area, and an incipient Asian trade bloc.

In Asia, it is market forces, not institutional arrangements such as in the European Union, that are pulling economies together. For the last several years, however, these countries have been expanding institutional arrangements to promote economic cooperation.

In 1990, Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia proposed to form an East Asian Economic Group, obviously counting on Japanese leadership. But Japan's reaction was lukewarm. Japan realized the importance of the U.S. in regional economic cooperation. Japan is to be commended for helping to avert the three-bloc scenario.

I will not elaborate here upon the process of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (the APEC forum). However, it is important to point out that President Clinton lifted this forum from a ministerial meeting to an informal leadership summit when the U.S. hosted the APEC meeting in 1993 in Seattle. Following upon this ground-breaking precedent, a second APEC "summit" was held last year in Bogor, Indonesia. At that meeting, the leaders took the major step of agreeing to establish free trade in the region by the year 2020.

There are, however, some major differences in the perception of this process of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific. Asians tend to emphasize the long-term relationship and take an evolutionary approach to trade liberalization. Americans tend to have a more legalistic approach. Detailed negotiations, usually with the assistance of many lawyers, precedes formal agreement, and the culmination of the process is a signed document to be followed with precise actions. This contrast is perhaps best illustrated by the NAFTA and ASEAN Free Trade Agreements. The NAFTA agreement exceeds 2000 pages; the AFTA document is only ten.

It will be a great mistake to think that APEC will bring about a free trade area in the near future. Americans tend to be impatient and think that this trade area can be created overnight. The region is too vast and diverse—in terms of economic development, political systems, and historical and cultural roots—for the integration process to be swift and decisive. A U.S.-Japan trade dispute will not hasten integration; rather, it will exacerbate tensions and only impact negatively on the prospects for economic cooperation.

This year, Japan will host the APEC summit meeting. Thus Japan is in an excellent position to push the APEC process forward and seize the opportunity to show its economic leadership at the regional and global level. But for Japan to truly take the leadership role in APEC, it will need to make major changes to its own economic structure and open its economy further to imports.

Unfortunately, so far Japan has shown little leadership in moving the process forward. Soon there will be mounting frustration that the APEC process is stalled, going nowhere. Grandiose announcements do not mean much if the details of liberalization do not materialize.

One suggestion that I have is to use a "building block" approach to economic cooperation. By this I mean an approach which emphasizes specific steps or "blocks" which, when put together, "build" a solid foundation for economic cooperation. Such "blocks" include concrete agreements to harmonize or standardize the rules governing trade, such as customs rules and regulations, product standards, and laws governing foreign investment. Such an approach to regional cooperation emphasizes laying the foundations of trade policy cooperation. It is a more promising and productive approach than the current belligerent American one. I think it could contribute significantly to realistic progress in regional economic cooperation.

A More Productive Government Role: Promoting Small and Medium Firms

Finally, I would like to say a word about the role of small and medium scale firms and Hawaii's role in the Asia-Pacific. Getting smaller firms more active in international trade is an area in which an active government role would be appropriate. It is also one in which the U.S. can learn from Japan and other East Asian countries. Instead of attempting to manage trade, we can stimulate trade by providing information to our disadvantaged small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

In the U.S., about 70% of exports are done by large firms, or firms affiliated with large firms. In contrast, I have observed a great deal more participation of SMEs in East Asia. Asian governments have provided much greater information to firms, and this flow of information enables smaller firms to participate in international trade on a far greater scale not only in Japan, but also in other countries such as Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and China. Unlike large corporations, SMEs lack the financial leverage to send their own consultants or business missions out into the region to seek business contacts and opportunities. In the absence of the supportive role played by trading firms and government information, smaller American firms are virtually excluded from most export opportunities.

The opportunities are there in the dynamic Asia-Pacific, but many American firms are not aware of them or how to access them. I just came back from leading a business delegation to China. I was very impressed with how much China wants to work with U.S. firms. But we have to be much more proactive in looking for opportunities in the Asia-Pacific. And one thing that our firms need is more information.

Thus, one of my goals is to provide more information to Hawaii's firms and, in the longer term, to build up technical expertise to assist local businesses. There are many existing U.S. government agencies and programs that assist potential traders and investors: the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the U.S. Small Business Administration. DBEDT will be working with these agencies to gather information on how their programs function and how to assist firms in accessing their services. Then, within DBEDT we will establish a "One-Stop Business Information Center." Such a center will provide Hawaii's firms not only with valuable information about business opportunities in Asia, but also with guidance on how best to utilize the services of various relevant federal agencies.

Hawaii's Role in the Asia-Pacific

Increasing the economic and cultural opportunities available to our children is the greatest challenge that we in Hawaii face if we are to provide our children with a meaningful future. The best prospect for us is to look at the surrounding Asia-Pacific, which is without a doubt the most economically dynamic region in the world today. Located in the middle of this thriving region, we in Hawaii not surprisingly have long pondered how Hawaii can take advantage of, and profit from, the tremendous growth in Asia, beyond the fields of tourism and tourism-related activities. We seek to capitalize on our strategic location and ideal time zone, as well as our beautiful weather, multi-ethnic population, and aloha spirit.

We still have a long way to go to fulfill the vision of Hawaii as the American "gateway to Asia." To compete in world markets we must be more competitive. We need to look outward, especially at the Asia-Pacific. But to do so, we must look inward as well, to see the weaknesses in ourselves and in our own backyard. We have to learn more about Asia and to strengthen our vital systems of education and infrastructure. Creation of a "One Stop Business Information Center" is just one of the many ways in which we will need to harness our capabilities to engage actively in business in the Asia-Pacific.

Through these efforts, we seek to contribute in a small but concrete way toward greater American productive engagement in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region. We hope these efforts will also help to ease economic tensions with Japan and other Asian trading partners and secure a brighter future for our children.

Yasunori Nishijima

Education: Critical Issues and New Directions

Prelude:

In 1871, the first Japanese Legate (which corresponded to Ambassador, later) to the United States of America, Mr. Arinori Mori, arrived in Washington, D. C. and opened the Japanese Governmental Commissioner's Office. The following year, he, with his ardent intention of designing the new educational system for the modernization of Japan, wrote letters to leaders of America in academia, in government and industry: "I wish to have your views in reference to the elevation of the condition of Japan, intellectually, morally, and physically."

Mr. Mori published a book entitled, "Education in Japan: A Series of Letters Addressed by Prominent Americans to Arinori Mori," D. Appleton and Company, New York, in 1873.

The First Stage (1870 - 1945):

The national principle of "Education for ALL" was announced in 1872 by the new Meiji government, and learning for practical utility was emphasized. Mr. Mori was appointed as the first Minister of Education in 1885 and established the basis for the entire educational system from primary school through university. The system was virtually sustained until the end of World War II.

By this time of commencement, however, mainly due to the influence of the emerging aggressive atmosphere in Europe, emphasis upon humanistic individualism waned and nationalism prevailed. Around the 1910's and 20's, humanistic democracy regained public support and some movement for new educational reform evolved emphasizing humanities study and respect for individual thinking. However, soon again the nation was headed toward war.

The Second Stage (1945 - 1985):

Shortly after the War, in 1946, the U. S. Mission for Japanese Education submitted its first report to General Douglas MacArthur, the Allied Commander of the Japanese Occupation Forces, proposing urgent educational reform to eradicate nationalism and to sow deep roots of democracy. The recommendation covered the entire change of the educational system and curricula. In 1947, significant educational reform was inaugurated under the strong command of the Occupation. The social equality of individuals was emphasized.

The transformation of the educational system struggled for completion concurrently with the postwar recovery of such essential needs of daily life as food, clothing and housing. Despite all, education was always the priority.

In the course of the astonishing economic reconstruction since the 1960's, social demands on education were enhanced, and academic careers became a progressively dominant factor in the hierarchy structure of society.

Recently, 96% of compulsory middle school graduates go on to high school, and 52% of high school graduates wish to enter college or a university. Keen competition for higher education focussed social attention on the university entrance examination with an overwhelming intensity. The curricula of high schools were forced to skew for the preparation of entrance examinations, and the effects extended into the middle schools and even to primary schools. Due to social concern about the superficial fairness in the selection of students, the entrance examinations tended to judge the aptitude of applicants by numerically measurable amounts of fragmented knowledge rather than the individual's intentions and depth of knowledge.

Although postwar educational reforms have efficiently contributed to the economic reconstruction of the nation, the contents of the educational system have been increasingly geared to the mechanism of socioeconomic structure.

The Third Stage (1985 -):

Towards the end of the 1970's, the public mood of Japanese society started to shift from seeking material affluence to cherishing the satisfaction of mind.

In 1985, the National Educational Council published its first report for radical reform consisting of the following three main targets:

(1) Emphasis upon individuality rather than uniformity.
(2) Establishment of life-long-learning educational systems with closer connections between schools and communities.
(3) Versatility of the educational system, made flexibly adaptable to the changing human society.

Contents of curricula for primary and secondary education have been revised stepwise since 1989. About 80% of universities and colleges have already started substantial reformation of their curricula.

Each educational institution is trying to establish its own identity. Society is seeking diversity instead of uniformity, flexibility instead of rigidity, and individuality instead of conformity. This implies a kind of cultural revolution that is the new phase of Japan.

Foreseeing the future, we must further a sympathetic international awareness and we must master the ability to cope with the flood of information and to judge its social implications. Ethics of universality is aspired to for humane commitment to global issues.

One of the common characteristics of the recent reform of higher education is the formation of trans-disciplinary integration, which may still be in the pre-disciplinary state, but challenges have already started. This is regarded for each center of learning as a necessity in order to survive in the future society serving the mission of higher education.

We do not know the ultimate effect of this cultural revolution in the form of educational reform, but we do realize the need of such a movement for the present society and for the centuries to come.

Kazuo Nukazawa

Easing Economic Tensions

(Format note: This paper was transcribed from Simul International's English translation recorded on audiotape.)

Many Japanese start their speeches with apologies, so I will begin with my apology for dressing in such a relaxed manner. There must have been a conspiracy among panelists to wear business suits because the Ambassador is wearing a business suit. But I feel that I learned from Mr. Kuriyama's speech that the Japanese society is changing to one of pluralism, so perhaps I am one of those who does not concur with the consensus of society. And that is my excuse for wearing an aloha shirt today—not just an aloha shirt, but a "Hawaii costume."

I am also not terribly ambitious, so I have not prepared a formal text for this occasion. Mr. Fukushima has prepared probably ten pages of his speech. The other presenters may have done so, as well. But I feared at the outset that I wouldn't have anything to say after Mr. Fukushima and the Ambassador because they are noted as impeccable speakers. I am not going to say what they have already said. I may say something which may be incongruous, after such excellent speeches, to you, an audience which is now fully satisfied "up to here" intellectually. So I probably should report what is occurring in Tokyo today, because perhaps half of you are from America, and half of the Japanese participants are probably not from Tokyo.

In Japan, we are discussing how to get out of this economic impasse. First, this impasse in our domestic economy. How might we get out from the doldrums, this four-year long economic recession? So only half of our collective mind is spared to find a solution out of the present impasse between the two countries, the United States and Japan. And the two issues are, of course, interrelated.

One breakthrough might be through macroeconomic management. If we increase domestic demand, we will be able to absorb more imports from foreign countries, including the United States. The deflation gap in Japan is very high. Japanese corporations invested heavily during the bubble years, so much so that their operations ratio is very low. The government has become greatly indebted during the past years. The long term bond of the Japanese government has come up to the level of 200 trillion yen, which is about 40% of Japanese GNP. To put it simply, the government does not have money.

The private sector also has over-invested during the past years. Normally there should be a lot of filing, and the unemployment rate should go up. But if you seek that kind of solution, we could be involved in a 1930s situation. Therefore, we have to increase demand. That is the commonsense approach. After the law of Keynes, we have learned how to print money and inflate demand. And that, probably, is the most commonsense solution. There is opposition to that, however, mainly from the people who are responsible for fiscal discipline.

We have borrowed too much from the nation, as I said. The short term debt of the Japanese government is also very high, as the government has borrowed from the nation through the system of the postal savings accounts. These accounts have amounted to about 200 trillion yen of Japanese savings. The Japanese government also has special accounts in forestry, and the Japanese national railways have done a lot of borrowing from the nation, and that is squarely in the hands of the government because the government has direct and indirect borrowing from the nation. The prefectures have borrowed too much, and the central government has borrowed too much from the prefectures. All in all, the central government has borrowed nearly 80% of the Japanese GNP, which is probably roughly proportionate to the American federal government's situation.

So there is legitimacy in what the fiscal authorities are saying about fiscal discipline. But there is also a small difference. The Japanese are borrowing from the Japanese, whereas the American government is borrowing not only from the Americans, but also from foreign countries. That is the small difference. Economic textbooks tell you that this is a situation for a Keynesian solution. The government must increase its expenditures and print money using IOUs and the IOU printing system. We have to increase demand in Japan. Probably after the election in July, the government and the legislature will tackle these problems.

The business community in Japan will want to see a large increase in government expenditures in the area of infrastructure, for instance, but also in the fields of technological breakthroughs, such as spending more money for basic science. A country like Japan, which has few natural resources, should have more technological breakthroughs—such as nuclear fusion, for instance. Nuclear fusion development is an area in which the United States, Europe, Japan and Russia are cooperating. They will want to go into the second stage soon, and they are short of money. The Japanese government should put money into that kind of program and provide breakthroughs for the next generation of the world, not only for the Japanese, but also for Asians.

Asian countries are debt importer nations for oil. Except for Indonesia, almost all Asian countries are importing enormous quantities of oil. You know that China has become a net importer of oil, as well. Therefore, we need some technological breakthroughs in the field of energy. Food, environment—these also need technological breakthroughs. We probably should spend more budgetary resources on these types of development.

Another area of effort which we are developing in Japan involves deregulation. We want to go into a period of "smaller government." We had one such period before the war. But after the Second World War, although democracy spread into rural areas, economic power has tended to be concentrated in the central government. Glen Fukushima has talked about the privatization of economic problems between the two countries and how the business community should go forward in the area of solving economic problems. I tend to agree with his view.

However, deregulation is not developing smoothly in Japan; it is obvious that there is opposition to it. Some people are dependent upon regulations. Our view is that if we deregulate, certainly there will be new business opportunities created as a result. Businesses will respond voluntarily without any urging from the Japanese government, moving into areas that are newly opened for investment. Also, if we deregulate there will be less opportunity for collapse. If you look back at the history of Japanese collapses after the war, they have been primarily the result of government subsidies and government regulations. Bureaucracies and politicians, as well as businessmen, have been using bypass, which costs money but also gives a fast solution to problems. So if we deregulate, we will be creating a better society, so I'm certainly for deregulation.

There is, as I have said, opposition to deregulation. Some opponents say that if we deregulate and deregulate, ultimately we will become like America. And America is not such a good country, these people say. There is a social malaise in the United States, and they say that if you create a society which is completely governed by policy or the mechanisms of competition, some lucky guys will win and many others will lose. Many of the losers may turn to drugs, violence and other avenues for solutions to their problems. So that is their sentiment, and its accompanying reasoning, against making the Japanese society look more like the American society.

I have some sympathy for what they say, but what we, the business community in Japan, are proposing is not evolving from Tokyo into New York. We are going from Tokyo to, say, Hawaii. And if we reach Hawaii we will start reconsidering where to go. We may go to San Francisco or we may go to Alaska, but not necessarily to New York. So there is room for deregulation in Japan. Do not go to the extreme of extrapolating our logical path to the very end—if we deregulate this and deregulate this, we may look like America. And if we do everything exactly the way that America has, probably we'll create the same kind of society. But we definitely have very pressing reasons for deregulation. That is our view.

However, the fight is difficult in Japan. And the fight is made even more difficult by the people who come from America as negotiators and say that the Japanese government should urge Japanese industry to do this and that. If the Japanese government agrees with those kinds of tactics on the part of American negotiators, probably we will see a society in which the Japanese government's hand will be made even stronger. Is that the kind of society you want to see in Japan?

We want to see a smaller government in Japan. We want to see government attempting to become a less powerful presence in Japanese society. That is the reason why we are totally opposed to the imposition of the will of the American negotiators on how to do business in Japan. Some companies may choose to buy parts and components from a company which they have trusted since before 1940, or even before 1930. They have developed a long history of cooperation and experience, shared among the people who have been doing business among themselves—the automobile assemblers and parts and components producers.

Of course, at some point, when an American producer shows a gadget—equipment which is, say, 10% or 20% cheaper—the psychological threshold will be broken and people will opt to buy cheaper parts and components. Nevertheless, there should be a basic understanding between the two countries that corporations should remain free to buy from anyone they choose. That is the heart and soul of corporate freedom. That is what free enterprise is about. If an American scholar or a USTR official comes and says to the Japanese producers, "This is cheaper. This is good," or "You must buy it. If you don't buy it, we'll go back to Washington and use 301 against you," we won't understand what you're talking about. Well . . . there *are* people who know what they are talking about, so I will leave it to them to explain. I am such a lazy person.

We must also take into consideration that the Asian countries are watching us. This is not just a Japan-American game. The automobile negotiations are about Japanese and American automobiles, but the Asians are watching because this is going to create an example or precedent. If the Japanese genuflect to the pressures, which to them look very irrational, it is only evident that Asians may feel that the Americans will come after them next. The Asians feel that they are smaller and less powerful than Japan. If the Japanese have to do what the Americans want, and they genuinely do not believe that is legitimate, there will be further problems. Probably the Asians feel that they will have to do what the Americans want whether it is good or bad, and that is not democracy.

The American system of democracy has spread to other countries beyond the oceans; that is the beauty of American democracy. American democracy should have universal currency. And so far, it *has* had universal currency. But there are value differences among us, as the Ambassador reminded you. Beyond the value differences, some of the elements of American universalism such as democracy and freedom have permeated the minds of the Japanese and Asians. And they want to be true to that. When strong countries come to Asia and Japan and say that this is what we want, and if you don't listen to what we want, we will use 301 despite what the international observer says, despite what international institutions say, this is undemocratic.

The OECD is a club of rich nations, the twenty-four richest nations in the world—and they have said unanimously that 301 is bad. WTO rules say that a unilateral increase in taxes is unfair. It's an infringement of GATT. Yet the USTR and the United States government said that it will increase the tax on luxury cars by about 100% last month, and since then, the Japanese exports of those automobiles has all but stopped. Japanese exports of luxury cars to the United States has stopped. Certainly, we would like to see business to business negotiations with the United States, but what is occurring is the USTR versus Japanese business negotiators. That does not sound to me very kosher, because the USTR has the USTR gun, the 301. I do not want to negotiate with anyone who has a gun. The results will be obvious. I want to talk with people who do not have guns, and who do have more common sense.

That is the present situation as I see it. Thank you very much.

Sozaburo Okamatsu

Easing Economic Tensions

When I look back on the relationship between Japan and the United States, what it is today looks like a dream.

In 1945, when the war ended with Japan's defeat, I was eight years old. During the decade or so that followed, the Japanese people were able to survive only with generous American aid. Because it was unthinkable and impractical to continue to count on another nation's largesse, however, we at once started to grapple with the staggering task of economic recovery. In that effort, we found that one factor worked against us: the deficit in the international balance of payment. Japan at the time had a feeble economic basis and could not tolerate the deficit continuing year after year. Because of this, we made almost desperate efforts to reduce and eliminate it until finally, during the second half of the 1960s, we were able to put our country on a stable surplus basis.

The irony today is that the pressing task for Japan is how to reduce its surplus in the current account. Also, we are deeply concerned about the ruinous appreciation of the yen, which is four times stronger against the dollar than it was a quarter century ago—a result of the continuing surplus.

I was with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry for thirty-five years until my retirement last year as Vice Minister for International Affairs. In effect, my career at MITI closely paralleled Japan's economic recovery and development. Therefore, I think I can say that I know fully both the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese economy.

In recent years, Japan and the United States have rapidly deepened their economic interdependence. In the trading between us, foodstuffs and consumer goods have been replaced by capital goods and intermediate products as principal trade commodities. This was to be expected. Today's industrial products are assembled from superior parts and components purchased from all over the world. For example, laptop computers cannot be made without liquid crystal flat panels made in Japan and microprocessors made in the United States. Similarly, close interdependence occurs in many other products.

Direct investment in each other's countries has also increased. Today, more than half of the so-called Japanese cars are, in fact, manufactured in the United States, and I can't think of a single Japanese city which doesn't have a McDonald's or Denny's. It is true that Japanese direct investment in the United States far exceeds U. S. investment in Japan. However, it is also true that the profitability of U. S. companies in Japan is far better than that of Japanese companies in the United States. Despite what you may have heard, a great number of American companies are doing just fine in Japan.

As direct investment has increased, so has the number of Japanese visiting and staying in the United States, and vice versa. The average length of stay for Japanese expatriates in the United States has become much longer than in the past, enabling them to take root in American culture and society. I can say this because for three years, from 1975 to 1978, I was stationed in New York. The ability of Japanese expatriates to blend into their community makes even me envious. Needless-to-say, direct investment creates jobs. According to the U. S. Department of Commerce, Japanese affiliates employ more than 750,000 people in the United States.

While economic interdependence has increased between us, frictions, unfortunately, have also increased. Trade frictions between Japan and the United States date from the early 1960s when textile imports from Japan provoked protests from U.S. textile producers. Following that, we have had disputes on iron and steel, color TV, and automobiles. As a result, increases in imports from Japan prompted U.S. industries to ask for import restrictions.

The situation began to change with the dispute on semiconductors in 1986. The U. S. shifted its focus from import restrictions to access to Japanese markets. As the Japanese economy expanded and began to account for a prominent share of the world economy, foreign interests in the Japanese market increased, and foreign exporters began to question Japan's domestic regulations, business practices, and government policies. In other words, trade frictions began to center upon Japan's economic and social structure.

As the nature of trade frictions changed, mutual distrust between Japan and the United States gradually increased. This is unfortunate. On the U.S. side, the frustration grew that Japan never changed; whereas, on the Japanese side, the irritation grew that no matter how much effort Japan made to accommodate American wishes, the United States never let up its pressure on Japan, demanding more and more "concessions." If you step back and look at the situation objectively, most disputes should have been solved, but in most cases, disputes were politicized and emotionalized.

When you take a wider view, you can say that frictions are inevitable as economic relations deepen. The U.S.-Canadian relationship may be described as one of the most closely intertwined, but the number of economic disputes is sizable. It is even pointed out that the major purpose of the free trade agreement between the two countries was to create effective dispute resolution mechanisms.

Indeed, I think economic disputes should be resolved without politicization. To do so, I think it preferable to create a framework for resolving economic disputes from a purely economic viewpoint, with expert but neutral mediation.

Japan and the Untied States do not have a free trade agreement, but we have a number of agreements on various sectors. During the framework talks, we discussed the possible creation of a forum for assessing progress in Japanese imports and government and corporate efforts, a forum consisting of industry representatives and neutral parties. Though nothing concrete has come out of these discussions, I think we should continue to look at some form of mechanism to manage disputes which are inevitable in growing economic interdependence. My personal view, indeed, is that what might be called "non-legal dispute resolution mechanisms" should be most effective.

In looking at trade frictions and ways of resolving them, I think it essential to maintain the conviction that international trade is a plus-sum game which benefits all parties concerned, not excepting Japan and the United States. Regarding this, I think the action of one trading nation imposing its will on its partner or partners would work to jeopardize trade and therefore it is unacceptable as a means of resolving frictions.

In the framework talks since last fall, we reached agreement on almost all the issues on our agenda, such as government procurement insurance and sheet glass, leaving only the disputes on autos and auto parts unresolved. It happens that the negotiations on this sector were the ones for which I was responsible at MITI and in which I was fully involved.

Regarding the auto and auto parts negotiations, the prevailing sense in the United States seems to be that Japan was unreasonably adamant. Therefore, I'd like to begin by emphasizing that, in this area, as in others, we did our utmost to accommodate American wishes. For example, we accepted all that the United States wanted in regard to inspection of auto repair parts—the very issue that is said to have prompted the U.S. decision to implement Section 301. Even where we were unable to accept U.S. demands verbatim, we made arrangements in such a way as to provide the Japanese consumer with options. As for dealerships for imported cars, we proposed to create a section within MITI that would facilitate their increase, while providing tax incentives and a special fund for the purpose of increasing the sales of foreign cars in Japan.

The only issues on which we could not accede to U.S. requests were the so-called voluntary plans for Japanese auto makers to increase their purchases of U.S. parts and the demand that a certain number of dealers be created by a certain date. These we could not accept because they would require the government to interfere with private corporate activity and accommodate managed trade, a clear violation of market mechanisms. To give preferential treatment to the United States would create disadvantages for other countries. This is something we are not prepared to do.

In any event, regardless of U.S. actions, the Government of Japan shall carry out our proposals because we believe that they would not only benefit Japanese consumers, but also help expand world trade.

On May 16, the U.S. Government, voicing dissatisfaction with the negotiations, announced a list of Japanese luxury cars that would be subjected to hundred percent tariffs. This unilateral action is a clear violation of WTO rules.

In response, Japan requested WTO to initiate discussions through its dispute resolution mechanisms. About a week ago, on June 12, we began the first round of talks in Geneva. We think that the unilateral U. S. action is a serious challenge to the newly established WTO. We also think that the auto and auto parts issues must be discussed at WTO from now on.

We are aware of the argument that the WTO dispute resolution mechanisms won't solve any problems—that in the end, issues such as these must be worked out bilaterally. But I think that at this stage these issues should be left to WTO so that they may be looked at by a number of countries. Parallel to the WTO dispute settlement process, I welcome the fact that both governments decided to have talks at a vice-ministerial level on this issue in Geneva later this week. I hope some progress will be made at this event. In the meantime, however, Japan and the United States must continue their efforts to strengthen their cooperative relationships in politics, international security, and other areas.

To conclude my remarks, I would like to comment briefly upon Japan and the United States. As a result of the economic growth that has continued for the past fifty years, Japan's per capita GDP today emulates that of the United States. However, the country is going through profound changes in politics, society, and the economy. To take just one economic aspect, we have seen Japanese consumers and users turn extremely price-conscious in the past few years, compelling the government to take steps such as reducing the great differences in domestic and foreign prices and carrying out extensive deregulation. We believe that deregulation, in particular, has crucial roles to play: namely, to increase foreign access to Japanese markets, to press for change in Japan's industrial structure, and to strengthen its economic foundations.

As for the United States, I wish to say that through my dealings with American people while I was stationed in New York and my work with MITI, I have come to appreciate that the American people are, above all, reasonable and fair. The strength of the United States lies in the fact that it accepted all kinds of people and cultures from all over the world to create the richest nation in the world in just over a hundred years. My hope is that from now on the United States will help create a global society that transcends historical, cultural, and social differences for further development of the world economy. Thank you very much.

Yukio Okamoto

U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia

(Format note: This paper was transcribed from an audiotape recorded by Simul International.)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have a somewhat dictatorial chairman on our panel who instructed me on two things. I said "yes" to one instruction, and "no" to the other. The instruction I have been observing is that all of us should come here without jackets—just because the chairman did not bring a jacket to Hawaii. However, I rejected his second request that I speak in Japanese. He said that my Japanese is much better than my English—thank you for the compliment—and that it would be a good way to balance our presentation. I have to write a thesis someday on this point, but when I speak in Japanese, I suddenly become very courteous and decent because of the nature of the language; whereas, when I try to speak in English, I can become more provocative and combative, maybe because you have so many cursing words in your English vocabulary. I wanted to become provocative, so I will proceed in English if the chairman permits.

I subscribe to what Jim Auer just said. I agree with at least 90% of what he has said. I, too, share worries about the future of our security relationship. Our future is precarious, to say the least. And there are fundamental doubts about whether we can really carry on our present form of alliance forever. The fundamental basis of the alliance upon which we stand has become very vulnerable.

The U.S.-Japan security system, to put it in an extremely abbreviated form, rests upon the fact that the United States should come to protect Japan jointly with Japan should there be an aggression against Japan. This is partly because Japan, under the American-made constitution, relinquished the right to arm itself with the necessary force structure to defend itself alone. In return for that, of course, we are offering many things to the U.S. side, as well, which I will mention to you later. But what it means is that the U.S. will have to risk the lives of tens of thousands of servicemen and women to defend Japan, and might even have to be ready to engage in nuclear exchange if there is a need. Now, will the U.S. do that just because such an obligation is written in the treaty? I think it is a bit naive to presuppose that there is an ironclad guarantee that the United States will always risk everything it has to defend Japan.

What is important is the *substance* of the relationship. The U.S.-Japan relationship has to be a very good one, always, in order to make Americans feel that Japan needs to be protected. But with the present inflammatory rhetoric going on across the Pacific, with these present invectives centering on the economic relationship (which is really acting as a body blow to the basic fabric of the relationship), there is a decidedly clear deterioration of the relationship. This is the fundamental source of my worries.

The U.S.-Japan security system is, militarily speaking, as valuable as ever because even without the Cold War structure, the Japan-U.S. security system was designed to cope with wide-ranging instabilities and contingencies in the Far East. So that situation remains unchanged. For Japan, the situation is a *sine qua non,* or an indispensable thing, because without the security system we will be exposed to the physical threat of surrounding nations. Russia still has an army of a half million in the Far Eastern area. China has an army of 2.3 million. North Korea has 0.9 million. If we are going to have a unified Korea, it will be a mighty nation with an army of 1.5 million.

I'm not saying that a unified Korea would attack Japan; I'm simply referring to the physical presence of destructive capabilities around Japan. Now, what is the force structure of Japan? A meager army of 150,000, which is less than the army of the Kingdom of Thailand and less, even, than the Burmese army. So without the U.S.-Japan security system, we could not survive.

At the same time, the U.S.-Japan security arrangement is an indispensable system for the United States because without Japan, you cannot effectively deliver your policy towards Asia-Pacific, extending over to the entire Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. I think my two colleagues will agree to that aspect.

Money is not the most important thing, but Japan's financial contribution is also sizable. Jim referred to the Japanese' making a huge contribution to the Persian Gulf, but come to think of it, Japan is paying a $7 billion contribution to the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. This means that every two years, we are paying more than the $11 billion contribution we made during the Gulf War, and in a much more normal and sound manner. I'm very happy to see that we are, in a substantive manner, helping the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. I am only saying that for both countries, this is an indispensable system.

The system is indispensable for Asian countries as well. We see, so many times, Asian leaders saying that the U.S.-Japan security system is the source of stability in East Asia, where differing threats exist. Where does the vulnerability come from? It comes from two fronts: one political and one economic. The political weakening of the alliance is partly due to the dismantling of the Cold War structure. When we had a common enemy, a common bogey man, we had to stand very close because it was a zero sum gain between the United States and the Soviet Union. So Japan supported the U.S. in every action it took, even in some dubious actions in light of the international role (such as the United

States' bombarding Khaddafi at his own capital, or seizing Noriega in his own capital).

Many legal interpretations can be made. But we were unequivocal in saying that we understood and supported the U.S. actions. That was fine. And the United States appreciated our support. But with that common enemy gone, the two countries have been unsuccessful in substituting for that common goal.

To a large extent, I think this is the responsibility of the United States because it has become so introverted and inward looking. In the past few years, at every Japan-U.S. summit talk, it is always the Japanese side which stresses the importance of transnational issues as the common agenda: environment, economic assistance, medical aid (including AIDS) and science and technology cooperation. But the United States is somewhat reluctant to place those as the common flags for the two countries, always saying, "No, there are more important issues to settle first, and those concern economic friction."

Of course Japan cannot be freed from blame for the weakening political alliance, as Jim mentioned. We did not do enough, clearly, in the Gulf War. However, I must hasten to add that what Japan did was much more than what is being perceived publicly. I am, right now, writing an English book to be read by an American audience on what Japan really did and did not do during the Gulf War. Since this is not the forum for economic subjects, I will not go into detail. But I was remembering today that when I accompanied Ambassador Ushiba, then Minister for External Economic Affairs, to Washington, it was 1978 and we were in a very, very tough negotiation with the then USTR Bob Strauss. Finally, we came to an amicable solution. But that was the start of our economic frictions.

That was almost twenty years ago. Twenty years ago both people were exposed to the exchange of mutual invectives, the "Japan unfair—America bullying" image inflated by newspaper headlines. If you are going to have twenty years of continuous squabbling between the two of you, yes, it is bound to weaken the basic emotional fabric of the relationship, and it has finally begun to take its toll.

The current auto talks, in my view, in terms of the substance of the negotiations, are no more difficult than many of the issues we have solved before. Textiles were more difficult. Beef was more difficult. So was citrus. So was FSX. So was rice. So was distribution. We are talking about mere auto parts, and the two sides are stuck. We are almost in a fist fight with each other.

We must understand that the major source of frustration on the economic front is coming from the Japanese side. We must understand the pent-up frustration of the United States for the last twenty years. I think it is incumbent upon Japan to really open up its markets by dismantling our complicated regulation system and also freeing up our potential consumption at home. The course is macroscopic, so there has to be a complementary measure: Japan's doing something about our excessive savings, and the United States doing something about its excessive consumption. But anyway, let's leave the economic side for the moment.

My final point is that I have some profound worries, and also some hopes, about the relationship. My worry as far as the United States is concerned is its trend toward regionalism. But for the sake of time, I won't go deeply into that. Certainly, the way you are trying to operate NAFTA and the way you are trying to single out countries—Chile, of course, Singapore, Korea—trying to form a new bloc in Asia Pacific while resisting hard against Asians' caucusing among themselves in the form of EAEC, is not very consistent.

What I worry about for Japan, first, is the rising trend of nationalism. The no-war resolution was almost scandalous, the way we watered it down. It became so lukewarm that even I did not know that the latent forces toward rightist ideologies or tendencies were so great in Japan. I write in many op-eds these days on U.S. auto talks that Japan and the United States should not confront each other. We should not go into the WTO, but we should really stick to solving the issue in a bilateral context. Then I get phone calls from rightists saying that "You are selling your country; we should not be afraid of America; we should stand firm against the United States." These kinds of phone calls are made to my office.

I am a bit concerned about the rising nationalistic trend among young bureaucrats as well. We lack the political leadership to direct such young men's assertiveness toward a more sound position. Another worry I have about Japan is the amateurization of Japanese politics. Just look at what sort of candidates we have in our political parties, especially those the LDP is trying to put in for the coming election. We have a bicycle racer. We have a professional wrestler. We have a professional boxer. We have a soccer champion. The explanation given by the LDP and other parties is that if you are good at one thing you can be good at another. So I'm predicting that very soon we'll be having Japan's best rat catcher on the list, or Japan's fastest noodle eater in the Diet. This whole sense of irresponsibility which prevails in the Japanese Diet (except for Ms. Tanaka, of course) is quite astounding.

In a more serious tone, the lack of ideological dialogue and political policy discussion among politicians is very deplorable, especially when the LDP is in an unholy alliance with the Socialists. There is no more policy integrity to protect, so everything is acceptable. Every policy is just fine, and the most important thing is to get as many members into your party as possible.

My hope is that, notwithstanding what I have said about young bureaucratic assertiveness, this can be converted into a very sound weapon to better the relationship, because these people know what to aim at. They are more confident. They are less inhibited in expressing themselves. I have great hope for American intellectual prowess, the intellectual capability which remains intact. The strength of America, in my view, does not come from military capability or economic power. It comes from your intellectual strength, the ability to create an international framework to erect an international order. Once your transitional period of being introverted is again unleashed to look outward towards the world, I think we will have a much better world.

Yasuaki Onuma

Seeking a Better Life: Challenges of International Migration

As you all know, it is a most sacred ritual for a Japanese speaker to begin his talk with apologies. But I found Professor Cornelius, although he's an American, started his speech with apologies, so I thought maybe I should start with some jokes. But in that case, I'm no longer a Japanese speaker and Mr. Alden has to find a substitute from the audience. That's too much to ask of him, I think, so I'll just start directly with my paper, which is written in Japanese. Since Professor Shimada has already given a detailed analysis of specific questions, I will limit myself to a longer perspective analysis.

Current issues in migration are fundamentally the after-effects of the "European-made modern era." Today, the problems of international migration are due to the economic gap between North and South, and the gigantic economic power of Northern advanced nations. After World War II, a majority of Asian and African countries gained independence, ending four centuries of European colonialism. However, most of the Asian and African nations under colonial rule suffered from religious, ethnic and tribal conflicts. They were unable to integrate their economies, education, culture and information to unite their nations. Since independence, these countries have been suffering from malfunctions, which is the major reason for the movement of the labor force out of the countries.

On the other hand, the advanced nations are proud of their unprecedented productivity and economic prosperity. After the war, the U.S. brought in much cheap labor from other countries. Western European countries also accepted a lot of foreign labor during the period of high economic growth in the 1960s. Since its founding, the U.S. has been a country which accepted immigrants. Western European nations with relatively homogeneous national compositions began accepting racial minorities with religious, cultural and linguistic differences in the 1960s.

The situation for Japan is rather different from Europe or the United States. Before the war, Japan had a large military force, but it was economically weak and sent a number of its people out of the country to the United States and South America. However, since Korea was under Japan's colonial rule from 1910 to 1945, many immigrated to Japan from the Korean Peninsula as cheap labor. In 1945, the population of Korean laborers in Japan amounted to 2 million, which was about 3% of the total population.

After the war, three-fourths of the Koreans in Japan returned to Korea. Post-war Japan, focused on rebuilding its devastated land and increasingly worried about gaining economic prosperity, did not think about accepting immigrants. The myth of the homogeneous nation has been fixed in Japanese society since the Meiji Period, and Japan has maintained a very closed policy toward immigration. Although industries introduced the idea of using aliens as a labor force during the high growth period of the 1960s, this did not result in any official policy changes. The Japanese policy of not accepting immigration remains basically unchanged even today.

In the 1980s, the Japanese economy expanded to become the second largest in the world, and the disparity between the per capita income of people in Japan and other Asian countries became several tens to one, so the situation changed drastically. On one hand, there was increased pressure in other Asian countries to go to Japan, a wealthy nation, to work. On the other hand, the labor shortage in Japan was serious, and industries started heated discussions about accepting alien laborers. In particular, the 1980s was an era in which progress was made for Japan in "internationalization" (in terms of corporations' international expansion and fervent acceptance of foreign cultures, the dramatic increase in foreign aid, and the increase in international exchange), so the problem of accepting foreign labor should be considered as part of this process of internationalization. During the second half of the 1980s, there was heated debate about a closed versus open policy on the issue of accepting foreign laborers.

Many who advocate allowing foreign laborers into Japan ignore the aforementioned problems with the Koreans living in Japan and the fact that Japan was once a country that sent its own workers abroad. These advocates point out only that from the 1960s, Japan accepted foreign laborers from Western Europe, and then it stopped immigration in the first half of the 1970s. This kind of debate misses the concept that the problem of the movement of international labor spanned four centuries and was caused by the collapse of the colonial system, something which has not necessarily been fully delved into.

Those who insist upon opening the doors to foreign labor emphasize that it is part of an "international contribution" without giving careful thought to the discrimination or prejudice faced by Koreans in Japan. Advocates of an open policy place importance on the development of overseas economic activity and, unless an unconventional immigration control law can be maintained in the future, insist on rapidly accepting foreign labor. In contrast, those insisting on closed doors say that conventional measures have been successful so far and should be maintained.

In response to the labor shortage during the period of high economic expansion in the 1960s, there was a definite appraisal in Japanese policy to push for production with robotics instead of relying upon cheap foreign labor. This course of action is obvious when looking at the situation for the Western European nations which earnestly accepted foreign laborers in the 1960s, hurriedly discontinued the policy with the oil shock in the first half of the 1970s, and suffered widespread repercussions and criminal attacks and discrimination against foreign workers and their families after the economic recession.

On the other hand, Japanese policies restricting foreign labor were derived from the strongly rooted myth of a homogeneous nation. This myth originated from the ideology which sought an identical unity in Japanese society, and rather than a matter to be proud of, it is something that should be corrected. Especially since in the 21st century, we will see economies and information across national borders become commonplace, and it will be impossible to control the influx of migration by means of immigration control laws.

In the United States, migration policies have both pros and cons. The United States has accepted diverse immigrants from all over the world. The competition and interaction between people based on these differences have made the country socially vital. Just as in European nations, immigrants from developing nations have supported American industries as cheap labor. Furthermore, accepting a number of immigrants and refugees indicated to the world the liberty and generosity of the United States. Accepting an enormous number of immigrants and refugees also indicated to the world America's ideology of tolerance and its belief in freedom.

I have lived my sixty years of life believing that America was a country I could never hope to emulate. I invited my sister to America. I asked her, "What is your first impression?" and naturally, I had expected her impression to be of surprise. But her first impression was, "What a dirty place is this country." That was my sister's first impression.

At that time, having lived in America, I had become an American in terms of my sensibilities, and I was shocked that she should call my country, my adopted country, dirty. But as someone who has lived in your country for some time, I can see the differences in your attitudes vis a vis immigrants and the whole matter of alien labor. The Japanese are extremely cautious about the influx of different racial groups. We may not have very explicit overt discrimination, but in our society where the mythology of homogeneity persists, we have many hidden barriers, obstacles and discrimination which do not prepare us sufficiently to live in the 21st century. But at the same time, there are universalistic attitudes in America and a rather self-centered view, as well. After all, America is one of the larger countries in the world. You, too, must learn to live in the new age.

The common theme of this Symposium is "learning from each other." For any of us, learning from others is difficult because we are all egocentric. That is human. But for the Japanese, learning from others is not so difficult because the Japanese have become accustomed to learning from others, first, from China, to a lesser extent from Korea for more than two thousand years, and then, since the 19th century from Europe, and finally from the United States for the last 50 years. What is most needed for the Japanese is thinking independently rather than learning from others.

For the Americans, the case is very different. Although Americans learned a great deal from Europe until the early 20th century, in this century Americans no longer feel it necessary to learn from others because the United States has become the leading nation. Japan and the United States have talked again and again about equal partnership, the most important bilateral relationship, etcetera. Yet, frankly speaking, Americans are far behind in learning from Japan. Some Americans say, "No, we are learning Toyota ways, etcetera, etcetera." I admit that Americans have started learning. However, the effort is far from satisfactory. What is important is to question hidden assumptions in terms of knowledge, language, culture and information. Yesterday, State Minister Tanaka gave her paper, not in Japanese *Niigata-ben*, the equivalent of a Southern drawl, but in English, even with a Philadelphia accent, according to her—which I couldn't sense, unfortunately. However, we cannot expect an American secretary to deliver his or her paper in Japanese. This is true even with ambassadors. We cannot imagine a Japanese ambassador who cannot speak English. But everyone takes it for granted that American ambassadors will speak in English in Japan, even though their audience is Japanese.

Some may have been aware of the fact that my name, today, was expressed in its proper order: family names comes first and then given names. Mr. Alden was kind enough to refer to me in the proper way. This was a result of my request. Otherwise, the proper order of my name would have been inverted. I appreciate that the organizer accepted my request. In Japan we do not call the U.S. President "Clinton Bill." We call him "Bill Clinton." However, in the United States our State Minister Tanaka was called "Makiko Tanaka," not "Tanaka Makiko." This is an example of an implicit assumption of asymmetry between the United States and Japan.

Learning from each other is important, even essential in the 21st century, when the United States must live not as *the* superpower but as *a* superpower among many superpowers. But it is easier said than done. I believe that all the people here in this room have made great efforts in bringing the United States to this direction—learning from others. I highly appreciate your efforts, but I do insist that more effort is needed. *Mahalo nui loa*. Thank you very much.

Atsuyuki Sassa

Public Safety: Crime and Justice

(Format note: This paper was transcribed from Simul International's English translation recorded on audiotape.)

Justice and crime: The war against crime is an ongoing proposition. Laws always come after acts of crime, so laws are therefore always less than effective in coping with crimes. For example: In 1970, Japan experienced its first hijacking incident, the seizing of airplane Yodo by the Red Army. At that point, there was no law against hijacking. Three months later, the national parliament, the Diet, hurriedly enacted a counter-hijacking law. That anti-hijacking law has been in effect ever since.

Similarly, on the 20th of March this year, the subway sarin incident happened. Suddenly we discovered that there was no law against using that poisonous gas. You may possess sarin and not be accused of any crime. You may use sarin and you may be indicted for murder, but not for the use of the sarin gas, itself. So, in this current session of the parliament, an anti-sarin law was enacted. That new law has been in effect since the first of May. But it was not retroactive, of course, to the March 20th incident. Before that, on the foot of Mount Fuji, people were manufacturing sarin, but they could be accused of no crime because the law was not retroactive.

In Japan, I talk about this case because we should be afraid of biological weapons. Botulinus, biological poison, was actually being cultured by that Aum sect. In fact, on March 25th, the cult was planning to use it on the subways. But as of now, you may possess botulinus biological poison and you will not be subject to any charge. The Aum Supreme Truth sect had all of these things. The ebola virus suddenly emerged in Zaire. The Aum sect people were actually researching this virus. There is no justice available to control that or to regulate it. Even as of today, we have no law against botulinus.

Crimes have to be judged and measured by laws. There has to be a specific written law on the books if any crime is to be committed. Without laws, you can commit no crime. That is the first principle. Second: there must be evidence. A mere confession cannot indict you. So there are some two hundred Aum sect members now in detention. They are confessing their acts one after another, but physical or material evidence is required, so this makes the investigation fairly difficult.

In the case of Japan, a major difference from the United States court system is that we have judges who are professional judges, but we have no jury system. In order to respect human rights, the whole justice process is very time consuming and tedious.

I have handled many cases, one of which was the Asama Mountain Villa case. In February, 1972, the Red Army students' group took hostages in a mountain villa in Mount Asama in Nagano. In that incident, fourteen members of the Red Army were lynched by their colleagues. Two of them died, and one police officer died. Altogether there were seventeen deaths. There was a trial, and that case was decided only the year before last, twenty-one years after the incident occurred. One man received a twenty-year imprisonment sentence twenty-one years after the incident.

I feel that the Asama Mountain Villa case demonstrates just how much respect the Japanese have for human rights. Rarely are capital punishment defendants executed. There are presently sixty people on death row awaiting executions that may never take place.

With this much respect for human rights, some people argue, we are being more cruel to the criminals by not giving them sentences more expeditiously. But these are some of the features of our system. The sarin incident may produce a dozen or so death penalty defendants. But they will not be sentenced during the rest of this century, and execution, if any, will take place in the 21st century. Many people tell me, "Please see to it that they are executed while we are still alive. You are abusing taxpayers' money. We don't want to see them enjoy the rest of their lives while we taxpayers die ahead of them because they have lived comfortably in prison." I receive many letters with similar sentiments.

Crime and justice: The relationship between the two is always that the crime comes first, and justice tries to chase it, follow it, *post facto,* as I was saying before. In the olden days, we Japanese sometimes say, the motivation for crimes seemed to be fairly simple and straightforward: love affairs, resentment, theft and so on, men's and women's troubles, disenchantment, a desire to steal something. These were simple, old-fashioned causes for crimes. The equation was fairly simple.

But now we have those would commit crimes simply for pleasure. There was a man called Soka Jiro who enjoyed placing dynamite in public transportation. He was never caught. He would actually enjoy watching people get panicky. It was a pleasure crime. And there are also happenstance murders where motivation is absolutely undetectable. The criminals just pass by people and suddenly commit a crime. Maybe there is a neurosis associated with life in huge metropolitan areas.

Further complicating matters are political crimes, political offenses. In the 60s and 70s, Marxist Leninist influences and even Trotsky's anarchist influences were ever present. Political ideologues backed their misguided revolutionary spirit with explosives, hijacking and terrorism.

One nightmare we had then was that they might use CBR (chemical, biological and radiological) weapons or instruments. CBR, the so-called "ultimate weapon," could destroy humanity forever. And then there are nuclear weapons which might be used against a mass of people, or the terrorists might take people, citizens or civilians, hostage to make their demands upon our government—like "Pay a certain amount of money for the release of certain prisoners." These have been our worst nightmares.

Quite luckily, while I was in office, we had no CBR incidents. Because under a country ruled by law, first, an extraterritorial role was necessary for anyone to use, and you needed a framework, you needed brains, and you needed a loyal paramilitary organization if you wanted to commit any kind of CBR crime, like Specter in the "007" movies. Otherwise, such an evil empire could not be obtained.

But then, on the 20th of March, we were jolted. We were shocked that we had these things—that is, the religious corporations which had been given legal protection. Their rights to worship whatever they believe are highly protected. They are tax exempt and they maintain extraterritorial rights. Prosecutors cannot trample upon their activities. For half a century, that was their status. 185,000 religious groups were there worshipping perhaps 250,000 gods. That was Japan. That has been Japan. Obviously, in 1951 when we implemented the religious corporation law, this was all made possible. Shintoism, for example, which lent a spiritual backing to the *kamikaze* suicide bombers, was given some kind of protection. And lawmakers wanted to make certain that Christianity was protected. Anybody who claimed, "This is persecution of religion," could deter the police. Religion was taboo for the police. We could not touch religion.

Now we have second thoughts. Now the Aum Supreme Truth group has surfaced and we are all responsible. By inaction, by omission, we created this monster.

The guru Shoko Asahara is an impostor. He attended a school for the blind. He was a masseur for a *boryoku dan* organized criminal syndicate. But he studied yoga and claimed that he had obtained superhuman capabilities. He could fly through the air. He could remain submerged in water for more than ten minutes. That is what Guru Asahara claimed. And he took advantage of the Cold War between Soviet Russia and the United States. By 1999, he said, there would be Armageddon, with all human beings annihilated by nuclear and biological weapons. There will be a massive global war (the final war, Armageddon) unless you join our Aum Supreme Truth sect. You will be given atropine medicine so you will be saved. You will survive the war. So, "Come join our religion," was what the guru was saying. He was, of course, an impostor, and his scheme a hoax.

In 1992, Asahara, the guru, tried to run for office. He suffered a miserable defeat. Eighteen hundred votes were all he got. He thought he would win a top seat. He wanted to go to the University of Tokyo. He failed. He wanted to become a politician. He failed. That sense of frustration drove Guru Asahara to say that 1999 would be the year of Armageddon. He tried to capture the hearts and the minds of the people. But then, in 1989, the Maltese summit ended the Cold War. No more Cold War, no possibility of Armageddon between the Americans and the Russians. So he, himself, had to stage an Armageddon.

Asahara said that in 1997 there would be Armageddon between Japan and the United States. That was what he began claiming. He shifted his strategy, and he claimed that the U.S. army would use poison gas—would experiment with poison gas against the Japanese. That sarin and botulinus biological poisons and neutron bombs, and such,, were being considered for acts of terrorism.

As I said, he is an imposter. He said he could stay submerged in water for ten minutes or more. He demonstrated, but in fifteen seconds he had to pop out of the water. Naturally, he couldn't fly through the air either. An impostor, that is what he is. But an imposter who committed a grievous crime.

I believe that there is much to be desired in our educational system. People without vision or dreams, and with a sense of insecurity about the future, find solutions and relief in something cultish. Perhaps this phenomenon is global. Our recent act of terrorism was a combination of a Branch Davidian-like cult and Mafia and MIT top students. That's how you can characterize our latest act of terrorism. All of these forces were put together in Japan.

To prevent actions such as these, we must reflect upon our own lives. That is, Japan could go down in history as the first country that staged chemical warfare, in a way. Let us hope that what we have learned and experienced in know-how, first aid and so on, can be shared with other countries to preclude any recurrence of crimes or offenses such as this. CBR is a new kind of threat for many countries—for Japan, as well. Thank you.

Robert A. Scalapino

Japan and America, 1945-1995: Peace, Progress, Partnership

In the long span of history, fifty years is a relatively brief time. Yet the amazing changes that have taken place in U.S.-Japan relations during that period testify to the dazzling pace of events in a period of global revolution.

The seeds of change were implanted at an early point in the post-war era. A personal note to underwrite this fact may be permitted. As a young Japanese-language officer in the U.S. Navy, I was in the Philippines when the war ended, and was sent immediately to Japan. Among our duties, we were directed to take a poll of Japanese citizens and American GIs in the late fall of 1945 to determine the attitude of each side toward the other.

The results were highly interesting. We asked each group to select what they liked and disliked about the other side. Japanese respondents indicated the following American traits positively: generosity, friendliness, and a willingness to work hard and efficiently. The traits disliked were boisterousness, waste of precious items such as food, and racial prejudice. On the American side, the Japanese traits listed affirmatively were: orderliness and obedience, neatness, and hard work. The traits assessed as negative were: an inability to treat individuals as equals, concealing real feelings or views, and racial prejudice (the latter complaint especially voiced by Black soldiers).

As can be noted, the weight of each side's assessment tilted toward the favorable side, and this notwithstanding the ferocity of the recent war and the deep enmity that had existed. In the years that followed, moreover, a patron-client relationship was built that reflected the realities of the times, and the proclivities of the two parties. In the American mind, Japan's status shifted from that of enemy to that of protégé, a test of the goals of a new breed of American missionaries: to save souls for democracy. And for their part, the Japanese, numbed by wartime devastation and the collapse of the old political order, were ready for change—providing it did not destroy certain deeply-laid values.

Under American tutelage, a new Japan emerged. Yet it would be very inaccurate to assume that all that was old disappeared. In its earlier modernization drive, Japan had demonstrated its genius in using its cultural traditions selectively to underwrite change. That trait remained very much alive. In the economic sphere, the military-industrial complex was altered, its military aspects removed, but certain features of the past were retained, albeit, in modified form: a hierarchical structure, with familial type relationships both between management and labor and within the industrial structure itself, typified by the *keiretsu* system; and an industrial policy with strong neo-mercantilist elements, dominated by a powerful bureaucracy that operated with extensive independence, relatively untouched by political tides.

In the political realm also, democracy with Japanese characteristics ensued. After some initial instability, a one and one-half party system had been implanted by the early 1950s, with one party—the conservative Liberal Democrats—always in power, and other parties always out of power. The dominant LDP, moreover, was in reality a federation of factions, leader-follower groups, bound together less by principle than by mutual gain, with money the milk that nourished young politicians. Power was highly centralized, with Tokyo the political hub. While a civil society apart from the state existed, pressures from this sector were applied in a most uneven fashion. The conservative power base lay in a combination of agriculture, industry and the bureaucracy.

The system worked. With the United States assuming chief responsibility for security, thereby alleviating that burden, and opening its markets to Japan, the export-oriented strategy paid rapid dividends. Within a few decades, Japan had become a model for other developing societies. The famous "flying geese" analogy faithfully depicted the trend, with Japan the lead goose, and other East Asian societies following.

Three decades after World War II, new factors relating both to the world and to the two allies had emerged. The Cold War was in the process of being won by the United States and its allies, but the costs had been extensive. Further, while assuming the burdens of a global leader, the U.S. was in the forefront of a global revolution induced by the latest scientific-technological advances, a revolution producing massive changes domestically. Indeed, the United States was the first post-modern society, with a wide range of problems to be faced. Rapid urbanization, unevenly distributed affluence, uncertainty as to values and rapid cultural changes resulting in major generational cleavages were among the issues that came to fore.

In this setting, it was understandable that the United States began to reconsider its foreign policies, including those toward allies. The new premium was upon "sharing the burdens" and an insistence upon "fairness" in bilateral relations. Implicit in the trends was an American effort, certain to be uneven and incomplete, to cut the costs of being a superpower. Such an effort implicitly required a willingness to share in the decision-making process, using instrumentalities such as the United Nations and regionally oriented bodies when appropriate.

In contrast to the United States, as noted, Japan maintained a combination of stability and steady economic growth during the decade of the 1970s and beyond. Under these circumstances, there were no strong domestic pressures for change, either in terms of policies or the power structure. Hence, in the United States two perceptions grew: first, that Japan's neo-mercantilist policies placed an unfair burden on the U.S., with its markets largely closed and its economic structure impervious to penetration, in contrast to the American system; second, that Japan was not playing a regional and global role commensurate with its economic strength and political interests.

From these two American perceptions, the image of Japan as threat was formed, and while such an image was by no means universally accepted, it began to have political salience in Washington. Meanwhile, at a slower pace, a shift in the Japanese mood began to be signalled. A new nationalist tone entered certain Japanese circles. "Revisionist" views concerning World War II were periodically voiced, with one theme being that Japan's role had been to liberate Asia from Western imperialism. Questions were also raised about Japan's supposed subservience to the United States. More strident critics championed the theme of a Japan that could say, "No." Public opinion in both countries was influenced by these developments. A negative evaluation of the U.S.-Japan relationship increased in strength, as public opinion polls revealed.

In this setting, it was imperative that some actions be taken by the two governments concerned. The primary issues were economic. Hence, the need was for some mechanisms for dialogue, both official and unofficial. Eventually, channels were established, although the process remains experimental. However, in the course of recent years, the United States and Japan have been making independent efforts to improve economic relations in the face of a continuous and mounting trade imbalance and recessions in both societies.

One interesting aspect of the dialogue is the contradiction it represents to the doctrine that one should not "interfere" in the domestic affairs of another nation, a doctrine widely hailed by nations like China. In the course of the U.S.-Japan economic dialogue, each side urges the other to make domestic policy changes. The United States calls for Japan to engage in more serious market opening measures, to reduce bureaucratic regulations and hidden restraints on outside bidders, and to engage in industrial restructuring so as to provide greater external access to the system.

Japan calls on the United States to handle its macro-economic policies more effectively, reducing the budget deficit, boosting savings rates, and in addition, improving the competitiveness of American industry and its interest in entering foreign markets.

The U.S.-Japan dialogue illustrates the fact that when a nation's domestic policies affect the interests of another country, criticism is to be expected, with the possibility of sanctions being employed should no remedial action be taken. That dialogue also indicates the importance of regularized mechanisms or institutions to deal with grievances, hopefully before they become intensely politicized.

We are in a new era at present. On the one hand, the nature of alliances has changed. Patron-client relations are giving way to demands for partnership, and reciprocal demands for burden-sharing. Alliances today are in reality alignments, with flexibility for all parties concerned. And all bilateral relations are some combination of cooperation and competition, with tensions to be alleviated only through the negotiatory process.

It is in this context that American-Japanese relations will evolve, and the broad trends warrant cautious optimism. First, on most basic issues relating to politics and security, we are in broad agreement. Washington and Tokyo have worked together harmoniously on the thorny Korean problem. With the U.S. opting for engagement rather than containment in its relations with China—and with Vietnam—a great compatibility on these issues has been achieved. The U.S. is sympathetic to Japan's position on the Northern Territories issue while wanting to see support given Russia to the extent possible in this perilous, transitional era.

Moreover, the U.S.-Japan security relationship remains firm. Overwhelmingly, both Americans and Japanese support the mutual security treaty as a stabilizing force in Asia. Over time, various readjustments will take place in U.S. strategic commitments, with ever greater emphasis upon lift capacity, mobile defenses and air and sea power, but there is no disposition at present to alter forward deployments in any significant manner. And contrary to some opinions, neither U.S. leaders nor the American public favor an isolationist policy.

Japan's recent political instability together with its recession, despite the problems created, have reduced the image of Japan as a threat. Once, some Americans saw Japan as ten feet tall; today, a more accurate picture prevails: Japan as a normal country, with its share of modern and postmodern problems, and with the need for some political and economic restructuring increasingly recognized within the country.

Temporarily, the foreign policy debate in Japan has been placed on the side-lines because of domestic concerns. However, sooner or later, the debate will resume over such issues as constitutional revision, a permanent seat in the United Nations, and a broader role for Japan regionally and internationally. In general, the United States can be expected to be supportive of a more prominent Japanese role, albeit, one that eschews a high-posture military stance.

For both nations, key challenges remain on the domestic front, many of them economic. The United States must tackle the deficit problem seriously, and at the same time reexamine its priorities in such critical fields as defense, education and social services—seeking both to protect future generations and place an emphasis upon those forces that will strengthen the nation internally. Fortunately, there are signs that American competitiveness has gained ground in the recent past.

Japan must face the problems of an aging society, with an increasing need for greater attention to social services. It must accelerate the process of deregulation, making this more than a rhetorical pronouncement. Political reform is also urgent, with the need to rebuild public confidence in the political system.

It is only as the United States and Japan address their internal problems that they will be, able to play a more constructive role on the regional and international stage. In foreign policy, the two nations each face a different overarching challenge at present. For the United States, the challenge is how to determine which situations demand engagement, and in what form, in the process of moving from unilateralism to multilateralism. The United States must be *a* leader in global affairs, but it cannot be *the* leader. In other words, both responsibility and decision-making must be shared.

For Japan, the issue is how to mesh a culture that, building on a high degree of homogeneity and introversion, retains elements of exclusiveness and separatism with the requirements that go with a nation increasingly interdependent with its region and the world and possessed of power. In sum, how does Japan become truly internationalist?

We are at a critical point in U.S.-Japan relations as it is well known. Both governments are politically fragile; hence, both are caused to place primary emphasis upon domestic politics, with foreign policies subsidiary to that fact. A rough period lies ahead. Yet while ours is likely to be a marriage with troubles, there will be no divorce.

We need each other—even more than in the past. The continuance of a strong and increasingly intimate American-Japanese relationship is crucial to meeting the challenges noted above, and to assisting in the construction of the regional and international mechanisms necessary to build peace, development and stability in Pacific-Asia and elsewhere. In sum, our bilateral relation remains the most important single bilateral relationship in the current world, not merely for our two countries but for others as well.

Haruo Shimada

Seeking a Better Life: Challenges of International Migration

Issues and Policy Proposals

Japan's foreign worker problem is a serious one that will influence the future of the nation to a greater extent than people generally realize.

Japan has become an industrialized nation with a high level of national income, but it faces an aging population and a long-term decline in its workforce, centered on the younger age-groups. Although there is plenty of scope for adapting to these changes in the structure of the workforce by developing labor-saving technology and moving toward a more efficient employment structure, it still seems inevitable that the influx of foreign labor will continue over the long term, owing to the strong demand arising from labor shortages in some sectors, and also to the continuing desire of foreign workers to come to Japan in search of higher earnings.

But how well equipped is Japanese society, either institutionally or psychologically, to accept foreign workers? How rapidly can society prepare for their acceptance, and what institutional form will those preparations take? Is Japan even ready to make the commitment?

If foreign workers continue to enter the country in gradually increasing numbers and provisions are not made for their acceptance, tensions in society, strains in the economy, and possibly outright conflict will result. If the situation slips out of control, the nation will face increasing criticism from the world community and a decline in trust and confidence.

If, on the other hand, Japan had in place a framework for accepting foreign workers, gave them a warm reception in society, and demonstrated that it intended to make a real contribution to the world community by offering them training opportunities, it would command greater trust and respect in the eyes of the world.

But this cannot be achieved without considerable effort and determination. The nation will have to make deliberate institutional reforms, and the Japanese people will have to change their mind-set drastically if they are to acquire the wisdom and tolerance to coexist with people of other cultures. The foreign worker problem, then, is a crucial test of Japan's ability to reform and to carve out a brighter future in international society.

Defects of the Current System

Illegal employment is a serious problem that to some degree afflicts all industrialized economies. In Japan's case, however, the problem is particularly acute, since illegal workers are a majority of the workforce in many areas.

One reason for this is Japan's legislation relating to foreign workers. The current Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law takes a strict line, permitting residence to foreign workers with special skills or knowledge but prohibiting those without such skills or knowhow from residing in the country for purposes of employment.

While this stance may in itself be justified, there is a widening gap between the official legal position and the actual state of affairs. Illegal employment continues to increase, due to the strong demand from Japanese industry for foreigners prepared to do unskilled work and to the strong desire of people in other countries to work in Japan, where they know they can earn high wages.

In trying to remain in business, Japanese employers now find themselves caught in a double bind. On the one hand, there is a shortage of Japanese workers willing to do necessary unskilled jobs; yet on the other hand, while there are any number of foreign workers willing to do these jobs, employers are unable to employ them openly and pay them a fair wage, and so are forced to employ them illegally in secret.

Foreign workers are able to enter the country under the sponsorship of brokers, but once in Japan most are forced to work illegally and treated in effect as criminals. They lack proper protection as workers, and are more or less compelled to live in hiding. The black market in foreign labor profits only the brokers and underground organizations, and is extremely unhealthy. It also arouses the suspicion, in the workers' countries of origin and the world at large, that Japan is operating a deceptive labor policy, claiming it does not officially admit foreign workers while continuing to introduce foreign labor without proper respect for workers' human rights, in response to the demand from Japanese industry.

In addition, the gradually increasing influx of illegal foreign workers will lead to tensions in Japanese society and distortions in the economy. Since illegal workers are relegated to an underground existence because of their illegal status, no one has any grasp of the real situation. Hence there is no guarantee that employers will respect their basic human rights as workers, and this dangerous state of affairs could lead to deteriorating health, the formation of ghettoes, various social problems including crime, and the creation of a permanent underclass in society. Dependence upon cheap foreign labor also threatens the working conditions of Japanese marginal workers and could impede efforts to modernize industry.

The Need for a Basic Law on Foreign Workers

Government agencies and other bodies concerned with the issue have made some effort to improve the situation. Policy proposals have been made by government departments, political parties, industry groups, private sector research organizations, labor unions, and many other organizations and opinion leaders. And these have led to some policy changes.

The revised Immigration Law implemented in 1990 makes it easier for foreign workers with specialized skills and knowledge to enter Japan, but denies resident status to those without such skills and knowledge, and institutes tougher penalties for working illegally. At the same time, however, the law allows unskilled workers to enter the country as trainees, while a Ministry of Justice proclamation has made it possible for even small businesses to accept foreign trainees legally. This may have met the demands of industry to some extent, but at the same time it appears to have raised excessive expectations among small businesses now suffering from a labor shortage that they will be able to use trainees as a source of labor.

The report issued at the end of 1991 by the Third Administrative Reform Council's Subcommittee on Japan's Role in the World proposed an on-the-job-skill-training *(gino-jisshu)* program, and set out a policy that would essentially permit the use of unskilled foreign workers as a workforce by allowing trainees to continue to work in the capacity of employees after completing their period of training. Since Administrative Reform Council reports tend to be strongly reflected in government policy decisions, this proposal normally should have resulted in some legislative action, or at least should have dictated subsequent policy on foreign workers.

After continuing for some time to move in the general direction indicated by the proposal at the practical level, the Ministry of Justice issued an official notification in April 1993 which formally instituted the principles set out in the proposal in the form of a "skills worktraining system."

In practice, a small organization called JITCO (Japan International Training Cooperation Organization), which was set up jointly by the government and the private sector, has been accumulating experience in advising and assisting with the reception of trainees, and a number of private organizations have been working in this area under the guidance of JITCO.

A skills training system will be developed on the basis of these practical experiences, and qualified trainees who have completed accredited training programs and wish to work utilizing their new skills will be able to do so.

This system in theory overcomes the contradictions that were defects in the previous training system. In my judgment, the system takes an important step forward in the sense of opening up opportunities for yet-to-be-skilled foreign workers to work in Japan once they have acquired certain basic skills through appropriate training programs. However, I do have some worries about whether the system, as it stands, will achieve the result it hopes to attain.

One problem is that the system, itself, is difficult for the public to understand because it has been presented only in the form of obscurely worded announcements from the Ministry of Justice. An announcement which is obscure and difficult to understand even in Japan can have little hope of being visible or understandable overseas to people who might be interested in coming to Japan to work. A system like this, which is as relevant as immigration laws to the non-Japanese public, should be presented in the more visible form of a law.

Another problem involves ensuring that foreign trainees really acquire adequate skills under this system. The process is more than just a legal prescription and definitions. An adequate process of skill acquisition will require a well-organized system that takes into account the many problems that can arise, and actually assists participants in achieving their goals.

Developing a Comprehensive Work-and-Learn Program

Allowing unskilled foreign workers to work in Japan is no different in practical terms from granting an amnesty to those who have already penetrated the Japanese labor market as illegal workers, and allowing them to work legally. But this will not solve the problem.

One vital prerequisite for a solution is that these workers acquire a certain level of skills through their experience working in Japan. They must be able to lead normal lives in society, learn job skills and techniques, make friends, save a certain amount of their earnings, and return to their home countries with favorable impressions and positive feelings about their experiences. But there is no guarantee this can be achieved by enacting a single law. If the various government bodies, organizations, employers, and ordinary people are to help foreign workers integrate in this way, they need guidance and support based on a carefully thought-out policy.

It should not be left just to the government to promote such a policy. The Japanese bureaucracy is very effective at carrying out policies once they have been decided upon, but it has little capacity for setting out new policies in response to changing circumstances. As has repeatedly been demonstrated in the past, even if one government department does come up with a new policy, reform is eventually rendered impossible by the mutually obstructive behavior of the other departments, each of which is an empire unto itself. What Japan needs more than anything is the political awareness and leadership to overcome these administrative weaknesses and develop a comprehensive policy.

My book advocates the idea of a "work-and-learn program" as the basis of such a comprehensive policy plan. This program, which I have been consistently advocating for the last five years, is explained in greater detail in Part II of this volume, but here let me list its principal features.

First, the program would establish and clearly define "work-and-learn" as a new category of residence status under the Immigration Law. Unskilled foreign workers participating in the program would be granted this status on entering the country, and would acquire skills as they worked. While their main purpose would be training, they would also be doing real work, and would therefore be paid a fair wage and guaranteed their rights as workers.

Second, a placement agency for work-and-learn employment would be set up under the program. This body would be run jointly by the government and the private sector, and be responsible for the acceptance, placement, and support of trainees. Its work would cover many areas: negotiating with the countries of origin over the acceptance of trainees, surveying and analyzing the needs and conditions in Japanese businesses accepting trainees, establishing and revising suitable training methods, regulating the total numbers and distribution of trainees, implementing and providing support for education and training, guiding and counseling trainees, evaluating and testing skills, and maintaining contact with trainees after their return to their own countries. The work would be complex and wide-ranging, and there would be a vast amount of it. With tens or hundreds of thousands of trainees enrolled in the program each year, both central and local governments would be required to earmark a substantial budget and make a major commitment to carry out this work.

The third main feature of the program would be a network of basic education and training centers. Foreigners wanting to work in Japan should acquire in advance the basic skills, such as Japanese language skills, that they will need to live and work in the country. The program would set up basic education and training facilities to help them acquire these skills, both at key locations in their own countries and throughout Japan. A curriculum would have to be developed for use in these facilities, and since it would be desirable for ordinary citizens to take part in the program as Japanese language teachers, a scheme could be devised to facilitate their participation.

Importance of Intermediate Skills Formation

For the work-and-learn program to achieve real results will require, above all, the involvement and cooperation of both the trainees, themselves, and the employers participating in the program.

Employers would have to fulfill three basic conditions. They would have to pay trainees an appropriate wage, provide them with suitable accommodations, and most important, assist them in acquiring intermediate skills—skills which can be acquired in two to five years of training, coupled with work experience, but which are sufficiently basic that, on the average work site, trainees can be entrusted to perform them in safety. They are neither the simple, elementary skills of temporary assistants nor the advanced skills of professionals with long years of experience. Intermediate skills are the sort of skills anyone can acquire with a certain amount of study and experience.

Such skills are among the most useful in any industry and type of job. Anyone who has worked in a job for some years would come to possess them, yet in most cases detailed descriptions of these skills and of the training and experience needed to acquire them have not been compiled. An urgent task for policymakers is to study the intermediate skills in a wide range of industries and types of job, set out clear descriptions of these skills, and draft guidelines that can readily be referred to by employers on work sites.

Employers would then be able to assist trainees in the acquisition of intermediate skills in accordance with the guidelines. It would be a condition for employers participating in the work-and-learn program that they provide such assistance, and those who did not comply with this condition would have to be excluded from the program. Some sort of monitoring system would be required to make sure employers did help trainees acquire skills. Monitoring could perhaps be carried out by employers' groups participating in the program.

If large numbers of employers made positive and steady efforts to assist trainees in the acquisition of skills, this would serve as a major foreign aid initiative and enable Japan to offer the world a model program for accepting foreign workers, based on the concept of aid through training, for which there are few precedents anywhere.

Long-term Prospects for Building an Open Nation

The work-and-learn program described above is a medium-term strategy for dealing with the foreign worker problem. It would to some extent resolve the contradiction between the current system and the actual situation, and it would provide a channel for the systematic acceptance of unskilled foreign workers seeking employment in Japan, allowing them to work and to acquire skills at the same time.

Such a program is only a medium-term policy, however, since it is based on the assumption that foreign workers are "guests" and will eventually return to their own countries. But in the long term we have to assume a rather different set of circumstances. Gradually, some foreign workers and their families will settle down in Japan—indeed there are signs that this is already happening—and eventually they will come to form quite a large social group.

The experience of nations that have admitted foreign workers suggests that this is nearly always what happens. Germany's experience suggests it most strongly. Its situation is relatively similar to that of Japan in the sense that it is not an immigrant nation, like the United States or Australia, nor was it until recently a colonial power like Britain or France. When Germany admitted large numbers of foreign workers from nearby developing countries, notably Turkey, during its period of rapid economic growth in the 1960s, nobody imagined that they would actually settle down in Germany with its high cost of living. But eventually some of them did remain; they had families, their families grew, and in the end they came to form quite a large community within German society. Prevented by their different culture from being assimilated as ethnic Germans, but at the same time unable to readapt to their countries of origin, they have remained outsiders. Today, Germany is having to make enormous efforts to integrate these people into society, and it is incurring huge costs in the process when it is already reeling under the additional burden of socially and economically integrating the former East Germany.

Japan has already passed the point of no return along the same road. There is no turning back now. At first it will seem that only a tiny number of foreign workers are settling down in the country, but eventually they will be a large subgroup in society. People must come to grips with this reality and strengthen their resolve to ensure that the situation does not develop in a way that would be unfortunate for all concerned.

In doing so, they should never lose sight of two points. First, if Japan is to accept foreign workers, it must welcome them as individuals with full human rights and not treat them merely as a source of labor. This means guaranteeing them all the human rights that are enjoyed by Japanese citizens, and all the rights they need to function freely in society as normal citizens. As workers, they must be guaranteed the right to receive proper compensation for accidents at work, medical insurance and unemployment benefits, the right not to be discriminated against either at work or socially, the right to a pension, and the right to vote in local elections. Along with these institutional rights, however, the Japanese people must also adjust psychologically to the idea of real social equality, so that foreigners are not discriminated against in areas outside the legal realm, like marriage, where they are entitled to freedom of choice as individuals. If we are going to accept foreigners, we must treat them in a completely open, fair, and equal manner.

Second, there is still a great deal of room for improvement in Japanese employment practices and for greater efficiency in the employment structure. Japan should do all it can to reform its employment system so that it can run its domestic economy as far as possible without relying on foreign labor.

It is easy to hold up the principle of equality, but anyone who claims that such equality can be fully implemented can hardly be living in the real world.

Considerable discrimination still exists even in nations made up of immigrants like the United States and Australia. In the former colonial powers, too, however equitable their societies may appear on the surface, deep divisions and prejudices still lurk beneath. It is easy to criticize such discrimination, but next to impossible to abolish it. It may be a weakness, or a behavior pattern, inherent in the human condition. The recent ethnic strife in Yugoslavia, for example, clearly demonstrates just how difficult it is to overcome.

Faced with these human failings, the best course of action is surely to increase the efficiency of the domestic workforce and create an employment structure that does not have to rely upon foreign labor. Fortunately, there is ample scope for such change in the Japanese economic structure, in industry as a whole, and in individual businesses. By doing its best to reform the employment structure, Japan will be in a better position to extend a positive welcome to foreign workers, accord them equal rights, and treat them the same way as Japanese citizens. This will minimize the various social problems that could arise from opening the doors to foreign workers, and it is the best way to ensure that the situation develops to our mutual advantage and not to our mutual detriment.

Yukiko Tsunoda

Public Safety: Crime and Justice

(Format note: This paper was transcribed from Simul International's English translation recorded on audiotape.)

When I received today's topic of "Crime and Justice," what came to mind was to consider the current situation for Japanese women. So far we have been discussing security or justice issues without paying attention to issues which many Japanese women face. So today, I'd like to talk about two infringements of women's human rights, namely rape and domestic violence. There is not an exact Japanese translation of domestic violence, so in my speech I would like to use "violence from the husband." If we use "violence from the husband," it is very limited. It has a different meaning from "domestic violence" in English, but in today's talk, I would like to use the words in that sense. Without paying attention to the problems of security and justice for women, who are part of the population, we cannot talk about security.

First of all, I would like to talk about rape. The number of reported rapes in Japan is very small. In 1994, the white paper on crime said that the number of rape cases reported to the police was 1,611. In Japan, unless reported to the police, rapes are not counted among crime statistics. The policy is that, without the desire to indict by the victim, herself, the rape cannot be acknowledged as a criminal case. Therefore the number of acknowledged cases seems to be approximately the same as those reported. In the span of five years, the figures have constantly been around 1,500-1,600. Compared to the figure that one out of every three women is raped in the United States, it is far below the number that one would expect.

My job at the Tokyo Rape Crisis Center is to counsel women who come for help. These women have only six months within which to report a case. So they have to come to us within six months, and only when they want to complain can I help them pursue a legal course. Or if six months have passed, and they cannot pursue the matter anymore, or maybe they don't want to sue but want to claim damages, then I help them bring the matter to court. This is what we do in the Tokyo Rape Crisis Center.

There are more women who would not, or cannot, complain because of the six-month period. This is not well known. So those women who call the Center first usually do so after six months have already passed. These women naturally are not included in the figures I mentioned earlier in the crime white paper (1,500-1,600). That means the police don't even know about these cases. Therefore, according to the police, the crimes do not exist. In Japan, rape offenders are seldom pursued or indicted. As I said, there are 5-10 times more unknown cases. That means that an equal number of offenders are never caught.

Why are the victims quiet and uncomplaining? There may be various reasons. The most basic problem is that both society and the criminal justice system together are forcing silence upon women. This is a serious infringement of the human rights of women, but this is still rampant.

According to the interpretation of Japanese criminal justice, the reason for rape is said to be to "protect the sexual freedom of women." But look at what happens to the women. Their sexual freedom is being trampled upon by the very justice that is supposed to protect them. Why this dichotomy?

Criminologists, judges, prosecutors and police believe, or at least most of them believe, that this is to protect the chastity of women. Chastity—that is an antique word. Actually, people are dropping that word. But what they are talking about is the chastity of women that they think they are protecting. They claim that they are doing it for women, but that is quite wrong. First, what is chastity? It's a concept geared to the advantage of men or husbands or husbands-to-be who are consumers. Therefore, this is a male chauvinistic view to protect the sexual interests of men, and is not in reality in conformity with the actual fact that there are rapes. No matter what, this is a matter of basic prestige for women as human beings and has nothing to do with chastity. Why do we punish rapes? This has to be based upon the right concept. Otherwise the procedure could be wholly wrong. We cannot protect the human rights of women.

The idea of protecting chastity applies if the offender was at one time engaged to, or had sexual relations with, a woman. In most cases, rape cannot be proven because once a woman has had a sexual relationship with a man, she no longer would be considered chaste. This is an extreme view. That is why there is no statutory rape between a husband and his wife. Chastity is to be preserved for a future husband, according to the prevailing view, so for a husband, there is no problem with the chastity of his wife.

So, as I said, both society and the justice system are in collusion to perpetuate this situation. Often women are accused of dressing rather seductively. They provoke the situation. The rape offense is caused by the victims, they say. This kind of view is well accepted, so women often are afraid of bringing their cases to the attention of the police because they feel they should be ashamed.

Even if a woman is pure enough to be defended on the basis of her chastity, her privacy is often infringed upon. Japanese criminal lawsuit procedures have no measures to protect victims' privacy, unlike in the United States. Therefore, it is natural for a raped woman to hesitate to report the rape to the police.

In terms of privacy infringement, I once saw a raped woman who said later, "The judiciary does not intervene in private troubles within the home or between husband and wife." So in that sense, we can say that the judiciary is also helping to infringe on women's human rights.

The biggest problem in the investigation of rape cases is to listen to victims' situations and to investigate rapists. The investigative agencies are usually in the hands of policemen who regularly investigate crimes such as robberies or murders. The few women who investigate these crimes are generally in charge of juvenile cases. I've never heard of implementing education for male investigators to teach them how to investigate raped women while maintaining respect for women's human rights.

As for sexual crimes, physical and mental injuries should be fully considered. At least that is common sense in Western nations. In the Japanese situation, it is completely the opposite.

In trials, there is no law to protect privacy, as mentioned before. Unless a victim is a primary school student or younger, anyone can freely observe examinations witnessed in a public open court. The actual name of the victim is revealed in court. A victim will naturally hesitate to report a case to the police if she wants to remain anonymous. The Japanese social atmosphere blames the victim's misconduct, so a victim whose privacy is not protected suffers great damage.

In addition, in order for rape to be recognized as a crime, it must be proven that the woman's damages were impossible to avoid. We normally don't have witnesses in cases of rape. Therefore, unless the witness is badly hurt, rape may be difficult to prove. In other words, a rapist could, strange as it may sound, insist that he and the victim had an unspoken agreement in their sexual behavior. In Japan, when rapes occur, people see men and women in different social relationships. There is a sexually discriminatory structure in Japan which creates a strange insensitivity.

These are partial reason for victims to keep silent, and as I said before, the silence of victims leaves the rapist unpunished forever. It is two sides of the same coin. Statistically, the number of rape cases is very few, but in actuality, women are obliged to live in a very dangerous society.

Several years ago, a woman minister of state wrote in a magazine that in the U.S., domestic violence was controversial, whereas in Japan, such problems did not exist. But what we don't have in Japan is not the violence itself, but merely the recognition of its existence and actual investigation by public organizations and countermeasures against violence.

In the spring of 1992 in Tokyo, eight women, including me, organized a commission to investigate and research domestic violence. From July to December, we implemented a survey. In 1995, the commission completed the analysis of the data. We published a report called "Violence," and held a report meeting at which the issue was discussed among a number of women. This was a research theme not discussed before, so those who were involved in actual research and the women's movement together formed a team and tackled this issue from diverse perspectives. We implemented 4,600 surveys and 807 were answered. This is not a low number.

In Japanese society, while we know of their existence, we neglect the fact that human rights infringements against women are obviously crimes. The survey revealed this fact and also investigated physical and psychological violence. In Japan, violence means primarily physical violence, but violence can also mean psychological or sexual violence, or an overlapping of the three.

Now I'd like to introduce some of the results of the survey: 467 of the respondents had experienced physical violence. Among them, 85% reported that they had been slapped, kicked, or received bodily injury. 60% had required medical treatment. Injuries were described as cuts, bruises or broken bones. 17% said their injuries took a long time to heal. Only injuries received from men other than spouses were considered crimes.

My 20-year experience tells me that if a person takes over a week to heal, the degree of injury sustained must be considered rather serious. Prosecutors or judges make judgments saying that the criminal charge of the accused is very serious. 91.3% of incidents of sexual violence occurred at home. Judging from this fact, the "safest place," one's home, becomes a major place for crimes against women. Moreover, such crimes are not legally accepted as crimes. The assailant is often discharged. These victims of violence are not given any legal assistance from the judiciary, just like those victims who were silenced into not reporting their rapes.

I have some experience in prosecuting cases. These women had not received help from the judiciary system or from their neighbors. The results were very sad. In a previous survey, there were only fourteen people who had informed the police, asking for their help. Wives are psychologically suppressed into not revealing their shame at home. Even if they had placed an emergency call, the policeman might have said that he generally cannot handle private matters. Rape by a husband is legally permitted, not violence. If a husband can rape his wife, it may well be said that violence is also be permitted. Not only does violence infringe upon women's human rights, it also indicates a severe injustice that such violence is considered legitimate.

In my survey, many women said that so far, those things have been ignored as private matters. However, only 2.4% of women felt that domestic violence, as a "private matter," should not be intervened in.

The theme of today's symposium is that it is important to learn from each other. When I came to the United States, what impressed me most was that rape and domestic violence were touched upon in the context of public safety. Above all, domestic violence was considered in efforts to eradicate crime. The entire community tackled the issue of how to provide safer lives for victims who were women or children, and to protect their human rights. These principles were being carried out in actual practice. In this context, the judiciary played a vital role, and people's human rights were protected. Many women in America, however, told me that in the 1970s, America was very much like Japan is today.

In conclusion, Japanese society has not paid much attention to the present human rights infringements against women. It has been said that Japan is a safe, secure society. This coming September, the meeting of the Fourth World Women's Conference will be held, and one of the agenda items is the eradication of violence against women. It is high time that Japan start considering improving its society into one which is safe for women in a very real sense.

Kazunori Yamanoi

Aging: Responsibility and Cost

People in Europe and America tend to believe that Japan is a nation that respects and takes good care of its elderly. It is true that in Japan's political and business world, power is held by the elders. In corporate society, the seniority system is the rule under the practice of lifetime employment. Also, the percentage of aged people living together with their children—about 60 percent—is higher in Japan than in Western countries.

The actuality, however, is not so pleasant for senior citizens.

As of 1994, 13.5 percent of Japan's population was 65 years old or over. It is predicted that the percentage will reach 17 percent in 2000, and Japan will pass Sweden as the country with the largest percentage of old people. Against this background, a problem that has come to the forefront is that of *netakiri rojin. Netakiri* means bedridden or bedbound; *rojin* means elderly. In 1989, Japan's Management and Coordination Agency conducted a poll on what people feared most in old age. The greatest number of respondents, 49 percent, replied, "Becoming a *netakiri rojin* or senile." This answer far outstripped the #2 fear of "economic insecurity." As of 1992, there were 700,000 *netakiri rojin* in Japan.

The reason for the large number of *netakiri rojin* is the failure of family members to provide proper care for their elderly relatives. In many cases, when an aged parent takes to bed with a sickness, he or she is cared for by the son's wife who is living in the same house. This is a situation that is peculiar to Japan, probably because there are many three-generation households. But there is a limit to uncompensated nursing by family members who lack medical knowledge. When an elderly person becomes unable to move physically, the family members do not know enough to put him through a rehabilitation program and look after him in this bedridden condition. They are thus producing *netakiri rojin*. The 700,000 *netakiri rojin* in Japan are the result of leaving the care of elderly sick people in the hands of family members, and neglecting to improve public welfare services for the elderly.

Along with the *netakiri rojin,* another indication of the seriousness of Japan's old-age problem is the high suicide rate among elderly people. In 1990, the number of people over 65 who committed suicide totaled 6,141. Of the elderly who took their own lives, 60 percent were those who were living with family members. Only 9 percent were those living alone. The main reasons cited for ending their lives were "family trouble" and "treated like a nuisance by family members." In Japan, it was traditionally believed that the ideal in old age was to live with the family of one's child. In modern Japan, living together with a child's family is not necessarily pleasant. The all-too-common struggle between the bride and the mother-in-law has become a social problem that is a popular theme of TV dramas today.

The percentage of old people living with their families, too, is falling rapidly. Eldest sons tend to be shunned by women as prospective husbands because of the high probability that the home must be shared with the man's parents. But the rate of the aged living with family, 60 percent, is high compared with the percentage in Europe and America. In big cities like Tokyo, however, the percentage is about 30 percent and is expected to fall.

An International Youth Year comparative study conducted in 1992 by the Management and Coordination Agency revealed that only 22.6 percent of young people in Japan "want by all means to support aged parents," the lowest of eleven countries surveyed. The percentages in other countries were America, 62.7 percent; South Korea, 66.7 percent; and the Philippines, 80.7 percent. The thinking of Asian people used to be that the family would look after the elderly. In Japan, however, there is a rapid weakening of the attitude of family members to help each other. One of the reasons for this is probably the increase in the number of affluent old people.

If family members do not look after the elderly, who is going to care for them in an emergency? In response to this question, what is known as the "silver business" is now growing. Of the various kinds of business targeted at the elderly market, one that is attracting great attention is "silver mansions," or apartments for aged people. As of 1993, the number of Japanese living in silver mansions totaled 17,000. In order to be looked after for the rest of their lives in these facilities, they must pay an entrance fee averaging 30 million yen and, in addition, a monthly rental of 150,000 yen, which covers meals. All this money pays only for the right of use, and heirs cannot get any part of it when the principal passes away. Old people who live in these facilities say, "I want to live independently without causing inconvenience to my children even when I become unable to move around by myself." Only a small number of rich elderly can afford to stay in a silver mansion. In order to raise the money to buy the right to stay in a silver mansion, many of the occupants sold their homes.

The reason why there are people who buy silver mansions is the great backwardness of public welfare for the aged in Japan. For instance, in the majority of the old people's homes (capacity 180,000) in Japan, there is no privacy because four people occupy one room. On top of that, there is a huge waiting list. In Tokyo, one must wait up to three years for a vacancy. There are today 700,000 *netakiri rojin* and one million senile people. Many of the families that are caring for them are on the brink of disintegration. The number of helpers who visit such families totals only 60,000. It has been estimated that in 2020, the number of *netakiri rojin* will have increased to 1.5 million, and that of senile people to 2.2 million.

A big topic in the Diet is the planned increase in indirect taxes as a way to boost revenue to pay for old people's welfare programs. One of the reasons why the people do not put up a big opposition to a tax increase is that they want to see welfare for the aged improved.

In a survey conducted in 1993 by the Social Security Council entitled "Survey of Perceptions Regarding the Future Shape of Social Security," 64 percent of the respondents said, "An increase in the tax burden cannot be helped in order to maintain or improve the level of social security."

Women's organizations are conducting a campaign to insist that people should not depend upon the free labor of housewives to care for the elderly. Deep-seated in the minds of leaders of industry, however, is the thinking that if Japan expands public welfare for the elderly, as in European countries, taxes will become so high that Japan's economic power will dwindle.

Japan is the first country in Asia ever to face the problems of a rapidly aging society. To what extent can Japan depend on the family to cope with the problems this creates? Japan's experiment will be watched with great interest by other Asian countries.

1995
International Symposium
of Japan-America
Societies

Keynote Addresses

Ambassador Takakazu Kuriyama takes the stage to deliver his address.

Takakazu Kuriyama

Japan and the U.S.: Old Friends, New Questions

The British Writer, G.K. Chesterton, once said to an American audience, "My last American tour consisted of inflicting no less than ninety lectures on people who never did me any harm."

In that same spirit, I've been speaking all over America, and I'm always grateful for the kind reception I receive . . . in spite of my speeches. As I told one audience, "I do not like to listen to long speeches any more than you do. Unfortunately, I do enjoy giving them." But I will stick within my allotted time this afternoon.

I want to begin by reading to you the memories of a young American marine who witnessed the bomb at Nagasaki and then went ashore a month later. In a magazine interview, he said:

"What can I say, except that the city looked just like the pictures you see—utter devastation . . . . We were walking down the street when suddenly these little children came out, maybe half a dozen of them, six or seven years old. They were adorable and well-mannered—they bowed politely and held our hands and we walked around with them, gave them some candy, and suddenly it was if the blackness of the war had lifted from our minds.

"The hatred most of us had felt for the Japanese during the past few years just went away. We had all been bragging about how, boy, when we get to Japan, we're gonna show them who's boss . . . and suddenly, standing there in a devastated city, holding hands with some smiling children, it was impossible to feel that way any longer. I think that was the day the war really ended for most of us."

The war caused tremendous pain and anguish for both Americans and Japanese. And yet the healing began with surprising speed.

Take my own family as an example. As a few of you have already heard me say, when I was fourteen my family's house was destroyed during an air raid on Tokyo. My parents, my sister and I barely escaped from the shelter we had dug in the backyard. One of the incendiary bombs dropped only a few feet from us, but it didn't explode. Now I can say, "Thank God, American technology was not what it is today." But, fifty years ago, it was a nightmare.

But look what happened—and this is what I mean by the healing that began taking place on both sides—my sister soon fell in love with an American serviceman, married him and moved to his hometown in Wyoming, where she lives to this day. My father, who had resigned from the diplomatic service because of his opposition to Japan's wartime policies, returned to public service and became a justice of the new Supreme Court. My mother was happy to enjoy a more normal life. She no longer had to look for farmers who would exchange rice and vegetables for her kimonos, as she had done in the final months of the war.

As for myself, against my father's advice, I went on to apply to the foreign service. My father didn't think a foreign service officer of a vanquished country would have anything useful to do. But today I take a great deal of personal satisfaction in having devoted almost three-fourths of my forty year career to the Japanese-American friendship.

In different ways, such experiences as my family's are true for Japan as a whole. Japan went from depending upon American relief packages to save us from hunger and malnutrition during the occupation to becoming America's largest trading partner after Canada. Together, Japan and the U.S. today account for 40% of the world's GNP, which means not only shared economic power, but a shared responsibility to make a more peaceful and prosperous world with larger freedom. Together, our alliance has ensured stability in Asia and the Pacific and played a major role in bringing the Cold War to an end in that region.

Do you know what I find amazing? That our two peoples could overcome such a terrible, emotional experience as war to accomplish what we've accomplished together. And in such a remarkably short time.

Are there still remnants of the war's pain and questioning? Yes, certainly, and on both sides. But our post-war relationship truly is one of the greatest success stories in the history of international relations.

Why have Japan and the U.S. been able to come so far? I believe it's because our two countries share common values and outlooks. Some things are not West; they are not East; they are good and right and democratic. This shared outlook toward the future fostered mutual trust between us. This trust is the reward for fifty years of healing and hard work.

Today, however, I am seriously concerned about the erosion of trust. Although the interests and values we share are wider and deeper than ever, our two peoples increasingly view our relationship not on the basis of our compatibilities but on our frictions.

After we have overcome so much, after we have accomplished so much, after there has been such healing, why have our recent relations become so raw and divisive?

On the surface, the reason is economics—or, more accurately, misperceptions about economics. But more deeply, there are misperceptions about change and culture and the differences between us. I'm often told that there are two schools of thought about Japan in the United States:

Number one: Japan and America are different, but Japan can be changed to become like America.

Number two: Japan and America are different, but Japan cannot be changed so, therefore, should be treated as different.

In my view, they are both wrong.

Japan and America are different, yes. And they will always remain different in significant ways because of their different historical and cultural backgrounds. But let me ask you a question. Think back to America thirty-five years ago, in 1960. President Eisenhower was still in the White House. Norman Rockwell's illustrations, with their depictions of family and small town life, still appeared on the covers of the *Saturday Evening Post.* Remember what America was like then. Has America changed over those years? Yes, certainly. Well, so has Japan; so has our outlook, our culture, our economy. Countries do not remain static.

Yet many Americans still see a Japan frozen in time. They believe in something called "Japan, Inc." In fact, it seems to be the basis for much of the U.S. trade policy and for much of the American distrust of Japan. But let me quote something here by T.R. Reid of the *Washington Post*, who wrote, "'Japan, Inc.': The term is used constantly by politicians, corporate chieftains and the major U.S. media. It's catchy. It's descriptive. There's only one problem: It's not true . . . today's Japan is much more pluralistic than the American stereotype suggests . . . So outdated is the notion of 'Japan, Inc.' that even James Abegglen, the scholar, consultant and veteran Japan hand who coined the term, now says ruefully that he wishes he could take the phrase back."

Consider the auto trade issue, which is symbolic of the notion of "Japan, Inc." On the day when the Clinton Administration announced the so-called sanctions list, I was on MacNeil/Lehrer with U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor. Toward the end, Jim Lehrer asked me, "What world are we talking about here? Because his view and your view of it are so different. Why is that?"

The next day, an American friend of mine who had watched the program told me, "I really thought that Ambassador Kantor and you were talking from two different worlds. The trouble is that when you say the Japanese car market is open and the Japanese government cannot force the carmakers to do something they don't want to do, no American believes you."

I felt very frustrated. Yet I thought the whole episode revealing. The reason why Mr. Kantor and I seemed to be living in two different worlds was because we were, in fact, talking about two different worlds. He was talking about the Japan of yesterday. I was talking about the Japan of today.

In the same broadcast, Mr. Kantor said that in the last twenty-five years the Japanese have sold forty million cars in the U.S., while the U.S. had sold only 400,000 cars in Japan. And you know what? He's probably about right. But I was also right in saying that U.S. car exports to Japan are now at a comparable level with U.S. car exports to the entire European Union.

Why aren't more American cars sold in Japan? Does Japan need to change to correct the imbalance?

The Economist notes that Germany's BMW has a network of 135 showrooms in Japan and that, rather than setting up their own dealer networks, American carmakers have simply wanted their cars magically to appear on Japanese showroom floors. Paul Ingrassia, the former Detroit bureau chief for *The Wall Street Journal*, writes, "The truth is that the Japanese have tried much harder to crack the American market than the Big Three have tried in Japan."

Ladies and gentlemen, just because the U.S. does not sell large numbers of cars to Japan does not mean that Japan has not changed from its admittedly once-closed ways. Auto sales are possible today in Japan if Detroit will aggressively pursue the Japanese market.

Sometimes Japan's changes just aren't seen by American eyes. I recently attended a meeting between Vice President Gore and a Japanese parliamentary delegation which included a couple of former foreign ministers. The Vice President kept using a figure that Japan's trade surplus with the U.S. only went down one percent last year. He said that at that rate it would take a century for our trade to be balanced. The Japanese delegation kept looking at each other and scratching their heads, wondering what kind of number this was. One of the former foreign ministers said—no, you've got it wrong, Mr. Vice President; the trade deficit with the U.S. went down ten percent. Back and forth it went—it was like watching a tennis game with each side playing with a different ball.

But here is what was happening—the Vice President was looking at Japan's surplus in dollar terms and was not at all persuaded by the Japanese delegation's looking at the situation in *yen* terms. But the fact of the matter is that in '94, Japan's surplus declined 10%—from 3.1% of Japan's GDP in 1993 to 2.7% of our GDP in 1994. There was a significant change here, but it could not be seen by the American side. The yen appreciation not only made travelling to Japan more expensive, but it also distorted the American perception of Japan.

What about those who say, "Well, doesn't Japan's large trade surplus, no matter whether measure in yen or dollars, prove nothing has changed?" The truth is that *Japan's* changing will never solve *America's* problems. As almost every economist will tell you—the United States will continue to run trade deficits as long as it runs federal budget deficits and America's savings rate remains as low as it is today.

Let me give you another example why, in spite of a changing Japan, Americans don't see much improvement in the trade figures with my country. Over the past year, the share of American personal computers in the Japanese market grew by about 10% and now stands at about 35% to 40%. I'd say that's pretty good. Frank Sanda, the president of Apple Japan, says, "We're growing at 30% year on year and now have better than a 20% market share, which is double what we have in the U.S."

But, guess what? This doesn't help the U.S. trade deficit, and it doesn't bolster Japan's claim to be more open to American goods. And do you know why? Because Apple's computers are assembled in Singapore.

Here's the fact that truly shows how much Japan has changed; it comes directly from the United States' own Department of Commerce. Today, the average Japanese buys more American products and services than the average American buys Japanese products and services, $553 per capita for Japanese versus $491 per capita for Americans. In fact, the U.S. would have a trade *surplus* with Japan if Japan had as large a population as America. I'm not using these figures to contend that Japan has nothing more to do to open its markets and to integrate its economy with the outside world. Japan still has much homework to do in this respect. But I hope they show that the bilateral trade imbalance in itself is not a very relevant measure to determine the openness or the closedness of the Japanese market.

Ladies and gentlemen, the level playing field we need is in *understanding*.

It is true that for most of our postwar history, Japan has been a "producers" country while the U.S. has been a "consumers" country. But change has occurred. It is occurring as I speak. Our economy is being deregulated and, in fact, the government's deregulation plan is being shortened from five years to three. And the plan is going to be monitored by an independent committee and is going to be revised every year, taking into account the views of our trading partners. But even more important, look at the change in Japanese consumer attitudes toward imports.

Robert Feldman, the chief economist at the Tokyo branch of Salomon Brothers, tells how he and his wife recently encountered a Japanese woman in her sixties while hiking near Tokyo. The woman was wearing a sweater identical to one Feldman's wife had gotten from L.L. Bean. He asked the woman if she had gotten her sweater from the Bean catalogue. The woman replied, "Let's see, I got it either there or Land's End." That is change.

Contrary to the widely shared American perception of Japan as an export-driven economy, export was a minus factor in Japan's growth in seven of the past ten years. The volume of Japan's imports rose much faster than that of exports during the period 1985-94.

I am concerned that neither the scope nor the depth of the changes occurring in Japan is understood in the U.S.

Bill Emmott, editor-in-chief of *The Economist*, and one of the most perceptive observers of Japan, says, "The relationship between change and tradition in Japan has always been complicated by the fact that change itself is a tradition . . . Change happens incrementally and quietly. But that does not prevent it from being rapid and profound." This is why Americans often find it difficult to catch up with what is going on in Japan.

And let me tell you that Japanese are no less baffled by America's bold experiments to change. As we observe the current debates in your country on a number of social, economic and political issues, we find it difficult to fathom the significance of change the American people are seeking to accomplish.

Today we live in the information age. CNN and Internet make us wonder how small the world has become. Yet, soundbites and fragmentary images on television do little to free us from old myths and stereotypes. Data retrieved instantaneously from computers do not necessarily improve our abilities to understand each other. Because information is not the same as knowledge.

Our respective cultures and traditions are different. Americans are identified with individualism and diversity, while Japanese value harmony and consensus. Japanese attach more importance than Americans to long-term human relationships built on trust. Such idiosyncrasies are not going to disappear and will continue to influence our political and economic systems, including ways of doing business.

But, at the same time, we must remember that cultures change as we interact. For example, younger generation Japanese are far more individualistic than their parents. As *The Washington Post* points out, Japanese society is becoming more pluralistic. And these changes also shape Japan's democracy and Japan's capitalism, which will create more similarities with American democracy and American capitalism.

Japanese should not take refuge in the sanctity of cultural uniqueness to escape from the pressure of the globalizing international economy. But Americans should also recognize that their rules are not necessarily universal in the world of diverse cultures.

Then, how much difference can we accept to work together? And how best can we promote change to cooperate effectively? These are the questions that must be asked today. These questions cannot be answered without better knowledge of our cultural and historical differences and without better understanding of our similarities—the values and outlooks we share, as well as the problems we face in common such as education, crime, and aging which you discussed this morning. Such knowledge and understanding can only be acquired through wider and more active interchanges between the two peoples.

Nothing encourages me more than meeting with those American men and women who have been to Japan under the JET (Japan Exchange and Teaching) Program—teaching English to high school students in little-known places or working in prefectural governments. They recall the various cultural shocks they encountered. But they all tell me how rewarding their experiences were. Many of them are anxious to go back. Many others are eager to make use of their knowledge and understanding to help promote Japan-U.S. relations.

The JET Program is convincing proof of how much grassroots exchanges can accomplish in removing the barriers of ignorance and in fostering mutual understanding across the Pacific. The problem, of course, is that the number of JET alumni is still far too small. To build a partnership commensurate with our mutual needs, we must have many more such programs at various levels—high school, college, business and government. We must encourage our two peoples to be exposed to the other's culture in order to understand our differences and our similarities.

And I ask those of you who represent the Japan-America Societies to further that understanding. I ask you, especially, to help the perceptions of Japan catch up with the reality of the changes in Japan. That is my request of you today.

In closing, I'd like to quote the inventor of the telephone, Alexander Graham Bell, who said, "Sometimes we stare so long at a door that is closing that we see too late the one that is opening."

Has America been staring at the closing door too long? Has America missed the door of change that is opening in Japan?

Ladies and gentlemen, as each of my American friends gathered here go back to your home cities, I urge you to spread the word about the opening door that is Japan.

Makiko Tanaka

Japan-U.S. Cooperation: A Key to Creating Future Global Society

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am Makikó Tanaka, Minister of State for Science and Technology.

First of all, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the Japan-America Society of Hawaii for inviting me to speak today.

Since I graduated from a Quaker school called Germantown Friends School located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, I will be addressing my speech today in a 1960s Philadelphian accent.

It may be difficult for you to imagine exactly how distant it was between Japan and the United States in the 1960s. I was the only foreign exchange student and the first from Asia at that school. When I arrived, my classmates used to look at me with a serious face and ask, "Is your father a samurai?" or "Were you carried to school in a Kago?"—a Kago is a sort of old sedan in Japan. I was also asked several times, "Have you ever tasted ice cream? It is sweet and cold." My classmates asked me these questions not from any ill intentions nor to tease me. And it is true that, at that time in Japan, the only ice cream flavors we had were vanilla, chocolate, and strawberry. In fact, I was astonished to see so many different flavors and colors of ice cream in the United States.

Other things that surprised me were TV dinners that were ready to put in the oven and the pop-up boxes of Kleenex with tissues that came out one after another. Still in my teens, I really had a big culture shock from these things.

From Tokyo to Philadelphia in those days, I had to go by a propeller plane, first to Honolulu to refuel, then to San Francisco, and from there on to Washington D.C. From there, I went to Philadelphia by train.

The Honolulu airport at that time was nothing like the current modern buildings. It was a simple hut with palm leaves for a roof (The restroom had a swinging door made of wood, so your head and legs could be seen from outside.) The beautiful clear blue sky and the breeze of this southern paradise carried the pleasant fragrance of flowers. Since this first visit as an exchange student, I have returned to Hawaii on my honeymoon and numerous other times with family and friends.

Times have certainly changed since those less hectic days in the 1960's, and I never imagined that I would someday visit Hawaii as a cabinet member of the Japanese government. I am very happy to be here among my old friends today on this special occasion of addressing the Japan-America Societies.

Today, I will focus my speech on science and technology and energy issues in Japan, my responsibility under the current administration of Prime Minister Murayama.

With the end of the cold war, the structure and order of the world have changed greatly. We have entered an era when all of the 5.6 billion people on the earth must help each other and cooperate. Among the serious issues that we must deal with are food supply, energy, and the environment on a world-wide basis. The world's population is expected to increase to 6.3 billion early in the 21st century and the food shortage will become more severe for some areas of the world, especially in Africa.

The social, political and economic activities of human beings have expanded on an enormous scale and have become increasingly complex. This expansion of human activities has multiplied the number and magnitude of the risks that we face. We are in an era when we must consider how we should respond to, and how we can minimize, these risks in order to contribute to the peace and happiness of mankind.

Prime Minister Murayama has often said, "Science and technology is an investment in our future for poor resource countries like Japan." This statement not only refers to the development of technology, hardware if you will, but also to the essential human resource development, or software that will become the basic foundation of our society.

Now, on specific topics, I would like to speak about Japan's energy situation.

According to recent data, 56% of the electric energy used in Japan comes from coal, oil, natural gas, and other forms of fossil fuel; 31% is from nuclear power, and the remainder comes from sources such as hydroelectric power. If the world continues to consume energy resources at the current rate, oil resources will dry up within 40 to 50 years, and a shortfall of uranium will develop. For this reason, we must promote the development and use of solar energy, geothermal energy, wave energy, fuel cells, and other forms of renewable energy to diversify power sources. The cost of these new energy is still too high and there are still unknown technological factors such as reliability and life span. We are now in the process of having utilities and other companies conduct demonstration tests on some of these potential energy sources.

The immediate issue that we must address is how to provide a stable and economical supply of electric power that is efficient, reduces the emission of carbon dioxide, and places a lighter burden on the global environment. (In our view, energy planning must be consistently implemented over a long period of time. An adequate time frame for these large investments is at least 10 to 20 years.)

Japan is also working with the United States, Europe and Russia to complete the nuclear fusion ITER project by around year two thousand and ten (2010). This is an international project to demonstrate the commercial viability of fusion energy. As for the next generation of nuclear reactors, we are making plans to re-process spent fuel from light water reactors and then to use the extracted plutonium in Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs). The current light water reactors can use mixed oxide (Mox) fuel, which is a combination of uranium and plutonium fuel. Yet this fuel option suffers from its high cost, compared to the typical enriched uranium fuel. Needless to say, economics and safety are paramount issues in developing new forms of nuclear energy.

Another very important issue concerning the use of nuclear energy is the management of nuclear waste. Currently Japan has contracts with French and British companies to reprocess its spent nuclear fuel overseas. The waste is then returned to Japan for storage and final disposal. Our current plans call for the eventual burial of this high level waste several hundred meters under the ground, after it has cooled down for thirty to fifty years. We are carrying out our studies of these issues seriously with environmental protection as a top priority. However, just as it is difficult to find a place to discard ordinary municipal garbage, the problem of finding a place to dispose of nuclear waste is no easy task. This leads me to hope for the arrival of the day when research and development can reduce the half-life of radioactive material. (We are actively carrying out such R & D in Japan today.)

As I mentioned at the beginning, environmental issues are a serious problem for humankind.

We know this beautiful, blue earth is the only place that can support human life. Having spoken with the two Japanese astronauts who flew in space under U.S.-Japan cooperation, I am convinced more than ever that we must do all we can to protect our beautiful blue planet for future generations.

Recently, we had the first joint demonstration of the Global Observation Information Network (GOIN), as a part of the cooperation between Japan and the United States on global issues. I joined in the demonstration and had a chance to talk with Dr. Gibbons, Assistant to the President, at the White House, through a satellite TV link.

GOIN will facilitate the flow and utilization of information which is useful for solving environmental issues such as global warming, deforestation and ozone depletion.

The picture and voice qualities through satellite TV link have been improved dramatically. I am very impressed with the progress in science and technology that has shrunk the distance across the Pacific Ocean. I am convinced that such a network should not be limited to both countries, but extended around the world.

We believe that science and technology investments today will provide for sustained economic growth in the future by creating new industries in areas such as manufacturing, agriculture and medical care. But in research areas with a large social and cultural impact such as nuclear power, ecological protection, genetic manipulation and information networks, we must never lose track of a strict ethical framework to guard against recklessness and misuse of these technologies. The importance of wisdom and ethics in the management of science and technology must not be forgotten, neither today nor in the future.

Next, I would like to talk about some of the difficulties in Japanese society today. Since the World War II, Japanese society has been aging at the fastest rate of any society in the world. The population over 65 has already exceeded 14% of the total; furthermore, the number of the elderly living alone is over two million.

Older people are experiencing more anxieties about their lives. They feel more uneasy about their health problems than about their financial issues. Especially, the problems of how to care for people once they become mentally or physically impaired are increasingly urgent. Although institutions for elderly care have spread across the nation, the total number of nurses and nursing assistants is still far from adequate.

On the other hand, the birth rate has dropped drastically, and the average number of children per family is now 1.78. The primary reasons for the decline of the number of children today are as follows:

(1) The high cost of raising children
(2) The aversion to giving birth at an older age due to the late marriages of an increasing number of working women
(3) Inadequate housing

We are worried about our future due to the rapid aging of our society and the decline in the number of children in each household. Such a situation could create serious social and economic tensions among future generations. We politicians are required to provide a meaningful life for the elderly, who feel anxious at the end of their working lives, and a wholesome environment where children of the next generation can be raised.

Just compare the 1960s, when I spent my high school years in the United States, to the current 1990s. The situation in Japan has greatly changed, which has inevitably affected the relationship between Japan and the United States.

I am always pondering about the great challenges facing Japanese society, both as a private citizen and as an elected official. I have many responsibilities in my private life. These include being the wife of another member of the Diet, taking care of my mother who is over 80 years old, and continuing to look after our three active children. I need to strive to be a productive member of Japanese society and not to become a burden to my family in the future. In other words, I must work to avoid becoming a substance like low level (radioactive) waste within my family as I get older; by this I mean a situation where I would be avoided by my family and shunned by society at large!

As a public figure, I have a political duty to make the greatest efforts possible to create a social environment in Japan in which the positive attributes of human beings can be fully utilized. Today is a time for us to concentrate our maximum efforts, not on the activities of one race or one nation, but instead on enhancing the welfare of all races and countries on the face of the globe.

At this 50th commemoration of the end of World War II, let us not permit the sacrifices of the young men and women in both countries to be in vain. Each of us in Japan and the United States should redouble our efforts to cooperate on joint projects, together with other nations, that will lead to the realization to the aspirations of all peoples in the world. This should be our common pledge.

Once again, I am grateful to the Japan-America Society of Hawaii for allowing me this opportunity today.

Thank you very much for your kind attention.

1995
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Student Essays

Student essay contest winners get to know each other at the Hawaii Symposium.

Erin Bruni

Surrounded by shouting children, I tried desperately to decipher their rapid, high-pitched Japanese as they touched my hair and pulled at my earrings. Understanding only their gasps of "*Sugoi!*," I looked to my host sister for guidance. She laughed and guided me and my new admirers across the shiny hardwood floors of the community center that hosted the LABO party meeting. I felt like somewhat of a movie star as the children pestered Chizuko to translate their questions for me. I marveled at these children—they seemed to bounce around, full of an exuberance that emitted so much energy that I could not help laughing. As the meeting progressed, the children focused their energies on singing and dancing to American folk songs, making special efforts to include me. Joining their merriment, I found it hard to believe that I was in Japan. After being there for only one day, I had already found so many contradictions to the strict country I had imagined. Unlike the my mental image of stoical workaholics, the Japanese people I had met were inquisitive, humorous, and personable. Their politeness surprised me, for it was neither stiff nor fake as I had presumed; it was genuine and welcoming. I had contrived a mental image of grim Japanese cities with people crammed into high rise apartment buildings and subways, or bustling about crowded streets toting umbrellas; yet the sun shone brightly on those streets and homes, making them open and charming, even comfortable.

As Japanese people kindly embraced me and shared their culture with me, they obliterated the mental barriers I had built. These stereotypes destroyed, I began learning about the real Japan and Japanese people. To my naive amazement, these people were also human—their emotions, their humor, their fears so similar to my own. I also discovered striking differences between America and Japan, some of which made me ashamed of my own country. America, so young compared to Japan, has some very important lessons to learn from Japan.

After traveling to Japan twice, I was surprised with how the Japanese compensate for their space shortage. Realizing the necessity of public transportation, the Japanese respect their subways and busses, keeping them clean and safe. For the most part, Americans in our automobile-obsessed society would much rather exercise their freedom to drive than ride a dangerous subway or dirty public bus. The Japanese have made their most crowded cities pleasant by planting trees in every expendable place, constructing parks on the tops of buildings, and minimizing crime. At present, America does not have to deal with a lack of space, but by taking heed from Japan, we could maximize the space that we are using, thus preserving our land and hopefully minimizing pollution.

Not only respectful of their surroundings, the Japanese people have shown that respect for the elderly is an integral part of their culture. While nursing homes are not unheard of in Japan, the majority do not commit their relatives to these institutions; rather, children are expected to care for their elderly parents, returning the effort and love that went into raising them. A true token of gratitude, these affections, combined with the society's commitment to lifelong health, preserves the elderly. In all three of the Japanese homes I visited, the grandparents lived with the family. At the age of eighty-two, my host's grandmother delivered newspapers by bicycle every morning. Her remarkable agility and stamina made me regret that I had supported my parents' decision to commit my own grandmother to a nursing home, rather than encouraging her to remain active.

While Americans could integrate more respect into their lives, we can also learn from the ability of the Japanese to be rational. Recently my Japanese sensei and I were talking about the earthquake that had ravaged Kobe, her college town; she commended American volunteerism. I was quick to say that although Kobe does not illustrate this, American volunteerism is often self-serving and sometimes harmful. Carefully considering her words, she pointed out that Americans often look at things as either bad or good, while Japanese tend to look at all aspects of a situation; there is so much truth in her words. In America, political strife is caused by fervent emotions that tell us something is either right or wrong. With more of an understanding of rationality, Americans might become more tolerant, patient human beings.

Despite our problems, I love my country, so I try to incorporate the virtues of each culture into my life. If America and Japan could somehow combine their strengths, the lives of their citizens would be more fulfilling, more wonderful.

Hiromasa Ebihara

(Format note: This paper was transcribed from Simul International's English translation recorded on audiotape.)

The year before last, I went to study for one year in Crystal Falls, a small city in the northernmost part of the state of Michigan, as a Rotary exchange student while I was a sophomore in high school. It was a very valuable experience. What I was impressed with most during that year was the difference in education. In Japan, as exemplified by the preparation for and fierce competition for college entrance examinations, rote learning tends to be emphasized. In America, instead of just cramming in knowledge, practical skills which are useful in daily life—such as carpentry, driving, machinery repairs, computer skills, designing homes and various volunteer activities—were all part of the school curriculum and regarded as important. In their spare time, American students enjoy working part time, enjoy various sports, and in the summer, the whole family would go out to enjoy camping and fishing in the beautiful wilderness. In the winter, they would go out for skiing and hunting. Americans seem to acquire practical knowledge through such experiences from the time that they are very young.

On January 17th, six months after I returned home, there was a great earthquake in Kobe which caused incredible damage. As it happened near where I live, I went to the affected areas several times as a volunteer. What I was struck with most at that time was the fact that quite a few people, most notably students, had gathered from all over Japan to be actively involved as volunteers. I was very impressed by that because, frankly speaking, I had not thought that Japanese youth would be so motivated. However, because most of them, including myself, were participating in volunteer activities for the first time, what they could do was limited to a very simple tasks.

In contrast, in America, where people have experience in volunteer activities from elementary and junior high school, people are capable of helping in a very organized manner to remove rubble, to repair homes, to control traffic and so forth, as was seen in Los Angeles in January of last year.

Recently, an American friend of mine said, "If a similar disaster had hit the U.S., there would be a lot of looting." But we didn't see any of that in Japan, and he was impressed. Indeed, the discipline of the Japanese people was one of the things we have found anew about Japan.

Through my experiences in America and in Kobe during the earthquake, I have keenly felt the importance of *chiko goitsu,* which means: true knowledge always accompanies action; without commensurate action, knowledge is useless. This spirit, I felt, is indispensable in today's international community. What we need are people who are capable of feeling with their hearts and thinking with their minds and making decisions to put into action. For this reason, Japan should reconsider its education based only on cramming and try to incorporate more practical training and activities as in the United States to foster people capable of making decisions in the international community.

Based on my valuable experiences, I will always remember the spirit of *chiko goitsu* and become someone who sees things from other people's perspectives and promptly acts on them. In this manner, I would like to try to become a true cosmopolitan.

Reina Nishimura

(Format note: This paper was transcribed from Simul International's English translation recorded on audiotape.)

After World War II, Japan achieved tremendous development as a result of massive economic growth, and we are now in a place where we are squarely competing with different countries in the world in many fields. At this time, in hope of further enhancing the role to be played by Japan, people with sophistication and flexibility who can cope with all possible changes are sought out.

I came to the United States for the first time in July of last year. At first, I struggled just to acclimate to a different culture, both physically and mentally. When I started to get used to life here, I moved to stay at a local family's home. The family who took care of me had two young children in lower grade school. Let me tell you the scene I came across there.

I was playing cards with the children after dinner. There was some trouble, and the younger brother started to cry out loud at the top of his lungs. My host mother came running and started to listen to her older boy's side of the story first. She seemed to have concluded that the younger son was at fault and took him to another room and then gave him a chance to give his side of the story. After hearing him out, she said in a very stern voice what she thought as a mother. It appeared to me that it wasn't anything like what is called a "parent's lecture" that you see in Japan.

It seems that what I saw was a fairly common scene in the United States when two people talk to each other. No matter who the other person is, it is often the case that you first listen to the other person and then give your view. The conversation would never be only one-sided. In Japan, because of trying to keep order and discipline, which is considered a virtue, people frequently hold back their views, and this results in others' forcing their views on you. It appears to me that this characteristic of a conservative island nation is manifested in the traits of its people.

For this very reason, Japanese tend to hold negative images of Americans, who are complete opposites, finding them too aggressive and stubbornly persistent in their views. However, this perception is merely a prejudice held by some people with fixed ideas. Rather, due to America's diversity and culture, American people are capable of coping with things very flexibly. They would listen to others. If they see a difference, they talk it out as long as they feel is necessary. The conclusions that are drawn would be incorporated with a person's own views and they become part of that very person. It's no wonder that Americans are confident in their views.

I feel the challenge facing the Japanese society is not to allow ourselves to be confined by preconceptions, but to review our thoughts and examine them from time to time. This attitude, I believe, is the very first step toward internationalization. If we are to seek a global perspective, what is urgently needed is for people to establish firm convictions of their own.

Kelly Sietz

Before one can analyze the impact a culture may have on another, a fact of human nature must be acknowledged. From across the street to across the world, humans are humans, and they all behave as such. What differentiates one people from another is the environment of each respective culture. In this lies the benefit the Japanese influence could have on the American people. Japan has a unique and thriving society, and its love of respect, of elders, and of simple peace would most certainly assist the American community in general and the American citizen in particular.

Japan is an ancient country. It is a country immersed in tradition, but to say that these behaviors are routine and unchanging would be a severe misunderstanding. The acts that have remained traditional, if one goes beyond the surface, are simply physical representations of simple, yet often neglected, morals. All of this can be illustrated by a single word: respect. Japan's rule is courtesy first, and perhaps if the world itself adopted this single rule, many outbreaks, from a frown to a war, could be prevented. Visitors, Japanese and foreigners alike, are all given the host's humble servitude. The young "rebels" of Japan bow submissively to their professors, as their dangling dyed hair and jewelry appear to pay homage as well. Both internally and externally, the American culture could learn much from this very basic ideal.

Youth Is King in a society such as the United States. Old age is seemingly a disease, so much so that every store has its remedies, its hair dyes, its facial cremes; enough that if used all at once one might disappear into nothingness, retracing so far into the past that existence is denied. However, Japanese culture dictates otherwise. Grandfathers are venerated and protected, being placed on a pedestal. Loyalty is a strong asset of Japan, and an American would gain much in their teachings. In America, too often a father is forgotten, a grandmother overlooked, until it is too late. But the older generation has much to offer, if one would only listen, for in this assemblage lies the experiences of a lifetime, the mistakes and accomplishments. The wealth the older population possesses should be nurtured, as the Japanese have realized, because without the instruction of those with the knowledge, where can growth be found? America would be all the wiser if it heeded this Japanese virtue.

Seldom can one feel wholly safe walking the streets of the United States.

Every day there is something new; every flip of a channel contains a recent crime. Statistically speaking, two days of crime in America equate an entire year in Japan. This figure can be nothing but amazing. The almost negligible violence in this Asian country is an offshoot of its respect for humankind, of people, and of property. The Japanese etiquette goes beyond an offer of tea. Imagine a world blanketed in reverence. Imagine Japan. America would do well to imitate this unwavering conduct.

Every society has its little quirks and nuances, just as every society has some element that would benefit another. The idea isn't to assimilate, but to adapt, to sample, until finally, ideally, paradise is found. This may never happen, for the simple reason that mankind as a whole is imperfect at best. The integration of Japanese customs into the realm of the United Stated would give this sought-after Utopia its greatest chance, and even then, it is only half the battle.

Aindree Sircar

Japan has a rich cultural heritage that has sustained it for thousands of years. As part of that heritage, Japan has become well-known for many good qualities that have led it to be regarded as a highly respected, world power. Some of these qualities include discipline, pride in their cultural heritage, the ability to work cooperatively with others, and the resilience to absorb other cultures. An analysis and appreciation of these qualities could lead to my own self-improvement and even the improvement of American society.

First of all, the Japanese have imparted a discipline in their schools, workplaces, and homes. The Japanese people believe that motivation for learning should be used to acquire a skill, then put back into society by teaching others. They also think that practicing a set schedule until it becomes instinctive is a cornerstone in the development of discipline. Finally, being able to monitor self-enhancement at work and school is imperative. These are the minimal requirements for determining future success in learning and working ventures. Discipline would improve both society and myself by helping to become more prioritized, organized, and more aware of time-management.

Next, maintaining pride in their cultural heritage is another respected characteristic of the Japanese. They emphasize that individual development is not tied to individual rights or to individualism. Rather, individual development comes when people can take responsibility for their actions and learn how to discriminate between right and wrong. Hard work, perseverance, and confidence are the keys to individual development. The Japanese say that a developed character or the strength of mature individuals will never develop unless people set higher goals and work hard for them. Persistence is mandatory in the development of one's character. Success does not come easily, and those who are demanding of themselves undergo long periods of unrewarding work in order to prepare for future challenges. It is their ultimate belief that human beings have to constantly improve themselves and strive toward perfection.

The Japanese also emphasize that reinforcing the spiritual qualities of people will make the world a better place in which to live. People should abandon their selfishness, cynicism, and reluctance to work with others. This could help to improve myself by broadening my mind, strengthening my character and intensifying my inner spirit. This could help society to deepen their roots and realize that everything is interrelated and regardless of race, religion, or creed, we are all equal.

Working with others and communicating is very important to the Japanese. Conformity is the desired behavior within groups. It results from a process that takes a large amount of effort and a great deal of time. If an employee does not communicate with his/her peers and employer, then the work will not be done well. Japanese employers try to establish good relationships with their employees by being involved in their work and creating friendly relationships after work by listening to the workers' problems and comments. Members of groups encourage each other to do better because it is assumed that each person has something to contribute. These are the reasons why Japanese businesses do so well. Similarly, for me, establishing friendly relationships at work or at school will lead to greater productivity.

Last, the Japanese have a flair for absorbing other cultures. They have always been able to incorporate the positive aspects of other cultures and then improve upon them. Yet, simultaneously the Japanese have also maintained their own culture. For example, in the past they adopted Chinese (Kanji) characters for writing, which proved to be very difficult to read for the uneducated people of Japan, so they improved upon the characters by deriving other reading and writing characters—Hiragana and Katakana. In recent years, the Japanese have adapted the American technology for producing cars. The Japanese not only incorporated their technology but enhanced the engine, made the car more compact so that the average Japanese could fit more comfortably, and made it easier to maneuver on the busy city streets. The way I could consolidate this in my own life is by consciously taking the good qualities of individuals. If I were to take one good thing from each individual (good work habits, honesty, zeal, etc.) I would be a better person. If society were to take one good aspect of each culture throughout the world, then it would be the next best thing to Utopia.

In conclusion, "The Japanese have studied our civilization carefully in order to absorb its values and surpass it. Perhaps we should be wise to study their civilization as patiently as they have studied ours, so that when the crisis comes that must issue either in war or understanding, we may be capable of understanding." (Will Durant, *Our Cultural Heritage*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1935, p. 829.)

Masumi Takemura

(Format note: This paper was transcribed from Simul International's English translation recorded on audiotape.)

"Well mannered." On the last day of my stay with my American family, Mrs. King unintentionally used these words while praising me enthusiastically. I was somehow relieved hearing these words. I thought it meant that I had not done anything to hurt her feelings during my stay. But in reflecting on this now, I wonder whether Mrs. King wanted to say simply that I was "well mannered," or something more.

In the United States, rather than who you are in terms of social status, age or sex distinction, people put more importance upon your character. Therefore, even when meeting for the first time, the behavior of Americans is very joyful and frank. Americans try to create an atmosphere in which they can understand the other person and be understood as well.

On the other hand, when Japanese have contact with others, they first put importance on politeness. The attitude of one person would be to evaluate the other's personality.

Without realizing it, I think I brought this typical Japanese way of thinking into the American home I stayed in. As I had tried not to reveal my true character in order to be polite, Mrs. King must have said the word "well mannered" to me with a little feeling of disappointment.

After defeat in the war, Japan was under the guidance of the United States in every aspect of the reformation of the country. The Japanese Constitution was one of those aspects. However, the Japanese Constitution contains ideas not from Japan but from America, a country which created its Constitution after going through a painful war for independence. The Japanese people acquired human rights and freedom without any difficulty, and even before seeking such Constitutional rights by their own will. Therefore, Japan has been slow to establish a sense of the individual. The Japanese hide their undeveloped individuality behind politeness and have delayed seeking an answer as to what true individualism is.

But especially now as the term "international society" is known even in Japan, we Japanese should show off our individuality, which will prevail once we put aside our politeness. Here the histories of the United States and other nations provide us with many references on how to develop a sense of individuality.

I was very happy when I realized, after my experiences in America, the importance of establishing a sense of individuality for myself. Someday, I may be able to visit the United States again. But by that time, I'm going to make my utmost efforts to establish my own humanity, and if I can achieve a real sense of politeness by respecting others without hiding my individuality, then finally I will learn what a true international person should be.

1995

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Speakers and Panelists

1995
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Kazuo
Nukazawa
David
McClai

Distinguished panelists discuss "Easing Economic Tensions" between the U.S. and Japan.

Vernon R. Alden

MODERATOR: "Seeking a Better Life: Challenges of International Migration"

For over 45 years, Vernon Alden, the current Chairman of the Japan Society of Boston, has been involved with Japan related activities. He served for four years as Chairman of the National Association of Japan-America Societies and is a trustee, director or member of numerous advisory councils, several of which are also Japan-related. Mr. Alden led many successful trade delegations to Japan, and continues to travel often to Japan. He has been widely recognized for his academic, business and service contributions, honors which include the Order of the Rising Sun, Star Class, conferred upon him by the Emperor of Japan.

Victor Atiyeh

MODERATOR: "Japan and America, 1945-1995: Peace, Progress, Partnership"

Victor Atiyeh, Former Governor of the State of Oregon (1979-1987), is known for his business as well as for his legislative acumen. At age 21, he assumed the presidency of a retail business begun by his father and uncle in 1900, and he has continued in the business' management both before and after his twenty years of service in the Oregon State Legislature and his eight years as Governor of Oregon. His distinguished career has garnered him numerous degrees and commendations, among them the Emperor of Japan's award of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Gold and Silver Star, and many awards for public service, humanitarianism and leadership.



James E. Auer

PANELIST: "U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia"

Dr. James Auer is Research Professor, George Peabody College for Teachers. As Director of the Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation, Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies, he brings special expertise on Japan to the International Symposium. His numerous professional affiliations include Coordinator, VIPPS U.S.-Japan Technology Forum. During a distinguished twenty year career as a naval officer (Ensign through Commander) he was assigned to posts in Japan, the Western Pacific and the U.S. From 1979 to 1988, Dr. Auer served as Special Assistant for Japan with the United States Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Daniel Bent

MODERATOR: "Public Safety: Crime and Justice"

Daniel Bent was appointed by the President to be the United States Attorney for Hawaii in 1983 and served in that position until 1993. As U.S. Attorney, he was responsible for the representation of the U.S. in civil and criminal litigation, and his service was honored by one of the first ever U.S. Department of Justice Awards for significant achievement by a U.S. Attorney on a national level. Mr. Bent specializes in the area of dispute resolution with an emphasis on trial litigation with the law firm, Carlsmith Ball Wichman Case & Ichiki. He is active in community affairs and is Treasurer and Board Member of the Hawaii State Bar Association.

Gene R. Carter

PANELIST: "Education: Critical Issues and New Directions"

Dr. Gene Carter is presently Executive Director of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD), an international association of educators which, with over 186,000 members, is one of the largest education associations in the world. Dr. Carter has held numerous teaching and administrative positions and has provided leadership training in many countries. He has received such honors as the "National Superintendent of the Year" by the American Association of School Administrators and the Presidential Citation by the National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education.

Wayne A. Cornelius

PANELIST: "Seeking a Better Life: Challenges of International Migration"

Dr. Wayne Cornelius is the founding Director of the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies and the Gildred Professor of U.S.-Mexican Relations at the University of California, San Diego. He has been awarded visiting research fellowships at numerous institutions, including Oxford University, Harvard University, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Tokyo, and taught eight years at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Many notable publications have resulted from his comparative research on immigration policies in nations such as Mexico, the U.S. and Japan.

Lynn A. Curtis

PANELIST: "Public Safety: Crime and Justice"

Dr. Lynn A. Curtis is President of The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation in Washington, D.C. The Foundation is a continuation, in the private sector, of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Dr. Curtis is also Vice Chair of Partners for Democratic Change, Trustee of the Parliamentary Human Rights Foundation, and a Director of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. He has written seven books and numerous articles, and testified before many Congressional committees, sharing his expertise on crime prevention and policy development.

Shinkichi Eto

PANELIST: "Education: Critical Issues and New Directions"

After teaching as an associate and full Professor at his alma mater, the University of Tokyo, international relations expert Shinkichi Eto became President of Asia University in Tokyo, a position he held until February 1995. In 1991 he was awarded a Purple Ribbon Medal by the Emperor of Japan for his academic accomplishments. Included in his numerous publications are biographies of Eisaku Sato and Miyazaki Toten, *Kokusai Kankeiron*, *The 1911 Revolution in China: Interpretive Essays* (co-editor), and *Sogo-Anpo to Mirai no Sentaku* (*Comprehensive Security and Future Alternatives of Japan*) (co-author).

Robert B. Friedland

PANELIST: "Aging: Responsibility and Cost"

Dr. Robert Friedland is Director of the National Academy on Aging, in Washington, D.C., a policy institute of the Gerontological Society of America. His wide range of research and public policy experience includes service as Director of Research, National Academy of Social Insurance; Chief Economist of Maryland's Medicaid program; Senior Research Associate, Employee Benefit Research Institute; and Economist on the staff of the U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive Health Care. His writings include *Facing the Costs of Long-Term Care* (1990), which was awarded the Elizur Wright Award by the American Risk and Insurance Association.

Glen S. Fukushima

PANELIST: "Easing Economic Tensions"

Glen Fukushima is Vice President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan and a member of the ACCJ Board of Governors. As Regional Director, Public Policy and Market Development at AT&T Japan Ltd., he works with governments and industries on telecommunications and electronics policy issues. Prior to joining AT&T, he was Deputy Assistant United States Trade Representative for Japan and China (1988-90) and Director for Japanese Affairs (1985-90) at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C. He is also a noted author and lecturer.

Fumiko Mori Halloran

MODERATOR: "Aging: Responsibility and Cost"

Writer Fumiko Mori Halloran has served as Senior Political Analyst, Japan Economic Institute of America, and Program Officer, Japan Center for International Exchange. Her firsthand knowledge of Asia and America has served her well as the author of nine books (and translator of another), and of columns for many prestigious magazines and journals. She was both a Woodrow Wilson National Fellow and a Fulbright grantee, and is much in demand as a lecturer and educator. Ms. Halloran's writing honors include the Oya Soichi Award for Best Non-Fiction (Tokyo). She is on the Project Screening Committee, Council for Better Corporate Citizenship, Keidanren.

Nagayo Homma

PANELIST: "Japan and America, 1945-1995: Peace, Progress, Partnership"

Educator and administrator Nagayo Homma is the current Executive Director of the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership. He also holds the position of Chancellor of The Seijo Gakuen Schools and University. He has been widely recognized for his scholarship and his teaching skills, and is a Professor Emeritus at the University of Tokyo. He shares his ideas at international symposia and conferences, bringing about a better understanding of the peoples of Japan and America. Professor Homma has authored numerous English and Japanese language publications in his field.

Akira Iriye

PANELIST: "Japan and America, 1945-1995: Peace, Progress, Partnership"

Harvard University Professor of History Akira Iriye is Director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies. His expertise in both East Asian and U.S. history has led to numerous appointments as visiting professor in Japan and France, as well as at the University of California at Berkeley and the University of Hawaii. Dr. Iriye served as President of the American Historical Association, one of his many professional affiliations. His books have received many honors and have been widely translated. *The Globalizing of America: United States Foreign Relations, 1913-1945* was published by Cambridge University Press in 1993.

Mikio Kawa

PANELIST: "Aging: Responsibility and Cost"

Upon Mikio Kawa's graduation from law school, he entered the Ministry of Health and Welfare. His distinguished career has been marked by steady progression to positions of higher responsibility at the Ministry of Health and Welfare. His many and varied appointments have included Assistant Director in the Social Security Agency (1984); Director of the Social Welfare Bureau, Ishikawa Prefecture Municipal Government (1987), Director, Policy and Research, Office of the Minister (1993). In 1993, Mr. Kawa became Director, Department of Aging and Welfare Promotion, Bureau of Aging, Health and Welfare.

James Andrew Kelly

PANELIST: "U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia"

James Kelly is President of the Pacific Forum/CSIS in Hawaii, an organization which has analyzed and led dialogue on Asia-Pacific political, security, and economic/business issues since 1975 and is the autonomous Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Mr. Kelly served as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Reagan, and as Senior Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for three years. From 1989 to 1994, Mr. Kelly was President of the international consulting firm, EAP Associates, Inc.

Ryosei Kokubun

PANELIST: "U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia"

Dr. Ryosei Kokubun teaches political science and international relations at Keio University in Tokyo. He has served as a visiting scholar at Harvard University and the University of Michigan in the United States, and at Fudan University in China. Among Dr. Kokubun's published works are *The Political Process and Democratization in China: An Analysis of Reforms and Open-Door Policies* (author), and *Documentary History of Contemporary China: Vol. I, Politics* (co-editor). He brings to the Symposium his extensive knowledge of Chinese politics and foreign policy, and of international relations in East Asia.

Glen M. Krebs

PANELIST: "Seeking A Better Life: Challenges of International Migration"

Attorney Glen Krebs has been practicing law with Greenebaum, Doll and McDonald for nine years in Lexington, Kentucky, where his expertise on Japan has been valuable in his firm's representation of many Japanese automotive firms with operations in the area. In 1990, he also formed a consulting company, Global Business Advisors, Ltd., of which he is President. Mr. Krebs earlier practiced law for two years in Tokyo; he speaks fluent Japanese and has lived in Japan for a total of four years. He is currently serving as Chairman of the Japan/America Society of Kentucky, Inc.

Thomas Mahoney

PANELIST: "Aging: Responsibility and Cost"

Dr. Thomas Mahoney is Professor of History Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institutte of Technology and served as Secretary of Elder Affairs in the cabinet of the Government of Massachusetts (1979-1983). Dr. Mahoney received the Democratic Congressional Leadership appointment to the Policy Committee of the 1995 White House Conference on Aging. Dr. Mahoney is also a member of the United Nations NGO Committee on Aging executive committee, N.Y. and was the American representative and member of the Board of Directors of the Centre International de Gerontologie Sociale, Paris until its dissolution last year. He now represents the International Federation on Aging, Montreal.

Yukio Matsuyama

PANELIST: "Japan and America, 1945-1995: Peace, Progress, Partnership"

Described as "one of today's most informed and experienced observers of U.S.-Japan relations," noted journalist Yukio Matsuyama has covered developments in Washington and Tokyo for nearly 30 years. After serving as the Chairperson of the *Asahi Shimbun*, he was named Honorary Chairperson of the Editorial Board. Currently, he is a professor at Kyoritsu Women's University. Mr. Matsuyama is a distinguished author, having written numerous books and articles on U.S.-Japan relations, including *A Comparison of Politics and Society Between Japan and the U.S.* and *Diagnosis of Japan From Abroad*.

David McClain

MODERATOR: "Easing Economic Tensions"

Dr. David McClain is the Henry A. Walker, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Business Enterprise and Professor of Financial Economics and Institutions at the University of Hawaii. He was previously a professor and department head at Boston University, a visiting member of the faculty at M.I.T.'s Sloan School and a visiting scholar at Keio University and Meiji University in Japan. Prior to joining Boston University, Dr. McClain served as a Senior Staff Economist, and, later as a consultant to the Council of Economic Advisers in the Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C. From 1974-78, he was Director of Global Information Services for Data Resources, Inc. He is a frequent contributor to various national financial news media.

Sabrina Shizue McKenna

PANELIST: "Public Safety: Crime and Justice"

Sabrina McKenna is Judge, Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii in Honolulu. She has served as a member of numerous Supreme Court committees and is currently a member of the Supreme Court Committee on Certification of Court Interpreters. After several years of practicing law (Associate, Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel; Corporate Secretary & General Counsel, Otaka Inc.), Judge McKenna became an instructor at the University of Hawaii and, in 1991, an Assistant Professor at the William S. Richardson School of Law. Her early education was in Japan, and she speaks fluent Japanese.

Seiji Naya

PANELIST: "Easing Economic Tensions"

Dr. Seiji Naya is Director, Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism (DBEDT) of the State of Hawaii and Professor of Economics (1971-present) at the University of Hawaii. His professional activities and many publications have focused on the international economic problems of Asian countries and issues of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. He has served as advisor to the ASEAN Economic Research Unit, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore, and as senior advisor to the non-profit International Center for Economic Growth (ICEG) in San Francisco, California.

Yasunori Nishijima

PANELIST: "Education: Critical Issues and New Directions"

Professor Emeritus (Kyoto University) Yasunori Nishijima is currently the Vice-President of the Science Council of Japan and President of the Japan WHO Association. In addition, he serves as the Chairman of the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO. Dr. Nishijima's teaching and administrative career began in 1962 as a Visiting Professor, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, and continued at his alma mater Kyoto University where he served as Dean of Students (1975-76), Dean of the Faculty of Engineering (1979-81), and President of Kyoto University (1985-1991). From 1993-1994, he was President of the Chemical Society of Japan.

Kazuo Nukazawa

PANELIST: "Easing Economic Tensions"

Kazuo Nukazawa, Managing Director, Keidanren, has spent the past 34 years with the Keidanren secretariat as a resource on domestic (anti-trust, environment, energy, tax and public finance) as well as external (trade, aid, and international investment) policies. As Managing Director of Keidanren, Mr. Nukazawa is in charge of international affairs and responsible for the operations of three departments (International Economic Affairs, Economic Cooperation, and Asian Affairs). He is also Senior Managing Director of the Keizai Koho Center (Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs) and of the Council for Better Corporate Citizenship (CBCC).

Sozaburo Okamatsu

PANELIST: "Easing Economic Tensions"

Upon Sozaburo Okamatsu's graduation from law school, he assumed his first post in Japan's Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI). His subsequent long and distinguished career has been marked by steady progression to positions of higher and higher responsibility at MITI. His many and varied appointments have included Division Chief for the Economic Cooperation Department in the Policy Bureau (1985); Bureau Chief for the Industrial Location Pollution Bureau (1989); Bureau Chief for MITI's Policy Bureau (1991); and Deputy Minister for the MITI (1993). In 1993, Mr. Okamatsu became Vice Minister for International Affairs.

Yukio Okamoto

PANELIST: "U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia"

Yukio Okamoto is President of Okamoto Associates, Inc., an international strategic consulting firm. As a sought-after political expert on Japan, he writes as a regular contributor to major newspapers and magazines in Japan and appears regularly as a political commentator on Japanese television. Before founding his consulting firm, Okamoto served for more than twenty years in Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with posts in France, the United States and Egypt. Among his many speaking engagements have been recent addresses at the National Association of Japan-America Societies' and the Japan-America Society of Hawaii's annual dinners.



Yasuaki Onuma

PANELIST: "Seeking a Better Life: Challenges of International Migration"

Law Professor Yasuaki Onuma teaches International Law at the University of Tokyo's Graduate School of Law and Politics. His expertise has been shared as a Visiting Scholar at Harvard Law School, Princeton University, the University of Sidney, Australian National University, University of Edinburgh and Yale Law School, among others. His work has been published in numerous and highly-respected journals, in both Japanese and English, and he has co-edited the book, ***The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium*** (1988) and edited ***A Normative Approach to War*** (1993), both in the English language, and ten books written in Japanese.

Atsuyuki Sassa

PANELIST: "Public Safety: Crime and Justice"

During a period of 35 years' service in administrative posts, Atsuyuki Sassa has been in charge of counter-espionage, counter-subversion, and counter-riot activities, handling incidents and assignments ranging from preparation of the Tokyo Olympic Games Security Measures Manual to the Kennedy assassination case research in Dallas, Texas. He has managed security measures in Japan for such visiting foreign heads of state as USSR Vice-Premier Mikhoyan, U.S. President Ford and Queen Elizabeth, and was appointed government delegate to the Japanese Parliament 28 times. His resume lists numerous published works and prestigious international awards.

Robert A. Scalapino

PANELIST: "Japan and America, 1945-1995: Peace, Progress, Partnership"

Noted Asia expert Dr. Robert Scalapino is currently Robson Research Professor of Government Emeritus, having retired from the University of California at Berkeley in 1990. In 1978, he founded the Institute of East Asian Studies and remained its director until his retirement. The recipient of numerous research grants, Dr. Scalapino has also garnered significant awards and honors (among them, the government of Japan's Order of the Sacred Treasure) for his scholastic accomplishments. He has traveled extensively in Asia and has published some 430 articles and 38 books or monographs on Asian politics and U.S.-Asian policy.

Haruo Shimada

PANELIST: "Seeking a Better Life: Challenges of International Migration"

Keio University Professor of Economics Haruo Shimada received his doctorate in industrial relations from the University of Wisconsin. Although a specialist in labor economics and industrial relations, he also researches and writes extensively in such fields as economic policy, international management and international relations. His most recent books include *Japan's "Guest Workers": Issues and Public Policies* (University of Tokyo Press, 1994); *Japanese Economy: Distortions and Revival* (in Japanese, 1991); and *Japanese Corporations: Next Reforms* (in Japanese, 1991).

Hee-Suk Shin

MODERATOR: "U.S.-Japan Relationship and Security in Asia"

Professor Hee-Suk Shin, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is Director General (1991-), Division for Asia-Pacific Studies. His major fields of scholarship include Japanese domestic politics and foreign policy, U.S.-Japan relations, and international relations, especially foreign policy-making. In addition to six books [most recent are *Japan's Foreign Policy* (1992) and *U.S.-Japan Relations and the Korean Peninsula* (forthcoming, 1995)] and approximately fifty articles in the Korean language, Professor Shin has authored numerous articles in both Japanese and English.

Yukiko Tsunoda

PANELIST: "Public Safety: Crime and Justice"

Attorney, educator, consultant and author Yukiko Tsunoda's most recent career experience has been with the Nagashima & Ohno (1977-1980), Uchida (1981-82) and Tsunoda (1983-present) law firms in Tokyo. Her teaching, consulting and law activities have centered upon her specialization in human rights protection, with an emphasis upon the rights of women. She has authored and co-authored numerous books and articles on these subjects, and has served as a member of several women's rights committees in both the Japan Federation of Bar Associations and the Tokyo Bar Association.

Kazunori Yamanoi

PANELIST: "Aging: Responsibility and Cost"

Authority on aging, Kazunori Yamanoi performed research on social welfare for the aged and on politics at the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management from 1986 to 1991. After a year as a Visiting Researcher at Lundo University in Sweden, he worked as a researcher at the Yamanoi Institute of Aged Society before assuming his present post as a Lecturer in the Social Welfare Department at Nara Women's University. His publications include *Global Social Welfare for the Aged* (1991) and *Report from Sweden: Living in an Aged Society* (1993). He has also jointly authored four other books and co-authored a translation.

Caroline A. Matano Yang

MODERATOR: "Education: Critical Issues and New Directions"

International education consultant Caroline Yang provided leadership for the Fulbright Program in Japan for 22 years as Executive Director, during which it developed into the second largest of its kind and was recognized for its strong alumni association. Her career has taken her to New York (nine years at the United Nations), Taiwan and the Michigan State University International Center. She has been honored with the Japanese Foreign Minister's award, the Smith College Medal, the Marita Houlihan Award from NAFSA, and, most recently, her appointment by President Clinton to the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board that oversees the program in 130 countries. She is also a board member of the Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (SYLFF) in Japan.

1995

International Symposium
of Japan-America
Societies

Directory of Societies



Society members from East and West join hands at the Symposium's closing ceremony.

American Societies (NAJAS)

The National Association of Japan-America Societies
333 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017

Phone: 212-715-1218 Fax: 212-715-1262 Email: marrabob@aol.com

President: Mr. John H. Steed
Executive Director: Dr. Robert J. Marra

The National Association of Japan-America Societies was founded to support its member societies by offering educational, cultural, and business programs about Japan and U.S.-Japan relations. Founded under the leadership of Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, NAJAS today includes 33 member societies and a number of affiliates. Collectively, membership exceeds 25,000 individuals, including representatives from more than 3,400 corporations. It is the only national nonprofit network in the U.S. dedicated to public education about Japan.

The Japan-America Society of Alabama
1500 Resource Drive, Birmingham, AL 35242

Phone: 205-250-4730 Fax: 205-250-4727

President: Mr. Roy F. Etheredge
Executive Director: Ms. Michiru Sugi (Interim) Founded in September, 1989

Since its founding, The Japan-America Society of Alabama has been providing an avenue for the people of Alabama and Japan to promote personal and professional relationships. Recently it has been involved in the renovation efforts of the house of Samuel Ullman, which is now open as a museum to honor the author of the famous poem, "Youth," which is widely known in Japan. JASA is also developing "Japan Trunks," which are new elementary-level teaching tools containing clothing, toys, tapes and other items designed to introduce Japanese culture to the children of Alabama.

Japan-America Society of Arkansas
Arkansas International Center, University of Arkansas at Little Rock
2801 South University, Little Rock, AR 72204

Phone: 501-569-3282 Fax: 501-569-8538

President: Mr. Ray Riggs
Executive Director: Dr. Walter Nunn Founded in February, 1994

The Japan-America Society of Arkansas was founded to promote friendship, goodwill, and understanding between the people of Japan and Arkansas through, but not limited to, educational social, cultural and exchange programs. This relatively new Society is working with other organizations in Arkansas with similar goals.

The Japan Society of Boston, Inc.

22 Batterymarch Street, Boston, MA 02109

Phone: 617-451-0726 Fax: 617-451-1191

Chairman: Mr. Vernon R. Alden
Executive Director: Ms. Charlotte A. Beattie Founded in 1904

The oldest of the Japan-America Societies, this Society began in 1904 as a discussion group sympathetic to Japan in the Russo-Japanese War. After disbanding during World War II, the Society was revived in 1953 under the leadership of the late Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, and it continues to serve as a focal point connecting a rich variety of Japan-related education, cultural and business organizations and individuals in the New England area. An extensive program of Japanese language classes and informational services are offered, in keeping with its goal of targeting youth. Plans for a spectacular centennial celebration are currently underway.

The Japan Society of Northern California

312 Sutter Street, Suite 410, San Francisco, CA 94108

Phone: 415-986-4383 Fax: 415-986-5772

President: Ms. Kathleen Kimura
Executive Director: Mr. Thomas A. Wilkins Founded in 1905

The Japan Society of Northern California represents more than 3,000 individuals and nearly 300 corporations which participate in the society and cover a wide range of professional activities by both Japanese and American firms. As a pro-active community outreach organization, it serves the diverse community of Japan-related interests with an active programming calendar featuring more than 80 educational presentations each year. It is one of the largest and most active Japan-related educational organizations in the western United States.

The Japan America Society of Southern California

ARCO Plaza, Level C, 505 South Flower Street, Los Angeles, CA 90071

Phone: 213-627-6217 Fax: 213-627-1353

Chairman: Mr. Sheldon Ausman
Executive Director: Dr. Barry Keehn Founded in February, 1909

With 3,500 individual and 280 corporate members, this society ranks as a leading center for Japan-related activities in the U.S., presenting more than 300 public affairs, cultural, business and social programs each year. It was formed when a group of Japanese and American friends held a banquet at the Los Angeles Y.M.C.A. and decided to establish a "Japanese American Fraternity," and has grown into the nation's second largest society. Its interesting history includes everything from a lavish 1953 banquet for the young Crown Prince Akihito to the establishment of the first "5:01 Club" social activities.

Japan-America Society of Charlotte

Office of International Programs, UNC Charlotte, Charlotte, NC 28223

Phone: 704-547-2727 Fax: 704-547-3168

President: Mr. George Pretty
Executive Director: Ms. Maria Domoto Founded in 1993

JASC has built upon the record of the Charlotte Japan Center, visualizing, six years ago, a Japan-America Society in the growing Charlotte region. This past year (1993-1994), it achieved its goal of induction into the National Association of Japan-America Societies, and it is actively promoting mutual understanding between the people of Japan and the Charlotte region through the exchange of information and ideas. Community events have increased goodwill across boundaries, and business, cultural and educational activities are already providing the Charlotte area with a diverse schedule of opportunities for meeting the Society's goals.

Japan America Society of Chicago, Inc.

225 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2250, Chicago, IL 60606

Phone: 312-263-3049 Fax: 312-263-6120

President: Mr. Dennis A. Britton
Executive Director: Dr. Richard P. Soter Founded in 1930

The Japan America Society of Chicago serves as the principal forum in the Midwest for the exchange of substantive ideas and information on economic, political and cultural affairs that shape and inform U.S.-Japan bilateral relations. To enhance those relations, it conducts business luncheons and evening cultural events and social programs, including sporting events. Experts from the Asia Pacific region participate in the Society's annual symposia, their discussions resulting in published Proceedings designed to influence policy planners on both sides of the Pacific. The Society also serves as Secretariat to the Midwest U.S.-Japan Association.

Japan-America Society of Greater Cincinnati

300 Carew Tower, 441 Vine Street, Cincinnati, OH 45202-2812

Phone: 513-579-3114 Fax: 513-579-3101

President: Mr. Patrick J. Ward
Associate Director: Ms. Amy Matsuzaki Founded in 1988

Due to the unprecedented growth of Japanese firms in the Greater Cincinnati area in the mid-1980s, a group of interested leaders formed the Cincinnati Society. There are now dozens of Japanese-owned firms in the area, with more than 9,000 employees working for Japanese or U.S.-Japan joint venture firms. The Society fills a need by helping them to conduct business and by offering civic activities which promote a better understanding of U.S.-Japan relations. Through a broad range of activities and publications, the Society seeks to help residents achieve the cultural literacy and direct dialogue necessary in today's international community.

Japan Society of Cleveland

Asia Plaza B210, 2999 Payne Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44114

Phone: 216-694-4774 Fax: 216-622-6009

Chairperson of the Board: Ms. Jane Benjamin
Executive Director: Ms. Yoshiko Ikuta Founded in 1992

The Japan Society of Cleveland evolved from the Japan Study Group, created by the Cleveland Council on World Affairs in 1990. The society began with an emphasis on cultural and educational programs, with a heavy representation of academia and rich artistic and cultural program components. Today, because the city faces Lake Erie, which is open to international seaways, many Japanese corporations have been drawn to the Greater Cleveland community. Consequently, the society has increased its international business programs in an effort to enrich that community while maintaining cultural richness.

Japan America Society of Colorado

P.O. Box 13740, Denver, CO 80201

Phone: 303-298-9633 Fax: 303-293-9222

President: Mr. Brian Pendleton
Executive Director: Ms. Shinobu Yoshitomi Founded in 1989

Ninety corporate and 500 individual members comprise the JASC, which was founded after community leaders saw several years of increasing Japan-related business and tourism in Colorado. The mission of the society, which is to increase Colorado/Japan understanding, appreciation and cooperation, is carried out in such ongoing programs as the JASC mentorship program in which business executives, in cooperation with JASC corporate members and theJapanese Firms Association, mentor high school students. In 1994, JASC and the Governor of Colorado were honored to host a luncheon for the Emperor and Empress of Japan.

Japan-America Society of Dallas/Fort Worth

174-B World Trade Center, 2050 N. Stemmons Fwy., Dallas, TX 75207

Phone: 214-761-1791 Fax: 214-761-1793

President: Mr. Dean H. Vanderbilt
Executive Director: Ms. Lois H. Stratton Founded in February, 1970

With an active total membership of 350, the society offers, in addition to the usual complement of programs and events, educational and cultural outreach programs targeted at school children through "Japan in a Suitcase." Last year, under a grant from the Center for Global Partnership, it examined the growth and development of the nonprofit sector in Japan and organized site visits to local social service agencies. In celebration of "25 Years of Friendship," JASD will present to the people of Dallas a gift of a 19th C. Kasuga lantern to honor Japan-America community linkages.

Japan Society of South Florida

80 S.W. 8th Street, Suite 2809, Miami, FL 33130

Phone: 305-358-6006 Fax: 305-374-1030

President: Mr. M. Chase Burritt
Executive Director: Ms. Akiko Endo Founded in 1989

Although the Japan Society of South Florida conducts extensive educational and cultural programs, business related activities are emphasized, with informational services seminars and conferences designed to further a comprehensive understanding of Japan. The Society participates in many non-political affairs concerning Japan, and it publishes newsletters in English and *The Florida News* in Japanese. School visits, Japanese classes, resource speakers, student exchange host programs, and a variety of workshops round out the Society's rich educational programs.

The Japan-America Society of Florida, Inc.

Belleview Mido Resort-Palm Cottage, 25 Belleview Blvd.
P.O. Box 2317, Clearwater, FL 34617

Phone: 813-442-3148 Fax: 813-442-3148

President: Mr. William J. Flynn III
Executive Director: Mr. Robert W. Payne Founded in 1982

From the very first, this society has been blessed by senior Florida and Japanese business and community leaders lending their expertise and time to provide society leadership. Today, it provides over sixty annual program activities ranging from conferences on Florida/Japan trade, to monthly business forums featuring prominent U.S./Japanese business and government leaders, to artistic performances and displays, and services such as consulting, translating and language training for its membership and the community. The society was selected to be the host for Florida's first full-time JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) Senior Trade Advisor.

Greater Detroit and Windsor Japan-America Society

150 West Jefferson, Suite 1500, Detroit, MI 48226

Phone: 313-963-1988 Fax: 313-963-8839

Chairman: Mr. Clare E. Winterbottom
President: Ms. Shirley J. Baker Founded in 1990

Windsor and Detroit share a common border and a cooperative relationship which enables them to work together in the international marketplace. Realizing that Canada, Japan and the U.S. have an immense (and growing) influence on global economic and political relations, the society is dedicated to strengthening the ties of friendship between the Japanese people and the citizens of the Detroit and Windsor area through its programs and activities.

The Japan-America Society of Georgia
Suite 710, South Tower, 225 Peachtree Street N. E., Atlanta, GA 30303

Phone: 404-524-7399 Fax: 404-524-8447

Chairman: Mr. Joseph R. White, Jr.
Executive Director: Ms. Hilda C. Lockhart Founded in 1980

The Japan-America Society of Georgia (JASG) was formed by a group of business and academic leaders to raise the level of knowledge among Georgians about Japan and its culture. The JASG develops and sponsors programs and events structured to 1) enhance Georgia's overall knowledge of the arts, industry, culture, political, educational and social systems of Japan and 2) to provide Japanese guests who are working and residing in Georgia with personal contacts in the state. The JASG was the first U.S. society to receive a citation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo for its high level of programming.

The Japan-America Society of Hawaii
P.O. Box 1412 Honolulu, HI 96806

Phone: 808-524-4450 Fax: 808-524-4451 Email: jash@aloha.net

President: Mr. Yoshiharu Satoh
Executive Director: Mr. Earl K. Okawa Founded in 1976

The Japan-America Society of Hawaii is proud to serve as host society for this first International Symposium of Japan-America Societies. Since it was established in 1976, the organization has thrived, a reflection of its location (often called "The Bridge to the Pacific") and Hawaii's large number of citizens and visitors of Japanese ancestry. It now provides services to over 1,000 individual and corporate members who wholeheartedly support its goals of promoting good relations between the peoples of Japan and the U.S. JASH has an active schedule of programs and publications that cover the entire spectrum of the U.S.-Japan relationship.

The Japan-America Society of Houston
1360 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 1760, Houston, TX 77056

Phone: 713-963-0121 Fax: 713-963-8270

President: Mr. Wesley J. Grove
Executive Director: Ms. Geraldine C. Gill Founded in 1968

To provide a cultural bridge between Japan and the U.S., especially between the peoples of Chiba and Houston, the Japan-America Society of Houston was founded. It offers a variety of programs, including lectures and conferences in open forums, to meet its goals. Japanese classes are offered, as are instructive programs on Japanese flower arrangement and tea ceremony. Cultural English programs are provided for Japanese-speaking members, as well. The Society conducts an Annual Festival and an Annual Coffee and Tea, and operates both Business and Academic Councils.

Japan-America Society of Indiana, Inc.

Merchants Bank Building, Suite 200, 11 South Meridian Street
Indianapolis, IN 46204-3509

Phone: 317-635-0123 Fax: 317-635-1452

President: Mr. Robert H. Reynolds
Executive Director: Ms. Theresa A. Kulczak Founded in 1988

JASI was founded by prominent Indiana leaders during the peak of Indiana-Japan economic growth following the arrival of Japanese manufacturing companies and their families. It serves as a bridge of understanding, friendship and cooperation between the people of Japan and Indiana by sponsoring a wide range of cultural, business, public affairs, educational, family, and social activities to further its goals. Over 50,000 individuals have been reached through its outreach programs. In 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan selected JASI to serve as host to the Second Annual Japan-U.S. Business Camp and Japan Executive Internship.

Japan/America Society of Kentucky

P.O. Box 333, Lexington, KY 40584

Phone: 606-231-7533 Fax: 606-233-9407

Chairman: Mr. Glen M. Krebs
Executive Director: Mr. Michael Cronan Founded in 1987

The Japan/America Society of Kentucky (JASK) helps promote mutual understanding, cooperation, and friendship between the people of Japan and Kentucky through a variety of business, cultural, social, and recreational programs. It is hoped that the opportunity to develop professional contacts within the framework of JASK will assist in strengthening economic ties between the people of Japan and Kentucky.

Japan America Society of Minnesota

Suite EH 401 Riverplace, 43 Main Street S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55414-1048

Phone: 612-627-9357 Fax: 612-379-4120

President: Ms. Mirja P. Hansen
Executive Director: Mr. Paul V. Sherburne Founded in 1972

The Japan America Society of Minnesota offers an exciting array of social, cultural, economic and public affairs programs. It serves as a clearinghouse for Japan-related information, resources and activities. JASM has a diverse membership of students, business people, professionals and others from the U.S. and Japan. It publishes a monthly calendar of events, a quarterly newsletter, and other publications such as a Japanese language "Guide to Living in Minnesota" and "A Teaching Guide to Japanese Arts and Culture." JASM annually provides scholarships to students wishing to attend *Nori No Ike* at Concordia Language Village.

The Japan-America Society of Nevada

P. O. Box 26267, Las Vegas, NV 89126-0267

Phone: 702-252-0277 Fax: 702-253-0075

President: Mr. Robert M. Jitchaku
Executive Director: Mr. Roberto M. Campos Founded in 1995

The Japan-America Society of Nevada (JASN) is dedicated to promoting understanding, cooperation and friendship between the peoples of Japan and Nevada. Recognizing the dynamic growth of Nevada as not only a top tourism destination, but also as a flourishing international business region with important ties to Japan and the Pacific Rim, public and private leaders united in 1995 to form the new society. A full slate of programs has been scheduled, including a Saturday School for children of Japanese expatriates residing in Las Vegas, and Nevadan children wishing to learn more about Japan's language and culture.

The Japan-America Society of New Hampshire

P. O. Box 1226, Portsmouth, NH 03802-1226

Phone: 603-433-1360 Fax: 603-431-8062

President: Mr. Charles B. Doleac
Executive Director: Mr. Mamoru (Mori) Mitsui Founded in 1988

To enhance the mutual understanding between peoples of Japan and New Hampshire, the society sponsors the Portsmouth Peace Treaty Forum, the first of which, held in 1994, signified the first formal meeting of Japanese, Russian and American scholars and diplomats in Portsmouth since the negotiation of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty in 1905. The Forum explored, through those nations' perspectives, the history of the treaty and its relevance to current issues involving the Northern Pacific Rim. Each Forum will build upon the work of the previous Forum: two were held in 1994 in what is planned to be a continuing program sponsored by the society.

Japan Society, Inc. (New York)

333 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017

Phone: 212-832-1155 Fax: 212-755-6752

Chairman: Mr. Michael I. Sovern
President: Mr. William Clark, Jr. Founded in 1907

The Japan Society is an American institution which is actively engaged in the promotion of understanding and enlightened relations between the U.S. and Japan. To foster informed attitudes, the society conducts a variety of programs. Major program areas include the U.S.-Japan Program, the Japan Society Gallery, the Japan Society Film Center, the Performing Arts Program, the Toyota Language Center, and the 14,000 volume C. V. Starr Library. Through these activities, the society builds understanding on the solid basis of knowledge and cross-cultural sensitivity.

North Carolina Japan Center

North Carolina State University, Box 8112, Raleigh, NC 27695-8112

Phone: 919-515-3450 Fax: 919-515-3686

President of the Center's Boards: Dr. William B. Toole III
Director: Dr. John Sylvester, Jr. Founded in 1980

The North Carolina Japan Center was established at North Carolina State University in Raleigh in 1980 at the request of the governor to strengthen the state's academic, economic, scientific and cultural ties with Japan. It works broadly within the university and has five chapters at regional public and private universities to inform citizens about the state's ties with Japan. The Center works closely with Japanese and American firms in the state and holds an annual high-level economic conference in addition to its regular public lectures and meetings.

Japan-America Society of Oregon

221 N.W. Second Avenue, Portland, OR 97209-3999

Phone: 503-228-9411, Ext. 235/236 Fax: 503-228-5126

President: Mr. Adolf Hertrich
Executive Director: Ms. Dixie McKeel Founded in 1907

Early in this century, as the Nippon Society, this organization sponsored public lectures and exhibits and served as a forum for the exchange of ideas between Americans and Japanese. It was inactive between 1941 and 1952, but committed members reactivated it in 1952, and in 1975 it adopted its present name in keeping with societies in both Japan and the United States. The society has shown consistent growth to its present total membership of 1,250. It is devoted to individuals, corporations and other organizations interested in promoting a strong and balanced relationship between the peoples of Oregon, southwest Washington, and Japan.

Japan-America Society of Pennsylvania

500 Wood Street, 20th Floor, Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Phone: 412-281-4440 Fax: 412-281-4460

President: Mr. Masahiko (Mark) Nakagawa Founded in 1986
Executive Dirrector: Ms. Elise S. Moersch

This society's goal is to provide a medium through which the world's two largest democracies may learn from the experience and achievements of one another by fostering personal relationships between members; by discussing important issues and interests common to Japan and America; and by promoting—through education—a better understanding of the countries' arts, literature, cultural ideals and aspirations. A variety of exceptional events advance this mission: last year, for example, receptions were held for musicians Midori and Sadao Watanabe, and distinguished speakers Dean Thomas Murrin and Glen Fukushima addressed the group.

Japan America Society of Greater Philadelphia

c/o Greater Philadelphia First, 1818 Market Street, Suite 3510
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Phone: 215-575-2200 Fax: 215-575-2222

Chairman: Mr. Lennox K. Black
Executive Director: Ms. Catherine Nagel Founded in 1994

The Japan America Society of Greater Philadelphia (JASGP) is an association of individuals, corporations and other associations in the geographic area centered on the City of Philadelphia. Its purpose is to bring the peoples of Japan and America closer together in understanding, appreciation, and cooperation. The JASGP is devoted to fostering relationships between Americans and Japanese by promoting and encouraging a better understanding of the business, cultural, social, educational and political practices and customs of Japan and the United States.

Japan-America Society of St. Louis, Inc.

7 North Brentwood Boulevard, Suite 202, St. Louis, MO 63105

Phone: 314-726-6822 Fax: 314-721-5083

President: Mr. Yoshiaki Shibusawa
Managing Director: Mr. Oliver A. Dulle, Jr. Founded in 1967

The Japan-America Society of St. Louis was honored to welcome the Emperor and Empress of Japan, along with Ambassador Kuriyama, to St. Louis in 1994. It also held its 20th Annual Japanese Festival at the Japanese Garden at the Missouri Botanical Garden. Over 40,000 people attended, making it the largest event in the history of the Garden. The Society co-sponsored an interesting video teleconference with MITI in Japan, and it continues its outreach throughout the state of Missouri. It has begun a number of initiatives to be held in collaboration with the educational community.

The Japan Society (Toronto)

Box 70 Sun Life Centre, West Tower, Suite 1301, 200 King Street West
Toronto Ontario Canada M5H 3T4

Phone: 416-591-3696 Fax: 416-591-2411

President and Chief Executive Officer: Mr. Ben J. Ciprietti
Executive Administrator: Ms. Susan Poaps

The Japan Society was established to provide a national forum for very senior Canadian and Japanese executives and academic leaders to meet on a continuing basis to discuss matters of mutual interest, to further economic relationships between the two countries, to acquire greater cultural understanding and to support business, educational and cultural exchange. Most members are from major Canadian and Japanese corporations and large universities. The society, which conducts both social and substantive programs, was accepted in 1994 as the first non-U.S. Affiliate Member of the National Association of Japan-America Societies.

The Japan-Virginia Society

830 East Main Street, Suite 304, Richmond, VA 23219

Phone: 804-783-0740 Fax: 804-643-3727

President: Mr. Malcolm S. McDonald
Executive Director: Ms. Barbara Nesbitt Founded in 1988

At the request of the Governor of Virginia, a group of business and professional leaders met in 1988 and laid the foundation for an organization to provide a forum for dialogue and the deepening of mutual understanding between the peoples of Japan and Virginia. The Society's programs now include seminars, luncheons, programs to acquaint Virginians with doing business with the Japanese, support for the construction and start-up phases of Japanese corporations, and liaison assistance in all phases of moving into and becoming established in Virginia. Cultural resource services are provided on things Japanese within the Virginia community.

Japan-America Society of the State of Washington

1800 Ninth Avenue, Suite 1550, Seattle, WA 98101-1322

Phone: 206-623-7900 Fax: 206-343-7930

President: Mr. Gary Severson
Executive Director: Ms. Susan S. Mochizuki Founded in 1923

This venerable and very active society has a rich history of working for the betterment of peoples in Japan and America. Many goodwill and diplomatic missions have visited Seattle under the Society's auspices, and programs are now conducted outside the Seattle area. Though primarily concerned with the Japan-U.S. trade, economics, politics and business relationship, cultural and educational programs are offered (including a 2-week summer "Japanese Language and Culture Camp for American High School Students") as are social and hospitality programs.

The Japan-America Society of Washington, D.C.

1020 Nineteenth Street N.W., Lower Lobby Suite 40, Washington, D.C. 20036

Phone: 202-833-2210 Fax: 202-833-2456

President: Dr. Carl J. Green
Executive Director: Ms. Patricia R. Kearns Founded in 1957

Over 3,000 individual and corporate representatives support this Society's goals of promoting a greater understanding between the peoples of the United States and Japan. It continuously expands on a variety of public affairs, cultural, corporate and educational programs in furtherance of this mission. Membership in this Mid-Atlantic region represents interests ranging from economic issues to Japanese theater, and includes student members who are studyingJapanese in the area's public schools. In addition, the Japan-America Society of Washington, D.C. includes approximately 125 corporations actively engaged in U.S.-Japan dialogue.

The Japan-America Society of Wisconsin, Inc.

756 N. Milwaukee Street, Milwaukee, WI 53202

Phone: 414-287-4111 Fax: 414-271-7753

President: Mr. Saburo Nishi
Executive Director: Mr. Perry Liljestrand Founded in 1990

The Japan-America Society of Wisconsin, Inc. (JASW) is celebrating its fifth year of significant growth and service to the Japanese and Americans in the Wisconsin area. It welcomes persons from all over the world to share in its unique programs—and especially to take advantage of its multitude of winter sports. The Society is proud to have been the sponsor of the 1994 National Association of Japan-America Societies' conference, and it is continuing to strive to meet the highest expectations of business corporations, educational institutions and the Wisconsin communities it represents.

Japan Societies (NAAJS)

The America-Japan Society, Inc.

17-4, Nagata-cho 2-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100

Phone: 03-3593-6617 Fax: 03-3593-6675

President: The Honorable Yoshio Okawara
Executive Director: Ms. Akiko Kuno Founded in 1917

This parent body of the America-Japan Societies was established by prominent American and Japanese leaders who wished to promote friendly America-Japan relations and to diffuse among the Japanese people "a more accurate knowledge of the United States." Viscount Kentaro Kaneko was the Society's first President; Ambassador R.S. Morris, its first Honorary President. The Society continues its founders' efforts, presenting a variety of programs to enhance friendship and understanding among its members. For businessmen, it offers the perfect meeting point for exchanging news and ideas. Since 1986, the America-Japan Society, Inc., has served as the National Association of America-Japan Societies (NAAJS).

Akita Japan-America Society

Room 219, Hotel Hakuto
1-1 Chiaki, Yatome-cho, Akita 010

Phone: 0188-35-3311 Fax: 0188-35-3316

President: Mr. Takeshi Ishii
Managing Director: Mr. Yoshio Watanabe Founded in 1958

The Japan-America Society of Asahikawa

Masuda Clinic
Migi 5, Ichijo 6-chome, Asahikawa, Hokkaido 070

Phone: 0166-22-9600 Fax: 0166-23-7112

President: Dr. Kazuo Masuda
Managing Director: Mr. Toshio Niwase Founded in 1953

The Asahikawa Japan-America Society promotes face-to-face understanding and friendships at the citizen level between the peoples of the United States and Japan.

The Fukui America-Japan Society

c/o Fukui Chamber of Commerce and Industry
8-1 Nishikida, 2-Chome, Fukui City 910

Phone: 0776-33-8253 Fax: 0776-36-8588

President: Mr. Tamotsu Ichihashi
Managing Director: Mr. Tatsuro Yamaguchi Founded in 1982

This Society aims at promoting cultural, economic and technological exchange between Fukui Prefecture and the United States, and contributing to the betterment of mutual understanding between the people of both areas. It actively exchanges information and materials, issues invitations to those in both countries involved in cultural and economic activities, and holds events such as research presentations, conferences, concerts and art exhibits in order to promote cultural exchange and person-to-person interaction.

The Japan-America Society of Fukuoka

6F Fukuoka Fuji Bldg., 8-49 Tenjin 2 Chome, Chuo-ku, Fukuoka 810

Phone: 092-771-6481 Fax: 092-771-6490

President: Mr. Reinosuke Ohya
Executive Director: Mr. Kiyomi Matsuo Founded in 1958

The Fukuoka Society was established by the local economic circle with the objective of contributing to the deepening friendship and understanding between the peoples of Japan and the United States. With this in view, the Society cooperates with several other civic organizations to schedule lectures on political, economic and international subjects, receptions for invited guests, Moon-viewing and Christmas parties, English classes, and support for women and youth. In addition to its membership in the National Association of America-Japan Societies, it keeps close relations with eight other America-Japan Societies by way of presidents' meetings and other interchanges.

Japan-America Society of Gifu

c/o English Education Dept., Faculty of Education,
Gifu University, 1-1 Yanagido, Gifu 501-11

Phone: 0582-30-1111 Fax: 0582-64-5852

President: Mr. Jun'ichiro Taga

The Japan-America Society of Hakodate

3F Kitaya Bldg., 25-12 Hon-cho, Hakodate 040

Phone: 0138-53-8352 Fax: 0138-32-6041

Secretary General: Mr. Akira Watanabe
Chairman: Mr. Shigeru Kanaya Founded in 1991

While recognizing the problems between the United States and Japan, the Hakodate Society aims continually at bringing about the exchange between groups of people in both countries and conducting activities aimed at deepening true mutual understanding in order to increase mutual friendship. In its efforts to focus on solid, firmly-grounded activities, it plans to offer fewer purely social activities and possibly to expand to the point where it performs a function like that of an American Center in Hakodate. An additional goal involves the establishment of a sister city relationship with a city in the United States.

Japan-America Society of Hiroshima

c/o President Room, RCC
21-3, Motomachi, Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730

Phone: 082-222-1114 Fax: 082-222-1189

President: Mr. Isao Horiguchi
Manager: Mr. Minoru Tamaki Founded in 1976

The Hiroshima Society was established in order to develop friendly relations and goodwill between Japan and the United States. Recently, the Society has been conducting a series of several lectures each year on the problems of U.S.-Japan economic frictions and on the cultures of both countries. The Hiroshima Society has also invited people who have come to Japan from America to the parties held for its members in July, for Independence Day, and in December, for Christmas, and has deepened friendships with these invitations.

The America-Japan Society of Hokkaido

c/o American Center, Nishi 28-Chome Ohdori, Chuo-ku, Sapporo 064

Phone: 011-641-0211

President: Dr. Mikio Arie
Managing Director: Mr. Toshimi Oe Founded in 1954

To meet its stated goals of deepening the mutual understanding between the U.S. and Japan, of forging close personal cultural and economic linkages, and of promoting friendly relationships, the Hokkaido Society conducts a variety of activities. These include holding meetings; hosting visitors from the United States; and introducing and facilitating interaction, cooperation and research between groups in the U.S. and Japan which have the same purposes. The Society also carries out activities which aid in research about such subjects as U.S. lifestyles, ideals, technology, industry and economy.

The Hokuriku Japan-America Cultural Society

Social Education Center, 2-15 Honda-Machi, 3-Chome, Kanazawa 920

Phone: 0762-31-3291

President: Mr. Kohei Hatta
Secretary General: Mr. Tatsuro Tatsuno

Kagoshima Japan-America Society

c/o Minami Nihon Broadcasting Co., Ltd., 5-25, Korai-cho, Kagoshima 890

Phone: 0992-54-7111, ext. 332 Fax: 0992-56-1070

President: Mr. Katsushi Terazono
Managing Director: Mr. Junnosuke Kishi

The Kita Kyushu Japan-America Society

c/o Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Kita Kyushu Shiritsu Shokoboeki Kaikan 7F
1-35 Furusenba-machi, Kokurakita-ku, Kita Kyushu 802

Phone: 093-541-0181 Fax: 093-531-1799

President: Mr. Masami Okano
Secretary General: Mr. Mutsuo Tajima

Japan-America Society of Kobe

Daiei Kobe Head Office, 9F Port Island Bldg.
1-1 Minatojima, Naka-Machi 4-Chome Chuo-Ku, Kobe 651

Phone: 078-302-5001 Fax: 078-302-5572

President: Mr. Isao Nakauchi
Executive Director: Mr. Akihiro Nishimiya

Japan-America Society of Kumamoto

c/o Kumamoto Hotel Castle, 2-4, Joto-machi, Kumamoto 860

Phone: 096-326-3311 Fax: 096-326-3324

President: Mr. Mitsuya Nagano
Managing Director: Mr. Isamu Takehara Founded in 1961

The objectives of the Kumamoto Society are to promote friendly relationships and understanding between the peoples of Japan and the United States, and to contribute to the interchange of the cultures of both countries. The Society does this by holding lectures, discussions and study meetings, providing opportunities for the exchange of information and research, and carrying out other work which is helpful in attaining its goals.

Japan-America Society of Kyoto

4-F Rokkaku Bldg., 245 Rokkaku-dori, Karasuma Higashi-iru
Donomae-cho, Nakagyo-ku, Kyoto 604

Phone: 075-255-3900 Fax: 075-255-3232

President: Mr. Kazuo Inamori
Secretary General: Mr. Muneya Nishimura Founded in 1987

This Society was founded upon the belief that the U.S.-Japan relationship, which in the past has been based upon political and economic frameworks, is no longer suitable today. In order to develop a healthy relationship, grass-roots exchanges between the two countries are necessary. Working within this philosophy, the Kyoto Society is making plans for inviting young members of Japan-America Societies in the United States who have never been to Japan to look at various facets of Japanese society and to deepen their understanding of Japan's culture. These plans will be put into action when sufficient funds have been secured.

The Japan America Society of Miyakonojo

Jonan Hospital 30-5 Daio-cho Miyakonojo City, Miyazakiken 885

Phone: 0986-23-2844 Fax: 0986-26-1997

President: Dr. Toshisuke Matsuura
Secretary: Ms. Ayako Matsuura Founded in 1986

The Japan America Society of Miyakonojo shares in the America-Japan Societies' goals of promoting friendly relations and understanding between the peoples of Japan and the United States. It seeks to contribute to the exchange of culture and economic understanding between the two countries. The Society holds discussions, lectures, study meetings, and research exchange sessions, and carries out other such projects as are helpful in attaining its objectives. It also encourages student exchanges, promoting interesting events to attract students from international universities and other educational institutions to the Miyakonojo area.

The Japan-America Society of Nagasaki

c/o The Eighteenth Bank, Ltd., 1-11 Doza Machi, Nagasaki 850

Phone: 0958-28-8178 Fax: 0958-26-6124

President: Mr. Genji Nozaki
Executive Secretary: Mr. Shinichiro Matsuda Founded in 1970

The Nagasaki Society sponsors a U.S.-Japan exchange of those experienced in education, and conducts conferences, research and presentations designed to broaden the foundation of friendship and trust between the U.S. and Japan. Its goal of increasing global cooperation between individuals is met, in part, by friendship and interaction with Saint Paul, its sister city, and the establishment of close relationships with visitors from the United States. It aims at advancing the cause of peace in the Asia Pacific sphere as well as globally, while at the same time increasing internationalization among its members.

Nagoya America-Japan Society

c/o Nagoya Chamber of Commerce and Industry
10-19, Sakae 2-chome, Naka-ku, Nagoya 460

Phone: 052-221-7211 Fax: 052-232-5751

President: Mr. Hideo Kamio Founded in 1945
Secretary: Mr. Kiyochi Murata

To fulfill its objective of promoting friendly relations and understanding between the peoples of Japan and America, the Society provides opportunities to exchange ideas and views on Japan and the United States at periodic meetings. It also arranges events which introduce Japanese and American culture and life. By cooperating with similar organizations, the Nagoya Society furthers cultural exchange and conducts many other activities deemed appropriate for implementing the objectives of the Society as approved by its Board of Directors.

The Niigata Japan-America Society

Apple Gaigo Kanko College, 2-13-13 Sasaguchi, Niigata-shi 950

Phone: 025-245-9339 Fax: 025-245-9399

President: Mr. Ikuo Hirayama
Executive Director: Mr. Toshihiko Watanabe Founded in 1960

Because of its esteem for both Japanese tradition and the American culture, the Niigata Society provides programs so that members can learn from each others' experiences. The Society serves as an intelligence center between Japan and America, and as a forum for discussing the countries' pending problems. It actively promotes mutual friendships between Japanese and American citizens, cementing the cooperative relationships between the peoples of Niigata and America. To accomplish this, it cooperates with other groups in projects for the cultural exchange between Japan and America.

Japan-America Society of Osaka

Kubota Corporation, Secretary Office
2-47 Shikitsuhigashi 1-Chome, Naniwa-ku Osaka 556

Phone: 06-648-2001 Fax: 06-648-2389

President: Mr. Shigekazu Mino Founded in 1946
Manager: Mr. Masayoshi Shimatani

A major goal of the Osaka Society is to provide its members with an opportunity to communicate and exchange information with other members who have different backgrounds. To contribute to the promoting of friendship, mutual understanding and cultural exchange between Americans and Japanese, it schedules discussions of major economic, political, business, and cultural issues with leading American and Japanese authorities at meetings such as luncheons and conferences. The Society also promotes an appreciation of Japanese culture through one-day excursions, Sumo-watching and other events.

Japan-America Society of Sasebo

Sasebo Chuo Hospital, 4-5 Tonoo-cho, Sasebo 857

Phone: 0956-23-5546 Fax: 0956-24-6313

President: Dr. Yuko Tominaga
Managing Director: Dr. Taro Nanakuma

The Japan-America Society of Sasebo aims at increasing friendship and understanding between the people of Japan and of the United States, and at fostering cultural exchange between these groups. In order to attain its goals, the Sasebo Society conducts an average of two conferences each year in addition to its various social gatherings.

The America-Japan Society of Shimoda

c/o Shimoda Chamber of Commerce and Industry
2-12-17 Shimoda, Shizuoka 415

Phone: 0558-22-1181 Fax: 0558-23-1160

President: Dr. Akira Kikuchi
Secretary: Mr. Hiroshi Watanabe Founded in 1986

Because Shimoda is the historical site where friendly relations began between the U.S. and Japan, with the opening of the port by the Black Ships led by Matthew Perry, Shimoda's people have always accepted friendly relations as the norm. The "Black Ship Festival," an annual event which commemorates this friendship, has been held 56 times, and Shimoda and Newport, Rhode Island (Commodore Perry's home town), forged a sister city relationship in 1958. In recent years, Shimoda has also begun exchanges with New York because of its association with U.S. Counsel Townsend Harris, who established Japan's first consulate, also in Shimoda.

The Japan-America Society of Tochigi

4-9-11 Fujimigaoka, Utsunomiya 320

Phone: 0286-21-3033 Fax: 0286-21-1769

President: Mr. Takaichi Amakawa
Executive Director: Mr. Akira Suzuki

Tohoku Japan-America Association

c/o Kamei Corporation, 3-1-18 Kokubun-cho, Aoba-ku, Sendai 980

Phone: 022-264-6004 Fax: 022-264-6080

President: Mr. Shogo Kamei
Secretary General: Mr. Masao Kudo Founded in 1959

The Tohoku Society holds several yearly events, including a General Meeting as well as different seasonal activities, in order to foster its aim of increasing friendship between its members. As necessity demands, the Society also holds such activities as conferences, exchange meetings, English contests, etc., to meet its goals. The city of Sendai is the sister city of Riverside City. Last year on October 24th, the Tohoku Japan-America Society took the lead in establishing a Sendai-Dallas Exchange Association, and it has since begun person-to-person level exchanges.

The Japan-America Society of Toyama

c/o Toyama Chamber of Commerce and Industry
2-1-3, Sogawa, Toyama 930

Phone: 0764-23-1111 Fax: 0764-23-1114

President: Mr. Tadahiro Yoshida
Secretary General: Mr. Takashi Kidon Founded in 1991

To foster its goal of the promotion of mutual friendship and understanding between the United States and Japan, the Toyama Society conducts activities which include "Symposia for U.S.-Japan Exchange" and exchange meetings under the title, "Seminars for Understanding the U.S." In April of 1993, the Society invited former United States President Jimmy Carter to Toyama Prefecture, where he delivered a speech titled, "Global Problems During the Clinton Administration."

The Japan-America Society of Yokohama

c/o Yokohama Chamber of Commerce and Industry
8F Sangyo Boeki Center Building, 2 Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohama 231

Phone: 045-671-7474 Fax: 045-671-7410

President: Mr. Shinji Kato
Managing Director: Mr. Katsumi Iijima Founded in 1952

As a subsidiary organization of the Yokohama Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Society sets its executive office within the Chamber, and all of its business transactions are taken care of by the Chamber's staff. The Society's key activities are New Year's Parties, U.S. Independence Day celebrations and Annual General Membership meetings, etc. The Yokohama Society is now attempting to increase the number of its American members, and to promote activities that will provide for more opportunities for all members to deepen their mutual understanding of Japanese and American peoples.

1995
International Symposium
of Japan-America
Societies

Symposium Delegates

Lei-bedecked Symposium delegates gather at a Hawaii reception.

Delegates from Japan

Beppu
Ms. Mihoko Makino

Fukuoka
Mr. Mizuho Ariyoshi
Ms. Minako Baba
Mr. Ryuichi Fukamizu
Mr. Hideaki Hara
Mr. Yoshihide Idemitsu
Mr. Yoshihiro Inoue
Ms. Takako Izumi
Mr. Kenji Kanetaka
Mr. Takatoshi Kawabe
Mr. Naoto Koike
Mrs. Satoko Koike
Mr. Hayato Maeda
Mr. Keisuke Matsui
Mr. Toshihiko Matsuo
Ms. Toshie Murayama
Mr. Takahiro Nakamura
Mrs. Kinuko Ohya
Mr. Reinosuke Ohya
Mr. Mitsuo Oishi
Ms. Aki Sumi
Ms. Chikako Uchino
Mr. Toshihiko Uchino
Mr. Suzumu Uenotsuchi
Mr. Yoshiaki Wakasugi
Mr. Donald Yamamoto
Mrs. Margaret Yamamoto
Mr. Kenji Yokoe
Mr. Tatsuya Yoshimura

Kita Kyushu
Mr. Masami Okano
Ms. Tatsuko Okano

Kurume
Mrs. Chie Kitamura
Mr. Sadao Kitamura

Kumamoto
Mr. Shiro Tajima

Kyoto
Mr. Muneya Nishimura
Ms. Kimie Sotobayashi

Miyakonojo
Ms. Tomoko Matsuura
Dr. Toshisuke Matsuura
Mr. Takashi Shirase

Nagasaki
Mr. Kokuo Hashida
Mr. Kunisuke Takushima
Mrs. Sachiko Takushima

Nagoya
Mrs. Kiyoko Inoue
Mr. Toshiyuki Inoue
Mr. Motoo Ito
Ms. Chieko Narita
Ms. Hisako Sato
Mr. Toshikazu Sato

Niigata
Mr. Bunkichi Ito
Ms. Kyoko Ito
Ms. Akiko Mashima
Ms. Yoshiko Yamada

Osaka
Mr. Philip Campanella
Mr. Craig Craven
Mrs. Maki Craven
Mrs. Emiko Ebihara
Mr. Koji Ebihara
Mr. Satoru Fukuda
Mrs. Setsuko Fukuda
Ms. Yumiko Nagai
Mr. Takeo Nakao
Ms. Masako Okamoto
Mr. Hideho Saeki
Ms. Miyoko Teraoka
Mr. Yoshijiro Yoshida

Sasebo
Mr. Noboru Imaide
Ms. Ikuko Matsuo

Shimoda
Mr. Shigeru Hirai
Mr. Hiroshi Watanabe

Tohoku
Mrs. Hiroko Aoki
Mr. Shigeyuki Aoki
Mr. Kokichi Imanishi
Ms. Yoshiko Narisawa
Ms. Michiko Sato

Tokyo
Mr. James Adachi
Mr. Nobumitsu Aihara
Mrs. Reiko Aihara
Mrs. Emi Amano
Mr. Haruo Amano
Mr. Yoshio Amano
Ms. Miyoko Aoki
Mr. Tetsuo Chino
Mr. Norishige Hasegawa
Mr. Tomio Kawai
Mrs. Yuko Kawai
Mr. Toshio Kinoshita
Ms. Akiko Kuno
Mr. Roy Lockheimer
Mr. Hideo Matsuda
Mrs. Hiroko Matsuda
Mr. Haruhiko Mori
Mr. Kazunao Murata
Mr. Masataka Nakamura
Mrs. Yukiko Nakamura
Mr. Kazuo Ohno
Mr. Akira Ohtomo
Mrs. Mari Ohtomo
Mr. Kikuo Okuda
Ms. Frances Ayako Sano
Ms. Tomiko Shirakigawa
Mr. Toshio Shono
Mrs. Charlotte Takahashi
Mr. Toru Takahashi
Mr. Yasuhiro Takahashi
Mr. Kei Tamaribuchi
Ms. Keiko Tanimura
Mr. Takashi Tanimura
Mr. Masao Toyama
Mr. Sho Yamamoto
Mr. Susumu Yoshida
Mr. Arthur Zegelbone

Toyama
Mr. Hiroshi Ogawa

Yokohama
Ms. Kazuko Arai
Mr. Ryoji Arai
Ms. Umeko Hamada
Mr. Hiroshi Ichihara
Mr. Katsumi Iijima
Mr. Genta Isomura
Mrs. Toshie Isomura
Mr. Shinji Kato
Ms. Makiko Sugihara
Mr. Satoshi Takano
Mr. Hikotaro Yamaguchi

Delegates from America

NAJAS
Dr. Robert Marra
Ms. Joy Rogers
Amb. Thomas Shoesmith

Alabama
Dr. Alexander Bolla
Mrs. Janet Bolla
Mrs. Glenda Etheredge
Mr. Roy Etheredge
Mr. James Miles

Boston
Mr. Vernon Alden
Ms. Charlotte Beattie
Mr. Yuji Ito
Mr. Carl Kay
Mr. Robert Magner
Mr. Franklin Wyman Jr.
Mrs. Ruth Wyman

Northern California
Ms. Anne Cherian
Mr. Clifford Clarke
Consul Hiroshi Furusawa
Miss Susan Nakamura
Mrs. Gene Wilkins
Mr. Thomas Wilkins

Southern California
Ms. Kathryn Carey
Ms. Linda Fitz
Mr. Tsutomu Gomibuchi
Ms. Delleta Hans
Mr. Milton Hans
Mr. Kenneth Ivory
Ms. Irene Jones
Mrs. Marcia Marcus
Mr. Dane Miller
Mr. Michael Moretti
Mr. Erven Nelson
Mrs. Sachi Seki
Mr. William Seki

Charlotte
Mr. Kazutaka (Tito) Domoto
Ms. Maria Domoto

Chicago
Ms. Catherine Elizabeth Healy
Ms. Cathy Pilkington

Cincinnati
Ms. Amy Matsuzaki
Mr. Ike Matsuzaki
Mrs. Hideko Okita
Mr. Takashi Okita

Cleveland
Mr. John Hughes
Ms. Yoshiko Ikuta
Mrs. Kei McMillin
Ms. Edythe Zimmerman

Colorado
Mr. Brian Pendleton
Mr. Kenichi Shimada
Dr. Susan Stein
Ms. Shinobu Yoshitomi

Dallas
Ms. Judith Becker
Mr. Richard Lalla
Mrs. Corinne McFarland
Dr. H. Neill McFarland
Ms. Lois Stratton
Mr. Dean Vanderbilt

Detroit
Mr. George Baker
Ms. Shirley Baker
Mrs. Carol Boyes
Mr. Paul Boyes
Mr. John Carroll Jr.
Ms. Penny Corbett
Mrs. Dorothy Endo
Mr. Patrick Endo
Mr. Gene Johnston
Ms. Nancy Kelly
Ms. Christine Mack
Mr. Hidehiro Okayama
Ms. Patt Preston
Mr. Koji Watanabe

Northwest Florida
Ms. Shigeko Honda

Florida
Mrs. Kay Orr
Dr. Mark Orr
Mr. Robert Payne

Georgia
Ms. Hilda Lockhart
Mr. John Steed
Mrs. Suzanne Steed

Hawaii
Mrs. Hidemi Amae
Consul General Kishichiro Amae
Mr. Yoshi Amae
Gov. George Ariyoshi
Mrs. Jean Ariyoshi
Ms. Carol Asai-Sato
Mr. Masakazu Asanuma
Ms. Margaret Boyer
Dr. Dorothy Bray
Mr. Dwane Brenneman
Ms. Margery Bronster
Miss Helen Cha
Dr. Doris Ching
Mr. Dick Clack
Mrs. Yoshiko Clack
Mrs. Norrie Del Vecchio
Mr. Paul Devens
Mrs. Setsuko Devens
Ms. Mildred Dohi
Mr. Patrick Donnellan
Mr. Dave Erdman
Dr. Lewis Freitas
Mr. Alan Fujimoto
Mr. Harry Fujita
Mr. Yasunori Fukui
Mr. Mark Fukunaga
Mr. Dan Furst
Mr. Yuri Giga
Dr. Norman Goldstein
Mr. Nick Griffin III
Mr. Chance Gusukuma
Ms. Laurinda Hadsell
Mr. Joseph Hale
Mrs. Marguerite Hale
Mr. Frank Hamada
Mr. Howard Hamamoto
Mr. Howard Hanada
Mr. Randall Harakal
Ms. R. Sinikka Hayasaka
Mrs. Masako Hayashi
Mr. Tatsumi Hayashi
Mr. Will Henderson
Ms. Hiroko Higa
Mr. Kihei Hirai
Mr. Ralph Honda
Mr. Russell Honma
Mr. Kinsuke Hosogai
Mrs. Noriko Hosogai
Mr. Keith Hudson
Ms. Momi Utako Hudson
Senior Consul Tokuji Ikeda
Mr. Koichi Isayama
Mr. Hiromi Ishigaki
Ms. Doris Iwamura

Consul Yoshimasa Iwata
Mr. Alexander Jampel
Mr. Neeraj Jhanji
Mr. Howard Karr
Mr. Steve Kawagishi
Mr. Tom Kellie
Ms. Grace Kido
Mr. James Kimura
Ms. Kyoko Kimura
Mr. Wayne Kirihara
Mr. Ray Kitsu
Ms. Ann Kobayashi
Mr. Kanae Kobayashi
Mr. Hideto Kono
Mrs. Mildred Kosaki
Dr. Richard Kosaki
Mr. Eigo Kudo
Mrs. Elsa Kudo
Mr. Yoichi Kunikane
Mr. Nobuo Kuniyuki
Ms. Amy Kurihara
Dr. Yasumasa Kuroda
Mr. Akemi Kurokawa
Mrs. Misako Kurokawa
Mr. Christopher Lamatsch
Ms. Natsuko Lambert
Dr. James Langworthy
Mr. Hart Larrabee IV
Mr. James Lee
Mrs. Vicky Lee
Mr. Michael Leineweber
Ms. Spencer Leineweber
Ms. Yuen San Amy Lin
Mr. Anthony Lojac
Ms. Adele Lum
Ms. Nani Mahoe
Mr. Richard Matsu
Mrs. Amy Matsuda
Dr. Fujio Matsuda
Dr. David McClain
Mr. Angus McKinnon
Ms. Marjorie Midkiff
Mr. Clifford Miller
Dr. Sharon Minichiello
Mr. Lawrence Miwa
Dr. Albert Miyasato
Mr. James Morita
Mr. Randal Nagatani
Mr. Albert Nakano
Mr. James Nakano
Mrs. Keiko Nakano
Mr. Dean Nakasone
Mr. Earl Nishimura
Mr. Minoru Nishimura

Ms. Sumiko Oda
Dr. Blair Odo
Mr. Marc Oe
Ms. Mitsuko Oe
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